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Series Editor’s Preface
The usual term used to describe the spread of Buddhism is ‘‘transmission,’’ which
implies the passing down of teachings and practices from masters to disciples in
established lineages mindful of preserving past traditions. Buddhism, however, has
also been presented to strangers, with successful propagation requiring innova-
tive strategies of interpretation and accommodation. In modern times, the trans-
mitters of Buddhism have been aware of themselves as missionaries not only to
their own overseas communities but to foreigners as well. As with commercial
and political institutions, Buddhism survives and thrives as a globalized religion in
America, Brazil, Hawai‘i, China,Nepal, and other localities. It is widely recognized
that globalization takes place through localization, but the strategies used by Bud-
dhist missionaries in accomplishing this have not gained widespread recognition
through sufficient study.
The present volume goes a long way toward filling this gap in our knowl-
edge. It explores Buddhism as a contemporary religion of immense variation. In
these pages, Buddhism appears as Theravada, Mahayana, and new religious move-
ments extending beyond familiar homelands to foreign territory. At the heart of
these stories are the missionaries themselves, clerics and laypersons pursuing their
mission of propagating Buddhism throughout the world, especially in the West.
George J. Tanabe, Jr.
Series Editor
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Introduction
Linda Learman
Peter Berger has noted four cultural dimensions of the worldwide communication
and economic integration called ‘‘globalization’’: the cultures of international busi-
ness, of the Western intelligentsia, of American popular tastes and values, and of
Evangelical and Pentecostal Protestantism.1 Although the impact of these cultures
may have been themajor anthropological narrative of our time, we live in an era in
which non-Western traditions, such as Eastern religions, martial arts, and healing
practices, have also spread around the world. Globalization has involved multi-
directional flows. Given the structures of power over the last century, however,
the West has had a predominant role, but not an exclusive one. The Buddhists
who are the focus of this book—Theravadins from Sri Lanka; Vajrayana teach-
ers from Tibet; Zen, True Pure Land, Shingon, and Soka Gakkai Buddhists from
Japan; and two distinctive Chinese Buddhist organizations from Taiwan—are ex-
amples of transnational and cross-cultural movements resulting from and shaped
by globalization but also making use of it. In the twentieth century, Buddhist tradi-
tions have not only increasingly forged links among themselves in Asia, they have
also emerged from Asia, being carried by emigrants, picked up by travelers, and
taught by Buddhist missionaries to new peoples of the Western and non-Western
world. Moreover, now Western Buddhists are becoming influential propagators of
the faith, in the West at least.
Although the papers in this book deal specifically with late-nineteenth- and
twentieth-century Buddhist missionaries, Steven Kemper raised the question of
whether we should view twentieth-century Buddhist missions as a critical depar-
ture from earlier Buddhists’ ethos and practice. He referred to Jonathan Walters’
dissertation ‘‘Rethinking BuddhistMissions,’’ in whichWalters rejected the notion
that premodern Buddhism was a missionary religion, at least in the Sri Lankan
Theravada tradition based on Pali texts.2 He maintained that the texts custom-
arily used to establish a Buddhist missionary agenda have alternative readings that
were totally missed by Buddhologists, who approached their subject with Anglo-
American Protestant preconceptions and purposes. ‘‘Buddhist mission,’’ he said,
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2 • Linda Learman
‘‘is an Anglo-American construct that has been maintained only by silencing the
premodern Buddhists who paradoxically are depicted as agents’’ (1:5).
While I remained unconvinced by Walter’s arguments about premodern
TheravadaBuddhism, his research into the development ofAnglo-American Prot-
estant thinking on the concepts of ‘‘mission’’ and ‘‘missionary’’ is very useful,
both for the background it gives for the twentieth-century encounters between
Buddhists and Protestants and for the comparative examples it affords. Thus, I
shall summarize the varied meanings of ‘‘mission’’ in nineteenth- and twentieth-
century Anglo-American discourse, drawing on Walters’ and others’ work, com-
paring them to Buddhist examples, and pointing out their impact on the develop-
ment of Buddhist missions in the twentieth century. Thereafter, I shall describe in
broad terms examples of premodern Buddhist ‘‘missionary spirit’’ and move on to
a discussion of the cases presented in this book. One of the main contributions of
this work is our focus on the active proselytization by Asian Buddhists themselves.
The second important contribution is sociological: comparing these cases in light
of Buddhist and Western social-science concepts of conversion has allowed us to
come up with a typology for missions that not only helps to explain some aspects
of our Buddhist data but also should be useful in the study of non-Buddhist ‘‘mis-
sion’’ and ‘‘missionary’’ efforts. I am grateful to George Tanabe for precipitating
these three types of missions from the data and pointing out their relevance to this
study.
ON THE DEFINITION OF MISSIONARY RELIGIONS,
MISSIONARIES, AND MISSIONARY METHODS
Walters pointed out that by about the 1840s Buddhism was being called a ‘‘mis-
sionary religion’’ inAnglo-American discourse, and the ‘‘first systematic attempt to
use ‘mission’ as a comparative category was made by Max Muller . . . in 1873’’ (99,
105). Of the eight ‘‘great world religions,’’ Muller classed Buddhism, Christianity,
and Islam as ‘‘missionary religions,’’ in contrast to the ‘‘non-missionary religions’’ of
Judaism, Brahmanism, and Zoroastrianism (Muller did not include Confucianism
or Taoism in either of these typologies; 100, 105).
Walters identified three phases of thinkingwith regard to ‘‘mission’’ and ‘‘mis-
sionaries,’’ although with the emergence of each, older models by no means disap-
peared. In the nineteenth century, the ideal missionary would have four attributes.
He would be a scholar, learning the language, customs, and beliefs of others in
order to undermine their religion and effect successful conversion; he would be a
‘‘civilizer,’’ eradicating customs that were inimical to Christian values, such as can-
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Introduction • 3
nibalism, suttee, and nakedness, while offering, in addition to the Gospel, literacy,
Western medicine, technology, law, and science; he would be an aggressive ‘‘saver
of souls,’’ working to supplant false religions; and, because of his ‘‘missionary spirit,’’
he would be the epitome of Christian life, undertaking hardships, risking martyr-
dom, and, sometimes, persevering because of suffering in order to become close
to God (17–22, 27–28, 29 n75, 35–36, 173). This is the model picked up by the
Sri Lankan Buddhist Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933), founder of the Maha
Bodhi Society and one of the most influential missionary figures of twentieth-
century Buddhism (see Chaps. 1 and 2); and as will be seen in the essays in this
book, whether by convergence or adoption, the roles of scholar, civilizer, and con-
verter to the truth have appeared inmost Buddhist missionary agendas, Theravada
and Mahayana alike.
The second phase, after World War I, was marked by a reorientation of
Anglo-American Protestant thinking. It was characterized by the recognition that
mission work needed to be done among the secularized at home. Moreover, mis-
sionaries were to place greater emphasis on education, women’s issues, and medi-
cal, agricultural, and industrial development. This phase was also characterized by
more tolerance of other religions, stemming from the idea that all paths lead to
the same God and the view that ‘‘religion,’’ itself, should be encouraged in order to
counteract science, materialism, atheism, and humanism (Walters, 85–90). Influ-
ential in Chinese Buddhist circles today (see Chaps. 7 and 8) and an early propo-
nent of studying and learning from Christianity was the Venerable Master Taixu
(1890–1947; also spelled Tai Hsü) in Republican China. What he admired, how-
ever, was not its central tenets of divine creation and the resurrection, but ‘‘its
ability to organize and motivate individual adherents in normative modes of belief
and practice . . . to engender in diverse adherents a singleness of purpose and uni-
fied commitment to mission.’’3 Like Dharmapala, Taixu wished to adopt Christian
missionary methods to promote domestic religious and social reform and interna-
tional ecumenical and propagation work.4
After World War II, in liberal Anglo-American Protestant circles a third
model emerged in which dialog replaced evangelism. For the most liberal, it was
accompanied by ‘‘universalism,’’ the view that it is possible to find the true essence
of religion and that to further the realization of this essence through active en-
gagement with other religious people on an equal footing was good.5 During this
period Buddhist figures have actively engaged in Buddhist–Christian dialog, the
Dalai Lama, Thich Nhat Hanh, and Nikkyo Niwano being internationally known
examples. Scholars Winston King and David Chappell have observed, however,
that unlike their Christian counterparts, most Buddhists have not been very inter-
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4 • Linda Learman
ested in dialog on questions of theology or ultimate reality or in the use of dialog
as a means to deepen their own understanding; rather, their motivation for en-
gagement has tended to be to ‘‘nurture a sense of global community in a divided
world,’’ to promote interreligious cooperation for world peace.6
Opting for an ‘‘indirect influence of Christianity on non-Christian tradi-
tions,’’ as Walters described post–World War II developments, was not acceptable
to all Anglo-American Protestant missionaries.7 A case in point was Pentecostal-
ism. Emerging from the Azusa Street Revival (1906–1909) in the United States
and holding that glossolalia and other gifts of the Holy Spirit were signs that the
end of the world was close at hand, all early Pentecostal churches felt strongly
obligated to undertake evangelical work.
Taking literally the word of the Bible, Pentecostal churches gave (and con-
tinue to give) precedence to the ‘‘ ‘leading of the [Holy] Spirit’ over administrative
structures and scientific church growth formulas.’’8 In contrast to the paternalis-
tic organizations of more established Protestant denominations—that is, organi-
zations in which church structures, financial backing, and major decision making
came from a home church in North America or Europe—beginning in the 1920s
Pentecostal mission strategy moved toward the creation of indigenous churches.
Pentecostal missionaries became catalysts for locally organized, led, and funded
churches. Their principles (articulated by the Presbyterian J. L. Nevius’ The Plant-
ing and Development of Missionary Churches [1886]) were the ‘‘three selfs’’: self-
propagation, self-support, and self-government.9 The earliest missionaries even
went into the field without financial backing or pledges, ‘‘relying solely on faith
and prayer for support.’’10
Given their conviction that ‘‘believers can and ought to proclaim their
faith wherever they will,’’ nonordained Pentecostals were (and are) encouraged to
make converts.11 Most churches denied women ordination; yet opportunities in
actual practice gave them substantial self-confidence, voice, and authority.12 And
throughout most, if not all, of their history, the majority of their missionaries have
been married and single women.13
Although I have no evidence that they were influenced by Pentecostal ex-
amples, two Buddhist movements that share an emphasis on the grassroots, lay-
witnessing approach to evangelism not unlike that of the Pentecostals are Soka
Gakkai from Japan and the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu-Chi Foundation (re-
ferred to in Huang’s chapter as Ciji, and herein shortened to Compassion Relief
Foundation) from Taiwan (see Chaps. 5 and 8). In both movements, women have
also been empowered and are one of the driving forces behind these primarily lay
organizations (see also LeVine and Rocha on missionary women). Yet there are
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
1
4
o
f
2
5
6
Introduction • 5
notable differences. In contrast to the fragmentation of the Pentecostal move-
ment, both have had strong central leadership, making them a unified force in
their home base and, for the Compassion Relief Foundation at least, tying their
overseas branches closely to it. Moreover, they aim for both world and personal
transformation.
While there is no doubt that most Theravada and Mahayana Buddhist orga-
nizations have engaged in what can be seen as ‘‘missionary’’ activity in the twenti-
eth century, a question posed by Walters and picked up in Steven Kemper’s essay
(Chap. 1), however, is whether ‘‘missions’’ and ‘‘missionaries’’ can be understood
to be a part of Buddhist institutional history before the nineteenth century.
The passage from the Pali canon often used by scholars as emblematic of a
long-standing, historical presence of a missionary ideal within the Theravada tra-
dition is the following (I will discuss Mahayana traditions a bit further on):
Wander about on wanderings [carikam], monks. For the good of many folk,
for the happiness of many folk, out of compassion for the world, for the
good and the happiness of gods and men, don’t two of you go by one [road].
Preach the Truth, monks, which is lovely at the beginning, lovely in the
middle, lovely at the end, in the letter and in the spirit. Demonstrate the
purified holy life which is fully complete. There are beings with little dust
in their eyes; they are falling away from the Truth because they do not hear
it. There will be people who understand. . . .14
According toWalters, carikammeans ‘‘moving about’’ or ‘‘journey.’’ He trans-
lated it as ‘‘wanderings,’’ arguing that Rhys-Davids’ earlier translation of carikam
as ‘‘mission’’ wrongly presupposed a category of ‘‘mission.’’ Instead, Walters main-
tained that ambiguities in the Pali make it possible to read the text in two ways:
one in which the monks are enjoined to wander, with preaching as secondary; and
the other in which monks are sent out specifically to preach. Moreover, despite
the spread of Buddhism through Asia, Walters found that the Pali word for ‘‘mis-
sionary,’’ dhammaduta, is of late-nineteenth-century coinage. There are quite a few
words for ‘‘preaching,’’ as, for example, dhammadana (‘‘gift of Truth’’), dhammabheri
(‘‘drum of Truth’’), dhammadesana (‘‘explication of Truth’’), dhammadatha (‘‘discus-
sion of Truth’’), and dhammadhaja (‘‘flag of Truth’’) (204–205, 212). But Walters
wanted to reserve the rubric ‘‘missionary’’ for only those religions for which prosely-
tization is the defining and essential characteristic (169, 211); a preaching tradition
is not sufficient.
Whether ambiguities allow for both readings or not, I would agree that the
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6 • Linda Learman
Theravada canon does not take proselytization as its defining characteristic. For
example, canonical sources suggest that an imperative to spread the Dharma is not
intrinsic to arhatship, the difference between a buddha and an arhat being the vow
to become liberated so as to liberate others and the subsequent long career as a
bodhisattva that finally culminates in buddhahood. Upholding the arhat ideal, the
Theravada doctrinally downplays the aspiration for buddhahood, pointing to the
Buddha’s encouragement of his disciples to make arhatship their goal. In addition,
the canons describe Pratyekabuddhas, those who achieve enlightenment without
the help of a teacher and do not have disciples.
Thus, while arhats are not defined by a zeal to propagate the dispensation,
central concerns have been the example of the Buddha’s forty-five years of clear-
ing away the ‘‘dust from people’s eyes’’ and his institutionalization of the sangha
through the rules for the order, so as to help others realize enlightenment and up-
hold a means by which the teaching could be maintained and passed on. Walter’s
argument only holds by using a very restricted definition of ‘‘missionary religion’’;
and it is clear from canonical texts and the sangha’s behavior that conversion to a
new viewpoint and propagation of the dispensation have been extremely impor-
tant parts of Theravada Buddhism. At this point, I think that we need to aban-
don Walter’s definition of a ‘‘missionary religion’’ and look at how Buddhists have
approached this aspect of their practice.
Erik Zurcher suggested that the above passage does present a missionary
ideal, but not one that can be characterized as a ‘‘large-scale planned mission-
ary movement’’; rather, the spread of Buddhism has depended on ‘‘the individual
efforts of itinerant monks and preachers.’’ 15 In a similar vein, Walters maintained
that the ‘‘Protestant’’ Buddhist missionary movement begun by Dharmapala was a
radical break with the premodern Theravada tradition. Perhaps the best evidence
that the Theravada sangha was not constituted in the manner of nineteenth-
century Protestant missionary organizations was the Protestant missionaries’ own
assessment that the monks were just too tolerant of other religions and too non-
confrontational.16
This does not, however, mean that pre-nineteenth-century Buddhists es-
chewed all manner of outreach or relied merely on preaching. Mahinda Deegalle,
in his article on bana, Sinhala vernacular texts used for lecturing that began to
emerge in the tenth century and that played an important role in a revival of Bud-
dhism in parts of Sri Lanka from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, showed
also that such texts were intended to be read by segments of the population who
were generally unable to attend preaching assemblies (that is, by common people
in remote areas, sequestered queens, kings andnobles too busy to attend, and senior
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Introduction • 7
monks too high in the hierarchy to listen to their juniors).17 In this we see both
public preaching and vernacular texts for private study asmethods of outreach, and
are reminded that methods of propagation and revitalization have neither been
static down the centuries nor, in some cases, so different cross-culturally.
As for twentieth-century missions, however, the experiences of colonial
domination and English Protestant evangelizing presented many of the methods,
as well as the challenge, to Sri Lankan Buddhists. Their missions’ primary support-
ers were the village intelligentsia and the educated, urban middle class that had
emerged over the nineteenth century.18
One last point. Walters noted the creation in 1989 in Sri Lanka of the Min-
istry of Buddhist Religion, a highly organized, state-funded, missionary project.19
Drawing on an ideal of an Asokan Buddhist state, the ministry focuses on mis-
sions at home and abroad, and appears to have a broad base of support. Sinhala
Buddhists have, in addition, continued to use much of the nineteenth-century
Protestant model, as in
‘‘letters from the field’’; conversion statistics and converts’ personal recol-
lections; warnings about the shortages of missionaries in certain parts of
Europe and the United States; criticisms of those who slack off at home;
missionary biographies; missionary journals; missionary keepsake volumes;
scores of missionary societies and institutions for training missionaries;
missiology.20
In Walters’ view, ‘‘contemporary Sri Lankan Buddhism is swimming in missionary
spirit.’’21
Despite his evaluation of a radical change having taken place in Sri Lankan
missionary practice, our two chapters on Sri Lankan missionaries show both sub-
stantial borrowings and differences from Protestant models. Kemper emphasizes
how missionaries work to make ‘‘Buddhism present in the world’’; LeVine points
out the tension between monks’ securing their own salvation, the preservation of
the tradition, and working for the secular and spiritual welfare of others.
What of theGreat Vehicle (orMahayana) traditions, in which the liberation
of others is said to be an integral part of one’s own path? How has the bodhisattva
ideal played out historically in terms of a ‘‘missionary spirit’’?
Studies of the spread of Buddhism to and within China largely uphold We-
ber’s observations on elective affinities, indicating that the religious Taoists were
attracted by Buddhist cosmography, ritual, vows, and meditation; the elite intelli-
gentsia, by its sophisticated thought and the model of an aristocratic householder,
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the Buddhist laymanVimalakirti; political elites, bymonks whowere adept at rain-
making, military and political strategy, miracle working, and Indian medicine; and
rural folk, by miracle working, teaching, meditation, Indian medicine, and other
good works.22
Using archaeological and textual sources, Shufen Liu found that by the early
fifth century rural north China was dotted with thousands of Buddhist statuary
stelae, which were used as ritual sites, as visualization and teaching aids, and as a
means for making merit. In addition to images of buddhas and bodhisattvas, the
stelae often showed scenes frompopular scriptures, such as the Lotus and theVima-
lakirti Nirdesa Scriptures; from the biography of the Buddha or of his previous
births; and pictures of the tortures of hell.23
At this time in north China, Buddhist monks led lay associations for public
works as well. The then title of itinerant Buddhist monks meant ‘‘Master of Chari-
tableOrganizations’’ (yi shi), and the activities of these associations included build-
ing bridges, digging wells, planting trees, feeding the hungry, providing cemeteries,
and erecting a stele at the site of each project.24 Women participated in these asso-
ciations, sometimes even organizing them on their own.25 If monks were enjoined
to ‘‘remove the dust from people’s eyes’’ through preaching and personal example
in the earliest of Buddhist traditions, in fifth-century China they also employed
ritual, instruction in visualization, and good works.
Evidence for Mahayana forms of ‘‘missionary spirit’’ can also be found in ca-
nonical sources. The strong emphasis in the Lotus Scripture, for example, on read-
ing, copying, reciting, practicing, and broadly propagating the scripture (found
throughout the scripture); on the development of the moral qualities of forbear-
ance and perseverance in the face of physical and verbal abuse when seeking to
convert skeptics (in the chapter ‘‘The Bodhisattva Never Disparaging’’); and on
the characterization of the bodhisattva of compassion Avalokiteswara as someone
whowould appear anywhere in whatever form is necessary in order to save sentient
beings (in chapter 25) all strongly suggest purposeful outreach to believers and
nonbelievers alike. The first of the four bodhisattva vows—however many beings
there may be, I vow to save them all—is another example of such concerns.
Themissionary aspect ofMahayana forms of Buddhismhas had diversemani-
festations. Dōgen (1200–1254), the founder of Sōtō Zen in Japan, promoted the
efficacy of silent meditation, writing of the legendary sixth-century Indian monk
Bodhidharma in China that ‘‘we still hear the echoes of his nine years facing a
wall.’’26 In the Tibetan tradition, the great Indian monk Padmasambhava (eighth
century) is credited with paving the way for the conversion of Tibet to Buddhism
by esoterically subduing and converting the local gods and demons. The Japa-
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nese monk Nichiren (1222–1282) courted martyrdom with the belief that in the
Dharma-ending age it was one’s duty to confront those whose faith was misplaced
and convert them to the Lotus Scripture. To suffer hardships in this endeavor alle-
viated one’s past bad karma; to die for the cause was to ensure one’s future buddha-
hood.27
As for twentieth-century Brazil, in this volume Cristina Rocha (Chap. 6)
notes that Zen missionaries rely on Dōgen’s emphasis on silent meditation, while
Peter Clarke (Chap. 5) documents substantial reworkings of Nichiren’s ‘‘mission-
ary spirit’’ among his heirs in Soka Gakkai.
Stuart Chandler and Julia Huang offer sustained treatments of Taiwan’sMas-
ter Xingyun and Master Zhengyan, two prominent figures in the reform of Bud-
dhism in Taiwan and in its spread in Chinese communities around the world.28
Both recognize their indebtedness toMaster Taixu, whose thought has had a num-
ber of parallels with the Dharmapalan reformation of the Theravada. Indeed,Mas-
ter Taixu attended a school for Buddhist missionaries that had been set up as a
result of Dharmapala’s visit to China in 1893.29 Both these leaders have distanced
themselves from ‘‘funeral Buddhism,’’ reorienting practice toward this world and
to global missions that aim to cross ethnic lines. Rooted in the Mahayana, both
share their approach with earlier responses to the Christian challenge.
George Tanabe (Chap. 3) offers a portrait of figures who were instrumen-
tal in the development of the True Pure Land Mission to Hawai‘i during the
early to middle years of the twentieth century, amply demonstrating the deliber-
ate selectivity with which Japanese priests working in an immigrant community
approached American civic and Christian traditions.
Gray Tuttle’s essay (Chap. 9) offers an exception to this pattern of selective
appropriation of Western ways. It gives us a picture of Tibetan Buddhist lamas in
China during the early decades of this century and shows how their agenda and
methods for spreading the Dharma in the contemporaryWest are remarkably simi-
lar to that earlier model, one that developed along Tibetan Buddhist and Chinese
administrative models independently from Western influence, and one that con-
tinues to emphasize the supernormal efficacy of ritual.
Therefore, although Buddhist missionaries in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries have certainly been stimulated and influenced by Christianity, they
should not be thought of as simplistically imitating or being overwhelmed byChris-
tian ethos and practices. Buddhists already had their own versions of ‘‘mission-
ary spirit’’ and traditions of social responsibility. In addition, and as a number of
the chapters in this book note, changes to economic, political, and social condi-
tions during this period—that is, colonialism, nationalism, worldwide economic
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integration and travel, organizational rationalization, science, technology, and
mass communications—have all contributed greatly to the character of twentieth-
century Buddhist missionary efforts.
CONVERSION: FOREIGN, DIASPORA, AND DOMESTIC MISSIONS
Kemper noted that most Sri Lankan Theravada missionaries do not seem to spend
much time trying to convert others, and Rocha and Clarke found that Zen in-
stitutions and Soka Gakkai in Brazil have come to have no denominational bar-
riers, permitting practitioners multiple religious affiliations. Moreover, Chandler
and Huang have observed that the vast majority of the new adherents of the Fo-
guang Shan (lit., Buddha’s Light Mountain) and the Compassion Relief organi-
zations already think of themselves as Buddhist. Like ‘‘missionary,’’ ‘‘conversion’’
and ‘‘mission’’ have more than one meaning.
Building on Jan Nattier’s earlier attempt to understand how religions ‘‘travel
to new places,’’ the essays in this book form the basis for proposing a new typology
for the sociology of missionary efforts.30 Once stated, they seem so obvious as to
go without saying; yet once articulated, they help to explain heretofore perplexing
data: particularly relevant to the character of missionary efforts and to the role of
conversion in the propagation of any religion is whether the target population is a
culturally foreign group being introduced to the religion for the first time, a dias-
pora community drawing on its religious heritage to make its way in a culturally
foreign environment, or a domestic audience deemed to be in need of religious
revitalization. The essays in this volume deal with all three kinds of missions.
Buddhist scriptures recognize two processes that resonate with Western
usages of ‘‘conversion,’’ namely, a transformation of character and viewpoint and
a change of affiliation. Decisive steps on the path to ‘‘enlightenment’’ (such as the
realization of the ‘‘four fruits’’) are the first type of conversion and constitute the
goal of practice.31 They are often accompanied by the second type of conversion,
that is, an increasing identification as a Buddhist and an intensification of com-
mitment. They are often marked by taking a particular monk, nun, or layman as
one’s teacher, undertaking to keep the lay precepts, undergoing ordination, and/or
receiving the bodhisattva vows.
Taking the Three Refuges is the Buddhist institutional equivalent of conver-
sion in the sense of a change of affiliation. It is formally marked when a person, in
the presence of an ordainedmember of the sangha, declares their intention to take
the Buddha, his teachings, and the sangha as their religious guides, to the exclusion
of other paths or faiths. The Pali canon records an instance in which Shakyamuni
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Buddha spoke of the first glimpse of nirvana as the time when one becomes amem-
ber of the Buddha’s lineage (or gotra), thus merging the ideas of character trans-
formation and insight with change of affiliation.32 This has remained a metaphor,
however, for the Buddha and sangha have recognized as disciples people who have
not yet entered the stream and have understood that people can awaken to the
truths of Buddhism without the benefit of the Three Treasures and subsequent in-
stitutional affiliation to them (the above-mentioned Pratyekabuddha being a case
in point). Moreover, because the Buddha recognized different realms of gods, the
sangha also has tended to respect deities and theistic faiths while still maintaining
the superiority of Buddhist goals and methods. This respect for spiritual entities
may tend to soften the sense of conversion, in the sense of change in affiliation,
more than Western observers might expect.
None of the authors in this book deal with conversion in the sense of en-
lightenment. Indeed, readers may wonder how awakening experiences and the
extinction of passions figure into the political agendas, ethnic chauvinism, and
generational conflicts that have sometimes characterized the Buddhists described
in this book. In his analysis of Dharmapala, however, H. L. Seneviratne noted that
meditation was an ‘‘ever present undercurrent’’ in his utopian vision.33 Dharma-
pala advocated both ‘‘active effort toward liberation’’ (paramattha dhamma) and
social service; but he and his successors also believed that social service should
take priority, even for the monastic sangha, when the people are poor, unhealthy,
uneducated, and ‘‘torn by caste division’’—hence their two different approaches
to mission: an emphasis on economic and social development on the one hand
and on meditation and insight on the other.34 Moreover, other voices in Thera-
vada Buddhism are not well represented in this book. There are, as Kemper points
out, Burmese, Thai, and Sri Lankan monks who are dismayed by what they feel
is the politicization and worldliness of many Sinhala monks and urge a reform of
the ‘‘Dharmapalan reformation.’’35
Future research should address how psychological conversion plays a role
in the lives of missionaries and the people attracted to Buddhism.36 For example,
Sarah LeVine mentioned that the women in her study were attracted to intensive
training by the ideal of enlightenment. After training for some time, they found
that what they really wanted was the capacity to help their families and commu-
nity, and that this could only be accomplished through realizing ‘‘no-self ’’ and let-
ting go of greed, hate, and delusive habits of mind.What is more, they experienced
their practice to be effective in this regard.37 In a similar vein, although with no
reference to anything that could be regarded as the ‘‘four fruits’’ or satori, Huang
describes the reorientation of outlook and intensification of commitment of Tai-
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wanese Buddhists in Taiwan and abroad—a domestic and diaspora revival, if you
will—by means of bodhisattva service and inspired by the charismatic leadership,
example, organizational skill, and political acumen (although the organization is
apolitical) of Master Zhengyan, a Buddhist nun.38
As for conversion in the sense of change of affiliation, the chapters in this
book examine cultural boundaries and how missionaries negotiate them. These
are complex processes for which our contributors have enlisted a variety of con-
ceptual and explanatory devices. George Tanabe offers his own particularly well-
developed analogy of the ‘‘transplantation’’ and ‘‘hybridization’’ of an immigrant
Pure Land temple in Hawai‘i. Cristina Rocha employs the ‘‘creolization’’ model
from linguisitics, in which elements from Buddhist culture (like ‘‘vocabulary’’) are
incorporated into preexisting habits of social interaction and religious cosmology
(like ‘‘rules of syntax’’) of Brazilians who take an interest in Buddhism. This pro-
cess is akin to Richard Payne’s use of the term ‘‘assimilation.’’ Payne borrows from
Piaget the distinction between assimilation and accommodation, in which he uses
‘‘assimilation’’ tomean the incorporation of new cultural elements withoutmaking
any fundamental changes in worldview or practice, while he adapts Piaget’s con-
cept of accommodation to mean the reworking of preexisting beliefs or practices
when faced with differences.39
Also important to the process of conversion is the means by which cultural
contact ismade andmaintained. Kemper’s ‘‘ethnoscape’’ and Payne’s ‘‘mediascape’’
draw on Arjun Appadurai’s work on the channels for cultural flows.40 The former
refers to people on the move—migrants, tourists, refugees, students, and so on—
creating complicated landscapes or networks and pockets of group identity that
do not straightforwardly conform to territorial or national boundaries. Missionar-
ies are brokers of the religiocultural boundaries of these ethnoscapes, using a wide
variety of ‘‘media’’ to create and broadcast their message.
While no explicit reference has been made to Appadurai’s other ‘‘scapes’’
in this work, for example, to ‘‘technoscapes,’’ ‘‘finanscapes,’’ and ‘‘ideoscapes’’—
that is, the interlocking global technological, financial, and political grids that
mark the contemporary world—the essays in this book do point to their impact on
Buddhist missions. The Compassion Relief Foundation has chosen highly sophis-
ticated technological media, namely, Western-type medical hospitals, worldwide
emergency disaster relief, an international bone-marrow registry, and a television
station to spearhead its outreach (Huang). American foreign aid in Nepal has
changed the opportunities for local youth so that youngmen study engineering and
economics rather than enter monastic life (LeVine); and there are the political
dimensions of Tibetan Buddhist missionary activities (Tuttle).
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The interaction between conflicting pressures for cultural survival and efforts
at conversion of outsiders is explored in a number of chapters and is particu-
larly important for understanding diaspora missions. At one end of the spectrum
are the Japanese-American followers of the True Pure Land School of Buddhism
(Jodo Shinshu Nishi Honpa Honganji) in Hawai‘i. Tanabe argues that, while declin-
ing steadily in numbers, they have been remarkably successful in maintaining un-
changed their core religious principle of ‘‘family, or ancestral, religion,’’ brought
from Japan, even as they embraced many formal aspects of Protestant religiosity.
He also points to a recurring, though not universal, idea among Japanese Bud-
dhists, namely, that one cannot really understand Buddhism without also being
Japanese. This is not the same as asserting a Buddhist identity for a particular
ethnic group—for instance, to be Sinhala is to be Buddhist—or the same as a dif-
ficult relationship between Buddhists of different cultures who share a temple (see
Rocha),41 for it asserts that authentic Buddhism cannot be truly learned by for-
eigners. Thus, some Japanese immigrant churches find it hard to embrace foreign
devotees (see Tanabe, Payne, and Rocha).
An example of a Japanese immigrant church that emphatically does not
share this ethnocentric view is Soka Gakkai in Brazil (see Clarke). In this case the
leadership in Japan, President Ikeda, set the course for the organization when he
targeted Brazil to be the vanguard for the spiritual transformation of the world.
Like the Theravada, Zen, and Tibetan missionaries who sought to spread Bud-
dhism beyond their own ethnic groups, Soka Gakkai in Brazil has been quite suc-
cessful at attracting nonimmigrant devotees.
Focusing on cultural presuppositions of Americans that have helped to shape
conversion patterns, Richard Payne explores the invisibility in the United States
of a Japanese Buddhist tantric tradition, Shingon, despite a contemporaneous avid
interest among some westerners in Tibetan Buddhist tantra and Zen. As immi-
grant churches that assimilated Protestant forms, they have not been attractive
to westerners who seek something altogether different from their known worlds.
His observations may also be relevant to the relative lack of success in reaching
beyond their ethnic communities of the two Chinese organizations discussed in
this book: both Buddha’s Light Mountain and the Compassion Relief Foundation
use charitable work and the concomitant pressure for fundraising and proselytiz-
ing as their primary means of self-cultivation.42 Apart from the appeal of Chinese
culture to some foreigners (Chandler), these churches’ practices are perhaps just
too similar to Western day-to-day experience and mainstream American church
organizations to be attractive to those who are disaffected with Western religious
alternatives.
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Class and caste differences need to be reckoned into the analysis of domes-
tic, diaspora, and foreign missions. As Rocha ably points out for Zen Buddhists in
Brazil, and LeVine for Newar Buddhists in Nepal, these divides are no less distinct
than commonly understood ‘‘cultural’’ ones.43
Methods used for reaching beyond ethnic and class barriers for conversions
described in this volume include the translation and publication of scriptures, com-
mentaries, and practice manuals into the vernacular (and more and more into
English as the internationally accessible language), the preparation of clergy ex-
plicitly for missionary work and training them in local languages (again, often
English), and the use of the latest technological advances in communications.
Other propagation methods for conversions include building magnificent
temples to pique the interest of non-Buddhists (Chandler); establishing personal
ties, ‘‘links of affinity,’’ which are given important religious significance in Chi-
nese missionary efforts (Chandler and Huang); and the Tibetan use of ritual em-
powerments, which have been quite successful in attracting devotees in war-torn
Republican China and in the modern West (Tuttle). None of these strategies are
different from ones used by Buddhists for their own ethnic groups.
The Brazilian missionary to the Sōtō Zen temple in São Paulo described
by Rocha, as well as the Theravadin monks described by Kemper, however, have
adopted a dual strategy, tailoring their teaching to the respective interests of their
diaspora and foreign congregations. As mentioned above, they also both point out
that conversion, in the sense of formal affiliation, is not emphasized. While down-
playing formal affiliation in some Buddhist missionary circles can have a variety of
motivations, it may also draw on Buddhist gradualist models, in which adherents
are given only so much teaching as they appear willing to accept, and injunctions
against craving, which can be applied just as much to craving converts as it can to
sensual desires, intellectual knowledge, or spiritual success.
Similarly, Peter Clarke found in Brazilian SokaGakkai a ‘‘strategy of reflexive
syncretism,’’ born of confidence in the power of their own religion, that replaced
shakabuku, a strongly exclusive, sectarian approach to conversion. In placing his
study in the larger context of plural societies and globalization, he suggests that
their further shift toward nonsectarianism—their acceptance of multiple church
memberships and the idea that individuals can decide for themselves what is best
for them—is a response to a trend in which people seek a religious consciousness
beyond any specific religious identity. This latter trend toward ‘‘nonsectarian uni-
versalism’’ (my term) contrasts with the ‘‘sectarian triumphalism’’ that has charac-
terized much of the thinking of the True Pure Land Church in Hawai‘i described
by Tanabe. By ‘‘sectarian triumphalism’’ Tanabe means the belief and practice that
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only one’s own tradition transcends all ethnic and sectarian claims (Tanabe). Ear-
lier in the century, this kind of thinking was used to enlist Buddhist missionaries
to further Japanese nationalism and colonialism (Tanabe).
None of the above approaches stands against another trend noted byChand-
ler, namely, that religious identities are not only reaching across national bound-
aries, but perhaps in some cases even superseding patriotic sentiment. All of these
observations dovetail with Rocha’s point that, under the pluralistic conditions of
our contemporary world, people are presented with more and more choices, in-
cluding religious choices, from which they need to construct their own individual
identities.44
CONCLUSIONS
The chapters in this volume are roughly arranged in the historical order of when a
particular Buddhist tradition began to send missions beyond Asia, although many
of the essays analyze domestic revivals and diaspora conditions that stimulated an
outreach to foreigners in the first place. This ordering is not to ignore the impor-
tance of East–East connections, which form an appreciable part of over half of
the chapters, some notable examples being the extension of Chinese Mahayana
bhikkhuni ordination to Theravada nuns, the influence of Sri Lankan Theravada
on Buddhism in Nepal and Vietnam, and the financial support offered by Japanese
Buddhists to Sri Lanka and elsewhere. All of the essays bring the reader up to the
late twentieth century.
What also stands out in the essays is the observation that a globalizing, evan-
gelical Christianity stimulated and/or gave shape to much of what we see as a
globalizing Buddhism, including Theravada, Japanese, and Chinese organizations.
This should not be taken to mean, however, that Buddhists have not drawn on
their own traditions of ‘‘missionary spirit’’ or methods. What is more, the ratio-
nalization of organizational life and the sense that the whole world is much more
tangibly within one’s reach, which characterize modernity and of which the Chris-
tian missions have been a highly visible example, are probably two of the more
lasting recent changes to Buddhist institutions.
Charity, nonreligious education, and other public works are not new to Bud-
dhists; but instead of what has been a more ad hoc and even anonymous approach
in some traditions (as Huang points out in Chapter 8),45 the search for worthy
charitable causes and the mobilization for these services on the scale that we see
today may be new, especially for Buddhist sects working without the backing of a
state. This reflects not only themodern push toward rationalization, but also a shift
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in thinking to embrace social welfare as an essential component of Buddhist orga-
nizational life. The recent salience of social activism also has had Christian and
Western stimuli; but given the historical evidence for social service by Buddhists,
I suspect that a large measure of this recent thrust comes from the gains in health
and human welfare made possible by science and technology, the need for a mod-
ern education generated by current economic organization, and favorable political
conditions for Buddhist organizations, rather than from the awakening of a new
social conscience. In addition, an emphasis on social ethics has not replaced the
ultimate, and ultimately legitimating, goal of supramundane insight and compas-
sion, although the latter may become submerged in the exigencies of day-to-day
practice or even be lost on some devotees.46
Involuntary exile has placed Tibetan missionaries in a very different position
from their counterparts in other Buddhist traditions. Without the safety net af-
forded by immigrant congregations, they have been forced to make a success of
the cross-cultural transmission of their teachings quickly. This, together with the
esoteric nature of their teachings, may help to explain their success among west-
erners, in contrast to the ethnic limitations encountered by even such charismatic
figures as the Taiwanese Master Zhengyan. What is more, the timing of the exile
in relation to the crisis of faith of some American and European youth beginning
in the late 1950s and gaining momentum in the 1960s perhaps has been an impor-
tant factor (see Payne and Tuttle).47 Last, the separation of politics from mission
work is by no means the norm in the Buddhist world (see Kemper, Tanabe, and
Chandler), but the theocratic tradition of the Geluk school (and other Tibetan
Buddhist schools), which shapes much of the current political agenda of the Dalai
Lama, sets it off from the other forms of Buddhism described in this book (see
Tuttle).
If understanding the Buddhist impact on cultures outside of its historical
milieus in the last 150 years is still in its infancy,48 the indigenization of Buddhism
has been found to be deeply significant and ongoing. Its responses to Christianity
and other agents ofmodernity are examples of this process.49 Indeed, PeterGregory
has suggested that the changes to Buddhist institutions and doctrines that began
during the colonial period are likely to be as significant, in the long run, as the
emergence of the Mahayana and the Vajrayana traditions in centuries past.50 The
essays in this book attest to this process of cross-fertilization, yet they show very
significant continuities as well.
Last, noting the three kinds of missionary work—namely, domestic revivals,
support for diaspora communities, and foreign conversions—helps to explain vari-
able Buddhist attitudes toward conversion and the trajectories of specific missions.
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It will also assist in comparisons of Buddhists with other religious people and orga-
nizations involved in missionary work.
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I want to thank Peter Gregory, Robert Weller, and Peter Wood for commenting on drafts of
the Introduction. Their advice was extremely helpful, though I have not been able to live
up to all of it.
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1 Dharmapala’s Dharmaduta andthe Buddhist Ethnoscape
Steven Kemper
Buddhism arrived early in Sri Lanka. The dominant tradition dates that arrival to
the time Asoka sent out an embassy to Anuradhapura with the doctrine and a sap-
ling of the bo tree under which the Buddha achieved enlightenment at BodhGaya.
This event and the unbroken descent of Buddhist belief and practice ever after are
pivotal facts of Sri Lankan history. The Tripitaka, as well as the commentaries and
subcommentaries that explain it, were committed to writing in Sri Lanka, and thus
arose another claim to orthodoxy. In time, Sri Lankan Buddhism came to be domi-
nated by one form of belief, Theravada, and Theravada came to be identified with
the Sinhala people, the island’s dominant ethnic identity.1 When Burma, Thai-
land, and Cambodia received Theravada from monks who came from Sri Lanka
some 1,500 years after the arrival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, they referred to it with
an eponym—Sinhala Buddhism. Monastic traditions of Sri Lanka became monas-
tic traditions of those countries.2 These references—authenticity guaranteed by
priority, textualization, and continuity, the connection between the religion and
an ethnic group, and a sense of authority andmissionary responsibility that follows
from these other notions—figure in Sinhalas’ present-day understanding of their
religion and themselves.
An entirely different set of missionary enterprises played a central role in
more recent Sri Lankan history. Portuguese rule (early sixteenth century to 1658)
brought Jesuits, Dominicans, Augustinians, and Capuchins; the Dutch (1650–
1796) drove off Catholic clergy and replaced them with ministers and proponents
of the Reformed Church; they were supplanted by British rule (1796–1948) and
Methodist and Baptist missionaries. Four hundred years of colonial control along
the southwestern littoral made Sri Lanka one of the most thoroughly missionized
societies in the world, as each wave of Europeans established schools, converted
people, and attended to small communities of the faithful. Well-to-do Sri Lankans
became thoroughly exposed to Western religions, learned Western history, played
Western games, spokeWestern languages, and pursued social practices that derived
from alien places. Joined together, two religious traditions—the Buddhist and the
Christian—gave direction to themodern practice of Sri LankanBuddhistmission-
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izing. That practice begins with the initiative of one man, Anagarika Dharmapala
(1864–1933).
Dharmapala’s youth as the son of a father who made a considerable fortune
manufacturing furniture, his early education at the hands of Christian missionar-
ies, his involvement with Henry Steele Olcott, Helena Blavatsky, and the Theo-
sophical Society, as well as the psychological tensions that marked his life—are
concerns that are fundamental to his biography but do not need to be repeated
here. Commentators have looked to Dharmapala for recuperating Buddhism and
Sinhala self-confidence; bringing Buddhist monks, laypeople, ideas and practices
into the public arena; rationalizing Buddhism and focusing it on this world.3 His
efforts led to the rise of an activist and secularized Buddhist monkhood and the
onset of ethnic chauvinism that now dominates Sri Lankan politics. Dharmapala’s
foreign involvements are less discussed, but he spent most of the years from 1891
to 1933 living abroad—which is to say, most of his adult life—while traveling five
times around the world and periodically returning to Sri Lanka.
Dharmapala’s activity outside of Sri Lanka as a dharmaduta (messenger of
Dhamma) set the course for modern Buddhist missionizing. In so doing, it shaped
the lives of monks and laypeople in Sri Lanka and beyond—the dispersal of Sin-
halas around the world I will call the Sinhala Buddhist ethnoscape—because his
dharmaduta work missionized new forms for monks to be monks and laypeople to
be laypeople. Appadurai defines an ‘‘ethnoscape’’ in a way that links it to contem-
porary life, calling it ‘‘the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in
which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugee exiles, guest workers, and other mov-
ing groups and individuals constitute an essential feature of the world and appear
to affect the politics of (and between) nations to an hitherto unprecedented de-
gree.’’4 Although he leaves out missionaries as such, Christian evangelicals, Mus-
lim fundamentalists, and Buddhist monks constitute a globalizing force as impor-
tant as any other ‘‘moving group.’’ Sinhala bhikkhus are scattered across the globe,
serving Buddhist communities that developed in colonial times in Malaysia and
Singapore, and more recently in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the
United States. In sacred sites in India such as Sarnath and Bodh Gaya, Sinhala
monks await Sinhala pilgrims and other religious seekers. In places without a Sin-
hala community—in the Netherlands, for instance, and Brazil—Sinhala monks
engage with local Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Together they constitute the Sin-
hala Buddhist ethnoscape. Extending beyond this Sinhala ethnoscape, and some-
times interspersed with it, lies a broader Buddhist ethnoscape.
Dharmapala’s attitudes toward Buddhism are marked by contradictions and
hybridity going well beyond the influence of Christianity upon his thinking.5 He
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made himself a champion of Sinhala village life, but his attitudes toward villagers
were condescending and often contemptuous. His vision of Buddhist social regen-
eration was motivated by, and framed in terms of, the values of Victorian England.
On the one hand, Dharmapala showed the respect for Buddhist relics—remains
of the Buddha’s body and articles he once used—images, and historical places (of
which Bodh Gaya where he had his enlightenment is the most pertinent) one
would expect of a Sinhala Buddhist of his time. He writes of growing up in a family
where everyone fasted on full-moon days and, on the day of the Buddha’s Enlight-
enment, spent a full twenty-four hours in meditation and study (Guruge, 682).
On the other hand, he initiated the process that rationalized Buddhism, creating
what Obeyeskere has called Protestant Buddhism, a new way of practicing an old
religion marked by a this-worldly asceticism, a code of ethics for laypeople, and
an emphasis on doctrine coupled with disdain for the intercession of gods and
demons.6
Two factors complicate understanding how Dharmapala influenced mission-
ary practice. The first is that he couched his innovations—Christian-influenced,
purely Buddhist, and otherwise—in terms of tradition. He spoke of reforming
things, returning Sinhalas to piety and orthodox belief and practice, yet our see-
ing beyond the language of restoration is easy enough.7 The second complication
is harder to sort out, because how Buddhism was propagated before Dharmapala
invented modern Buddhist missionizing is problematic. Millennia before colonial-
ism and Christianity entered the Buddhist world, choices confronted the every-
day practices of Buddhist monks: were monks to wander about or live ‘‘at one
place’’ (ekatra) and ‘‘at a fixed residence’’ (dhruvas´ila),8 were their lives to be soli-
tary or communal, were their days to be lived in villages or forest retreats, and
were they to pursue their own salvation or teach the Dhamma for the benefit of
others? Over the course of South Asian history, those choices were resolved in
ways that generally favored the settled life, communal living situated in village set-
tings where monks shared their learning with other monks and laypeople. But the
preeminence of learning is beset by a more subtle distinction. Acting as a reposi-
tory of Dhamma—committing the teachings to memory and sharing them with
others—constitutes the minimal realization of a life of learning; proselytizing non-
Buddhists and regarding that function as central to the religious life realizes that
role in more outward-looking fashion.
Despite the way in which missionary enterprise figures in modern self-under-
standings, despite the words of the Buddha that seem to require missionary work—
‘‘Go ye now, O bhikkhus, and wander for the gain of the many, for the welfare of
the many, out of compassion for the world, for the good, for the gain, and for the
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welfare of gods and men. Let not two of you go the same way’’9—and, finally, de-
spite the fact that the religion has obviously been dispersed by some means across
Asia, the precolonial history of the Buddhist sasana had little to do with mission-
ary work as the notion came to be used after Dharmapala. As Jonathan Walters
points out, conversion may not have been integral to early Buddhism or a duty
that monks felt compelled to take on.10 Monks could well have carried the ‘‘yoke
of learning’’ (granthadhura) without acting on motivations more characteristic of
West Asian religious traditions centered on one god, sharp boundaries separating
believers and nonbelievers, and an understanding of conversion—as in the case of
Christianity—that has it serving as the enactment of one’s own faith.
There was little chance that Dharmapala’s reinvention of Buddhist mission-
izing could not have been influenced byWestern practices.Consider how the hege-
mony of Christianity weighed on Dharmapala. His generation found Buddhism
pushed out of the public life of the colony, replaced after Anglicanism was dises-
tablished in 1880 by a policy that placed all religions on an equal footing (despite
the fact that Christianity remained the religion of those who ruled). Sri Lankans
of Dharmapala’s class were often Christians, nominal or heartfelt, or Buddhists
(andHindus) who had been educated at Christian schools. They carried Christian
names—Dharmapala was born Don David Hevāvitārana, three names referencing
three ethnic identities—and the English-based education he received put him in
closer touch withWestern history and culture than with the lives of villagers living
only a few miles outside Colombo. Returning Buddhism to its historical place was
the first step toward returning Sri Lankans to a way of life, as seen in dress, names,
social forms, and values, authentically theirs. But his reimagination of Buddhism
was itself influenced by his own life experiences—Victorian propriety, American
entrepreneurship, mixed with resentment of Western power and arrogance. And
what motivated Dharmapala’s missionizing was reactive in a way that efforts to
propagate Buddhism in ancient South Asia could not have been, for he was an
‘‘antimissionary missionary.’’11
The sixth-century chronicle of the Sri Lankan state, the Mahavamsa, be-
gins with an account of the Lord Buddha’s three visits to the island, ‘‘for Lanka
was known to the Conqueror as a place where his doctrine should (thereafter)
shine in glory.’’12 That chapter concludes with more luminous imagery (1:84):
‘‘Thus the Master of boundless wisdom, looking to the salvation of Lanka in time
to come . . . visited this fair island three times—he, the compassionate Enlight-
ener of the world—therefore this isle, radiant with the light of truth, came to
high honour among faithful believers.’’ That second figure—‘‘radiant with the light
of truth’’—comes from the Pali dhammadīpa, and dhammadīpa can be interpreted
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in two ways—as ‘‘radiant with the light of truth’’ (referring back to Lanka) or as
‘‘island of truth.’’ Geiger’s translation comes closer to the original, but the sec-
ond interpretation has the advantage of setting Lanka apart as a special place, the
very island of Dhamma. Dharmapala—and the Sinhala nationalists he inspired—
favored the latter, and the neologism dharmaduta envisioned a role that acted out
the responsibility that came with Lanka’s being the ‘‘island of truth.’’ Even if the
term had to be invented, nineteenth-century Sinhala Buddhists must have found
the missionary role self-evident. How else to explain the dispersal of Buddhism
across Asia? How else to account for the early arrival of the religion in Sri Lanka
(and how else to take advantage of the priority of Sinhala Buddhism in the Thera-
vada world)?
Assume that the first ‘‘missionary’’ connection comes by way of the Buddha
himself (following the Mahavamsa’s account of his flying to Sri Lanka) and the re-
sponsibility dates to the life of the founder. Or assume that it derives from Asoka’s
son and daughter’s visit to the island (favoring a realist but still suspect story of
one great South Asian king’s sending an embassy to another). That connection
is virtually as ancient, and better serves Dharmapala’s purposes, dismissing an ac-
count with mythological exuberance for one that sets a human example for his
own missionizing (Guruge, 486). The scholarly consensus focuses on what is im-
plied by archeological and textual evidence, but even those sober facts establish
the presence of Buddhism in the island a century before the beginning of the com-
mon era. Sri Lankans, in other words, were practicing Buddhism at a time when
Britons were an insignificant society living on the margins of the Roman Empire.
In that contrast Dharmapala found pathos. Two thousand years earlier Sinhalas
were enjoying the glories of great kings, the Dhamma, and a magnificent hydraulic
society. At that same point, their colonial masters ‘‘painted their bodies and wore
skins to ward off the cold’’ (ibid., 480).13
For Walters, the issue is whether Dharmapala’s taking on the responsibility
of missionizing Buddhism represented a renewal of tradition or an innovation
on it. For me, it is enough to emphasize how thoroughly Dharmapala borrowed
from Christian practice, innovated, and adapted those ideas to his circumstances.
Olcott had shown Sinhalas the virtues of Christianmissionary practice. He copied
the practice of raising funds at church bazaars. He envisioned Buddhist Sunday
schools and urged Buddhists to insist that governmentmake the Buddha’s birthday
a public holiday on a par with Christmas. Dharmapala learned the arts of propa-
ganda and efficiency from the American, and his newspaper Sinhala Baudhaya was
nothing if not efficient. It put Dharmapala in a position to propagandize his cause
in Sri Lanka even while living as a dharmaduta in India. We can attribute these
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innovations as we like to Olcott’s organizational ingenuity, print capitalism, or
Christian practice, but what is pertinent here is that Dharmapala invented a mis-
sionary Buddhism with modern organizational forms, and this Buddhism is here
to stay.
‘‘TO DIE OUT SLOWLY FROM INANITION’’
I want to beginwithDharmapala’s own vision of Buddhistmissionarywork—‘‘Bud-
dhism had its missionaries before Christianity was preached. It conquered all of
Asia and made the Mongolian mild’’—and then consider contemporary efforts to
spread the teachings in places as faraway as Brazil and Australia, before returning
to a Colombo now linked to Buddhists the world over (Guruge, xvii). Sri Lankan
monasteries these days are found in Bodh Gaya and other sacred sites associated
with early Buddhism, Indian cities, North America, England, the Netherlands,
and Brazil, as well as Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Dharmapala’s outward
vision included quite a lot more than conversion. Olcott was the first European to
convert to Buddhism, but by my calculation Dharmapala himself converted only
a handful of westerners. In this regard I would turn Walters’ concerns back on
modern dharmaduta, because one thing ‘‘Buddhist missionizing’’ did not borrow
from Protestantism was its emphasis on conversion proper.14 The Christian im-
petus and even the word ‘‘dharmaduta’’ make it easy to overlook the simplicity of
the project—tomake Buddhism present in the world, ‘‘bringing knowledge’’ of the
Dhamma.
Dharmapala’s efforts, both the missionizing abroad and what could be called
either missionizing at home or ‘‘internal conversion,’’ weremotivated by high colo-
nial pathos.15 Centuries of foreign rule had put the existence of Sinhalas at risk. ‘‘It
is, indeed, pathetic,’’ Dharmapala wrote, ‘‘to observe that a unique race who had
been the custodians of an ancient religious literature for 2200 years, Aryan in ori-
gin, should be allowed to die out slowly from inanition. The history of evolution
can point to no other race today that has withstood the ravages of time and kept
its individuality for so long as the Sinhalese people’’ (Guruge, 483). The notions
that organize this passage—race, Aryan origins, evolution—derive from Dharma-
pala’s education in Christian schools and the popularized science he encountered
in journals and newspapers. On his understanding, the source of the problem is also
Western: the ‘‘ancient race is slowly dying out under the despotic administration
of Anglo-Indian bureaucracy.’’
When Dharmapala ticks off his complaints, it is obvious that he is less up-
set by despotic administration than by its collateral effects—cultural corruption,
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dissipation, and lethargy. ‘‘Although they are a powerful race today,’’ Dharmapala
says of the British, ‘‘their hereditary tendencies of primitive barbarism still cling to
them. Cruelty, drunkenness, slaughter of innocent animals, wife-beating, roasting
the whole ox on feast days, promiscuous dancing of men and women regardless
of the laws of decency are vestiges of their primitive customs . . .’’ (Guruge, 479–
480). The low morality of the British—embodied in the careers of Clive, Hast-
ings, North, Sladen, and Rhodes—has corrupted ‘‘unsophisticated Asiatics,’’ and
to make matters worse in Sri Lanka, British administrators cut down the highland
forests to plant tea, while insinuating opium, ganja, marijuana, whiskey, and arrack
into every village (ibid., 482).
The long-term solution is for the British to return to their own island; the
short-term solution is for Sinhalas to return to their own religion, now redefined
by Dharmapala. By giving up on Buddhism, Sinhalas had given up on being Sin-
hala. The remedy was activity, recalling the example of Buddhist kings who ‘‘spent
all their wealth in building temples, public baths, dagobas [Sinhala: relic mounds],
libraries, monasteries, rest houses, hospitals for man and beast, schools, tanks,
seven-storied mansions, water works and beautifying] the city of Anuradhapura’’
(Guruge, 481). Building a Buddhist temple (Skt. and Pali: vihāra) in London,
Dharmapala thought, was a way for Sinhalas to return to the tradition of building
and to reform themselves in the process. (‘‘Sinhalas do not have the intelligence to
give the English anything worldly. The only wealth the Sinhalas can give the En-
glish is the noble dharma.’’)16 The viharawould give themwhat the Buddha taught,
and that knowledge would give them insight: ‘‘I am convinced that by the power
of the Dhamma they would see the unwisdom of enslaving nations to satisfy their
ambitions’’ (ibid., 740).
What is instructive is that Dharmapala thought that Sinhalas needed to
missionize their religion among non-Buddhists for the sake of reforming them-
selves. He makes his case for his religion’s potential for social reformation by quot-
ingMaxMuller: ‘‘Themost important element of Buddhist reform has always been
its social and moral code. . . . He whose meditations had been how to deliver
the soul of man from misery and the fear of death had delivered the people from
a degrading thralldom and from priestly tyranny’’ (Guruge, 650). The resonance
of those words—not merely Dharmapala’s engagement with Muller and Western
scholarly concerns, but also the transposition bywhichBuddha’s liberating ancient
Indians from Brahmin priests becomes the Dhamma’s liberating modern Sinhalas
from Christian ones—assumes that missionizing is as much involved with reform-
ing society as with setting the individual on the path to salvation. Social reform is
not in fact a traditional Buddhist goal; but Dharmapala understands Buddhism as
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a vehicle for saving the Sinhala people from deracination. Beyond Sri Lanka, Bud-
dhism has more general liberational potential. As a religion of analysis and inquiry
into the self, it can liberate a believer in any religion from ‘‘priestcraft, materialism,
and sheep theology’’ (ibid., 696).
Olcott reached Sri Lanka in 1880 and immediately took the five precepts in
Galle (without regarding his doing so as conversion or even an exclusive commit-
ment to one Asian religion).17 Once acquainted, Dharmapala and Olcott traveled
by oxcart through a part of the island Dharmapala knew no better than Olcott,
village Sri Lanka. There Dharmapala encountered a landscape of what he thought
of as desolation—the poverty and lethargy of the Sinhala peasantry. In 1890 when
Olcott convened a meeting of Buddhists in Madras, Dharmapala joined delegates
from Burma, Chittagong, and Japan as the representative of Sinhala Buddhism.
Afterward he went north to Bodh Gaya with the Japanese delegate and saw an-
other landscape of desolation, the desecration of the most sacred place in the Bud-
dhist world (Guruge, 649). To this extent, Dharmapala’s project was of one piece;
he would reclaim the ancient sites, return Sri Lankan villages to the righteous-
ness they had known before colonialism, unite the Buddhist world by way of the
Maha Bodhi Society, and missionize Buddhism in non-Buddhist societies as an act
of self-reform and world renewal.
Dharmapala’s emphasis on clear exposition in preaching theDhammawas ap-
plicable to either a local context or a foreign one. To Sinhala audiences, he offered
moral instruction and practical advice about handling money, table manners, and
personal hygiene.18 For Western audiences, preaching in a way that resembled a
Christian sermon made it an easily recognized social practice. Clarity allowed the
brilliance of the Buddha’s teaching to be easily communicated, and nothing was
lost, he thought, by sloughing off the repetitive and time-consuming quality of
the traditional form. Westerners were not likely in any event to be interested in
making merit. They could convert by taking the Three Refuges; they could par-
ticipate if they liked; or they could come and go. The one thing non-Sinhalas were
certain to find engaging was meditation. Dharmapala reimagined that practice as
something laypeople could pursue; he practiced meditation himself; and he made
certain that foreign donors saw him doing so.19
The way Dharmapala talks about missionizing cycles ranges between the be-
nign and the ferocious. In 1893 he told the Parliament of Religions that the Chi-
cago meeting recalled Asoka’s third-century B.C.E. sending out ‘‘gentle teachers,
the mild disciples of Buddha,’’ going on to conclude that ‘‘the influence of that
congress, held twenty one centuries ago, is today a living power, for you everywhere
see mildness in Asia’’ (Guruge, 655). In order to make the ‘‘Mongolian mild,’’ how-
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ever, Buddhism had to ‘‘conquer’’ Asia (xvii). Although the British have brought
Sri Lanka ‘‘opium, ganja, whisky, and other alcoholic poisons as well as every kind
of abominable vice . . . to undermine the vitality of our people . . . [w]e, on our part,
should with a loving heart, give the Britishers the ennobling and purifying faith of
our Tathagato’’ (ibid., 764). He described his own mission in even milder terms: ‘‘I
have come to the West . . . not to convert Westerners to Buddhism, but to bring
some knowledge of a religion that . . . has quickened the peoples of Asia to higher
achievements’’ (ibid., 681). The distinction between conversion and ‘‘bringing
knowledge’’ is worth reiterating. By not imposing Protestant ideas about conver-
sion,Dharmapala gave theWest a Buddhismmore agreeable to seekers abandoning
religious traditions that insist on religious identity as an exclusive commitment.20
Obeyesekere makes a great deal of the contrast between Dharmapala’s in-
vocation of mildness and his ‘‘oedipal rage.’’21 Although Dharmapala frequently
spoke of compassion (Pali: maitreya), he did not visit much of it on westernized Sri
Lankans, including his own family.He turned against his father (‘‘thewild elephant
with a walking stick,’’ Guruge, 242) and his brother (‘‘an elephant doctor,’’ ibid.,
243), despite the fact that it was their money which supported his early missionary
efforts. Joining forces with the two outstanding monks of his day, he preferred the
company of Mohottivatte Gunananda, (1823–1890), the fiery orator, over Hikka-
duve Sumangala (1827–1911), the scholarly administrator (ibid., 232). In speaking
of the Japanese victory over the Russians in 1905, Dharmapala described the de-
feat in terms that are at once religious and bloodthirsty: ‘‘A day of triumph for
Buddhism. The Christian god lies prostrate before Buddha. His head is crushed,
he lies expiring.’’22 Although he drew a distinction between Christian missionar-
ies and Buddhist ones—Christians are high-living, corrupt, meat-eaters; Buddhists
are peaceful, righteous, and vegetarian—he also took pleasure in discovering that
Buddhists had set fire to a Catholic church in Anuradhapura.23
These contradictions can be read in several ways—poetic excess, the evo-
lution of a human being who is both charismatic and fallible, or the ugly face
Dharmapala showed minorities in Sri Lanka (as opposed to his inclusive feelings
toward Buddhists and non-Buddhists beyond it). Dharmapala brought great inten-
sity to the project of reform, and he was incapable of recognizing the virtue in Sri
Lanka’s being amultiethnic society. The balance of power had swung, Dharmapala
thought, to the Sri Lankan minorities—he reviled Tamils, Muslims, and even im-
migrants fromKerala (too few in number to count as aminority community)—and
Buddhist ‘‘mildness’’ too closely resembled the inanition he wanted to put right.
He had this same ambivalence toward the monkhood. ‘‘In all Buddhist countries,’’
he argued, ‘‘the Bhikshusmonks with a few exceptions, have failed to influence the
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people’’ (Guruge, 328). More Buddhist mildness will not right the balance; ‘‘de-
voted enthusiasts’’ need to be ‘‘zealous’’ in spreading the religion (ibid., 328). The
emphasis on activism has important consequences for the Buddhism Dharmapala
envisioned: ‘‘Greater than the bliss of sweet Nirvana is the life of moral activity’’
(737).
As Dharmapala understood things, the inanition of his coreligionists could
scarcely be traced to the Buddha’s own life:
The Blessed One worked daily for 22 hours, from His 35th year to His 80th
Year. . . . The ancient Rishis counted time in years, but our Lord counted
time by hours. An hour under the Dispensation of the Buddha is equal to
a year and the Gospel of Activity was what He preached day after day for
16,200 days, and each day He was engaged in doing good to the world of
gods and men twenty-two hours. During the forty-five years His blessed life
was spent for 256400 [sic] hours in working for the welfare of the world.
(Guruge, 737)
While Dharmapala calibrates the Buddha’s life on a hyperbolic scale, he interprets
that life in an even more exotic manner, melding the ‘‘this-worldly asceticism’’
that Obeyesekere associates with Protestant Buddhism with a Taylorist fixation
on small units of time—not unimaginably long Hindu intervals—for productive
work.24
There are inconsistencies here that go beyond the activity Buddhism requires
and the peace it offers. Dharmapala redefined the nature of a Buddhist sermon
(Pali: bana), sloughing off the incantatory parts and reducing the night-long act of
merit making to something resembling a Christian sermon (dhammades´ana). And
while he insisted on the rationalistic character of the religion, he also propagated
meditation as an important part of Buddhist religiosity. In describing both the
coming of the Sinhala prince Vijaya to Sri Lanka and the subsequent founding of
Buddhism in the island, he read the mythological details out of the stories (Gu-
ruge, 479 and 485). He excluded popular religion, astrology, and necromancy from
the practice of enlightened Buddhism in Burma and Sri Lanka (ibid., 637–638),
arguing that Buddhism was ‘‘pure science’’ with no room for theology or the wor-
ship of the Hindu gods (devas) who formed an integral part of Sinhala Buddhism
from Dharmapala’s time to the present (ibid., 658). But he also told a British audi-
ence that, although the Buddhist doctrine is called atheistic, ‘‘Buddhism teaches
that we are surrounded by gods or devas. Buddha taught there are many gods. One
god can illuminate ten thousand world systems. Such mighty gods exist. Divine
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beings exist from eternity to eternity. The Buddha was no atheist. He was a super-
divine-devatideva [the god of gods]’’ (ibid., 669).25
I mention these complications to foreground the role the Maha Bodhi So-
ciety played in the evolution of the Buddhist ethnoscape, for it developed in simi-
larly convoluted ways. Dharmapala founded the society to restore the sacred site
of Bodh Gaya, a place that preserved material evidence of the Enlightenment and
a living connection to the Buddha. For Olcott, by contrast, relic veneration was
superstition—he thought that the Tooth Relic in Kandy was an animal bone—
and Dharmapala’s interest in relics played a role in the two men’s estrangement.26
But the irony is surely this. However unlikely venerating the physical remains of a
man who taught the doctrine of no-soul (and however inconsistent with the ratio-
nalistic BuddhismDharmapala generally favored), the veneration of relics and the
practice of pilgrimage that it inspired had surprising results. They created a nexus
for a Buddhist ethnoscape that transcends the Sinhala influences on its twentieth-
century reconstruction. Relics have a prelapsarian centrality for all varieties of
Buddhism that enables the Maha Bodhi Society to be nonethnic, nonsectarian,
and inclusive of women.27 In that regard, relics come to play a progressive role in
the universalist Buddhism Dharmapala created abroad.
THE MAHA BODHI SOCIETY
Dharmapala first learned of the wretched condition to which BodhGaya had been
reduced indirectly by reading Edwin Arnold’s account in a London newspaper.
‘‘Vandalism,’’ Arnold wrote, ‘‘has made havoc of the graceful life-like statues of the
Glorious Tathagata; and it is certainly painful . . . to wander round the precincts of
the holy tree and see scores and hundreds of broken sculptures lying . . . on brick
heaps scattered; some delicately carved with incidents of the Buddha legend, and
some bearing clear and precious inscriptions . . .’’ (Guruge, 589). That vandalism
derives from the Buddhists’ losing control of the place; toward the end of the six-
teenth century the Bodh Gaya temple fell into Hindu control. By Dharmapala’s
time a lineage of Shaivite priests held sway over the temple, conducting their own
rituals. Dharmapala was not the first outsider to find Hindus presiding over the
site. In attempting to restore the Buddhist character of Bodh Gaya, Dharmapala
followed in the wake of a Burmese king who had started to restore the place in
1833.28 That effort came to naught, but was succeeded in the 1870s by the Bur-
mese king Mindon’s attempt to carry on the work, and a final Burmese initiative
under Thibaw, who sent Burmese monks to reside in a rest house he built.29 Bur-
mese patronage was superseded by a government of Bengal project with a different
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conception of restoration work (itself guided by a small stone model found among
the ruins).
Dharmapala arrived in Bodh Gaya in January of 1891. By May he had started
a branch of theMaha Bodhi Society, ‘‘the first Buddhist organization in the history
of modern Buddhism to begin a propaganda for the dissemination of the Dhamma
in non-Buddhist lands’’ (ibid., 732), and by July he brought four Sinhala monks of
the Ramanna Nikaya (monastic community) to reside in the Burmese rest house.30
The ethnic markers were at cross-purposes with Dharmapala’s intention to estab-
lish Bodh Gaya as a shrine and pilgrimage site for all Buddhists.31 But a religious
difference immediately outstripped ethnic and sectarian divisions, and Dharma-
pala threw himself into removing the Shaivites from the temple. Although he
established branches of the Maha Bodhi Society elsewhere and trained monks for
dharmaduta, it is unclear how wholeheartedly Dharmapala ‘‘brought knowledge’’
of the Dhamma to Indians. In print his feelings were clearer. There he melded per-
sonal salvation with social reformation by asserting that ‘‘the people of India were
happy in the Buddhist period. Our Lord Buddha opened the gates of Immortality
to all without distinction of Caste, Colour, and Sex.’’32
Dharmapala did not linger in Bodh Gaya, moving the Maha Bodhi Society
to Calcutta and founding the Maha Bodhi Journal in 1892. The journal led to his
being invited in 1893 to attend the Parliament of Religions in Chicago. Before
he went, he visited Arakan (where Buddhists raised funds to rent a house in Cal-
cutta), Rangoon, Sri Lanka, and England. In Chicago, he gave the Three Refuges
to a New York businessman, Charles Strauss, an act that might be considered the
first conversion inAmerica.33He convinced Paul Carus to establish a branch of the
Maha Bodhi Society in Chicago.34 Onhis way back to Sri Lanka he visitedHawai‘i
(meeting a wealthy American woman who became his chief lay supporter), Japan,
China, Thailand, and Malaysia (Guruge, xxxvi–xxxvii). In Colombo he raised
funds for the purchase of Maha Bodhi Village, and in 1894 arranged the first orga-
nized pilgrimage of Sinhala Buddhists to Bodh Gaya. As Dharmapala’s efforts to
restore the site to Buddhist control got under way, relations with Bodh Gaya’s
Shaivite priest becamemore contentious, culminating in the priest and his helpers
removing (and throwing into a nearby pond) the Buddha image Dharmapala had
brought from Japan. Dharmapala sued, and he was able to regain control of the
Burmese rest house and install the Buddha image there (where it remained until
1910 when a judge ordered it transferred to Calcutta).
In his own life Dharmapala pursued the zealous activity he advocated for
the reformation of Buddhism and Buddhists. In a letter to a British official in Sri
Lanka, he insisted: ‘‘I have to be active and activity means agitation according to
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constitutional means’’ (Guruge, 753). He traveled the world, making a second trip
to the United States in 1896, another trip to Japan (his third) in 1902, followed by
a third to the United States in 1902, a fourth in 1913, and a fifth in 1925, besides
periodically returning to Sri Lanka. The organizational skills he saw in Olcott he
applied to the Buddhist cause, establishing branches of the Maha Bodhi Society in
Madras and Kushinagar in 1900, purchasing land at Sarnath in 1901, and found-
ing industrial schools (which he had first seen in the United States and Europe)
in Sarnath in 1904 and Sri Lanka in 1906. That same year he also established a
Sinhala Buddhist newspaper in Colombo and the Maha Bodhi Press. In 1920 he
completed construction of a Buddhist vihara in Calcutta. In 1926 he established
the headquarters of the British Buddhist mission in London and in 1930 built a
vihara at Sarnath.
THE INSTITUTIONAL LIFE OF DHARMADUTA
Dharmapala established a school in Colombo to begin the training of mission-
ary monks, sending them on to India for higher education. But the school never
amounted to much, and after his lifetime no one institution developed for propa-
gating Sinhala Buddhism.35 As is generally the case with Dharmapala’s innova-
tions, his influence was wide but diffuse. In Colombo that influence ran, first,
through two colleges of monastic learning, Vidyodaya and Vidyalankara, which
had been established in the late nineteenth century, and later, through a mon-
astery, Vajirarama, which began with a modernist and foreign-facing orientation.
For all of Bodh Gaya’s importance as a focus of Buddhist feeling, these institutions
have played amuch greater role in the propagation of Buddhism abroad. They have
been sending institutions; Bodh Gaya has been a receiving institution. The World
Fellowship of Buddhists is another vehicle for mission work, led by monks and lay-
people. Although its membership is truly worldwide, it was founded in Colombo,
and Sinhala Buddhists have always played a dominant role in the organization.
In its Sri Lankan context, the Maha Bodhi Society began on the grounds of
Vidyodaya.36Monks educated there—Kalukondayave Pannasekhera (1895–1977),
Hinatiyana Dhammaloka (1900–1981), and Hendiyagala Silaratana (1913–1982)
are leading examples—absorbed Dharmapala’s concern for the desolation of Sin-
hala villages and attempted to invigorate them by programs fixed on village de-
velopment and the eradication of crime, temperance, vegetarianism, and proper
female behavior.37 They were missionaries to their own people. Dhammaloka used
to wait at the Kompanna Veedya train station as Colombo office workers were
heading home from work. There he would preach in a public arena (one that has
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a Christian precedent but no Buddhist one), and preach so quickly that he could
deliver his message in the brief time during which trains paused to pick up passen-
gers (putting into practice Dharmapala’s emphasis on the Buddha’s Taylorism).38
In Heenatiyana, a village notorious for cattle theft and gambling, he established a
conciliation board, voluntary labor campaigns, and meditation classes, as well as
a school where he trained monks for dharmaduta.39
Vidyalankara monks, by contrast, applied the nationalist and political
aspects of Dharmapala’s program to everyday life. Although the distinction be-
tween the ‘‘Marxist-dominated and anti-imperialist Vidyalankara and the con-
servative Vidyodaya’’ sometimes grows blurry, Seneviratne castigates the Vidya-
lankara monks in particular for pursuing a Marxism that evolved into a Buddhist
socialism and then into a Sinhala chauvinism.40 Vidyalankara monks such as Wal-
pola Rahula and Yakkaduwe Pragnarama carried Dharmapala’s ideas forward even
more aggressively than the Vidyodaya monks, insisting that a monk’s obligations
lay in this world, guiding laypeople, speaking out on political issues, and defend-
ing the nation. Rahula wore a beret in Paris, while Pragnarama kept a beard, slept
during the day, and carried on his affairs at night. In pushing the limits of decorum,
such figures redefined the role of a monk. That was their point: Rahula once sup-
ported a young monk who had received a law degree and wanted to practice law.41
The connections among these institutions are multiple and cross-cutting.
Palane Vajiragnana (1878–1955) was one of the monks Dharmapala considered a
‘‘hero-giant,’’ suitable for use as an example to cast shame on theColombo elite. He
was educated at Vidyodaya by Hikkaduve Sumangala, who also served as the presi-
dent of the Maha Bodhi Society. Vajiragnana developed Vajirarama into a temple
with a self-consciously modern and active relationship with the outside world, and
in the 1920s he delivered the first Buddhist sermon broadcast on radio. His ser-
mons applied the Dhamma to everyday problems. His students went further afield.
Although he spent the great majority of his life in Sri Lanka, Madihe Pannasiha
(1913– ) established the first Sri Lankan vihara in North America. Palane Vajira-
gnana’s other students became relentless dharmadutas. His senior student Narada
(1898–1993) established a tradition of travel that mimicked Dharmapala’s high
energy, traveling to Vietnam thirty-five times.42
When Dharmapala finished the Mulagandakuti Vihara in Sarnath, he in-
vited Narada to participate in the opening celebration. Although he was rela-
tively young, Narada possessed the skill dharmaduta monks need most—a world
language—and conducted the ceremony in English on behalf of a senior monk
who lacked it.43 In the 1950s Narada spent some years at the London Buddhist
Vihara, whichDharmapala had established in 1926, using it as a base for forays into
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nearby places in continental Europe. There he began a practice of writing short
pamphlets—‘‘Buddhism in a Nutshell’’ suggests their function—that introduced
Buddhism to both westerners and Sri Lankans. Eventually Vajirarama became the
base for his work, although he continued to make regular dharmaduta journeys
abroad.
Narada brought saplings from the bo tree at Anuradhapura to places he
visited and as early as 1935 planted one at Borobudur while on a lecture tour of
Java, following suit in Dar-es-Salaam, Singapore, Malaysia, India, andNepal.44 But
the focus of his travels was Vietnam, where he distributed saplings from Saigon to
Hanoi.45He followed theDharmapalite practice of visiting the poor andneedy, and
in the 1970s visited military hospitals to bring comfort to patients, as well as orga-
nizing the recitation of protective verses at the Jetavana Vihara, the headquarters
of the Theravada monkhood in Vietnam.46 The biographer of his brother monk
Piyadassi says that Narada cleared the way for Piyadassi’s later work by weaning
Vietnamese away from Cao-Dai: ‘‘Through his influence people gave up the ritu-
alistic type of Buddhism and instead followed the intellectual and philosophical
aspects of the Theravada teaching.’’47 In Southeast Asia, the thrust of dharmaduta
work paralleled efforts in Sri Lanka to move people from one kind of Buddhist
practice to another. But rather than simply following Dharmapala’s insistence that
ritual is bad and real Theravada is not ritualistic, Narada and Piyadassi retained the
chanting ritual—Piyadassi’s biography notwithstanding—and the Xa Loi temple
in Saigon where Narada resided draws Buddhists because it has what other Viet-
namese temples lack, a Buddha relic.
The cover of Abeyesekera’s biography depicts Piyadassi in a lonely setting,
barefoot, with his begging bowl swung over his shoulder. His description of Piya-
dassi as a ‘‘wandering monk’’ evokes an image of missionary Buddhism that reso-
nates with the life of the early monkhood. But Piyadassi (like Narada and other
dharmaduta monks today) had a fixed residence, and the photographs at the end
of Abeyesekera’s text better suggest the contexts where Sinhala monks pursue
dharmaduta these days: feeding kangaroos in Australia, administering the eight
precepts to a Swiss lawyer in a forest hermitage in Kandy, addressing theWorld Fel-
lowship of Buddhists in Bangkok, speaking to students at the University of Stock-
holm, establishing a ritual space in theNetherlands, and trekking upMonteBianco
in Italy (165–190). By the early 1990s Piyadassi had traveled around the world
thirteen times.48
Sometimes contacts between Sri Lankan Buddhists and other parts of the
Theravada world developed from the opposite direction. As LeVine (Chap. 2)
shows, a Theravada tradition was reawakened in Nepal early in the twentieth cen-
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
4
6
o
f
2
5
6
Dharmapala’s DHARMADUTA • 37
tury by a monk named Pragnananda, who led a long monastic life of sixty-four
years. During this time, he was expelled from Nepal and tried to reestablish pil-
grimage to Lumbini.49 His student Amritananda was given lower ordination in
1936 (by the same Burmese monk who had ordained Pragnananda), and Amrita-
nanda was sent to Colombo for further studies. He received his higher ordination
from Palane Vajirarama and returned to Nepal in 1942. He and his teacher were
banished from Nepal in short order, and he went back to Sri Lanka. In 1946 Amri-
tananda returned with Narada. They gained an audience with the Nepalese king,
and bhikkhus were allowed to stay, restoring Theravada. Amritananda, by then a
member of the global Theravada establishment, was back in Colombo in 1950 for
the inaugural conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists, and he hosted the
group’s fourth and fifteenth conferences in Nepal.50
When Sri Lankan monks go on dharmaduta missions these days, they typi-
cally tie together a number of stops that take them entirely around the world.
Piyadassi’s world mission of 1991 entailed a representative variety of activities. In
the Netherlands he served as chief guest at the opening of a new monastery and
officiated at a robe-offering ceremony at a temple in The Hague.51 From there he
flew to Rome, where he gave a talk on ‘‘The Central Concept of Buddhism’’ to
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, before visiting the first
Theravada vihara in Italy at Seeze. He flew on to France, giving a similar talk at the
UNESCOheadquarters, then visited his longtime lay supporters at the Vietnamese
center and led a program of meditation and discussion sessions. In Switzerland he
taught meditation. After a stop in Sweden, a month-long program of activities fol-
lowed in England, as he moved among the London Buddhist Vihara, the Thames
Meditation Center in Sussex, the Saddhatissa International Center in Surrey, and
the Buddhist Cultural Institute in London. Crossing the Atlantic, he spent the
first half of 1992 in Los Angeles, venturing out to New York, Washington, D.C.,
Montreal, Toronto, Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver, and San Francisco. In Japan
he visited with the chief monk of the Kōdō Kyōdan Sect and lent his support to
the World Tathagata movement in Korea. On his way home, he made stops in
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.
THE SINHALA BUDDHIST ETHNOSCAPE
Whatever other effects nineteenth-century missionary discourse exerted on how
Sri Lankans—monks, laypeople, historians of religion, and other academics—
have conceptualized dharmaduta, Piyadassi’s travels suggest that he does not spend
a lot of time trying to convert non-Buddhists. He pastors to a flock that has spread
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itself around the globe. He leads meditation sessions. He talks about Dhamma to
interested non-Buddhists. The skills required to do so entail considerably more
than textual knowledge. On Piyadassi’s interpretation of dharmaduta, a monk
needs to have knowledge of several languages; he urges young monks to acquire
more than a knowledge of Sinhala, Tamil, Pali, and Sanskrit. ‘‘Most of the Sanskrit
and Pali works, their commentaries, and interpretations are found in English,’’ he
writes. ‘‘English, therefore, is a must for every bhikkhu.’’52 This is even more im-
portant for a monk intending to work overseas: without it, ‘‘one becomes a dumb
animal in foreign soil.’’ The virtues of a world language duly noted, the argument
that knowing English is a monk’s access to Buddhist doctrine should give the Pali
Text Society cause for reflection on hybridity and unintended effects.
In theWest, the dharmadutamonk needs an additional skill. Hemust acquire
comparative knowledge:
In the West in particular, the bhikkhu would cut a sorry figure without the
knowledge of other isms. The Western mind is an inquiring mind. They
are fed up with their traditional religious beliefs, with the catastrophic wars
and threat of impending nuclear disasters. The Westerner’s great and im-
mediate need is a new way of life. That is the task the Buddhist monk has
to fulfil in the modern day world.53
On the Sri Lankan front, Piyadassi urges reform, in this case reforming the
reformation, namely the political activism and secularization associated with the
Vidyalankara monks. As young monks became increasingly involved in political
movements in the late 1980s, he made comments that were framed abstractly
but referenced Sinhala society’s anxiety about monks’ involvement in nationalist
organizations. He tied his vision to the need for a monk to be a ‘‘practical’’ per-
son, which he defines as a person who ‘‘practices’’ meditation.54 A monk cannot
describe the benefits of meditation without having studied both vipassana (Pali:
mindfulness) and satipathana (Pali: insight) meditation. Disaster occurs when a
monk commits himself entirely to the life of this world—social service, hospi-
tal welfare work, teaching in schools. Piyadassi’s energetic pursuit of dharmaduta
work owes to Dharmapala, even as he opposes the ‘‘this-worldly’’ orientation that
Dharmapala introduced to the monkhood.
Sinhala monks nowadays regard dharmaduta as an ancient and fundamental
part of the monastic life. A small number of Sinhala monks reside permanently
overseas as dharmaduta monks, and a larger number periodically go out on dharma-
duta trips. Their activities border on the entrepreneurial. When they establish
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Buddhism in exotic places, they benefit themselves. Seneviratne pulls no punches
about foreign travel.55 It provides upwardmobility for monks and redounds to their
economic advantage. I once saw Mapalagama Vipulasara—a monk easy to recog-
nize because of his goatee—in the Bangkok airport when he was returning from a
conference. As he made his way to the departure gate, he had so many electrical
appliances in his two baggage carts that he had to ask another traveler to push one
for him. Members of the Sri Lanka monkhood have a neologism for foreign travel.
They call it videsagatavima (‘‘enforeignization’’) and recognize what spending time
abroad does for a monk’s career. It achieves the same result that foreign residence
does for a Sri Lankan in business, civil service, or academic life: it confers status.
That monks know how many trips to Vietnam they have made or how many times
they have flown around the world suggests the same conclusion.
Before his deathVipulasara served as general secretary of theMahaBodhi So-
ciety, and to that extent he carried on the dharmaduta role in an organizational set-
ting that beganwithDharmapala andOlcott. But his other offices indicate just how
far the proliferation of voluntary organizations has come in modern Buddhism.
Besides serving on the Kalyani Samagi Dharma Maha Sangha Sabha (the board
that manages his monastic community), he was involved with the World Bhik-
khu Congress, the Sri Lanka Korea Cultural Association, the Sri Lanka Supreme
Sangha Council (organizer/secretary), the Jathika Kala Peramuna (founder), the
Sri Lanka Buddhist Congress (president), the Japan–Sri Lanka Center in Japan,
the Asian Buddhist Peace Council (vice president), the Lanka Kala Sangamaya
(patron), the Board of Management of the Buddhist and Pali University, and the
All Religious Leaders’ Council. Japan loomed large in Vipulasara’s travel overseas,
and in 1975 he established the Japan Sri Lanka Friendship Society.56 In the years
that followed Sri Lankan relics were sent to Japan, Sinhala dance troupes appeared
there, and one of the monk’s students was ordained as a Sōtō Zenmonk, taking his
training in that tradition at the Eihei Temple in Chubu.57 In such lives the Sinhala
Buddhist ethnoscape meets the Buddhist ethnoscape headlong.
When Sinhala monks travel overseas, their destination is likely to be one of
two types of monasteries.58 The first is the universalistic monastery that Dharma-
pala envisioned. He wanted the London Buddhist Vihara to spread the teachings
to the British, not serve Sinhalas living in England. When he established the Lon-
don vihara in 1926, it became the first Theravada Buddhist temple located beyond
the continent of Asia.59 Circumstances forced the vihara to close at the time of the
Second World War, and it has moved several times from one residence to another.
Its functions have also changed over time because it now serves Sinhalas living in
London and beyond. But themost changed circumstance is external to the temple.
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It is now one of fifty-one Buddhist temples, foundations, and centers in London.60
In this context, it makes sense to qualify the expression ‘‘universalistic’’ by saying
that, while each of these groups is likely to welcome outsiders, all but two have a
doctrinal tradition. Dharmapala’s Buddhism for non-Buddhists was Theravada (of
the Sinhala variety); nowadays some of these centers are as eclectic as the one that
practices both Theravada and Mahayana, and some are innovative (the Heart of
London Sangha, Community of Interbeing, describes itself as ‘‘Vietnamese Zen’’
and ‘‘engaged Buddhist’’).
Universalistic Theravada temples have grown up in other Western contexts.
Most were established by westerners who arranged for a Sri Lankan monk to live
at the temple, give Dhamma talks, and teachmeditation. The Buddhayana temple
in the Netherlands has been universalistic in a doctrinal way. The Dutchman who
started the temple took the name Anagarika, linking himself to Dharmapala, and
Piyadassi has been a regular visitor.61 But Anagarika Dhammawirantha also main-
tains connections to Tibetan and Mahayana monks, who give talks and teach
meditation at the Buddhayana center, the name suggesting an attempt to tran-
scend sectarianism. And the center has acquired another universalizing element
by default. Although its focus falls on Dutch people interested in Buddhism, Sri
Lankans living in Europe also take part in the temple’s activities.
The other form Sri Lankan temples assume overseas is the ethnic temple,
serving Sinhala expatriates. The distinction between the two types is seldom im-
permeable, temples focused on westerners often including local Sinhalas, and Sin-
hala temples abroad reaching out to local people. Postwar Malaysia provides a case
in point.Worried about the influence ofChristian schools and the prospect of their
children converting, Sinhala Buddhists in Kuala Lumpur wrote the principal of
Vidyalankara, asking him to send them a monk to reside at the Brickfields Vihara.
Kirinde Dhammananda arrived in 1952 and set about refurbishing the temple,
preaching in Sinhala, counseling people, and establishing a Sunday school.62 In
1963 he organized the Buddhist Missionary Society, which publishes pamphlets
and books, usually in English, but also translated into Chinese and Indonesian.
He usually preaches in English (as do his students), traveling around Malaysia and
Singapore in a way that makes Dhamma available not only to Sinhalas, but also
to other English-speaking Southeast Asians and Europeans.
Dhammananda has ties to Mahayana monks in Malaysia, an openness he
traces to the Buddha’s knowing nothing of sectarian distinctions.63 The main Sin-
hala temple in Singapore, Lankaramaya, provides a more extreme example of the
ethnic temple, demonstrating that ethnic distinctionsmean quite a lot to Sinhalas.
The membership of Lankaramaya is almost entirely Sinhala, and even though the
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vihara’s chartermakes no reference to ethnicity, its activities exclude the participa-
tion of people who do not speak Sinhala. Dhamma discourse is done in the Sinhala
style (the very form that Dharmapala rejected); the giving of alms to monks and
the chanting of pirit are emphasized, as is the veneration of a Buddha image and
relics brought from Sri Lanka. These religious activities are supplemented by cul-
tural ones, including the teaching of Sinhala for children and the celebration of
the Sinhala New Year. Where the universalistic temple brings something new to
non-Buddhists, the ethnic temple allows Buddhists to hold on to their traditions
in a new and often threatening setting.
Sometimes monks prove to be more willing to adapt their lives to an exotic
setting than their supporters would like; sometimes they are less eager to adapt than
their lay supporters; sometimes the temple ordains non-Asians as monks and wel-
comes converts and religious seekers; sometimes it remains an ethnic enclave. A
Sinhala temple was established in Sydney in 1990, appropriating the name Lanka-
ramaya as a sign of both its intentions and inspirations. The exclusivity of the
Sydney temple made one Australian Buddhist of Sinhala origins upset enough to
set up aweb page to air his views.His objections to the Lankaramayamodel derived
from his conception of Buddhism as a missionary religion:
While there are now a large number of Sri Lankan monks in Western
countries they are not engaged in dhamma-duta work, but in catering for
the Sri Lankan communities abroad. In effect they are denying the uni-
versalistic character of Buddhism [and] returning it to the particularistic
mould of ethnic religion in contravention of the clear injunctions of the
Buddha.64
From Gunasekara’s point of view, spreading Buddhism does not require knowledge
of Pali, sitting on the floor, or Asian attire. All that is needed to restore Buddhism’s
universalistic nature is avoiding the bana-style preaching of the Lankaramaya kind
in favor of the Dhamma discussion that Dharmapala advocated.65
THE BUDDHIST ETHNOSCAPE
There is a network of Sinhala monks spread around the world bringing Dhamma
to westerners (from London and Los Angeles to Rio), ‘‘theravadizing’’ local sys-
tems of belief and practice among non-Theravada Buddhists (in Singapore,Malay-
sia, Vietnam, and Nepal), catering to the everyday needs of Sinhalas in foreign
contexts, maintaining sacred sites in India (Bodh Gaya, Sarnath, Sanchi, Savatti,
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Amaravati), and serving pilgrims of all kinds.66This network depends on laypeople
who serve as supporters (dāyakas) for those monks, and it would not exist without
them. In most contexts dāyakas are local Buddhists, but in India the situation is
less clear. Are those supporters local Buddhists or Sinhalas now on pilgrimage? Are
they local non-Buddhists or foreign Buddhists? These questions address two issues:
just how successful was Dharmapala in ‘‘bringing knowledge’’ of Dhamma to India
and at what point does the Sinhala Buddhist ethnoscape yield to the Buddhist
ethnoscape.
Dharmapala is missing from Trevor Ling’s treatment of the revival of Bud-
dhism in India, which does not say much about the Maha Bodhi Society either.
Instead he emphasizes that modern Buddhism has attracted two types of Indian
adherents, which he typifies by drawing a distinction between Nehru and Ambed-
kar.67 As secular intellectuals both were drawn to Buddhism because of their dis-
enchantment with caste society and its inequities, a connection Dharmapala first
struck. However impressed he may have been by Buddhism as a teaching, Nehru
never became a Buddhist, and Indians like him have gravitated instead toward
groups such as the Maha Bodhi Society. Although they became Buddhists, Am-
bedkar’s Dalit followers, by contrast, have not looked to the society or to non-
Indian monks who live in India for leadership. Either Dharmapala regarded India
as important for its sacred sites and relics (and converting Indians was incidental)
or his missionizing—in India as in the West—did not have a great investment in
conversion as such. As it has turned out, the Maha Bodhi Society has had greater
relevance to Buddhists living outside of India than to local people.68
New Indian Buddhists have no obvious connection to the Maha Bodhi So-
ciety. Ambedkar did not learn of Buddhism by way of either Dharmapala or the
society. As a student, Ambedkar was given a Marathi-language biography of the
Buddha, and that account sparked his lifelong interest.69 Nor did the society play
much of a role in his conversion some forty years later. After he announced in 1935
that he would not die a Hindu, the Maha Bodhi Society invited him to become a
Buddhist, just as he received proposals from followers of other Indian religions—
Islam, Sikhism, andChristianity—urging his conversion.70 Initially he planned the
event (as well as the mass conversions that would follow) for Mumbai, but he was
persuaded to move the ceremony to Nagpur because of his reform campaigns there
and the presence of substantial numbers of Dalits in that part of easternMaharash-
tra.71 Neither place qualifies as a Buddhist sacred site. In other words, the social
reform that the mass conversion of Dalits to Buddhism represents follows neither
from the reestablishing of the Buddhist sites of north India nor from Dharmapala’s
insistence that Buddhism offers India a chance at its own reformation.
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The Maha Bodhi Society’s example led to the proliferation of transnational
Buddhist voluntary organizations such as the World Fellowship of Buddhists
(WFB). It was more directly an outgrowth of the Ceylon Buddhist Congress and
carried on both organizations’ interest in fostering Buddhism by extending it in
transnational directions. The WFB held its first conference in Colombo in 1950
and its second in 1952 in Japan, drawing Buddhists of various ethnic origins and
sectarian identities. Although conferences have taken up education, social action,
and doctrinal issues, spreading the teachings has been in the forefront.72 Those
early meetings led to the reinvigoration of Theravada inNepal and the founding of
several Theravadamonasteries in Vietnam.73 Narada’s thirty-five visits put contact
between Sinhala Buddhism and some 150,000 Vietnamese followers of Theravada
on a regular basis.74 In this context, dharmaduta has produced the internal con-
version of Theravada Buddhists to practices Dharmapala endorsed, such as relic
veneration.
Japanese delegates attended those first meetings of the WFB, and in meet-
ing with other Buddhists, some became interested in organizational unification
and others were impressed by Theravada’s claim to being the original form of Bud-
dhism.75 As a result, Japanese laypeople have become involved in Sinhala Bud-
dhism in a variety of ways: offering to protect the Tooth Relic with bullet-proof
glass, organizing peace marches to respond to the ethnic conflict, establishing free
nurseries and schools, and supporting village temples. Tracing out the upturn of
Japanese charity and presence in Sri Lanka during the late 1980s and early 1990s,
Seneviratne points to a local backlash against the considerable money and power
that has flowed into the hands of Sinhala monks from Japanese supporters.76 The
most notorious controversy was the allegation that Pelpola Vipassi (who enjoyed
the support of one of theworld’s richestmen,Ryoichi Sasakawa) intended to estab-
lish Mahayana Buddhism in Sri Lanka. However baseless the allegation, the furor
it created indicates the limits of the Buddhist ethnoscape.
But there are counterindications. The presence of voluntary organizations
and the practice of regular visits have meant the cross-fertilization of, and chal-
lenge to, various forms of Buddhism. Having studied in Japan, a Sinhala monk
returned to the island and constructed a Japanese-influenced temple outside of
Colombo where nowadays dāyakas purchase space to commemorate their parents
by installing their ashes in small shrines. Another Sinhala monk renovated San-
chi Vihara in India, splitting his time between Sanchi and his temple in Colombo.
Japanese lay supporters brought one of that monk’s students to reside in Japan,
where in time he was appointed the chief Theravada (sanghanāyaka) of Japan.77
It hardly seems likely that Japanese Buddhists will gravitate toward Theravada or
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Sinhalas adopt Mahayana, but Buddhist influences nowadays move in both direc-
tions.
If the Buddhist ethnoscape has a center of gravity, it is the sacred sites of
north India, because their historical importance, prelapsarian quality, andmaterial
potency draw together Buddhists of all kinds. Colombo organizes a specifically Sin-
hala Buddhist ethnoscape, its centrality deriving not from relics but from those
self-understandings with which I began—the island’s crucial role in the historical
unfolding of what became ‘‘Buddhism’’ and a gathering sense that Buddhism is a
missionary religion with responsibilities to all kinds of people. In many overseas
settings, circumstances are making Sinhala Buddhism less Sri Lankan; in places
such as Vietnam, Sinhala Buddhist missionaries are making local Buddhism more
Theravada (in its specifically Sinhala form). Besides the interaction of particu-
larisms that attach to ethnic identities—Sinhala and Japanese are the pertinent
ones—the Buddhist ethnoscape is structured by a second dialectic between doctri-
nal forms such as Theravada and a generic Buddhism that is developing inWestern
venues. Amid their individual projects Buddhist missionaries negotiate their way
through these force fields. And as for inanition, Dharmapala’s indictment can-
not be raised against today’s monks. In the national election of December 2001,
a Buddhist monk was elected to a seat in the Sri Lankan parliament.
Notes
1. I have used the expression ‘‘identity’’ rather than ‘‘community,’’ not wanting to reinscribe
here the mythology of an unchanging Sinhala ethnic group that begins with Vijaya and
continues to the present. The best critique of that notion is R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, ‘‘The
People of the Lion: The Sinhala Identity and Ideology inHistory andHistoriography,’’ in Sri
Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990),
45–86.
2. Walpola Rahula, ‘‘A Challenge for the Maha Sangha,’’ Daily News, January 2, 1988.
3. See Gananath Obeyesekere and Richard Gombrich, Buddhism Transformed: Religious
Change in Sri Lanka (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 202–240.
4. Arjun Appadurai develops the ‘‘ethnoscape’’ notion in two articles: ‘‘Disjuncture and
Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,’’ and ‘‘Global Ethnoscapes: Notes and Queries
for a Transnational Anthropology,’’ in Appadurai, Modernity at Large; Cultural Dimensions
of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 27–47 and 48–65 at
33. Dharmapala himself thought he lived in a radically shrinking world—‘‘aeroplanes have
brought England within ten days distance from Ceylon’’—but his evaluation takes shape
against a backdrop of travel by ocean liner; Ananda Guruge, ed., Return to Righteousness: A
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9. T.W.RhysDavids andHermannOldenberg,VinayaTexts (NewYork:Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1899), Mahavagga I.11, 112.
10. Jonathan S. Walters, ‘‘Rethinking Buddhist Missions’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Chi-
cago, 1992). Walters makes his case for a nonmissiological reading of the ‘‘Buddha’s Great
Commission’’ by arguing that the string of datives (‘‘for the sake of . . .’’) modify not the
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first century B.C.E., Britons were wearing clothes made of flax, not animal skins.
14. As sympathetic as I am to Walters’ intentions, his definition of missionizing is so spe-
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University Press, 1964), 282–302.
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22. Quoted in Michael Roberts, ‘‘For Humanity. For the Sinhalese. Dharmapala as Crusad-
ing Bosat,’’ Journal of Asian Studies 56, no. 4 (November 1997): 1006–1032 at 1023.
23. Ibid., 1026.
24. Obeyesekere and Gombrich, Buddhism Transformed, 231.
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scorned the intercessionary powers of devas (gods) and demons’’ in ‘‘Personal Identity and
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off his friendship with Olcott after he discovered that a copy of the Tooth Relic that had
been given as a gift to Olcott had been placed under a shelf; Guruge,Return to Righteousness,
xxxix. For his part, Olcott also opposed Dharmapala’s zeal to confront the Hindu priest of
Bodh Gaya. See K. D. G. Wimalaratna, ‘‘The Buddhist Revival and the Maha Bodhi So-
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included the participation of Kirinde Dhammananda, P. Somalankara, and Mapalagama
Vipulasara (the president of theMaha Bodhi Society of India), as well as ThichNhatHanh,
the Dalai Lama, and the Supreme Patriarch of the Cambodian monkhood. The monkhood
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Affirm Equality of Women in Unprecedented Ordination Ceremony,’’ January 30, 1998,
http://www.prweb.com/releases/1998/prweb3407.htm.
28. Aryadasa Ranasinghe, ‘‘How Anagarika Dharmapala Saw Buddhagaya Viharaya in
1891,’’ Daily News, April 27, 1999.
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the early years of this ordination tradition, whose establishment dates to 1864, theRamanna
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in Sinhalese Society, 1750–1900 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
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of Indians to Buddhism, ‘‘Return of Buddhism to India,’’ Maha Bodhi Journal 40 (October
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64. V.A.Gunasekara, ‘‘Ethnic Buddhism andOtherObstacles to theDhamma in theWest,’’
BuddhaZine, The Buddhist Society of Queensland, Australia, http://buddhanet.net/bsq14.
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68. Ambedkar Buddhists have not been very interested in ordination themselves, settling
for trained laypeople who function as social workers, ritual specialists, or missionaries. On
some accounts, Ambedkar Buddhists have found non-Indian bhikkhus in India ‘‘aloof ’’ and
‘‘indifferent.’’ Ibid., 110.
69. M. S. Gore, The Social Context of an Ideology: Ambedkar’s Political and Social Thought
(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 217.
70. Ibid., 144.
71. VasantMoon,Growing upUntouchable in India (London: Rowman andLittlefield, 2001),
149.
72. Joseph M. Kitagawa and Frank Reynolds, ‘‘Theravada Buddhism in the Twentieth Cen-
tury,’’ in Dumoulin, ed., Buddhism in the Modern World, 59.
73. Heinz Bechert and Vu Duy-Tu, ‘‘Buddhism in Vietnam,’’ in Dumoulin, ed., Buddhism in
the Modern World, 190.
74. My colleague Trian Nguyen says that 150,000 undercounts the number of Theravada
Buddhists in Vietnam by a factor of three or four. These communities, located in the south-
ern part of the country, especially along the Cambodian border, are long-standing and not
Narada’s converts.
75. Heinrich Dumoulin, ‘‘Buddhism in Modern Japan,’’ in Dumoulin, ed., Buddhism in the
Modern World, 237.
76. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings, 214–220.
77. ‘‘Ven. Pannatissa Worked to Propagate Buddhism,’’ Daily News, October 24, 1991. Also
see Seneviratne, The Work of Kings, 213–215. As in the case of Banagala Upatissa’s appoint-
ment as sanghanayake of Japan, the proliferation of grandiloquent titles for offices of no
responsibility is a by-product of both the dharmaduta ethic and monkly self-promotion.
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2 The Theravada Domestic Missionin Twentieth-Century Nepal
Sarah LeVine
Almost eighty years ago, a Buddhist revival was launched in the Newar commu-
nity of the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal. Although it had a dual focus, Tibetan and
Theravada, the Theravadins have had a greater impact. Factors involved in the
Theravadins’ success include, first, the social conditions that made Newar Bud-
dhists more receptive to the ‘‘modernist’’ message of the Maha Bodhi Society than
toMahayana philosophy and practice; second, the strategies selected by theThera-
vadins to put their movement on a firm footing; and third, the support received
fromBuddhists and Buddhist institutions elsewhere inAsia. Following a discussion
of some enduring weaknesses of the monks’ order, my focus will be on the growth
and development of the nuns’ order and its impressive contributions to the Bud-
dhist community. For the first five decades of the order’s existence inNepal, female
recruits took the Ten Precepts as ‘‘ordained lay women.’’ But after being encour-
aged to do so by theDalai Lama in his address to the first International Conference
of Buddhist Women in Bodh Gaya in 1987, Nepali nuns started taking full ordi-
nation (bhikshuni upasampada) according to Chinese rites. As of 2003, more than
one-third of Nepali nuns, defying their monk preceptors, have taken full ordina-
tion abroad.1
BACKGROUND TO A MISSION
Since the beginning of recorded history Hinduism and Buddhism have coexisted
in the Kathmandu Valley (the ‘‘Nepal’’ of premodern times), and although Nepa-
lese kings seem almost always to have been Shaivite Hindus, at the same time
they were the principal patrons of many Buddhist institutions and major ritual
events.2 The last kings of the Newars, a Tibeto-Burman people who until recently
were the numerically and culturally dominant ethnic group of the Valley, were de-
feated in 1768–1769 by the Nepali-speaking Gorkha king Prithivi Narayan Shah.3
More than a century later, the British Resident Surgeon Daniel Wright estimated
that Vajrayana Buddhism—whose clerics were married priests, the descendents
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of monastics who had abandoned celibacy for householder life—was practiced by
two-thirds of the Newar population.4
But strong as the Buddhist community may have appeared to Wright, in
reality it was under great pressure. Thirty years earlier, in 1846, following a bloody
coup that he appears to have engineered himself, a courtier and military com-
mander named Jang Bahadur Kunwar had placed the Gorkha king Rajendra under
virtual house arrest. Having changed his family name to Rana and upgraded his
caste from warrior to princely status, Jang Bahadur took the titles of ‘‘Maharaja’’
and hereditary ‘‘Prime Minister,’’ and thenceforth ruled the Gorkha Empire—
which was only officially renamed ‘‘Nepal’’ in 1930—as his private fiefdom.5
In 1854, following a trip to Europe where he was impressed by the French
focus on codification, Jang Bahadur promulgated the Nepalese Legal Code (Mu-
luki Ain). This imposed both a standardized legal code throughout the kingdom
and a ‘‘national caste hierarchy’’6 that incorporated myriad castes and ethnic cate-
gories and, through the application of a religious paradigm, legitimized inequality.7
Jang Bahadur’s objective inmelding an extremely diverse population into a unified
Hindu state was to centralize authority—nominally in the hands of the king but
actually in his own—and to emphasize Nepal’s ‘‘unique’’ religious identity, whose
prestige, he hoped, would protect his country’s independence from the British,
who had assumed control of most of the Indian subcontinent. As Burghart pointed
out: ‘‘Rana identity became double talk. . . . It declared its modernizing intentions
to the agents of modernity and its traditionalizing intentions to the agents of tra-
dition. . . . Gorkha’s religious identity served to resist imperialism, but as a mode
of resistance, religion became a counter for tradition.’’8
Jang Bahadur was succeeded by brothers, nephews, and great-nephews. Over
a period of 105 years (1846–1951), while four kings were restricted to their palaces,
ten Rana maharajas and prime ministers maintained autocratic rule and brah-
manical orthodoxy inNepal. Buddhist institutions, stripped of royal patronage, de-
clined, and Newars were politically and economically motivated to identify them-
selves as Hindus, at least for official purposes. By the end of the Rana era, few
Newars other than those who could not deny their religious affiliation because of
caste ascriptions, still publicly acknowledged their Buddhism. It was among these
high-caste Newar holdouts that the movement to modernize Newar Buddhism
found its first recruits.
In the 1920s and early 1930s a few young Newar men and women who re-
garded their traditional laicized form of Vajrayana Buddhism as baroquely ritualis-
tic and doctrinally obfuscated and their priests as elitist and scripturally ignorant,
began to search for a ‘‘purer’’ model.9 Some looked north to Tibet. TheKathmandu
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Valley, which stands on an ancient trade route between the Gangetic Plain and
the Trans-Himalayan region, was a conduit for the transmission of Buddhism from
India toTibet between the seventh and the thirteenth centuries. Thereafter Tibet-
ans came to regard the Valley as a ‘‘province’’ of the Tibetan hinterland and visited
the great Kathmandu Valley stupas of Namobuddha, Svayambhu, and Bauddha on
pilgrimage to the north Indian sacred sites. Although in the early years of this cen-
tury the small group of Tibetan monks who resided in the Valley were primarily
concerned with caring for the stupas and ministering to pilgrims,10 from time to
time celebrated lamas would arrive from Lhasa and elsewhere, and the teachings
they offered would attract Newar Buddhists, many of them traders with close ties
to the Tibetan plateau, as well as Tibetans.
In 1924, aNyngmapamonkKangtse Lama caused a sensation inKathmandu.
He had prostrated his way all the way from Kiyrong in Tibet, an ordeal that had
taken him more than three years. As the guest of Dharma Man Tuladhar, a Uray
merchant with extensive business in Tibet, the lama gave teachings in Kimdo
Baha, a Vajrayana Buddhist monastery near the Svayambhu stupa, where each
day he attracted more and more people, most of them Newars. After teaching the
preliminary practices of Tibetan Buddhism (Kunzang lama’l sheling ngon-dro) to a
cumulative total of several thousand people, Kangste Lama returned to Tibet in
the spring of 1925, leaving his devotees bereft.11 But they soon turned to another
Tibetan Buddhist teacher, a native of Kashmir named Tsering Norbu, who, with
government permission, established himself in a hut on Nagarjuna Hill overlook-
ing Svayambhu. Although he did not know Kangtse Lama personally, he accepted
the lama’s disciples and undertook to give them further instruction inTibetanBud-
dhism. Some of his devotees were Tibetan and some Newars, including a handful
whom he ordained as novices. After two years he was expelled, having repeatedly
come into conflict with the government because he sent his red-robed disciples
into the city to collect alms—a practice the Ranas harshly condemned, given the
strict rules of commensality laid down by the Nepal Legal Code. Accompanied by
five Newar novices, Tsering Norbu went first to India and thence made his way
back to Tibet.12
In 1927 it might have appeared that the Newars, having an elective affinity
for the Tibetan tradition, had found an alternative Buddhist model that suited
them well. But although Kangtse Lama and Tsering Norbu had sown the seeds of
revivalism, it was Theravada missionaries arriving in the Valley just a few years
later who reaped what the Tibetans had sown. Tibetan pilgrim teachers continued
to visit the Valley, and some had considerable impact; again, from time to time
Newars would take vows as Nyngmapa and Karma Kagyupa monks. But after the
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great interest that Kangtse Lama and Tsering Norbu aroused in the 1920s, their
successors never again achieved such wide appeal.
While some Newar Buddhist ‘‘seekers’’ looked—and traveled—to Tibet,
others looked and traveled to India, where they encounteredMaha Bodhimission-
ary monks at Buddhist sacred sites. Convinced that the Theravadins’ ‘‘modernist’’
interpretation of Buddhist teaching was what they had been seeking,13 they took
novice ordination (pabbajjaa) and went on to Burma and Sri Lanka, where they
studied in monastic institutions and took higher ordination (upasampadaa).14
These young Nepalese Theravadins were reformers not revolutionaries; far
from rejecting the religion of their ancestors, their goal was to purify it, namely, to
rid it of magical practices, ritual sacrifice, and caste distinctions absorbed in medi-
eval times from Hinduism, and to rebuild the community by reintroducing monas-
ticism and educating the laity, the greatmajority of whomhad no understanding of
such fundamentals of Buddhist doctrine as the Four Noble Truths. Other than for
the small priestly and merchant elite who were eligible to take esoteric initiations,
Nepal Buddhism was a social and apotropaic rather than a soteriological religion.
While emphasizing generosity to neighbors and kin and giving donations (daana)
to themonastery and its community (sangha), it provided life-cycle and protective
rituals and a community focus.
When the reformers returned to Nepal after ordination they found harsh
opposition from the Rana regime, which regarded new ideas, whether political,
religious, or literary, as a threat to the status quo.15 They harassed, imprisoned,
and even exiled the Theravadins through 1951 when, after their ousting and the
restoration of monarchial power, the missionaries were finally free to put their re-
forms into effect.16 In the years following the ‘‘coming of democracy’’ (pvajatantra),
the Theravadins launched a wide-ranging program of teaching, monastery con-
struction, scriptural translation, and vernacular publication that soon won them
a strong lay backing.17
THE ROOTS OF THERAVADA SUCCESS 1923–1951
The Ranas went to great lengths to protect Nepal from contamination, both by
democratic and egalitarian ideas, which were circulating in India, and by Chris-
tianity, whosemissionaries had been active in Bengal since the late 1700s. Further-
more, for decades their efforts were largely effective: the malaria-infested border
region blocked movement into and out of the country; only a handful of west-
erners were permitted to enter Nepal; and Nepalis from the Kathmandu Valley
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who wished to travel to India could do so only in the dry season with government
permission.
But the Ranas’ determination to seal off the country and prevent the infiltra-
tion of pernicious foreign influences was defeated, first by the mercenary soldiers,
known as Gurkhas, who, under the terms of the Sagauli Treaty (1816) with the
British, were recruited in ever greater numbers into the Indian army.18 They were
followed to their posts in India and in Buddhist Burma, which became a British
colony in 1885, by Newar Buddhist goldsmiths belonging to the priestly Shakya
caste. Though a few settled permanently in Burma, most traveled back and forth,
carrying with them a familiarity with Burmese Buddhism.
A second factor allowing the infiltration of Buddhist modernist ideas was the
Ranas’ craving for foreign goods. Despite their refusal to permit all but a hand-
ful of westerners into the country, they, their captive kings, and their courtiers de-
veloped an insatiable appetite for Western luxuries, the supplying of which
required the development of trading networks in India. The majority of these
traders were Newar merchants from the Kathmandu Valley, many of whom also
had business in Tibet.19 When, after the Younghusband expedition of 1904, the
India–Tibetan trade was rerouted from Patna–Kathmandu–Shigatse–Lhasa to
Calcutta–Kalimpong–Gyantse–Lhasa, some traders settled in Calcutta, where
they encountered and were impressed by Maha Bodhi Society missionaries who,
led by their Sri Lankan founderDharmapalaAnagarika (see Kemper, this volume),
had had their headquarters in that city since 1892.20
Nepalese students were a third conduit for ‘‘pernicious’’ ideas. In the early
years of the twentieth century, the Ranas finally acknowledged their need for
Western-educated bureaucrats. Since Jang Bahadur’s time, the Ranas had had a
palace school in which Indian, and sometimes British, teachers were employed to
instruct their sons and the sons of their counselors and courtiers;21 but until 1918
when Tri Chandra College was established, no Western-style institution of higher
learning existed in Kathmandu. Thus the government was obliged to send some
young men, including some Newars, to India, where they were exposed not only
to the incendiary ideas of the Free India movement but—at least from a Newar
Buddhist perspective—to the equally radical ideas of the Maha Bodhi Society.
The first Newar to embrace Buddhist modernism was a young Shakya from
Patan named Jagat Man Vaidya, whose father was a court physician. In 1923 Jagat
Man arrived at Calcutta University on a government scholarship to study com-
merce, a subject that Tri ChandraCollege did not offer.AftermeetingDharmapala
Anagarika, an experience so compelling that he likened it tomeeting Shakyamuni
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Buddha himself,22 he changed his name to Dharmadittya Dharmacarya, donned a
yellow robe, and dedicated himself to the revival of Newar Buddhism. His strate-
gies in this regard included publishing a journal in Hindi, Nepali, and Newari, and
learning Pali, which equipped him to translate and publish anthologies of excerpts
from canonical texts in Newari and Nepali. In addition, he founded a Buddhist
laymen’s organization in Kathmandu during his summer vacation and, in 1928,
organized an all-India Buddhist conference in Calcutta whose focus was the status
of Buddhism inNepal. Most important, although he himself was never ordained as
a monk, he pushed for the reestablishment of a monastic order. As a result of these
activities he neglected his university studies, failed his exams, lost his scholarship,
and had to return to Nepal. He spent the rest of his working life in the employ
of Bajra Ratna Kansakar, a wealthy Uray merchant who, having himself been a
devotee of Dharmapala in Calcutta, became a generous financial backer of the
Theravada mission in Kathmandu.
Why did the Maha Bodhi Society’s modernist message have a greater im-
pact on Newar Buddhists than that of the Tibetan lamas? First, the Tibetan lan-
guage presented a major problem. Although many Newars who had spent time in
Tibet spoke Tibetan, not only are written and colloquial Tibetan very different,
but the language of the Dharma is virtually unintelligible to the untutored layman.
It was very important that the Maha Bodhi Society had published Pali texts in
Hindi, which virtually all literate Nepalese could read, and also that Dharmadittya
Dharmacarya, the erstwhile commerce student, had translated lengthy canonical
passages into Newari.
Second, Tibetan Buddhism is tightly organized, with a clearly defined hier-
archy that only gradually permits non-Tibetans a position of some standing. Al-
though from time to time Newars had taken ordination, there is no record of any
having risen in the hierarchy. Rather, they remained as devotees of rimpoches and
lower-level lamas. The closed Tibetan system could hardly have appealed to most
Newar Buddhists, whether to prospective monks or to the Newar laity, who were
used to having full control of their temples.
The radical simplicity of Theravada Buddhism also held great appeal for the
Newars. To focus on the figure of themonk and on the strict worship of the Buddha
alone struck the reformers as a much more effective way of changing Newar Bud-
dhism than to adopt esoteric Tibetan practices that would only have compounded
the mysteries of their traditional Buddhism.23
Last but not least, the reformers were drawn to Theravada Buddhism because
it came not from the north but from the south, the source, for Nepalese people,
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of all things modern and progressive. Although Payne notes in this volume that
Tibetan Buddhism, as transmitted to the West in the post-1959 diaspora, has had
a markedly reformist character, in the 1930s, the Tibetan Buddhism with which
Newar Buddhists were familiar both in Kathmandu and Tibet itself was still deeply
conservative.
The first cohort of Nepalese monks and nuns were largely drawn from two
upper castes, Shakyas and Urays, who, given their involvement in international
trade, may have been more familiar with the outside world—and more receptive
to new ideas—than were members of other Newar Buddhist castes. Moreover, in
the 1920s the Uray trading community became alienated from traditional Bud-
dhism by a bitter dispute with their Vajracharya household priests. It was resolved
only by a court decision in the 1950s, by which time many Uray families had
given up calling on their priests to officiate at ritual occasions and were turning
instead to Theravada monks.24 The other group—aside from Vajracharya house-
hold priests—at the apex of the Newar Buddhist caste system are Shakya temple
priests who, through the 1950s, still called themselves ‘‘Shakyabhikshu.’’ As Shak-
yas are not household priests (purohit) and do not have patrons (jajmaan), their
priestly status does not provide them with a livelihood. Traditionally their work
has been goldsmithing and image making. Shakyas then, like Urays, had little to
lose by shifting their religious affiliation and financial support from traditional to
reformist religious institutions.
The Theravada sangha could not have survived the years of Rana persecu-
tion without the moral and practical support of the Maha Bodhi Society. The
entire first generation received first ordination from its missionaries, in particular
from Chandramani Mahasthavira, a Burmese monk who, with Dharmapala’s sup-
port, had established, in 1902, a monastery at Kushinagar, the town close to the
Nepalese border where the Buddha died (attained final release, parinibbaana).25
Chandramani and other monks in Sarnath, Bodh Gaya, and Calcutta welcomed
the Nepalis, gave them novice ordination, and organized their passages to Burma
and Sri Lanka, where they received higher ordination and religious training (see
Kemper, Chap. 1 this volume). On return, most passed through Kushinagar, where
Chandramani taught them Maha Bodhi mission strategies in large part borrowed
from Protestant missionaries in Sri Lanka and Bengal.
By the 1940s, serious opposition to the Rana regime had mobilized, provok-
ing a major crackdown not only on political ‘‘subversives,’’ but on the Theravadins
too.26 In 1944, the police stopped a monk from giving the Ten Precepts to a female
recruit and immediately thereafter ordered monastics living in Kathmandu and
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Patan to desist from teaching, performing rituals, or ordaining novices.When they
refused to comply, they were exiled to India where they joined other Nepalese emi-
grés at Sarnath. There they founded theDharmodaya Sabha, the Buddhist Society
of Nepal, with the Burmese monk Chandramani as president, a position he held
until his death at age ninety-six in 1972.27 Only after the intervention in 1946 of
the prominent Sinhalese monk Narada Mahasthavira did the government permit
the Theravadins to return to Kathmandu. Even so, for the remaining four years
of the Rana regime, their activities were closely monitored.28
TRAILBLAZERS
Central to the survival of the movement were a handful of charismatic individu-
als who combined imagination, energy, and determination with an unusual ability
to communicate. One of the most interesting was a monk named Mahapragya.29
Prem Bahadur Shrestha and a Hindu by birth, after participating enthusiastically
in both Hindu and Buddhist devotional activities as a youth in Kathmandu, he
left his wife and family to wander from temple to temple and teacher to teacher
in north India in search of a more profound spiritual truth than he believed Nepal
could provide. In 1924 he was back in Kathmandu, where he heard Kangtse Lama’s
discourses on Tibetan Buddhist practice. When the lama left for Tibet, Maha-
pragya followed and received ordination as a Nyngmapamonk across the border in
Kiyrong. He subsequently returned to the Valley, where he spent two years as a dis-
ciple of the Kashmiri lama, Tsering Norbu.When his teacher was expelled to India
by the Ranas—in part this was because, by accepting Mahapragya (who had been
born a Hindu) as his disciple Tsering Norbu had broken the law against conver-
sion—Mahapragya and fourNewar novice companions elected to go on pilgrimage
with him to Bodh Gaya. There, according to his autobiography, teacher as well as
disciples were so impressed by the Burmese missionary monks they encountered
that they took novice ordination according to Theravada rites. From Bodh Gaya
the group proceeded to Calcutta where they met Dharmadittya Dharmacarya. Al-
thoughMahapragya, in particular, wasmuch stirred by what he had heard and read
in Bodh Gaya and Calcutta, he still considered himself Tsering Norbu’s disciple,
and, when his teacher invited to him to Tibet, he accepted.
In 1927,making yet another turnabout,Mahapragya was ordained as aGeluk
monk in Lhasa and, because his teachings on the Lam Rim Path were thought to
be so effective, received authorization to ordain novices himself. But instead of re-
maining in Lhasa and pursuing further studies, he wandered about central Tibet,
living on alms. As a result of the altitude, the harsh climate, and a steady diet of
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tsampa, he became very sick and, returning to Lhasa, was treated by a Uray doctor
(vaidya) named Kul Man Singh Tuladhar, who restored him to health.
Having convinced his doctor to renounce lay life, abandonhis wife and child,
and take ordination with the new name Karmasila, Mahapragya set off with him
to Shigatse. After almost a year meditating in a cave, the two men left for India,
dissatisfied with the ‘‘fruits’’ of their retreat. Mahapragya had been mulling over
what he had learned about Theravada Buddhism in India and now was eager to
learn more. Arriving in Kushinagar, he and his companion committed themselves
to Chandramani’s tutelage and soon received novice ordination—Mahapragya for
the second time. When, in 1930, Mahapragya and Pragyananda—as Kul Man
Singh/Karmasila had become at Theravada ordination—returned to Kathmandu
in their ochre robes and began to preach in public places, where they attracted not
only enthusiastic devotees but enduring government hostility.
In 1946 Mahapragya disrobed and married a widow in Kalimpong. While
earning his living as a photographer, he continued to teach Theravada Buddhism
in the large Newar community of Kalimpong. He also published a book in Newari
entitled The Sensible Buddhist Life, which over the years reached a wide readership.
Eventually he once again renounced householder life, returned to Kathmandu,
and settled in a small house that his devotees built for him near the city center.
Since he had broken the celibacy vow and hencewas ‘‘onewho had fallen’’ (paaraa-
jika), he was definitively barred from ordaining as a monk a second time. Thus
he called himself ‘‘Buddhist sage’’ (bauddha rishi), rather than monk (bhikkhu), and
wore a long beard and maroon Tibetan dress. A dynamic preacher and teacher, he
continued to attract a large following until his death in 1978.
Women, too, were among the Buddhist revival’s earliest recruits. In the
1920s, a few Uray wives and widows studied Buddhist books with a widow named
Laxminani Tuladhar. Hearing of their activities, Prime Minister Chandra Sham-
sher Rana summoned them to his palace and told them their behavior ill befitted
females. According to Hindu tradition, religious texts were for male eyes only. He
ordered them to return to their houses and take care of their families!30
Laxminani, the leader of the group, had lost her husband and childrenwithin
a short period and turned for solace to the Tibetanmonks—first Kangtse Lama and
later Tsering Norbu. One of the very few literate Newar women of her generation,
she read whatever Buddhist books in Newari, Nepali, and Hindi she could lay her
hands on and taught her illiterate friends what she learned.31 In the early 1930s,
she converted to Theravada Buddhism. In the aftermath of the great earthquake
of 1934, having enraged her in-laws by distributing the contents of their shop to
starving townspeople, she and five of her followers traveled to Arakan in Burma.
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There they took the Precepts and received Dharma names. Since the Theravada
bhikkhuni ordination lineage had died out a millennium earlier,32 they were given
the appellation anaagaarikaa, meaning ‘‘female homeless one,’’ by their preceptor.
Although as ‘‘ordained lay women’’ they were excluded from the Nepalese
monastic order, on their return to Kathmandu, having nowhere else to go, they
settled in Kimdo Baha, the samemonastery in which Kangtse Lama had electrified
large audiences with his teachings years before. Their housemates at Kimdo were
an eclectic group of monastics—a handful of Tibetans, a half-dozen Theravada
monks, a Vajrayana tantric with his two shakti consorts, and three Newar nuns
who had preceded them into ‘‘homelessness’’ in 1931.33
Despite having to contend with government persecution and the determina-
tion of the bhantes (monks) to keep the gurumaas (mother-teachers, as nuns were
called locally) subordinated, Dharmacari (Laxminani’s ordination name) held her
own. Eventually, tired of harassment by their male companions and lay gossip—
rumor had it that Dharmacari had given birth to a baby fathered by a monk—the
nuns moved to separate quarters that Dharmacari built with personal funds and
donations from her devotees. The nunnery soon became a center of learning for
Buddhist women from the Kathmandu Valley and beyond, a role it played until
Dharmacari died at age eighty—within months of Mahapragya—in 1978.
STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS 1951–1980
Shortly before the ousting of the Ranas and the ‘‘restoration’’ of the monarchy in
1951, the Theravadins listed their objectives in the journal of the Buddhist Society
of Nepal, which was being published in Kalimpong, India, due to government cen-
sorship. Their objectives, many adopted from the Maha Bodhi Society’s program,
were:
1. To open Buddhist schools all over Nepal;
2. To build a vihara, as the Theravada monasteries are called, in every
town or village with a substantial Newar Buddhist population, and to
have one or two monks in residence to provide religious instruction and
free medical services;
3. To publish canonical texts and other books in Nepali and Newari;
4. To educate Nepalis to propagate Buddhism;
5. To publish two journals, one in Nepali and one in English;
6. To persuade Nepalese officials to preserve ancient Buddhist monuments
at Lumbini and Kapilavastu;
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7. To encourage Buddhists of other countries to visit Nepal and offer facili-
ties to Buddhist scholars;
8. To guard against members of other faiths making converts within the
Buddhist community.34
As soon as they were permitted to work openly, the Theravadins set about
making their blueprint a reality. But they faced many obstacles, not the least being
their small number—in 1950 there were only about twenty monks and novices,
and thirty nuns—and lack of government backing. In Thailand and Burma, Bud-
dhism is the state religion; until its disestablishment by the British in the nine-
teenth century, Buddhism was the state religion of Sri Lanka too, and although it
languished during the colonial period, in the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury Buddhism, in its modernist form, received the endorsement of the nationalist
movement.Moreover, the constitution that Sri Lanka adopted after independence
in 1947 afforded Buddhism special state protection. Initially the Nepali Thera-
vadins found King Tribuvan well-disposed toward Theravada Buddhism, as it was
a welcome alternative to the brahmanical orthodoxy of the Ranas, his erstwhile
jailors. In 1955, however, with King Tribhuvan’s death and the succession to the
throne of his son King Mahendra, state backing for the Theravada movement,
brief as it had been, soon disappeared.
What alternative sources of support were available? On the one hand, there
was a small group of progressive Newar Buddhist merchants who were disaffected
with traditional Buddhism; and on the other, there were the foreign networks that
the Theravadins had begun to develop during their years of training and exile
abroad.
A Nepalese law forbade religious conversion.35 Thus the Theravadins were
only permitted to approach people who were already Buddhist by birth. Although
they might, with impunity, have sought converts among Tamangs and other sub-
montane ethnic groups who followed the Tibetan tradition, their efforts in the
early years were primarily focused on their ownNewar community. They soon real-
ized that Newar Buddhists needed to be wooed with what was familiar as well as
with what was new. In a word, to be acceptable, Buddhist ‘‘modernism’’ would have
to be domesticated,36 or, to borrow the concept that Tanabe uses with regard to
Japanese Buddhism in Hawai‘i (see Chap. 3), ‘‘cross-pollination’’ would have to
take place.
The monks chose carefully where to incorporate local practice and where
to take a stand against it.37 Male members of the lay community, which at this
point was still largely drawn from the upper castes, were accustomed to being cen-
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trally involved in the running of the ancient monastic institutions (bahaaas) to
which, by virtue of patrilineal descent, they belonged. Similarly, they expected to
be centrally involved in the new viharas—for which they were now providing land,
construction and maintenance costs. Thus the monks needed to allow the laity a
much more prominent role in the administration of their viharas than was the case
elsewhere in the Theravada world.
Second, although Buddhism itself rejects caste within the sangha, caste in
some form is a reality in a number of Buddhist societies, including that of the
Newars.38 At least since the fourteenth century, if not long before, it has been a
highly stratified society. Furthermore, even if the Newar caste system had once
been quite flexible, in 1854 Jang Bahadur Rana’s legal code had established an im-
mutable six-level hierarchy with rules of commensality that all Newars—Hindu
and Buddhist alike—were required to obey.39 Thus a majority of laypeople and
mostmonks also were opposed tomonks’—all of whom, at this juncture, were from
upper castes—accepting boiled rice (kacca bhat), their staple food, as alms from
people belonging to a caste lower than their own.40 This meant that, since middle-
caste farmers composed the majority in most Newar communities, the alms round
produced very little food, and sometimes none at all.41 Thus, although the monks’
alms round was a prominent feature in some of the Buddhist countries where the
Nepali monks had received their training, back home they were soon obliged to
abandon it. They asked instead that devotees donate uncooked food and cash di-
rectly to the monastery, and they promoted other ways by which merit could be
earned, such as sponsoring rituals, providing robes (civara), financing the publica-
tion of Buddhist books, and going on pilgrimages.42
The monks initiated vigorous campaigns against certain practices that they
identified as Hindu—principally, blood sacrifice to family deities. But others, such
as the performance of death rituals (shraddha) for the ancestors, they endorsed.
In addition they endorsed certain Vajrayana practices. These included putting on
plays based on Buddhist stories and making the month of Gunla (August-Septem-
ber), traditionally a time of intense devotional activity, a period of daily preaching
in the monastery itself and in public spaces. They also encouraged the singing of
devotional songs at public events.Whereas traditional Newar Buddhist groups had
sung hymns (strota) on festival days in front of the main shrine of a temple, the
Theravadins composed their own songs, which they had lay members of the com-
munity sing both in the new viharas and in alcoves in the old monasteries. Stimu-
lated by regularly scheduled competitions, these gyanmala (garland of wisdom)
groups, as they were called, proliferated and soon became a prominent feature of
Theravada community life.
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Resolved to simplify or even eliminate rituals they deemed anachronistic
or overly elaborate, the monks began to assume certain functions of Vajracarya
household priests, such as the administration of life-cycle rites, including an alter-
native to a ritual for preadolescent Newar boys of nonpriestly castes (kaytaa puuja).
The nuns followed suit with aTheravada alternative to the girls’ puberty rite (barha
tayegu). Children who participated in these alternative rites spent a week or ten
days in a monastery or nunnery dressed as novice monks (saamaneras) and proba-
tionary nuns (rishini); they took eight or ten precepts, memorized texts to chant
during Buddha Puja (the principal Theravada devotional ritual) and studied core
doctrines of Buddhism. These temporary ordination rites became popular both
with parents, who could thereby avoid the expense of providing a feast for several
hundred kinfolk and friends, as the traditional rites required, and with children,
who enjoyed living and playing with age mates away from home.43 Just as Soka
Gakkai’s success in Brazil in recent decades has resulted in part from incorporating
practices from other religions, notably Roman Catholicism (see Clarke, Chap. 5),
so too has the incorporation of numerous Hindu and Vajrayana practices helped
Theravada Buddhism to broaden its appeal. Newars have embraced this ‘‘cross-
pollinated’’ message because it seems to point the way to a wider world without
requiring that one stray too far from the familiar: to the intensely community-
focused religion of the ancient monastery has been added the textually focused
religion of the vihara in which, with like-minded people, the devoteemay work out
his or her own salvation with diligence. Although help in this regard is available
from monks and nuns, in sharp contrast with traditional Newar Buddhist practice
no priestly intercessor is necessary.
But while the Theravada lay community expanded rapidly in the years fol-
lowing the ousting of the Ranas, recruits to the monks’ order remained few and far
between. Themonastic tradition in Newar Buddhism had died out many centuries
ago, and the fact that it was taking more than one generation to become firmly
reestablished should hardly come as a surprise. First, the celibacy rule was exceed-
ingly difficult to keep, andmonks too often lapsed. Second, before the 1970s, given
that few Nepali children, other than elite males, had any formal schooling, secu-
lar education was considered unnecessary for a monk. So novices spent most of
their time doing domestic work: they cleaned the rooms, cooked the food, washed
the clothes, and massaged the backs and limbs of their teachers. Meanwhile the
religious instruction they received was limited. They learned to chant in Pali with
little understanding of what they were chanting; they read vernacular translations
of Jataka stories and verses from the Dhammapada; and sometimes they learned to
practice meditation techniques, notably anapana, which focused on watching the
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breath, and kesaloma, which involved contemplation of bodily decay as a means
of understanding impermanence (anicca). All the novices were being equipped to
do was to perform daily devotional rituals, receive donations, and serve as fields of
merit, a career that few boys or their parents found attractive.
Given that rigorous religious training could only be had abroad, Bhikkhu
Amritananda, the secretary of the Dharmodaya Sabha (the Buddhist Society of
Nepal), was assiduous in his efforts to develop networks that might provide it.
At the Fourth World Fellowship of Buddhists Conference, held in Kathmandu in
October 1956, six months after the celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the
birth of the Buddha, the Buddhist world made much both of the central role of
Nepal as the birthplace of the Buddha and of the nascent Nepalese Theravada
community’s need for foreign support.44 Amritananda, who had been trained in
Vajirarama Monastery in Colombo in the 1930s and 1940s, began to travel abroad
to Theravada countries and also to Communist China,Mongolia, andNorth Viet-
nam in order to strengthen ties and make new ones with people and institutions
that might provide training for Nepalese novices. While Amritananda’s trips to
communist countries did not bear fruit, Nepalese novices began to receive invita-
tions and sponsorship from Buddhist institutions in Burma, Sri Lanka, and, later,
in Thailand andTaiwan as well. Attempts to secure the help of foreignmissionaries
was less successful, however. Some came to visit but very few stayed on.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: WHAT LIES AHEAD?
Without doubt, the charismatic Theravadin pioneers accomplished a great deal.
Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century every goal set by the Dharmodaya
Sabha in 1950 had been met. By selectively incorporating features of traditional
Newar Buddhism into their modernist framework, the Theravadins had offered
their devotees freedom to pursue personal goals within familiar sociocentric struc-
tures. They had put in place a multifaceted program to serve a burgeoning com-
munity, whose members had found in the Theravada movement a way of defining
themselves as progressive without being obliged to turn their backs on traditional
ritual or renounce core beliefs.45 By 2000, in addition to being close to complet-
ing the translation into Newari of the entire Pali canon, they had published more
than five hundred vernacular books on Buddhist topics, which they encouraged—
even hounded—their devotees to read.
But their achievements do not obscure serious structural flaws. Among these
are the continued lack of support from the government. According to the con-
stitution adopted after the 1990 revolution, Nepal is defined as a ‘‘multi-ethnic,
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
7
4
o
f
2
5
6
Theravada Domestic Mission in Nepal • 65
multilingual, democratic, independent, indivisable, sovereign,ConstitutionalMo-
narchical Kingdom’’; nevertheless, it remains Hindu.46
Again, the first charismatic generation, all of whose members are either dead
or very old, has not been replaced. Today the sangha lacks leadership strong enough
to bring consensus on issues of policy and practice. Networking by Bhikkhu Am-
ritananda and others provided religious training for recruits to the order, but this
has come at a price. For the most part, novices go abroad in adolescence and stay
abroad for many years in countries where not only is Buddhism the state religion,
with all the prestige that implies, but that are far more developed and affluent
than their own. To the seventeen-year-old Nepalese novice newly arrived from a
village in the Kathmandu Valley, the sumptuous wats of Bangkok look more like
palaces than monasteries, and the resident monks, with their plethora of posses-
sions, including laptop computers, boomboxes andTVs,more like sons of privilege
than ascetics. Meanwhile, outside the monastery walls life in the streets—through
which novices pass daily on the alms round—beckons seductively. The medita-
tion centers of Rangoon and Sagain, where young Nepali monks and nuns are also
trained,47 may be somewhat more austere, but even so, they too are lavishly sup-
ported and equipped by theBurmese laity, which, according to some estimates, give
one-quarter of their annual income in daana. Many Nepali novices never make it
back to Nepal. With their near-native fluency in the language and their degrees
from Buddhist universities, whether as monks or, after disrobing, as laymen, they
make a life for themselves in Sri Lanka, Thailand, and elsewhere.
When those who resist the lures of Colombo and Bangkok do return home,
not only do they feel like strangers in their impoverished native land, but they find,
instead of a cohesive community whose leaders are in agreement on goals, a col-
lection of individuals trained in different countries, wedded to different traditions,
each with his own priorities and constituency. In the post-mission era, the frontier
mentality of each man (monk) for himself has failed to shift to one of collabora-
tion. In the absence of energetic and appealing leaders offering them challenging
roles, the exigencies and tedium of monastic discipline are more than most can
tolerate for long. Ashok, a monk newly returned from training in Vajirarama, in
a suburb of Colombo, which gave social work and buddha dharma equal emphasis,
reported that several abbots had invited him to live in their monasteries but he
had refused.48 ‘‘I could see the monks in those places weren’t doing anything—just
performing (protective) rituals, receiving donations, and eating in the houses of
devotees. . . . All most of them do is give laypeople the chance to earn merit. But
I was trained to do work among the poor and that’s what I intend to do, not sit in
the vihara!’’49
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Offered a room in the corner of a dilapidated Newar monastery, Ashok ac-
cepted it. He lived by himself, did his own housekeeping, and, with little support
from the community, which had never had a Theravadamonk living in their midst
before, began putting a program of his own design in place. His living conditions
were not easy: his roof leaked; he sometimes went without a main midday meal;
his nights were frequently disturbed by local people coming to the courtyard to
feast and get drunk. But at least, as he said, he was doing what he had been trained
to do.
Unfortunately, only a few monks of Ashok’s generation have the determi-
nation to pursue their own goals. Most, lacking Ashok’s purposefulness, become
discouraged. Keshab, who returned after ten years in Thailand to live in the same
monastery as his teacher, failed to find the guidance he needed to make his way in
the steadily secularizing culture of Kathmandu. ‘‘My guru kept me in the monas-
tery. . . . So there I was, day after day. He didn’t let me use my training. He had no
plans of his own forme, and he rejectedmine.’’ After three years of increasing bore-
dom and irritation Keshab, potential leadership material, returned to Thailand,
where he disrobed.50
For a while it looked as if vipassana (insight)meditation, introduced toNepal
in the early 1980s by the celebrated Burmese ‘‘teacher-monk’’Mahasi Sayadaw and
the Indian lay meditation master S. N. Goenka, would provide a new focus for
the sangha. Prior to this time most monks who studied abroad learned meditation
practices that they would teach to other monks and to a select group of especially
devout laypeople; but for the most part the laity regarded meditation as esoteric
and not for them. Today, by contrast, in addition to two large meditation centers
in Kathmandu and a third at Lumbini, most viharas offer daily meditation sessions.
But despite the great interest generated by vipassana in the lay community,
long-standing problems still threaten the sangha with stagnation. Not least of
these is the failure to retain recruits. The sangha emerged from long years of perse-
cution under the Ranas numbering only 20monks; thirty years later, there were 60
monks and 72 novices, many of whom were in training abroad and, as it emerged,
disrobed on completion of their studies.51 In 2001 there were reported to be 161
Nepali monks and novices.52 But although boys and young men continue to join
the order, the problem of ‘‘seepage’’ is far from solved: those 161 include dozens
who, though still ‘‘on the books,’’ went abroad for training and whose whereabouts
are no longer known. In sum, it is thought that, without informing their teachers
back home, they simply disrobed.
Ex-monks cite various reasons for their decision to disrobe, lack of ‘‘job satis-
faction’’ being the one they discussmost freely. However, sexual frustration appears
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to be the main reason, although they are more likely to say that their families pres-
sured them to marry than to admit that they left the order because celibacy had
become intolerable. Elsewhere in the Theravada world temporary ordination is a
prominent feature of religious life: Thai and Burmese males are required to ordain
for at least a short period prior to marriage, and although these days many ignore
the rule, a majority continues to conform. Should a monk disrobe even after a
period of several years, few will find fault with him. But Thailand and Burma are
Buddhist countries in which there is no shortage of monks who ordain for life.
Nepal, on the other hand, is the world’s only official Hindu kingdom. The Thera-
vada Buddhist lay community consists of only a few thousand committed members
for whomeachmonk represents a significant investment of time,money, and hope.
Such a small community cannot afford for its monks to disrobe and, despite the
frequency of this occurrence, is dismayed when they do. One abbot, who had sent
fifteen novices to Thailand, none of whom had returned, lived in a great echoing
monastery with three other monks, one of whom was an octogenarian while the
other two appeared to be mentally ill. Of his revolving-door efforts at recruitment,
he remarked resignedly, ‘‘PerhapsNewarmen aren’t really suited to bemonks. . . .’’53
THE GENDER GAP
Today it is the nuns’ order, not the monks’, that provides the Theravada com-
munity’s most vigorous leadership. While, in a rapidly secularizing society that is
ever more closely tied into the once remote wider world by the internet and cable
TV, a monastic career holds little appeal for the brightest and best young Newar
men, young Newar women, some of whom are from well-to-do families and al-
ready hold university degrees, continue to renounce lay life. Already by the 1970s,
Vajracharya, Shakya, and Uray families, well placed to receive the first fruits of
the ‘‘foreign aid economy,’’ were sending their sons to newly established second-
ary schools; if afterward they sent them abroad it was to universities in Britain,
China, and theUnited States to study engineering and economics rather than bud-
dha dharma in monastic institutions in South and Southeast Asia. Whereas in the
first mission generation, monastic recruits had come exclusively from the upper
castes, by the 1980s middle- and occupational-caste boys, some from deeply im-
poverished families, had replaced them. Ordination offered them the education
that their parents could not provide.
But although recruitment of monks from privileged backgrounds has now al-
most entirely ceased, young women from Buddhist families are quite likely to see
the monastic life as a prestigious career choice. In their view, far from being intol-
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erably restrictive, celibacy offers a precious freedom, a liberation from an arranged
marriage and the ‘‘tyranny’’ of the joint family—still the domestic arrangement
of choice for the majority of Newars—and an opportunity to focus on meditation
practice, perform meaningful work in the community, and travel abroad. Were
there space to accommodate them—nunneries are generally less spacious and less
well-equipped than monasteries—the nuns’ order would have many more recruits
than it does. Furthermore, unlike the monks, once having ‘‘shaved their heads,’’
few nuns return to lay life.54
Almost from the outset in the 1930s and 1940s, nuns outnumbered monks.
But in the first missionary cohort virtually all of them—including their leader,
Dharmacari—were widows and rejected wives at themargins of Newar society. Al-
though at that time neither monks nor nuns had been to school, all the monks had
somehow acquired literacy skills before joining the order, whereas this was true of
few nuns.
After ordination, most male novices had the chance to study abroad, where
they learned Pali and Sanskrit, Burmese or Sinhala, and some, English or Japa-
nese. They were absorbed into a tradition with its own particular worldview and,
on returning to their homeland, attempted to live according to its values. Some
were impressively productive: they translated scriptures and wrote commentaries
and textbooks; they set up health clinics and established primary schools in the
capital; they preached the Dharma in remote villages and on the radio, and later,
on TV.
Meanwhile, in their monasteries these monks reproduced their gurus’ tastes
and esthetics, down to the smallest detail. The chair on which a monk sat, the
small round table at which he ate, the cushion on which he meditated, as well
as the books he read, might replicate exactly what he had seen in his Burmese
teacher’s rooms. This identification with the guru was rarely reinforced by face-to-
face contact, however. Decades might go by before a student had the opportunity
to visit his teacher, if he ever did. In the meantime, reluctant to share his intimate
concerns with colleagues trained under different teachers in different countries, he
kept them to himself. A missionary, albeit a missionary working in his own society,
could feel extremely isolated.
In contrast, few in the first generation of nuns were equipped to do much
more than chant and perform Buddha Puja, for which they received alms. If ever
they traveled outside the country, theywent as pilgrims, not as students. In 1944/45
themonks whowere living in Kathmandu were expelled to India, where they ener-
getically developed networks among Maha Bodhi missionaries at Sarnath, Bodh
Gaya, and Calcutta that in time would provide sources of funding and opportuni-
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ties for study abroad.Meanwhile, the nuns, led byDharmacari, took themselves off
to Trisuli, a market town with a large Newar population less than one day’s jour-
ney from the capital. Unlike the monks’ exile, theirs hardly gave them the chance
to make influential contacts.
But in the 1960s a handful of young nuns who had had the opportunity—
rare for female recruits—to study in Burma, returned to Nepal. The leader of the
group was Dhammawati, a Shakya woman then aged twenty-eight, who had just
attained the Dharmacarya, the highest level of Buddhist studies, in Kemarama
nunnery in Moulmein.55 Invited to remain in Burma where she had already devel-
oped a reputation as an able scholar and teacher, she made the decision to return
to her country to teach the Dharma in her own community. She recalled many
years later that coming back to Nepal was like going to hell from heaven. Whereas
in Burma women were almost the equals of men—and nuns almost the equals of
monks—inNepal ‘‘they were down, down, down.’’56 Within a short time she found
herself in conflict with the senior monks, who barred her, as a ten-precept lay-
woman, from preaching in their viharas, even though as a Dharmacarya holder—
a distinction no Nepalese monk at that date had achieved—technically she was
better qualified than anyone else in the community to do so. But she bit her tongue
and decided that the best strategy would be to construct a life for herself and her
companions that would allow them as great a degree of independence as possible
from the monks. Instead of joining Dharmacari and the other formerly married
nuns in Kimdol Vihara, she and her ‘‘virgin’’ companions decided to live separately.
With donations from relatives and friends, Dhammawati built a nunnery in
the center of Kathmandu, which she named Dharmakirti Vihara. Over the next
decade she and her colleagues created their own program of teaching, publishing,
and social service, while ignoring as far as possible the senior monks’ attempts to
restrict their activities. Dharmakirti Vihara soon took over from Kimdol Vihara as
a meeting place and focus of religious activity for Theravada laywomen.57
Although the nuns were earning the respect and esteem of the community,
their model of how to proceed was still based on what had become familiar to them
in the nunnery where they had all been trained in Burma. In their view, only reli-
gious education was necessary for a nun; secular education was peripheral to their
interests and a distraction. When young recruits to the nuns’ order asked permis-
sion to continue with their studies, their elders strongly discouraged them. One
nun remembers that, although after a long battle she was permitted to enroll in
the university, her abbess, Dhammawati, required her to do so as an ‘‘external stu-
dent.’’ As a nun, it would be inappropriate for her to attend lectures with members
of the opposite sex!
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Not until the late 1980s did Dhammawati change her views in this regard.
Invited to the first International Conference on Buddhist Women at Bodh Gaya
in 1987, she was exposed to the views of nuns and laywomen from many coun-
tries, many of whom were struggling to attain equality and respect in societies as
male-dominated as her own. She had never much valued secular education until
the conference where, because she knew no English, the language in which the
proceedings were conducted, she was dependent on a male interpreter, a devotee
from the Dharmakirti community who had accompanied her to India.
Dhammawati herself had had no formal secular schooling; she had learned
to read at home from the tutor her father had engaged to teach her brothers. Until
now, her educational model had been Burmese, which focused on mastering San-
skrit and Pali and committing the Tripitaka to memory. Bodh Gaya opened up
a new world to her. She started to imagine how different things could be in her
community and soon resolved, despite the financial burden this would involve,
to provide the young nuns in her charge with as much secular education as their
talents merited.58 Whereas once she had actively discouraged them from study-
ing, now, having understood that gender equality would never be conceded by the
monks but would have to be claimed by nuns who were as well-prepared as they, she
insisted that they study. Most important, although it was too late for her to learn
English or Chinese, now was their chance. In Bodh Gaya she had come to realize
that the cutting edge of Buddhism was not in conservative Burma or Thailand as
she had long believed, but in Taiwan and Sri Lanka. For Nepalese nuns, participa-
tion in modern international Buddhist discourse required their knowing modern,
international languages as well as Sanskrit and Pali.
As of 2003 virtually all Nepalese nuns under the age of thirty are enrolled
in educational programs. The younger ones study in government schools and the
older ones in colleges. At least two dozen are studying abroad, many in institutions
to whichDhammawati’s contacts, carefully cultivated since BodhGaya and at sub-
sequent international meetings, have given them access. Although the majority
are studying in nunneries, Nepalese nuns are also enrolled in Buddhist colleges
and universities in Burma, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan. Whether, as a result
of exposure to the lures of economic development in these countries, these young
nuns eventually will disrobe like the novice monks remains to be seen.
A second equally important outcome of the 1987 Sakyadhita conference has
been the nuns’ success in their pursuit of full ordination. At BodhGaya, Dhamma-
wati heard the Dalai Lama himself encourage nuns, in whose tradition female
ordination had either never been established (Tibet) or, as in the case of Thera-
vada, had died out, to take higher ordination from Chinese or Taiwanese Maha-
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yana monks and nuns whose ordination lineages had survived.59 Almost to a man,
Theravada monks maintained—and today still maintain—that Theravada nuns’
ordination, having vanished, could never be revived. Furthermore, in their view
the Chinese ordination rite is inauthentic so far as Theravada nuns are concerned,
even though it is believed to have been brought toChina in 433C.E. by Sri Lankan
nuns.60 Indeed, until she heard the address of His Holiness and the protracted dis-
cussions of the issue during conference sessions, this had been Dhammawati’s own
view. Knowing that the senior Nepali monks would never give their consent, in
December 1988 Dhammawati and two other nuns traveled secretly to the United
States to take full ordination according to Chinese rites at the Taiwanese Foguang
Shan Buddhist Order’s California branch Hsi Lai Monastery in Los Angeles. By
2003, despite the entrenched opposition of their monk preceptors, of the roughly
one hundred members of the nuns’ order who are old enough to ordain (twenty
years), forty-two had traveled to China (Guangdong, December 1997; Shanghai,
May 2002), Taiwan (Foguang Shan Monastery, on several occasions), and India
(Bodh Gaya, 1998) to take full ordination.61 The Bhikkhuni Vibanga (Deportment
rules) require that ten fully ordained nuns as well as ten fully ordained monks, all
of whom have themselves been ordained for at least twelve years, be in attendance
at a nun’s full ordination rite. In 2010 the waiting period will have expired, and
for the first time in history full ordination for nuns will be available in Nepal.62
Although to date the senior nuns admit that finding ten monks who are willing to
participate in the ritual might still be difficult, they are optimistic. They believe
that everything, even the most recalcitrant opposition, is impermanent.
CONCLUSION
With very few exceptions, the senior members of the Nepali monks’ order who,
as novices and young missionary monks, once represented the dedicated, schol-
arly, and energetic best of Buddhist modernism have become, in old age, arch-
conservatives. Their response to the massive socioeconomic changes that are
sweeping Nepal, as well as everywhere else in the region, is to dig in their heels and
refuse to adjust to a changed reality. ‘‘It is only because of the Vinaya that Bud-
dhism has survived for 2,500 years. If we relax the rules now, we are lost,’’ one abbot
intoned to me. Laypeople still respect the monks; they have not forgotten their
good work, but they are deserting their monasteries—elaborate structures built
with Thai and Malaysian funds—and are flocking to the more easily approachable
gurumaaswhose nunneries, built with local contributions, are generallymoremod-
est. For today, with the exception of a very few young monks, it is the gurumaas
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whose Dharma talks people want to hear. Approaching seventy, Dhammawati is
still a workaholic, and several of her disciples are cut from the same cloth.Whereas
once it was the monks who preached the Dharma in Newar villages, now it is the
nuns in their spotless pink and orange dresses who travel by bus, truck, bicycle,
and on foot beyond the limits of the Newar world to Tibetan Buddhist settlements
in the Himalayas and to Muslim villages in the Terai. It is they, rather than the
monks, who are the Theravada missionaries of the new millennium.
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3 Grafting Identity: The HawaiianBranches of the Bodhi Tree
George J. Tanabe, Jr.
Japanese Buddhism in Hawai‘i for the last thirty years has been suffering a slow
but certain death. Temple memberships continue to drop, rural temples often do
not have permanent ministers, and, most ominous, young people are noticeably
disinterested. Temple leaders and ministers constantly worry about the bleeding,
unable to stop the flow. In the early 1960s there were about fifty thousand Bud-
dhists inHawai‘i, of whom about half belonged to theHonpaHonganji sect. Today
there are approximately twenty thousand Buddhists, of whom eight thousand are
Honpa members.1 The numbers decline year by year, quietly because there is no
overt pressure forcing the exodus, voluntarily because people freely choose not to
belong.
The most widely recognized cause of this demise is Americanization of Japa-
nese Americans. Like other immigrant groups, Japanese Americans have been fol-
lowing a straight-linemodel of acculturation by which each succeeding generation
becomes more American, less Japanese. Language is the most obvious indicator:
the first generation (issei) spoke only Japanese, the second generation (nisei) was
mostly bilingual, and the third generation on (sansei, yonsei, etc.) speak only En-
glish. Traditional customs have followed the same linear decline. Of the many
agents of Americanization the Buddhist temples themselves played an extremely
important role in promoting the making of good civic and cultural citizens of
America. Temple members worked hard to ensure that their children would be
more successful Americans than they, and their resultant success is a matter of
record and intense pride. They untied the ties of Japanese cultural and religious
attachment and let go of their youth, and many of those who left the temples did
not return. Victims of their own desired success, the temples unwittingly slit their
own wrists, committing slow suicide.
Although local Buddhist temples borrowed Christian-style pulpits, pews, or-
gans, Sunday schools (now called Dharma schools), and hymnals, these adapta-
tions have not gone far enough to satisfy those who find the temples too Japanese
for their American tastes. The perceived pattern of temple assimilation, however,
is still understood along the lines charted for the acculturation of the people: a
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straight line of increasing Americanization. The difference between the two is one
of degree, and both lines charted on a graph would be parallel, the one for temple
assimilation being below that for the people. The gap between the two is the rea-
son for the departure of the young people. Revival, if there is to be one, must take
the form of increased Americanization on the part of the temples in order to close
the gap, to make the two lines coincide, to replace, in effect, the ethnic Japanese
elements with American ones.
Employing ideas of assimilation, acculturation, adaptation, and syncretism,
this linear model of social process can be traced back to sociologists active at
the University of Hawai‘i in the twenties and thirties. In 1920 Romanzo Adams
was appointed the first professor of sociology and economics at the university and
continued to be the guiding inspiration for a generation of faculty and students
carrying out research in Hawai‘i. His view of cultural assimilation was the clas-
sic melting-pot model, which posited an ever-increasing blending of cultures that
made up a thick brew he called Americanism.
While most Japanese Americans in Hawai‘i have embraced the melting-pot
ideal instead of an ideology of multicultural diversity that locates identity in a
single (ironically, nondiverse) culture, the Buddhist temples have locked them-
selves into a religious culture that is westernized on the surface but remains un-
assimilated at its core. This has not been due to a deliberate social ideology, but
to a conservatism rooted in the very heart of Japanese Buddhist missions that did
not seek to convert foreigners but to maintain the home culture and religion. This
nondiversified religious core keeps Buddhism essentially Japanese, and is thus a
showcase for multicultural diversity in modern Hawai‘i.
The problemwithAdams’melting-potmodel is not that it is wrong—it accu-
rately describes the assimilative process Japanese Americans have chosen—but
that it does not explain how or why Buddhist temples remain outside the pot, re-
fusing to be melted at their core. It does not explain the historical development
of local Buddhism, which embarked in the early twentieth century on a conscious
campaign to assimilate itself into the American melting pot, but then followed a
bumpy road of decreasing Americanization, at least in doctrinal and ritual terms.
The call for a nonethnic or transethnic universal Buddhism, which a model of lin-
ear assimilation would expect in later rather than earlier stages, was made in the
early twentieth century, peaked around the thirties, and now remains a mostly for-
gotten vestige in the postwar period, even though calls for an internationalized or
globalized Buddhism are periodically heard.2 In important ways, there has been an
increase in a Japanization representing a reversal of the assimilation process.
By their nature, models of assimilation are interested in adaptive change and
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ignore inherited elements that refuse to change. What we need, therefore, is a
more complex model that can account for the nonassimilation of the discrete in-
gredients of the tossed salad as well as the assimilation of the melting pot. Instead
of using lines in a geometry of change, I propose an organic model drawn from
horticulture. The use of plants as cultural metaphors is not new, and we commonly
speak of seeds of change, branches of institutions, roots of identity, the flowering
of culture, and so forth. This diction, in fact, was used often by the early Buddhist
leaders in Hawai‘i. Horticulture is particularly suggestive of human affairs because
it deals with the invasive methods of manipulating growth through transplanting,
cross-pollinating, pruning, and grafting. Cultural processes can be fruitfully sub-
jected to horticultural analysis, and after defining thesemanipulative techniques, I
will argue that the transplanted rootstock of Japanese Buddhism established itself
firmly in Hawai‘i’s soil and continues to exist unmodified as a family or ancestral
(and therefore mostly ethnic) religion. I shall also argue that a variety of branches
were grafted to the transplanted tree with different degrees of success, and that
cross-pollination, also known as hybridization, seldom, if ever, took place. Put in
terms of the melting pot, which can be correlated with hybridization, or in chemi-
cal terms with ‘‘alchemic absorption,’’3 my argument is that assimilation did not
take place in the temples where it counted the most, at the core. The value of this
arboreal model is that it allows us to see divergent genetic identities of different
and even foreign branches growing on a rootstock that nourished the branches
without changing its own ancestral identity.
HORTICULTURAL MANIPULATIONS
Transplanting
Transplanting is the removal of a plant in enough of its entirety to replant in an-
other location. The plant remains the very same organism moved from one place
to another. While different environmental factors can modify its growth patterns,
they do not change the basic genetic identity of the plant.
Propagation by cutting
A new plant can be started by taking a cutting from a parent stock, rooting it, and
planting it apart from its parent. It is a form of cloning through an asexual process
that produces identical stock. As with transplanting, the new plant is genetically
identical to its parent.
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Cross-pollination
Cross-pollination, cross-breeding, or hybridization occurs when the pollen from
the flowers of two different plants are mixed to produce seeds resulting in plants
that combine the characteristics of the parents and therefore are not identical to
either parent. If cross-pollination, which can take place between plants of the same
species, occurs between two species, then a third species bearing the combined
characteristics of its parents is produced. A cross between a red rose and a white
one will produce a pink blossom. Unlike the results of transplanting or propaga-
tion by cutting, the new plant is genetically different in slight but very significant
ways from its parents.
Mutation
A spontaneous shift in the genetic identity of a plant can take place within itself
(that is, without cross-pollination) through responses to the environment. Most
mutations are deleterious and, being the result of natural internal changes, are not
the results of horticultural manipulations.
Grafting
A scion, which consists of a branch or bud from one plant, can be grafted to a
host plant and continue to grow symbiotically but without changing its genetic
identity. Within the same genus, grafting can take place between different species
without any changes occurring to either species. A lemon branch, for instance,
can be grafted to a lime tree and will produce lemons that are genetically identical
to the parent lemon. It is a form of propagation by cutting, except that the branch
does not produce its own root system and lives off the root and stock of its host
instead.
Pruning
The trimming of branches changes the physical shape of the plant and encourages
new growth but does not alter its genetic identity.
The most important of these terms for my analysis are cross-pollination and
grafting. When two cultural or religious species meet to produce something new,
then that social process can be likened to cross-pollination. As a hybrid, the new
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creation must be significantly if not essentially different from either of its parents.
Bred from a horse and a donkey, a mule is not just a novelty but is something new.
When terms such as ‘‘syncretism’’ or ‘‘assimilation’’ are used to describe the adop-
tion of a Shinto kami into a Buddhist temple (or vice versa), hybridization is not
involved, as the kami can still be recognized genetically as a non-Buddhist deity
even though it may be treated as a buddha or bodhisattva. As Ian Reader and I
have pointed out, the association of the Shinto kami and Buddhist deities in Japan
is but a gathering of gods that retain their unique identities, and since new deities
are not produced, hybridization is absent. Buddhist-Shinto syncretism is a tossed
salad, not a melting pot.4
In horticultural terms, Buddhist-Shinto syncretism of the deities is a graft
in which scions retain their unique identities apart from the host stock. Just as a
lemon growing on a lime tree is a novelty but not a new fruit, so a Shinto kami
can flourish at a Buddhist temple and still remain genetically a kami. Grafting was
the dominant technique used by Buddhists in Hawai‘i because it allowed the root-
stock to remain unchanged. The genetic identity of that rootstock, however, was
not the same as that for the bodhi tree in India or China because cross-pollination
in addition to grafting took place in Japan to produce a hybrid Buddhism unique
to Japan. Upon transplantation to Hawai‘i, hybrid Japanese Buddhism became the
rootstock onto which grafts were made, but cross-pollination seldom if ever took
place. There is as yet no hybrid Hawaiian Buddhism, for the rootstock remains
locked in the double helix of Japanese Buddhism and Japanese ethnicity. The case
of the Honpa Honganji shows that its particular combination of religion and eth-
nicity has resisted hybridization and remains a purebred religion of family ances-
try instead of the community at large.5 Like Japanese ethnicity itself, Buddhism
is transmitted primarily within non-hybrid bloodlines. Once the integrity of the
ethnic lineage is disrupted through intermarriage (that is, cross-breeding), it be-
comes difficult for the mongrel line to nurture purebred Buddhism. Most attempts
at cross-pollinating Buddhism itself failed quietly, but the first person to try it in
Hawai‘i was publicly humiliated.
THE DANGERS OF CROSS-BREEDING
Cross-breeding Buddhism with Christianity in Hawai‘i put an end to the clerical
career of Kagahi Sōryū (d. 1917), the founder of Jōdo Shinshū (Nishi)HonpaHon-
ganji in the islands. As a young priest in Kyushu, Kagahi had heard many stories of
hardship from friends and neighbors receiving letters from those who had gone to
Hawai‘i as contract laborers on the sugar plantations. Determined to help, Kagahi
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went to the Honganji headquarters in Kyoto in January 1889 and requested that
priests be sent to Hawai‘i. With a budget already strained by overseas missions in
China, Korea, andTaiwan, the sectarian officials could offer only their sympathetic
support for Kagahi’s idea but no funds. Undeterred, Kagahi secured private fund-
ing and set sail for Hawai‘i. Arriving in Honolulu Harbor on March 2, he called on
Consul-General Ando Tarō, who advised him, ‘‘when in Rome do as the Romans
do,’’ advocating that Japanese living in a Christian country should therefore be-
come Christians. That same evening, Kagahi, paying no heed to Ando’s advice,
conducted the first Shinshū ceremony in his room at the Kojima Hotel, striking a
tiny gong that rang out a sound never heard before in Honolulu.
By the time he returned to Japan in October 1889, Kagahi had visited the
islands of Hawai‘i, Maui, and Kauai; secured enough donations to purchase a lot
in Honolulu; and built a temple in Hilo. As many of the Japanese laborers had
come from areas in Japan where Shinshū was well established, Kagahi found many
willing supporters. Kimura Saiji was one of the most enthusiastic, especially be-
cause he had consciously reaffirmed his faith in Amida after being tempted to con-
vert to Christianity while he had been a student in France. A labor supervisor in
the Bureau of Immigration, Kimura was well known among the Japanese. Much
of Kagahi’s success was due to Kimura’s efforts but so too, inadvertently, was his
downfall.
In one of their many discussions, Kimura told Kagahi that he believedAmida
to be identical to the Christian God. Kagahi seems not to have responded in any
particular way to this statement, and besides, except for Consul-General Ando’s
advice, there was little need to worry about Christianity since he would be work-
ing among people who were already Buddhists by custom, if not belief. Buddhist
missionary work (kaikyō) did not call for converting Christians or even defend-
ing the faith. Rapidly increasing in numbers, the Japanese in Hawai‘i would com-
prise 40 percent of the population by 1920, by which time Hawai‘i was called the
‘‘Japanese village in the Pacific.’’ As Stuart Chandler and C. Julia Huang point
out in their essays included in this volume (Chaps. 7, 8), the modern Foguang
Shan and Ciji movements outside of Taiwan minister primarily to overseas Chi-
nese. Although the word ‘‘mission’’ can be used to describe these efforts, there is a
fundamental difference between diaspora missions serving those who are already
Buddhists and foreign missions designed to convert non-Buddhists. Buddhism in
Hawai‘i was diasporic, and ministering there was not very different from temple
work in Kyushu.
Arriving back in Japan in October 1889, Kagahi gave an enthusiastic report
of his successes and the prospects for vigorous mission work among Japanese Bud-
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dhists inHawai‘i. This time the headquarters respondedwith positive support. The
Overseas Mission Association issued a call for kaikyōshi, ‘‘priests who open up the
teachings’’ in newplaces. The term is usually translated as ‘‘missionary,’’ and though
it can include the work of converting foreigners, in the context of Kagahi’s mission
it was understood that converting and serving non-Japanese were not involved.
The call was met with eager responses, and everything went well for Kagahi—until
he made the mistake of saying that Amida should be identified with God as an
expedient means (hōben) of propagating Buddhism in a Christian society. Kagahi’s
stand would have made sense if his objective had been to convert Christians, but
that was not the case. He may have thought that there was a legal requirement
for all religions in Hawai‘i to recognize the existence of God.6 Unfortunately for
him, however, he published his opinion in a widely read journal and caused a huge
controversy. His supporters turned against him; even his teacher, who was also
his father-in-law, censured him. Kagahi was stunned. He left the priesthood and
sought refuge in his family temple in Oita, where he wrote his memoirs, Hawai‘i
kikō (Hawai‘i journal). He died in 1917, unrecognized for his pioneering efforts.7
As Japanese Buddhism has a long history of using expedient means to justify
all kinds of unlikely alliances, Kagahi’s downfall is a bit surprising. It would seem
that his proposal for relatingAmida toGodwas not so different from the Buddhist-
Shinto syncretism that was so prevalent in Japan. While Jōdo Shinshū orthodoxy
rejected linkages with the kami, it also taught, as Rennyo did, respect for them.
Kagahi’s proposal, however, went far beyond the pattern of grafting kami to Bud-
dhist deities. The theory of honji suijaku (original ground, manifest traces), which
was developed to justify Buddhist-Shinto associations, did not assert an equal iden-
tity between the gods, but an unequal relationship in which both sides retained
their essential identities, the Buddhist deities being in the superior (honji) position.
Kagahi’s proposal, in contrast, was to equate Amida with God in a melting pot that
threatened the loss of Amida’s (and God’s) identity. A grafting of distinct and un-
equal parts would be acceptable, but an amalgam of identical and equal parts was
anathema. It smacked of something new, of hybridization.
TRANSPLANTING THE TREE
Between 1889 and 1897, individual priests followed Kagahi’s pattern of going to
Hawai‘i with the blessing but not the financial support of the headquarters. In 1897
the headquarters sent Miyamoto Ejun to survey conditions. Miyamoto returned
with petitions for more ministers, and the headquarters finally sent its first offi-
cial kaikyōshi in October 1897 with the understanding that the laborers in Hawai‘i
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would provide all of the financial support. The kaikyōshi were referred to as mis-
sionaries, but their mission was to serve native Japanese, not to convert others. In
January 1898, Satomi Hōji was sent as the first kantoku, or bishop, as he was called
in Hawai‘i. In June he returned to Japan for health reasons and to recruit more
priests. When he went back to Hawai‘i in early 1899, he took with him Imamura
Emyō (also Yemyō), a graduate of Keio University trained to speak English and
imbued with the ideals of reformers like Fukuzawa Yūkichi and Kiyozawa Manshi.
It was a time of rapid expansion, and the growing number of priests established
temples wherever Japanese laborers had settled in the growing number of planta-
tion communities.
The temples provided many social functions, but the basic religious service
they offered consisted of funeral and memorial services. Working conditions on
the plantations were harsh—even Imamura, who was not given to emotional ex-
tremes, thought that workers were treated like ‘‘slaves and horses’’8—and it was
not uncommon for them to die of illness or accidents at a young age. Okano Ju-
suke reported that, in the early days before the arrival of the Buddhist ministers,
the dead were buried in crude boxes without benefit of religious rites; when it was
discovered that a certain Teraoka Tosuke was a lay Buddhist trained to recite the
Amida Sutra and the Shōshinge, he was called upon to perform funerals. Okano
estimated that Teraoka conducted no less than four hundred funerals.9
Because the early laborers were primarily single men, it cannot be said that
the first forms of Buddhism were centered in the family. Imamura’s initial assign-
ment was at plantation camps in rural Oahu, and his primary task was to reach
hard-drinking, whoring, bad-tempered men who were not interested in sermons
on Amida’s compassion. Often ridiculed and rejected, Imamura felt himself to be
a failure, but he persevered in the face of this seeming futility because he was con-
vinced that Buddhism could improve the lives of the Japanese men in a way that
Christianity could not. Japanese Christian missionaries had been active in the
plantation camps before the Buddhist priests arrived, and, unlike their Buddhist
counterparts, they enjoyed the financial support of their home churches. Imamura
was convinced, however, that the Christian ministers were taking the wrong ap-
proach by preaching temperance and abstinence to men whose primary solace
came from alcohol and sex. The Christians failed to treat them ‘‘as Japanese’’ and
expected them to conform to Western norms of puritanical behavior. Rejected for
his own straitlaced manner, Imamura was not puritanical and did not condemn
alcohol and sex.10
The way to deal with the ‘‘bad-tempered’’ men was to create a surrogate
family for them. Rather than condemning their behavior, the ‘‘primary mission of
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the Honganji in Hawai‘i is to provide comfort by being loving fathers and mothers
to these orphans’’ (Imamura 1918, 27). This was not yet the family Buddhism cen-
tered on the ancestors, but it was clearly familial in a way theChristianity preached
by the moralists was not. It also treated the men as Japanese, and Imamura was
confident that Buddhismwould prevail over Christianity. But Christianity was not
the only unsuitable religion for the rough kind of people who were in Hawai‘i.
With sectarian specificity, Imamura argued that Tendai and Shingon were too aris-
tocratic, that Jōdo and Zen were for samurai. Only Shinshū was appropriate for
the common laborer. ‘‘We do not despise eating meat, do not forbid having wives,
and pay no attention to whether one is rich or poor, high or low class, educated or
uneducated, foolish or wise. Ours is a teaching of equality. Wealthy people value
it, and laborers love it. Foreigners respect it, and believers embrace it’’ (ibid., 26).
While Imamura was not concerned about converting non-Japanese, he was keenly
aware that he needed to win the respect of the Christian community and to de-
fend his sect against the claims of other Japanese Buddhist organizations. Mission
work was more than ministering to his own kind in an overseas setting; it involved
active persuasion to show the general community that Shinshū could hold its own,
and even do better than Christian and other Buddhist claims.
The combination of universal egalitarianism with sectarian triumphalism is
a recurrent theme in Imamura’s writings, one that was also being developed by
other Buddhist leaders in Japan at the time. Imamura made this egalitarian ideal
the centerpiece of a new Buddhism that purported to transcend ethnic and sec-
tarian boundaries, but like so many claims about universalism it was made on his
Shinshū terms—only his sect could transcend all sects. Arguing that his univer-
sal Buddhism was appropriate for all, Imamura was keenly aware that such a new
formulation would be needed in any approach to non-Buddhists but it was not
really necessary for his ownmission, for the Japanese were already Buddhists. After
twenty years of successful mission work, Imamura knew that the real reason why
the Shinshū movement had succeeded is that most of the laborers came from
Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Kumamoto, and Fukuoka, places where Shinshū was well
established, not because of his message of egalitarianism.
Such rapid progress of our mission work is mainly due to the fact that our
countrymen here—most of them—came over to Hawai‘i from that part
of the country where our faith held its firm ground during many hundred
years. [The] seed was already sown, and we have had only to foster it.11
For twenty years until this day we have succeeded in our mission be-
cause the seeds that had already been planted in the old country bore fruit.
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In this sense we must understand that the success of Shinshū in Hawai‘i is
not an accident. When a ditch is constructed, the water flows; and when
the pods open, the beans fall out.12
Imamura’s horticultural imagery of seeds and fruit is not specifically that of trans-
planting, but the idea is still the same: the laborers from Japanwere already Shinshū
seeds transported to Hawai‘i to sprout and bear their predictable fruit. The min-
isters did not have to convert them. Ōtani Kōmyō (1885–1961), a high-ranking
Shinshū priest, also put it in the horticultural terms of transplantating: ‘‘The trunk
of the tree has been created, and from it will grow branches, leaves, flowers and
fruit. There is great promise for Buddhism in Hawai‘i.’’ 13
Shinshū was thus transplanted to Hawai‘i not just by the ministers but by
the people themselves. The environment was different, but the core religious need
was for funeral services for men who were single but still sons and brothers. Pre-
cisely because they were single, Imamura aimed at creating a family for them by
being their loving father. In a short time, with the arrival of picture brides and
other women, real families needed the traditional religion of funerals, memorial
services, and ancestor veneration. Ancestors and family exist in bloodlines, and
the rites of memorialization were inseparable from ethnicity, at least for as long as
family lineage remained Japanese.
Rooted in the family, the transplanted bodhi tree also had the budding
branches of an egalitarian Shinshū suitable for all classes of people. Once in Ha-
wai‘i, the tree received a solid graft of a universal Buddhism, and this branch spread
its shade beyond Japanese class structure and reached out to ethnic Caucasians.
The success of that graft, however, was threatened by an older, well-developed
branch that came with the tree. Japanese nationalism had long been grafted onto
the bodhi tree in Japan, and while it was allowed to flourish in Hawai‘i—the first
generation were, after all, loyal subjects of the emperor, and many from the sec-
ond generation maintained similar loyalties—Buddhist leaders like Imamura felt a
tremendous pressure from the American community to prune the branch, or even
to sever it completely so that it could be replaced by American nationalism.
The sap of family Buddhism keeping the tree in good healthwasmostly taken
for granted as custom and did not elicit the public attention that the branches of
nationalism did. Many eyes watched to see if Imamura would replace the branch
of Japanese nationalism with an American one, and add the branch of universal
Buddhism to complement the budding egalitarian Buddhism already on the tree.
The horticultural challenge was intricate. He had to prune the political species
of Japanese nationalism, graft in its place another political species from a differ-
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ent country, also graft a philosophical species of universal Buddhism, and continue
to nurture the rootstock bearing the double helix of family religion and Japanese
ethnicity. Imamura went about his work carefully—transplanting, pruning, and
grafting, all the whilemaking sure that cross-pollinationwould not take place, that
nothing genetically newwould be produced. Each branch retained its own identity
and could be removed or added without changing the double helix of the stock.
This strategy worked exceedingly well, and thus Imamura avoided the dangers of
cross-pollination that had destroyed Kagahi before him.
GRAFTING UNIVERSAL BUDDHISM
In 1918 Imamura’s architectural dream came true with the completion of the
Honpa Honganji main temple. Designed by two American architects working
under the close guidance of Imamura, the temple departed radically from Japa-
nese styles and featured an international combination of Indian and Western ex-
terior forms. The roofline no longer had gently curving slopes, but dramatic circles
stacked to form stupas topped by rings of Indian cosmology. It was important for the
temple not to look Japanese so that it could take its proud position in anAmerican
city without being out of place. Young people should be proud of its international
appearance and not shamed by an ethnically circumscribed building. Although
the stupa forms were certainly foreign, they resembled domes, and the front roof
structure was supported by a series of massive RomanTuscan columns. At the dedi-
cation ceremony, Imamura declared that ‘‘true religion ought to rise above and be
applicable to any country and nationality and so assimilate with every state and
nation.’’14
Had he stopped there, Imamura could be seen as a cross-breeder of hybrids.
But he went on to add that ‘‘the final object of the Hongwanji mission’s idea is
to plant the gospel of Buddha Amida in the true spirit of every nation in every
corner of the world’’ (Imamura 1918, 54). This was triumphalism at its missionary
best and once again restricted his universal Buddhism to his own sectarian gospel.
Imamura saw no need to modify his Shinshū faith through hybridization and was
satisfied that his purebred religion was suitable for the entire world because it was
the universal truth. If anything, states and nations should be changed by assimi-
lating Shinshū. While in his actual work he did little to convert Christians, his
stated ideals were imbued with the spirit of a missionary seeking to win the world
over to his faith.
The theme of sectarian universalism was repeated by many of Imamura’s col-
leagues. Writing at his request, Tsunoda Ryūsaku, an educator in Hawai‘i who
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would later do much to shape Asian studies in America while teaching at Colum-
bia University and directing its East Asian Library, wrote The Essence of Japanese
Buddhism, ‘‘in order to inform the white circles of essential features of Buddha’s
teaching and bring them to the right understanding of it.’’15 In his preface to the
book, Imamura explained that ‘‘in the teaching of St. Shinran, the central idea is
to induce all nations and all races on the earth, with no regard to their color and
rank, to unite in the work of forming one large family, with our Buddha Amida
as their universal parent.’’16 After explaining the basic tenets of Indian Buddhism,
Tsunoda argued that the Buddha taught both a religion of the ‘‘emphatic nay,’’
which promoted the ascetic rejection of desires, and theway of the ‘‘emphatic yea,’’
in which all beings are buddhas with nothing to reject or negate.17 In Japan the
emphatic yea was perfected by Shinran, who affirmed that all people, regardless of
gender, status, ethnicity, or nationality, are saved by the grace ofAmida. Christians
have wrongly accused Shinshū of teaching ‘‘national prejudice and bigoted patrio-
tism,’’ but ‘‘the teaching of Amida’s salvation is far from being national or racial
in its essence.’’ ‘‘Not only are Shinshuists free from racial or national prejudices,
but they are also free from petty hatred of sectarianism’’ (Imamura 1918, 64–65).
Shinran transformed the ‘‘emphatic yea’’ into the ‘‘Absolute Yea’’ (ibid., 82).
Writing in 1918, Ōtani Kōmyō (1885–1961), a high-ranking Honpa Hon-
ganji official who had studied in Europe and America, reminded his readers that
Imamura was remarkable not only for establishing and spreading Shinshū in Ha-
wai‘i, but for ‘‘propagating the path of true peace to all the peoples of the world.’’
The highest good, he explained, is to strive for an equality shared by all peoples
of the world, not just those from individual homes, certain societies, particular
nations, or specific ethnic groups. He recalled his visit to Hawai‘i and the speeches
he gave in which he discussed these ideas and the essentials required for good re-
lations between Japan and America: ‘‘I remember saying that the spiritual foun-
dation for this exists only in the sacred sphere of [Amida’s] selected vow.’’ 18
Takakusu Junjirō (1866–1945), the eminent Indologist and Buddhist scholar,
looked upon Hawai‘i as the place where the ocean currents from the East and
West mix and provide sustenance for ‘‘international fish’’ (kokusaiteki gyozoku). For
Takakusu, the teaching of Buddhist egalitarianism goes back to India, where the
Buddha transformed a religion for aristocrats into one for ordinary people. That
egalitarianism made its way to Japan, where Prince Shōtoku promoted it as the
basis for culture. Shinran then perfected the teaching of equality that the Buddha
and Shōtoku Taishi could not realize themselves, and it is therefore not surprising
that Shinran should be called ‘‘the avatar of egalitarianism.’’19
The idea of a sectarian universalism is conceptually problematic if it must
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combine the particular and the general with the internal consistency of a hybrid;
but seen as a doctrinally conceived universal Buddhism grafted onto the stem of
sectarian family religion, the combination preserves the separate and even contra-
dictory identities of the parts. Amida was thus made to reign over all peoples and
nations at the same time thatAmida remained a family deity (ujigami).The branch
of universalism was promoted with such vigor that it even came close to over-
whelming the rest of the tree. If through the lens of assimilation theories Buddhism
in Hawai‘i appears to be Americanized or westernized it is because this branch
alone dominates the view. The overspreading branch was so commanding that
there were some who came close to advocating that the sectarian trunk of family
religion itself be pruned away from the branch of universal Buddhism.
Ernest Hunt (1876–1967) was a British merchant-marine seaman who had
converted to Buddhism in his travels throughout Asia. Hunt arrived in Hawai‘i
in 1915 and worked in the offices of several sugar plantations before Imamura re-
cruited him and his wife, Dorothy, for the Honpa Honganji English Department,
which was established in 1921; it had initially been run by M. T. Kirby, a former
cowboy and lumberjack convert who loved to strut about in his Buddhist robes de-
livering tirades against Christianity, which he was fond of saying should be taken
‘‘cum grano salis’’ (with a grain of salt). Of questionable sanity, Kirby left the islands
after ‘‘more than five years of irreparable disservice to Buddhism in Hawai‘i,’’ spar-
ing everyone, Buddhists and Christians alike, more sermons such as ‘‘Did Jesus
Really Live?’’20 Well-read and a gentleman, Hunt was a welcome relief. In a move
that would be unthinkable today, Imamura ordained Hunt and his wife in 1924,
and as Buddhist ministers the couple contributed to the Buddhist movement in
extraordinary ways. Inducted into the Honpa Honganji, they were nevertheless
like lemons on a lime tree, devoid of Japanese ancestral religion.
What they really espoused was Theravada Buddhism. Hunt held the degree
of Bachelor ofDharma issued by theBurmaBuddhistMission inRangoon.Apopu-
lar preacher, he toured temples throughout the islands, and older nisei today still
remember his sermons delivered in English, their own native tongue. His mes-
sage centered on moral lessons drawn from the teaching of karma, the Four Noble
Truths, and the Eightfold Path. His was a Buddhist humanism in which Shakya-
muni was a wise teacher but not a god, and the Dharma was about love, charity,
kindness, respect, service, gratitude, and poise.21 Hunt wrote English hymns (Skt:
gathas), English services, textbooks, pamphlets, and a catechism for Buddhist Sun-
day schools. As early as 1900 two Caucasian women had founded the Children’s
Church, which later became theHonpaHongwanji Sunday School, and theHunts
worked tirelessly to develop such schools. Their influence reached beyond the
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Honpa Honganji, and by 1931 there were 12,800 children studying in 125 Sunday
schools throughout the islands.22 He was also a leader of the Young Buddhist As-
sociation, the Y.B.A., which was patterned after the Y.M.C.A. Working with Ima-
mura within the Honpa Honganji, Hunt developed a basic Buddhism promoted
as a nonsectarian, nonethnic, and universal religion.
In 1929, the Chinese Buddhist reformer Taixu (also Tai Hsü; (1890–1947)
visited Hawai‘i and met with Imamura and Hunt about establishing a Hawai-
ian branch of his International Buddhist Institute (I.B.I.). Based at the Honpa
Honganji, the I.B.I. set out to propagate Buddhism in English, foster cooperation
among all sects, banish war, promote peace, foster international-mindedness, and
work for social good.23 On the issue of sectarianism, Hunt went beyond Imamura’s
call for cooperation and advocated the elimination of traditional divisions, ex-
pressing his ‘‘fervent desire’’ to abolish ‘‘the heresy of separateness now prevailing
among Buddhists of Honolulu’’ and to replace it with ‘‘the fundamental and ethical
teaching’’ of basic Buddhism.24 Hunt did not share in Imamura’s Shinshū trium-
phalism, and for him ‘‘the Teaching of Amitabha means the divine character and
continued power of the Buddha to lead all people, who follow the Teachings and
repeat His Holy Name, to Nirvana.’’25 His Catechism for Buddhist Sunday Schools
does not mention Shinran at all.
In 1930 the I.B.I sponsored an international Buddhist youth conference,
which was attended by 170 delegates from the U.S. mainland, Hawai‘i, Canada,
China, Japan, Korea, Thailand, India, and Burma. The participants discussed two
pressing issues: how to propagate Buddhism among young people everywhere in the
world and how to eliminate sectarian divisions. The conference passed a resolution
naming Hawai‘i as the ‘‘nucleus from which nonsectarian Buddhism, adapted to
Western countries, may be spread to Pacific countries.’’ This high ideal was never
realized, but the conference marked the high point of the movement to create an
international Buddhism.
On December 22, 1932, Hunt and Imamura sat in the bishop’s office discuss-
ing plans. Imamura abruptly excused himself and walked to his nearby residence.
Alerted by the hysterical cries of a temple member, Hunt rushed to Imamura’s
home to find him dead of a heart attack. The loss was felt far beyond the Honpa
Honganji, and American leaders as well as Japanese mourned his passing at his
funeral attended bymore than three thousand people. Imamura was replaced by an
interim bishop who neither opposed nor actively helped the I.B.I., and Hunt con-
tinued the work that he and Imamura had begun, attracting an increasing number
of members. By 1935, despite Imamura’s death, the I.B.I. had become a territory-
wide association, winning the acclaim of local and international Buddhists.
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Nineteen thirty-five was also the year in which a new bishop arrived from
Japan. A staunch nationalist and ardent Shinshū Buddhist, Bishop KuchibaGikyō
was opposed to Hunt’s nonsectarian international Buddhism. Kuchiba was dis-
tressed that Japanese in Hawai‘i professed a Buddhism that ‘‘follows the stream of
Japanese Buddhism [but] is not Japanese Buddhism.’’26 Dissolving the English De-
partment, he firedHunt. Though I.B.I. activities continued on an ad hoc basis, the
institute was permanently damaged. In one swift stroke, Kuchiba lopped interna-
tional Buddhism from the Shinshū tree. While there was a resurgence of Japanese
nationalism in the late 1930s, that branch of the tree was also pruned, more slowly
and with greater difficulty. The six-colored international Buddhist flag designed
in 1889 in Sri Lanka had been a popular accouterment at Buddhist functions, but
it passed into disuse. So too did the Japanese flag.
PRUNING JAPANESE NATIONALISM AND
GRAFTING AMERICAN PATRIOTISM
As attested to in any number of photographs, a standard feature of temple cele-
brations in the prewar period was the posting of the American and Japanese flags,
often with their standards crossing each other. Like other immigrant groups, the
Japanese in Hawai‘i held double loyalties, one prevailing over the other according
to the individual or the occasion. Few questioned the need to Americanize, but
Americanization had at least two distinct components, one political, the other
cultural. The political aspect, expressed as loyalty, was not an easy issue to resolve,
but it was far simpler than the question of cultural allegiance.
As one trained in a Buddhist institution that had close ties to Japanese na-
tionalism and the emperor system,27 Imamura was a typical Japanese nationalist
at the time of his arrival in Hawai‘i but quickly realized that those born there
could never be Japanese loyalists. Imamura became an outstanding leader in the
Americanization movement in its political component and is remembered for this
more than for any other aspect of his career. Aware that many of the laborers were
making Hawai‘i their permanent home, and that their children were American
citizens (or at least held dual citizenship), Imamura declared his stand very clearly
in 1931:
I take here the liberty of announcing in no ambiguous terms that our
mission as a whole advocates Americanizing the people of this territory
in every possible way. I, more than anyone else, am aware of my incom-
petency in carrying on this work. Born as a Japanese, brought up as a
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Japanese, I am a Japanese through and through. Whatever honest inten-
tion and pure motive I may have, this sense of incompetency has always
kept me from pushing to the front as an active participant in this work
of Americanization. But it was our mission that extended its ready hand
when the local Y.M.C.A. asked us to co-operate in the proposed citizen-
ship educational campaign. It was our mission that published, when [the
First World] war broke, a reprint of the five great state papers of Ameri-
can history with a Japanese version, in order to inform our public of the
true idea and principle of the great Democracy. In the Food Conservation
Campaign, in the Red Cross movement, our mission was second to none
in doing its very best. In saying all of this I am perfectly aware that our
mission has done nothing more than the level best of honest men. Strange
to say, however, our mission, during its existence of twenty years in this
territory, has often been accused of strong autocratic or anti-American
tendency. Let our accusers have their day. I have no mind to say anything
against them. Our record is our best defense.28
Despite his own sense of not being a truly cultural citizen, Imamura unequivocally
advocated loyalty and patriotism to America. He knew that his job was not to
convert Americans to Buddhism, but to transform Japanese Buddhists intoAmeri-
cans.
Political identity is easier to negotiate and transfer than cultural self-defini-
tion, and Imamura knew that good cultural Japanese can also be politically loyal
Americans. He condemned what he called the ‘‘fifty-fifty’’ spirit of dividing politi-
cal loyalties between two countries. There must be only one national allegiance,
and the second generation of Japanese in Hawai‘i should commit themselves to-
tally to America. ‘‘The first of the evil tendencies which one cannot fail to observe
in the immigrant community is the lack of single-minded loyalty, the prevalence
of that ‘fifty-fifty’ spirit’’ (Imamura 1931, 9). Aware that Japanese parents would
‘‘feel lonesome’’ if their children exercised their right to become American citi-
zens, he instructed his ministers to ‘‘give them solace. Tell them that good parents
must think more of the future of their children than their own. To give in this
Life is to receive in another.’’ Ministers must teach parents how to obtain proper
birth certificates for their children, encourage them to send their children to pub-
lic schools, and interest them in participating in Americanization programs. ‘‘Get
a right understanding of TRUE Americanism. This is essential to the work of a
Buddhist priest in the Hawaiian Islands’’ (ibid., 22–23).
While critics continued to charge that Buddhism was anti-American, Ima-
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mura was content to let the record show that the temples had pruned the bodhi
tree of Japanese nationalism. To it were grafted citizenship campaigns, Red Cross
volunteerism, and active support for America’s war effort. The tree spoke for itself
and was there for all to see. Removing Japanese nationalism was easy enough, but
despite the clarity and sincerity of his Americanism, splinters still remained. For
all of his vauntedAmericanism, Imamura was still ‘‘Japanese through and through’’
and could not free himself from the very ‘‘fifty-fifty’’ spirit he condemned.
The problemwas not political but philosophical and cultural. In a short essay
published in a widely distributed bilingual pamphlet, Imamura began by assert-
ing the absolute compatibility between Buddhism and democracy. ‘‘Democracy
according to the Buddhist Viewpoint’’ was written in 1918 and begins with a heart-
felt lament about the horrors of the First World War. The central issue of that
war, as he saw it, was the battle between democracy and autocracy. Buddhism was
clearly on the side of democracy, being in ‘‘perfect harmony’’ with it, and ‘‘in fact,
whatever democracy there is in the East, it derives its power and support fromBud-
dhism.’’ The Buddhist teaching of nonduality is philosophically consonant with
democratic principles of equality, and as the ‘‘rational culmination of the Buddhist
teachings,’’ Shinshū Buddhism holds to the social ideal of universal brotherhood.
Modern democracy in practice, however, is filled with contradictions created by
those who espouse the ideal but fail to live up to it. ‘‘To take away all such contra-
dictions, to open the way unobstructed for the advance of democratic ideals . . .
this is the proclamation of Buddhism to all the modern advocates of democracy.’’
Buddhism can transform imperfect practice into a perfect democracy.29
Buddhist nonduality, however, is double-edged. Just as it eliminates in-
equality between all people, so does it dissolve any antagonism between democracy
and autocracy.
Therefore, our solemn conviction gained in the light of the Buddha is this:
If autocracy has no absolute value, neither has democracy. If democracy is
right, why should not autocracy be right also? We Buddhists believe that
in this world as well as in the ideal world of Amida there are no absolutely
determined values or particular things that cannot be reduced to some
other terms, and therefore that autocracy does not unconditionally exclude
democracy, nor does democracy autocracy, they are after all two aspects of
a thing which is in itself above such opposites (Y. Imamura 1918, 26–27).
In addition to asserting a profound dualism between the truth of nonmultiplicity
and the falsity of plurality, the Buddhist teaching of nonduality also posits the
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simultaneous existence of both (ni funi, two but not two). It can, on the one hand,
be exemplified by the image of the pot that melts away all distinctions, or it can be
likened to a salad of discrete but equal parts. Or, to use Imamura’s ownhorticultural
language of flowers:
In the Land of Purity all flowers are blooming in profusion, each in its own
individual magnificence. Why can we not in this world of ours make all
forms of government flourish each with its special characteristic advan-
tages? Cannot autocracy prosper side by side with democracy? Indeed,
democracy is autocracy popularised, and autocracy is democracy consoli-
dated (ibid., 28).
Imamura concluded with a plea for a multicultural diversity that would prevent
America from trying to change Japan’s preference for autocracy, just as it would
keep Japan from forcing America to abandon its democracy. Buddhism, then, does
not justify democracy by rejecting autocracy, but ‘‘in the great Ocean of Love and
Mercy of Amitabha Buddha’’ embraces our ‘‘individual and national differences.’’
Insisting on preserving separate genetic identities, Imamura rejected hybridization
as a function of the Buddhist temples.
Hybridization in the melting pot is the proper work of the public schools,
and should be supported there. ‘‘Public instruction was there of course, and it was
doing highly credible work for the ‘melting pot.’ As an instrument of teaching the
duties of American citizenship, the public schools of this territory command the
respect of the right-thinking residents.’’30 The temple schools had the different
task of preserving the rootstock of family heritage. Public education cannot and
should not instill knowledge of this heritage. The primary identity of the children
was based in the family: ‘‘children are members of the family before they belong to
the community.’’ Buddhist temples preserve a religion for Japanese family ancestry;
only secondarily is it for the community at large.
Imamura thus had it both ways. On the one hand, political loyalty was rela-
tively easy to transfer from the emperor to the president, from autocracy to democ-
racy, and immigrants should free themselves from the ‘‘fifty-fifty’’ spirit; on the
other hand, the philosophy of Buddhist nonduality embraced both in a hundred-
hundred totality that did not require any side to compromise its integrity. Likewise
in the cultural sphere, family heritage must be taught and preserved by keeping
it out of the melting pot. Nurtured in the garden of the temples and its private
schools, family religion was pruned of Japanese nationalism and received grafts of
American nationalism and democracy. Understood horticulturally, the single tree
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can been seen in its genetically different parts, and Imamura’s affirmation of its
American and Japanese distinctions made sense; but from a more common view-
point that expects only assimilation or hybridization, ‘‘Imamura’s position at best
seemed full of contradictions or, at worst, just so much double talk.’’31
Christian rivals attacked Imamura’s double talk and proclaimed the advan-
tages of an exclusive identity betweenAmericanism andChristianity: only aChris-
tian could be a good American. Christians rejected the fifty-fifty spirit in a way
that Imamura, despite his claims about doing the same, could not. As long as it
defined itself in ancestral terms, Buddhism was inextricably tied to being Japanese.
Those who converted to Christianity—and many did—severed that tie, but Ima-
mura knew that the Buddhist–Japanese cultural equation could be maintained at
the same time that Japanese nationalism could be pruned and replaced by Ameri-
can patriotism.And it worked: nisei Buddhist soldiers died forAmerica as willingly
as did Christian servicemen and were buried with Buddhist rites that confirmed
forever their ancestral place and identity.
Once the issue of loyalty was settled through the Second World War, the
branch of Americanism could be taken for granted, and even forgotten, as Japa-
nese Americans found the same shade in more easily accessible places like the
public schools, the military, business, and government. Few congregated under the
branch of Americanism growing in the temple yards, but many still gathered for
ancestral rites performed in the familiar shade of the maturing bodhi tree. They
also went to the temples as loyal Americans to enjoy the shade cast by the branch
that used to be Japanese nationalism, now flourishing as cultural nostalgia for
things Japanese and a yearning for a spiritual homeland (furusato).They celebrated
their heritage—and continue to do so—with a deep sense of gratitude to predeces-
sors and ancestors, expressed by the phrase okagesama de, which in arboreal terms
means that they were who they were ‘‘because I stand in your shade.’’
Although civic identity was produced by Americanization, nostalgia for the
spiritual homeland, moving in the opposite direction, manifested itself as increas-
ing Japanization. This is clearly seen in the history of the Shinshū hymns or gathas.
In 1924 Ernest and Dorothy Hunt published Vade Mecum, a collection of hymns
they wrote with several other Caucasian Buddhists. The songs were nonsectarian,
espoused the ideals of TheravadaBuddhism, and did not sing the praises of Shinshū
teachings. But the songbook blended well with Imamura’s international interests,
and it was used extensively in Shinshū services. The influence of the Vade Mecum
and its general Buddhist principles survives in the current hymnal, but the inter-
vening editions of 1939, 1962, and 1990 steadily increased the number of hymns
that were translations from the Japanese or espoused the virtues of Shinran, the
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teachings of Shinshū, and Japan. The pruning and grafting of hymns from one
edition to the next produced an increasingly sectarian body of songs that shifts
attention from Shakyamuni to Amida, from India to Japan, and from general Bud-
dhism to Shinshū. To the ordinary worshiper, for whom Shakyamuni, the Buddha,
and Amida blur into one loving deity, it may not matter, for they all offer the same
pietism that satisfies the longing for a spiritual home. Still, Japan looms large in
the 1990 edition, and the universal virtues of the original Vade Mecum are rooted
in moral abstractions, not a homeland, so it is not surprising that the hymns were
shorn of an earlier, nearly exclusively, Western version of Buddhism in favor of
one that is more Japanese.32 In a similar reference to the mother country, modern
temple architecture has reinstated the graceful slope of the Japanese roof.
CONCLUSION: THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE TREE
Pruned of Japanese nationalism and universal Buddhism, the trunk of family reli-
gion still remains, with a mostly unused branch of American patriotism and a
popular outgrowth of cultural and spiritual nostalgia. The architecture of the main
temple is also emblematic: the exterior facade is international, the outer sanctuary
(gejin) of pews American, and the inner altar (naijin) purely Japanese. Thus, the
external architecture, the branches of the tree, and the outer sanctuary all have
been altered from what is Japanese in Japan, but the inner core remains the same.
The Amida statue, a priceless treasure from medieval Japan, and the inner altar
could be transported back to Japan and easily placed in any Shinshū temple. The
double helix of Amida and ancestry has never changed.
Under the leadership of assimilation theorist Romanzo Adams, University
of Hawai‘i sociology students such as Katsumi Onishi predicted the development
of a new Buddhism in 1937, but nothing that is new at the inner core has emerged.
Onishi wrote that second-generation Buddhists are ‘‘breathing new life and vigor
into the Hongwanji, freeing it from the shackles of narrow sectarianism, creating
and evolving a new Buddhism, peculiar and native to Hawai‘i.’’33 Had he been
right, a hybrid Hawaiian Buddhism would have emerged, but no such creature
exists. The temples are solidly sectarian, the members are almost exclusively of
Japanese ancestry, and the important rituals, abbreviated in length, are still un-
changed in essence. Hybridization has not taken place.
The resistance of Japanese Buddhism to change at the center is also appar-
ent among Japanese Brazilians. Writing in this volume, Cristina Rocha (Chap. 6)
documents the popularity of Zen Buddhism among non-Japanese Brazilians, but
their Zen was imported from hybrid Zen sources in America and Europe, not from
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the ethnic Japanese Zen community that has long been in Brazil. Despite their
remarkable successes in adopting new host cultures as their own, the Japanese im-
migrant communities in Brazil and Hawai‘i have preserved forms of traditional
Buddhism as ancestral religions. Peter Clarke, however, points out in his essay
(Chap. 5) that Soka Gakkai, with its strategy of inclusive pluralism, may be the
exception to this exclusive pattern. For the most part, however, the self-imposed
isolation of traditional Japanese Buddhist groups has prevented them from exert-
ing a significant influence outside of their ethnic boundaries. Assimilation at the
political and cultural surfaces is visible, but the rootstock remains largely uncom-
promised.
The political graftings inHawai‘i have either died or lost their immediate sig-
nificance. Once ubiquitous, the flags are all gone. The international Buddhist flag
is nowhere to be seen, the Japanese flag is no longer flown, and even the Stars and
Stripes hardly makes an appearance. Political branches were easily added and just
as easily removed since those surface manipulations did not involve any change
in the core. In contrast to Japanese Buddhist missionaries in Hawai‘i, Japanese
colonial Buddhists in Korea, China, and Taiwan carried out the political task of
transforming non-Japanese colonial subjects into imperial loyalists (kōminka), and
many Buddhist ministers served both in Hawai‘i and the colonies. Isobe Hōsen,
the first bishop of the Sōtō Mission in Hawai‘i, also established important temples
in Korea. For the Japanese Buddhist priests in Korea, however, ‘‘what really was
at stake was not the spread of Buddhist teachings, but the thought and behavior
of the Korean people, which were to be made compatible with the cause of Japa-
nese colonialism.’’34 Buddhist teachings and ritual did not really apply to Koreans
because they were of different ancestry. In Korea, Isobe did religious work with
the ethnic Japanese residents and carried out political and cultural tasks with the
Koreans. Japanese Buddhistministers in the colonies were chargedwith the duty of
assimilating their subjects into the colonial melting pot, not the spiritual crucible
of Japanese ancestral religion. The task for the ministers in Hawai‘i was to assimi-
late their Japanese members into the American political and social melting pot
without allowing cross-breeding to take place at the religious core. In both places,
hybridization was allowed and even encouraged at the political, social, doctrinal,
and philosophical levels, but not at the rootstock of family religion.
Imamura did reach out to a few non-Japanese and bring them into the fold.
Unlike the Koreans, who were kept out of the religious arena entirely, Ernest Shin-
kaku Hunt would seem to have been assimilated into the core. Was he a rare case
of religious hybridization? He was ordained a priest, wore the robes, wrote gathas,
propagated teachings, conductedworship services, and preached sermons. The key
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question, however, must be asked of the inner sanctum of ancestral ritual: did he
perform funerals? There is as yet no evidence that he did.
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4 Hiding in Plain Sight: The Invisibility ofthe Shingon Mission to the United States
Richard K. Payne
While Tibetan Buddhism has entered into the mainstream of American popular
religious culture since its introduction in the 1960s, another tantric Buddhist tra-
dition has remained effectively invisible. Despite having been in the United States
for over a century, Shingon Buddhism remains almost entirely unknown toAmeri-
can converts to Buddhism and even to the overwhelming majority of scholars of
either Buddhism or American religion.1 Even beyond the narrow provincialism of
American academe, Shingon as well as the other immigrant forms of Buddhism
are also not to be seen on the ‘‘international mediascape’’ of Buddhism. This essay
seeks to answer the question of why one tantric Buddhist tradition should have
become an icon of popular culture while another remains an obscure oddity. My
thesis is that one of the important factors creating this discrepancy is the conflict
between the romantic presumptions of American popular religious culture, which
desired mimetic union with Buddhism as the idealized and exotic Other, and the
desire of the Japanese-American community to accommodate to the dominant
religious culture. This thesis will be tested against a possible counterexample, the
apparent success of Zen, which is as much a cultural icon as Tibetan Buddhism
and draws the same kind of attention from the media. This discussion highlights
the utility of the categories of immigrant and convert Buddhisms as a preliminary
distinction toward more fully nuanced analyses.
Focusing on the ways in which different missionaries have responded to their
new environment, we find an interplay between three different concerns in the
transmission of Buddhism.2 These concerns, to be seen in all of the chapters in-
cluded in this book, are: conservationist, in which missionaries and congregations
attempt to retain what they perceive to be essential to their faith; propagation-
ist, in which missionaries attempt to draw in new disciples, revitalize existing ad-
herents, or simply retain current members, by emphasizing the uniqueness and
the superiority of what they have to offer over what is available in the surround-
ing community; and accommodationist-assimilationist, in which missionaries and
congregations attempt to bring their own tradition into better consonance with
the surrounding society. Interestingly, efforts to ‘‘modernize’’ Buddhism can be seen
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to address all of these concerns. Drawing a cognitive distinction between accom-
modation and assimilation, this chapter focuses on the way in which American
romantic values have made the Buddhism espoused by immigrants invisible. At
the same time, it also gives some attention to the interplay between the dynamic of
propagating Buddhism, which utilized the romantic values in American religious
culture, and the modernizing dynamic of some of the other Buddhist missionary
activities.
Piaget’s terminology for describing childhood development distinguishes be-
tween assimilation and accommodation. These psychological categories can be
adapted as a heuristically useful sociocognitive distinction to examine the differ-
ence between the popularity of the Tibetan forms of tantric Buddhism and the
invisibility of the Japanese forms.3 ‘‘Assimilation’’ is used here to identify the pro-
cess by which new information is made to fit into existing cognitive categories.
‘‘Accommodation,’’ on the other hand, identifies the formation of a new cate-
gory in light of new information and is much the same as the dynamic referred
to by Tanabe (Chap. 3) as ‘‘acculturation.’’ These two dynamics—assimilation
and accommodation—simplify the complex social and historical actualities and,
it should be noted, are not mutually exclusive.4 In attempting to identify a general
social pattern, however, such simplification is necessary. Complex as all sociohis-
torical processes are, it is the contention of this essay that assimilation and ac-
commodation contribute to our understanding of contrasting dynamics of religious
change.
Other factors that also played a role in the development of Buddhist churches
in America but would require separate analysis include economic differences; the
specifically ethnic character of the Shingon as well as many of the other Japanese-
American Buddhist churches; and the modernizing, reformist intent of those Ti-
betans who migrated to Western countries. Both economically and institutionally
there is a significant difference between the pattern of immigration and that of
exile. Where the Japanese-American Buddhist churches were established within
the context of immigrant communities that could provide economic support, Ti-
betan teachers usually came to theUnited States as individuals and had to establish
convert communities for their own support. Likewise, Tibetan teachers in exile
were largely dependent upon their own authority, whereas the immigrant temples
maintained institutional affiliation with their head temples in Japan, depending
upon an external source of institutional authority. The founding orientation of
the Japanese-American Buddhist churches toward immigrant communities gave
them a markedly ethnic character, one that can appear totally impenetrable even
to interested and sympathetic outsiders. This ethnic insularity was very strongly
reinforced by the events of World War II when, rejected by the dominant society,
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the Japanese community turned inward and was largely alienated from the rest of
the society.
Finally, those Tibetans who chose to leave their South Asian exile and seek
to establish themselves in the West adopted the orientation of Buddhist modern-
ism, including a psychologistic interpretation of Buddhism.5 Though not a uni-
fied movement as such, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw several
similar responses to the challenge of Christian evangelism by Buddhists in vari-
ous Asian countries. These reformers sought to represent Buddhism as a modern
religion that could relate on the basis of equality with other ‘‘world religions.’’ It is
also characterized by an emphasis on the ethical, rational, and psychological char-
acter of Buddhist teachings, and by the creation of lay associations.6 Although it
is unknown inside Tibet per se, Tibetan teachers in exile—particularly the Dalai
Lama—have adopted this modernist stance.7
Just as Buddhist modernism has been employed in the representation of
Tibetan Buddhism to the West, so some Zen teachers who came to the West
from Japan shared this modernizing approach (see Rocha, Chap. 6). However, be-
cause the Shingon church in the United States was established to serve immigrant
communities and functioned as a center of ethnic identity, the missionaries who
founded it would have had no motivation to re-create Shingon along the lines of
Buddhist modernism.
Other chapters in this book address these issues for other Buddhist schools
elsewhere in the world, and they are not without relevance to Buddhism in the
United States (see Rocha on the importance of economic class, Tanabe on ethnic
insularity, and Kemper and LeVine on modernization). Acknowledging the im-
portance of these other factors, this essay focuses on the way in which the religious
culture of the United States made Shingon invisible. By employing the concepts
of assimilation and accommodation, we can restate the thesis of this essay: the
mismatch between the Japanese-American attempt to accommodate to American
religious culture and the tendency of the romantic presumptions of American reli-
gious culture to assimilate Buddhism into its own conception of the exotic Other
led to the invisibility of the Shingon tradition in theUnited States. This mismatch
precluded the immigrant-based churches of Japanese Buddhism such as Shingon
from appealing to the romantic mimetic impulse within a powerful segment of
American religious seekers—that is, their desire to become the exotic Other.
SHINGON AND ITS MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES
Shingon Buddhism is the Japanese form of the Vajrayana tradition, and was estab-
lished in Japan by Kukai at the beginning of the ninth century. Shingon prac-
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titioners trace their lineage back to the teachings of the Dharmakaya Buddha,
Mahavairocana Tathagata (Dainichi Nyorai). According to his autobiography, Ku-
kai traveled toChina specifically to study the esoteric teachings. There he received
initiation into a dual lineage that brought together two sets of ritual practices,
mandalas, and texts. The primary textual basis for the tradition are the Maha-
vairocana (Dainichi kyo) and theVajrashekhara (Kongo cho gyo) scriptures.8Though
Western scholarship is only starting to discern the formative role of esoteric Bud-
dhism in East Asia, Shingon ritual practices and conceptual schemes molded the
development of Japanese religions for a millennium.
The official Shingon mission to the United States began in 1909. In Octo-
ber of that year, the Reverend Shutai Aoyama left Japan for the United States
with the intent of providing religious services to the immigrant Japanese commu-
nity. Shortly after his arrival in San Francisco, however, he fell ill and his medical
expenses entirely depleted his resources. Lacking any other means of supporting
himself, he worked as a farm laborer for three years. Eventually, in 1912 he arrived
in Los Angeles, where one of the leaders of the local Japanese community encour-
aged him to establish a temple. Thus, it was not until January 1913 that a Shingon
temple was opened on a temporary basis in a house rented for the purpose.9
The temple was established as an O Daishi kyokai, that is, a church devoted
to Kukai, whose posthumous title is Kobo Daishi, meaning ‘‘the Great Teacher
who is an Ocean of Wisdom.’’ The official name of the temple was the Los Angeles
Daishi Church. The centrality of devotion to the founder is common in Japanese
Buddhism,10 and for the Shingon tradition devotion to Kukai is one of the uni-
fying threads that distinguishes it from other forms of Vajrayana Buddhism, many
of which have strains of devotionalism focused on their own founders.11
Shingon was established in Hawai‘i in a very different fashion, but one that
itself emphasizes an important aspect of the religious needs of an immigrant com-
munity—healing. In 1902 a layman,HogenYujiri, establishedhimself in a ‘‘preach-
ing hall’’ in Lahaina. He claimed that he had been ‘‘miraculously cured of an eye
disease through the limitless compassion of KoboDaishi.’’12On the island of Kauai,
another layman, Kodo Yamamoto, worked together with other devotees to re-
create in miniature the pilgrimage route of Shikoku Island.13 Here also there were
reports of miraculous cures, and additional Shingon temples headed by lay practi-
tioners were established in Waimea, Hilo, and Honolulu.
The lay practitioners were untrained in Shingon practice, having only a su-
perficial grasp of doctrinal understandings behind the ritual forms. Competition
between lay practitioners and the disdain of other Buddhist professionals led to a
view of Shingon as a corrupt and unorthodox form of Buddhism. Eventually this
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came to the attention of Shingon authorities, and a priest, Eikaku Seki, was sent
to investigate the situation in the islands. After completing his investigation the
Reverend Seki established an official branch of Kongobuji, the head temple of
the Koyasan branch of Shingon, in Honolulu. By 1926, when Honpa Honganji—
then the largest Buddhist denomination—had seventy-one temples and mission
stations, there were twenty-five Shingon temples in the islands.14
Institutional development of the church took two forms: the reproduction of
services within the temple based upon the Japanese model of temple organization
and the adoption of services based on the model of American church organiza-
tion. Exemplary of the former are funeral and memorial services and the Fujin-kai
(women’s auxiliary), while the formulation of a Shingon wedding ceremony and
the institutionalization of their own Boy Scout troop exemplify the latter.
Because the performance of funerals has been fundamental to Buddhist insti-
tutions in Japan, perhaps themost symbolically dramatic instance of the expansion
of religious services provided by the church was the first funeral service to be held
at the Los Angeles Daishi Church. This was conducted for Shigeru Koyama, who
died on November 7, 1913, at the age of twenty-seven.15 Because most immigrants
were young, such funeral services were rare. More commonly the church was asked
to perform memorial services on the event of the death of a parent in Japan. With
the epidemic of Spanish influenza of 1918, however, the number of funeral services
increased.
As in most Japanese-American Buddhist temples, the Los Angeles Daishi
Church’s Fujin-kai served as one of the key organizations within the temple. As
well as other fund-raising activities, the Fujin-kai is commonly responsible for pro-
viding food at any public event sponsored by the temple. In the case of the Los
Angeles Daishi Church, however, one of its main activities highlights the continu-
ing identification of the immigrant Japanese community with Japan. This took the
form of hosting sailors from Japanese navy ships when these came to Los Angeles.
Between 1934 and 1939 eleven ships visited Los Angeles, and their crews were
entertained by the Fujin-kai. These services were acknowledged by Japan’s minis-
ter of navy, and the ministry donated an oil painting to the temple in 1939. Later
in that same year the ground-breaking ceremony for a new temple building was
moved up by two days in order to coincide with the arrival of the Japanese Navy
Special Service Vessel Shiriya.16 As tensions between the United States and Japan
grew in the subsequent year, the propriety of continuing to welcome sailors be-
came an issue within the temple. No definite decision was reached, however, prior
to the beginning of the war.
Accommodation to the religious culture of the United States is evident in
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the request for a Buddhist wedding ceremony. In Japan, the division of religious
labors was such that Buddhist priests were almost exclusively concerned with fu-
neral andmemorial services. The creation of a Shingonwedding ceremony gives us
a glimpse of the complex religiocultural situation of the immigrant Japanese com-
munity in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Although at this distance we
cannot discern the specific religious motivations of the participants in the creation
of this novel ritual in American Shingon, we can use it as a focal point around
which the complexities come into view.
Throughout the nineteenth century, marriage ceremonies in Japan were nor-
mally domestic affairs officiated over by members of the household. The only reli-
gious aspect was the presentation of the in-marrying spouse to the ancestors—
present within the household in the form of their memorial tablets (J. ihai) on
the Buddhist altar (J. butsudan) or ancestor shelf (J. senzodana). Toward the end
of the nineteenth century, however, some lay Buddhist groups in Japan began to
perform Buddhist wedding ceremonies, perhaps under the influence of Christian
missionary activity. According to Richard Jaffe, ‘‘what is probably the first Japa-
nese Buddhist wedding ceremony’’ was written by Tanaka Chigaku, the founder
of the Nichirenist lay association Rengekai, in 1887.17 According to Tanaka’s own
report, his Buddhist wedding ceremony proved popular and was soon copied in the
Jodo Shinshu and Zen sects.18
Widely publicized, the marriage of the crown prince in a Shinto shrine in
1900 appears to have had a great effect on the general populace’s expectations of
what should comprise a proper wedding.19 This novelty caught on quickly, gaining
the patina of ancient custom in the process. It seems reasonable to assume that by
1918 Japanese immigrants to the United States would have been exposed to this
idea that a wedding service is primarily a religious affair within Japanese religious
culture itself, whether considered to be specifically Shinto or Buddhist.20
Living in the religious milieu of Christian America would have strongly re-
inforced this reconceptualization of weddings as religious in two ways: the long-
standing Christian tradition of weddings as sacramental and the understanding
that, as exclusive institutions, all churches are expected to provide a full range of
religious services for their adherents. Thus it was that Jutaro Narumi, one of the
church leaders, asked the Reverend Aoyama to perform the wedding ceremony
for his marriage to Yoneko Tsukada, which took place on June 25, 1918.21 This
required that the Reverend Aoyama create an entirely new ceremony, as accord-
ing to the temple history: ‘‘Japanese Buddhist priests normally concern themselves
only in funeral or memorial services, and do not officiate a wedding ceremony.
Therefore, there was no program for a wedding ceremony in the Daishi Church.’’22
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Thus, changes to religious culture in Japan, particularly the creation of religious
wedding ceremonies—both Buddhist and Shinto—and the expectations created
byAmerican church practices, began to transform the religious life of the Shingon
church in the United States.
Boy Scout Troop 79 (later renamed Troop 379) was established by the Rev-
erend Kitagawa in 1931.23 He saw it as a means of providing a positive response to
the Great Depression which had begun two years earlier. And, as with present-day
Chinese Buddhist Master Xingyun (see Chandler, Chap. 7), it was also a means of
instilling a set of positive values—ethics, responsibility, discipline—shared by both
the Japanese community and the wider society, as well as being an organization
that rejected racial discrimination and prejudice.
According to the temple history, Troop 379, particularly theDrum and Bugle
Corps, worked very hard to excel. Their success is indicated by the fact that it
was the only Boy Scout Troop to be invited in its entirety to attend the Jamboree
commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Boy Scouts hosted by Presi-
dent Roosevelt in 1935. After the troop had completed all their arrangements for
the trip to Washington, D.C., including fund-raising, the jamboree was canceled
due to an outbreak of polio. To avoid their having to abandon their plans entirely,
the Japanese ambassador in Washington arranged for the troop to receive a spe-
cial invitation to visit the White House. They brought with them a photograph
album of Japan’s national treasures as a gift fromKongobuji to President Roosevelt.
The president’s schedule precluded their being able to make the presentation di-
rectly, however. Like the Fujin-kai’s greeting of Japanese sailors, the intervention
of the Japanese ambassador on behalf of the temple’s Boy Scout Troop indicates
the continuing identification with Japan.
It was in this same year that Kongobuji, head temple of the Chuin ryu lin-
eage located on Mount Koya, raised the status of the Los Angeles Daishi Church.
The church now became a branch of Kongobuji, and its name was changed to Ko-
yasan Beikoku Betsuin Temple. The title of ‘‘betsuin’’ marks the status of being a
direct branch of the head temple. ‘‘Beikoku’’ is an older Japanese term referring to
the United States and literally means ‘‘rice country,’’ an allusion to the prosperity
promised to immigrants by labor contractors.
Since 1929 there had been discussion about the need for a larger temple.
However, after being raised to the status of betsuin, plans for establishing a new
temple building advanced rapidly. In 1936, the decision was taken to pursue the
acquisition of property on East First Street in Los Angeles, in the heart of the Japa-
nese section of town. This initiated a cycle of planning and fund-raising, and the
property was purchased in July 1937. At this time it was against the law for non-
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citizens to own real estate, so the purchase was made in the names of one son each
of Tomozu Tomio and Zenzaburo Yamamoto, two of the organizers of the building
effort. As the design of the building developed over the next two years, so did the
estimated costs—from a total of $40,000 to $64,000.However, the committee per-
severed in their efforts, overcoming the difficulties of fund-raising and seeing the
project through to its completion. Contributions from Kongobuji included a cash
contribution of $3,000 and twelve logs of Koya cypress, considered the highest-
quality building material, for use as columns of the new building. Individual dona-
tions amounting to about $400 were also collected from Shingon priests in Japan.
As mentioned above, groundbreaking for construction was held on November 17,
1939, and the temple was completed on August 21, 1940. In this we can see the
continuing ties to the head church in Japan.
Just over a year later, the attack on Pearl Harbor precipitated the declaration
of war between Japan and theUnited States and the relocation of JapaneseAmeri-
cans—whether citizens of theUnited States or not—to concentration camps away
from the coast. As a leader of the Japanese community, the Reverend Takahashi
was one of the first arrested. This left the Reverend Sogabe, who had only recently
been posted to Los Angeles, in charge. Sogabe made the temple buildings avail-
able to members of the community as a place to store their belongings during their
absence, and when he was ordered to leave as well, closed up the temple buildings.
For two and a half years, the priests did their best to minister to the Shingon
community, which was now diffused through the ten relocation centers: Topaz,
Poston, Gila, Granada, Heart Mountain, Minedoca, Tule Lake, Jerome, Rohwer,
and Manzanar. Assisted by lay leaders in these camps, by correspondence, and by
occasional opportunities to visit among camps, the temple maintained religious
services. At the end of the war the Japanese returned from the camps only to find
themselves displaced from their homes. Again, under the guidance of Sogabe, who
had been allowed to return prior to the actual cessation of conflict, the temple
became a refuge, providing temporary housing. As with other Japanese-American
Buddhist denominations, the wartime relocation left their members more spread
out over the United States than previously.
After all of these difficulties, Los Angeles County added a final insult by
claiming that the temple was in arrears on its property taxes to the amount of
$5,000. The county’s claimwas that the temple had ceased to operate as a religious
institution, serving instead first as storage for members’ belongings and then as a
hostel. Other Buddhist temples in the same situation sought relief in the courts,
but lost their suits. The Shingon temple was finally able to pay off this debt when
in 1957 it received funds from the Wartime Evacuation Compensation Bill.
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The temple celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 1962. At that time efforts
were under way to improve the qualifications of priests to provide religious ser-
vices in English. Four priests pursued advanced degrees. These included Yoshito S.
Hakeda, who published translations of key works for the study of Shingon Bud-
dhism,24 Shunsho Terakawa, who taught philosophy and religion at San Jose State
University for many years, and TaisenMiyata, who is currently bishop at the Koya-
san Beikoku Betsuin Temple.
ACCOMMODATION TO THE PROTESTANT
NORMS OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS CULTURE
In the early part of the twentieth century, Japanese Buddhist denominations in the
United States experienced a significant loss of membership to Protestant Chris-
tian churches, particularly the Methodist. Active evangelism on the part of the
Protestants, together with a desire on the part of Japanese to blend into Ameri-
can society, were significant factors contributing to this shift in religious affiliation.
Japanese-American Buddhist organizations responded by adapting their liturgical
practices so as to appear closer to the normativemodel ofAmerican Protestantism,
in some cases building on adaptations that had already been initiated by modern-
izers in Japan. For example, both Shin (a Japanese Pure Land denomination, see
Tanabe, Chap. 3) and Shingon churches hold Sunday services, with the congre-
gation (usually referred to by the Sanskrit term ‘‘sangha’’) seated in pews, listening
to organ music, singing hymns set to Western musical forms, and in some cases
listening to choirs. At the center of the Sunday liturgy is a Dharma talk, or ser-
mon. While many Buddhist churches retained traditional altars, some ‘‘modern-
ized,’’ adopting very spare altars highly reminiscent of the Puritan model of church
as courtroom.
Institutionally, many Buddhist churches also developed their social role as
community centers, simultaneously accommodating aspects of American culture
while seeking to preserve their Japanese heritage. Basketball leagues, for example,
were sponsored alongside more traditionally Japanese cultural activities such as
judo, kendo, or flower arranging. In many communities the largest public activity
of the temple is the midsummer O Bon festival. This festival, celebrating the an-
cestors, provides an opportunity for annual fund-raising by selling teriyaki chicken
and sushi alongside hamburgers and corn on the cob. In some circles one can hear
rather disdainful comments regarding Japanese-American Buddhist temples be-
cause of their function as community centers. The disparaging tone of these com-
ments—made by both insiders and outsiders—implicitly accepts the this-worldly
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versus other-worldly dualismwhich pervadesAmerican religious culture. The pres-
ence of activities judged to be this-worldly is equated with the absence of an
other-worldly, or spiritual, orientation. Not only is the application of this dualis-
tic preconception problematic for the Buddhist tradition, but the attitude fails to
recognize the pivotal role that temples played in creating a sense of community
for the immigrants. It was not simply a matter of being a community center, but
of creating a community by providing it with a center.
Accommodation, however, did not extend as deeply into the liturgical realm
as is sometimes assumed, particularly when one considers the modernizing efforts
of someone like Dharmapala (see Kemper, Chap. 1). One of the few scholars in the
contemporary study of American Buddhism even to note the existence of Shin-
gon in the United States is Charles Prebish. Some aspects of his brief comments
do, however, misrepresent the actual situation of Shingon in America. While it is
accurate to say that the Koyasan Buddhist Temple follows the Buddhist Churches
of America’s25 ‘‘pattern of holding a Sunday service, maintaining a Sunday-school
program, and serving as a community center for its adherents,’’ it is inaccurate and
misleading to claim that for ‘‘the most part, the use of mantras and mudras has
been eliminated from the practice.’’26
On the contrary, the ordinary lay adherent would in the course of an English-
language Shingon service recite many mantra. The order of service for English-
language Shingon services is adoration, repentance, Three Refuges, confirmation
of commitment to the Triple Jewel, Ten Precepts, aspiration for awakening (Skt.
bodhicitta), pledge, recitation of the Heart Sutra, recitation of the mantras of the
thirteen Buddhas, recitation of the light mantra, recitation of the guru mantra,
universal prayer (transfer of merits), and concluding adoration.27 In addition to
the liturgical acts specifically identified as mantra recitation, several of the others
also include mantra. The claim that mudra as well as mantra have been eliminated
points to a further confusion. It seems to imply that performance of mudra and
recitation of mantra by lay adherents are the norm for Shingon services in Japan.
My own observations of Japanese Shingon services across the span of a quarter-
century indicate that lay adherents very rarely recitemantra and are even less likely
to perform mudra. Generally, as seems also to be the case in many other Buddhist
traditions in Japan, the only activity undertaken by lay adherents in the course
of a service is the offering of incense. The inclusion of mantra recitation by lay
adherents as a part of the order of service for Shingon in America appears to be
part of the accommodation to the model of religious services as found in Ameri-
can religious culture. Without proper initiation, however, lay adherents would not
be taught to perform the mudra, which constitutes the priest’s role in the service.
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Central to the idea of Shingon as an ‘‘esoteric’’ tradition is the role played
by initiation. Initiation is felt to be necessary because Shingon practices are effi-
cacious and powerful, and it is necessary to protect them from individuals who
might misuse the powers inherent in those practices and would thereby endanger
both themselves and others. Thus, mudras are the special province of the priests
and are often performed secretly, under the concealment of their robes.28 This dis-
tinction is not one that originated in the adaptation to the religious culture of the
United States but is also found in contemporary Shingon temples in Japan. In-
deed, it is implied by the fact that descriptions of the mudras are not to be found
in the earliest translations of tantric texts into Chinese. It is the mudras that are
considered to activate the mantras, thus while the mantras could be recorded, the
mudras were to be directly transmitted from teacher to disciple. The adaptation
to mainstream Protestant norms is substantial enough, however, that even those
Americans whose interests led them to investigate a wide variety of esoteric tra-
ditions did not find the Shingon tradition appealing enough to pursue.29
ROMANTICISM, MIMESIS, AND THE
DESIRE FOR THE EXOTIC OTHER
As an identifiable movement, the origin of romanticism has been traced to the
eighteenth century.30 Although largely concerned with aesthetics—art and poetry
—it was also very influential as a religious and philosophic orientation, as well as
having social and political consequences.31 To greatly simplify two complex phases
in the history of European thought, romanticism was in large part a reaction to the
Enlightenment, which had valued reason and order, emphasizing instead emotion
and spontaneity. The idea that ‘‘authentic’’ religiosity is rooted in the emotions
and is manifested by a childlike naïveté and spontaneity are romantic conceptions
of religion that continue into the present. While romanticism in general is char-
acterized by the emotions of nostalgia, longing, and alienation from one’s natal
society, its mimetic impulse is key to understanding the reception of Buddhism in
the West.
Themimetic impulse32 is not by anymeans unique to the romantics.33 Mime-
sis is used in Shingon—and tantric Buddhist ritual generally—when the practi-
tioner identifies with the deity evoked.34 Indeed, all of Buddhist meditation prac-
tice might be interpreted as a kind of mimesis—you have to practice what the
Buddha practiced in order to become a buddha. For the romantics, however, the
mimetic impulse was informed by their social alienation, which directed them
toward Asia, and by their preconceptions regarding religion. While they sought
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fulfillment in the object of their mimetic desire, their appropriation of Buddhism
was a form of assimilation—of incorporating Buddhism into their own precon-
ceptions regarding religion. Of course, not all converts to Buddhism were moti-
vated primarily by mimetic desire or have not grown into a deeper appreciation of
the actualities of Buddhist practice. However, romantic mimesis is central to the
formation of popular conceptions of Buddhism and other Asian religions within
American religious culture, including the marginalization of traditions that did
not fit into the preconceptions of romanticism.35
Themimetic impulse can be described as the desire to obtain the power of the
Other, not by conquest, but by becoming that Other.36 In the case of Tibetan Bud-
dhism, Donald Lopez has noted that ‘‘Tibet operates as a constituent of a roman-
ticism in which the Orient is not debased but exalted as a surrogate self endowed
with all that theWest wants.’’37The romantics located that powerfulOther inAsia
and marked it as the exotic. This is so central to the development of romanticism
that Edward Said has summarized Raymond Schwab’s La Renaissance orientale as
asserting that ‘‘Romanticism cannot be understood unless some account is taken
of the great textual and linguistic discoveries made about the Orient during the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.’’38
These discoveries also influenced the way in which the American variant of
romanticism, transcendentalism, developed.39 Arthur Versluis has demonstrated
the pivotal role of Asian religions in the early formation of transcendentalism,
especially in the works of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, who
are considered to be the most important figures in the movement’s establishment.
According toVersluis, ‘‘neither Emerson norThoreauwould havewritten the same
works had they not read Hindu and Buddhist scriptures.’’40 Although later tran-
scendentalist authors did not read widely in Asian religions, they did continue to
develop ideas, such as the one that a ‘‘universal religion’’ was already emerging in
their own day, that set the stage for New Thought in the late nineteenth century
and New Age religiosity in the late twentieth.41
One of the origins of mimetic desire is Hegel, who framed the structures of
thought within which and against which romanticism developed. Hegel placed
mimesis at the heart of his epistemology—the truest knowing comes by becoming
the other.42 The fuller this identification, the more adequate the knowledge. The
romantics transformed this from an epistemology into a doctrine that one’s full
potential was to be achieved by a sudden, transformative experience, or religious
insight. Such central Buddhist concepts as merit making (Kemper, Chap. 1) and
the path structure would not fit within this naturalized, individualistic romantic
anthropology.43
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For Romanticism, mimetic desire is directed toward the idealized Oriental
Other, who is perceived as having qualities such as tranquility, wisdom, and purity,
which one can only acquire for oneself by ceasing to be oneself and becoming
the Other. Through a variety of vehicles—clothing, habits, food, objets d’art—
one attempts to mold oneself into the image of the idealized Other. Some forms
of Buddhism, such as Foguang Shan, have purposely played up to the appeal of
the exotic (Chandler, Chap. 7), while others, such as the Jōdo Shinshū temples
of Hawai‘i, have attempted to further Americanize themselves in order to keep
later generations of Japanese Americans as members—a strategy that is the mirror
image of the appeal to the exotic (Tanabe, Chap. 3). However, the romantic desire
to become the exotic Other finds little of appeal in those forms of Japanese Bud-
dhism that sought to accommodate themselves to mainstream American religious
culture.
The transmission of romantic attitudes and values from the romantics per se
into the religious culture of twentieth-century America was mediated by a set of
individuals whose purposes were distinct enough that they have been called ‘‘neo-
romantics.’’ It is these neoromantics who are most responsible for creating the
current liberal understanding of religion, an understanding based on their ‘‘asser-
tions of religious experience as an autonomous, irreducible and universal intuition
or feeling of the Infinite, of human cultural expressions as the medium through
which divine revelation is mediated, and of the various religions of the world as
the positive forms in which the essence of religion manifests itself.’’44
Consequently, the romantic attitudes that came to pervade American reli-
gious culture in the twentieth century are not simply identical with the aesthetic
movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Most impor-
tant, the rise of modernism, with its emphasis on quantification, and the socioeco-
nomic correlate of modernism—industrialism—created in the twentieth century
an intellectual climate radically different from that of the nineteenth. However,
although no longer an identifiable movement among intellectual elites whose cre-
ativity was expressed and whose attitudes were frequently communicated through
the medium of poetry, nineteenth-century romanticism lingers on in what by now
have become fragmentary presumptions about human existence, social relations,
and the world in which we live. Being unexamined, these presumptions were in
some ways even more deeply influential in the twentieth century and are in the
present than they were when they were the topic of discussion and disagreement.
It is the presumptive character of these beliefs and attitudes that has allowed them
to mold the Buddhism perceived by the West into a reflection of these very same
beliefs and attitudes.
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Indicative of the extent to which romantic values and preconceptions came
to inform the Western apprehension of Buddhism is the way in which those values
and preconceptions were themselves rhetorically employed to assert the superi-
ority of ‘‘Eastern thought’’ over ‘‘Western.’’ One of the best-known figures in the
transmission of Buddhism to the West is D. T. Suzuki. As a member of the Kyoto
school, his way of presenting Zen Buddhism was itself deeply informed by roman-
ticism.45 This romanticization would seem to have been an important factor in
Suzuki’s international success as a promoter of Zen (Rocha, Chap. 6). The roman-
tic basis of his approach is evident in what may be his most frequently reprinted
essays, ‘‘Lectures on Zen Buddhism.’’46 In the first of these lectures, Suzuki asserts
the superiority of the ‘‘East’’ over the ‘‘West.’’ Taking one poem each by Bashō and
Tennyson, he develops a simplistic comparison between East and West. Suzuki as-
serts that Eastern thought, which he characterizes as mystical and ‘‘antescientific,’’
is superior to Western thought, which he characterizes as analytical and ‘‘scien-
tific.’’47He structures the comparison in such a fashion as to lead the reader to value
East over West. It is ironic, however, that he does so by appealing to romantic,
that is, Western, values. The romantic mimetic ideal of mystic unity is deployed
by Suzuki in a rhetoric of reversal in which the supposedly mystical thinking of
‘‘the Oriental,’’ which in the hands of Euro-American imperialists had served as
a rationalization for colonialism, is now given positive valence and returned as a
critique of the colonizer.
ZEN: A COUNTEREXAMPLE?
The popular reception of Zen, being so similar to that of Tibetan Buddhism, would
seem at first sight to be a counterexample disproving the thesis proposed here. Zen
could look like a counterexample because of the failure of the following argument
by analogy:
Shingon and Zen are alike in that both are forms of Japanese Buddhism
found in the United States.
Due to the dynamics of romantic mimesis, Shingon is invisible.
Therefore, Zen should be subject to the same dynamics and be invisible as
well.
However, Zen is as widely known—asmuch a cultural icon—asTibetanBuddhism,
seeming to indicate that something other than the dynamics of romantic mimesis
has made Shingon invisible.
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It is, however, important to distinguish between convert Zen and immigrant
Zen.48 The Zen of the immigrant Japanese-American communities remains just
as invisible on the American religious landscape as Shingon or Shin.49 What is
known so widely is convert Zen. This is due at least in part to the international-
izing project of such figures as D. T. Suzuki, who, along with Alan Watts, actively
worked to popularize Zen in the West.
One of the clearest instances of the importance of this distinction between
immigrant and convert Zen can be seen in the way in which Zen is represented in
the media. The media has demonstrated a consistent tendency to focus all of its
attention—whether sympathetic or hostile—on convert Zen, as if it were news-
worthy because it is some kind of anomalous phenomenon.50 The version of con-
vert Zen popularized in themedia is itself informed by the romantic andmodernist
religious assumptions shared both by many converts themselves and by the mem-
bers of themedia interviewing them, as well as by themodernizingBuddhist leaders
most able to articulately present Buddhism to a Western public. In this way, al-
though there is wide public recognition of Zen, it is not the Zen of the immigrant
communities. The vastly greater media attention devoted to convert Buddhism—
whether Zen or Tibetan Buddhism—seems to mirror with profound irony the idea
that spiritual conversion to Christianity by Orientals is analogous to cultural con-
version, and that this is the normative direction of religiocultural movement.
The equivalence between religious conversion and cultural conversion is
found, for example, in the merging of the interests of Christian missionaries and
sociologists in the first quarter of the twentieth century.51 While spiritual conver-
sion to Christianity and adoption of American culture by Orientals were what the
missionaries desired, the idea of white Americans converting to Buddhism seems
to pose a threat to implicit assumptions that cultural conversion ought to be only
toward American culture, a progress toward the presumptively superior. While
much of the media attention has been sympathetic, the very fact that the focus
is on those who convert to Buddhism is reminiscent of the fear felt by members
of the British Empire in the eighteenth century that white men were in danger
of ‘‘going native,’’ and the loathing felt toward those who were thought to have
done so.
CONCLUSION
It is important that we reflect critically on the romantic presumptions that inform
the popular religious culture of America. On the one hand these presumptions
have structured Buddhism as it is known in the West; at the same time, they also
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marginalize to the point of invisibility much, if not most, of the actual historical
tradition of Buddhism.
It seems to be a regular feature of the American assimilation of Buddhism
that the exotic is mistaken for the authentic. The contrast between the evident
appeal of the exotic of Tibetan monks dressed in traditional robes and the ac-
commodationist stance of Japanese priests dressed in business suits exemplifies this
conflation of authenticity and the exotic. The concept of authenticity itself needs
to be understood as a rhetorical strategy, deployed to support assertions of superi-
ority. In the case of the movement of Buddhism into the religious culture of the
United States, however, the appeal of the exotic extends beyond its apparent vali-
dation of authenticity. Historically, of course, concern with the exotic Other was
by no means limited to the idealized version embraced by romanticism. The Ori-
ental as ‘‘the ultimate symbol of exotic difference’’52 drew not only the positive
attention of the romantics and neoromantics, but also the negative reaction of
rejecting the exotic Other described so powerfully in the critiques of Orientalism.
For the mimetic desire of romanticism, the Buddhist as exotic Other pro-
vides the sense of authentic access to the ‘‘sacred wisdom of the East’’—itself a
Western construct—that was thought to be the corrective to the problems of one’s
own society. Japanese-American Buddhists who were themselves motivated to ac-
commodate to the norms of American popular religious culture could not serve as
that exotic Other. In addition, the missionary mandate of the Japanese-Buddhist
churches established in the first half of the twentieth century was to serve an
immigrant community, not to convert new members. Hence, despite Japanese-
American Buddhist sanghas having been a part of the American religious milieu
for over a century, even today they remain largely invisible.
Notes
1. A review of recent publications on Buddhism in America reveals several books claim-
ing to make various kinds of comprehensive statements, but with only minor exceptions
these include no mention of Shingon. Al Rapaport and Brian D. Hotchkiss, eds., Buddhism
in America (Rutland, Vermont, Boston, and Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1998); the record of
‘‘the landmark Buddhism in America Conference (Boston, January 17–19, 1997)’’; Richard
Hughes Seager,Buddhism in America (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1999); Charles
S. Prebish and Kenneth K. Tanaka, eds., The Faces of Buddhism in America (Berkeley, Los
Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1998); Duncan Ryuken Williams and
Christopher S. Queen, eds., American Buddhism: Methods and Findings in Recent Scholarship
(Richmond, Eng.: Curzon, 1999); and James William Coleman, The New Buddhism: The
Western Tranformation of an Ancient Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)—all
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include no reference to Shingon. In keeping with his topic, Thomas A. Tweed, The Ameri-
can Encounter with Buddhism, 1844–1912: Victorian Culture and the Limits of Dissent (Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1992), makes several references to Shingon in relation to
the Victorians Ernest Fenollosa and William Sturgis Bigelow, both of whom studied Shin-
gon and Tendai in Japan, but does not discuss the presence of immigrant Buddhists in the
United States. Rick Fields,How the Swans Came to the Lake: ANarrative History of Buddhism
inAmerica, 3d ed. (Boston: Shambhala, 1992),makes passing reference to Shingon, though,
as he shares the concern of most of the studies with the development of convert Buddhism,
his work pays scant attention to immigrant Buddhism. Similarly, the intentions of Cole-
man, New Buddhism, and Stephen Batchelor, The Awakening of the West: The Encounter of
Buddhism and Western Culture (Berkeley: Parallax, 1994), are not to be comprehensive and
also pay scant attention to immigrant Buddhism, giving no mention to Shingon. Though
not mentioning Shingon, an important study that gives thorough attention to immigrant
Buddhists in Canada is Janet McLellan, Many Petals of the Lotus: Five Asian Buddhist Com-
munities in Toronto (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). The new, popular work by
Diana L. Eck, A New Religious America: How a ‘‘Christian Country’’ Has Become the World’s
Most Religiously Diverse Nation (New York: Harper San Francisco, 2001), has the benefit
of treating immigrant Buddhism seriously but does not mention Shingon per se. The only
recent work that gives any serious attention to Shingon is the brief treatment found in
Charles Prebish, Luminous Passage: The Practice and Study of Buddhism in America (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999). In the study of American religion,
immigrant forms of Asian religions are typically marginalized in two ways. First, as discussed
more fully later in this essay, there is a strong tendency to attend exclusively to converts,
who are more easily accessible than the immigrant communities. The second marginalizing
tendency is to focus on the changes in the immigration laws in the mid-1960s, a time when
some immigrant churches had already been established for over half a century.
2. It has become something of a commonplace to identify two forms of Buddhism when
discussing Buddhist missionary activity in the West. One of the ways these two are differen-
tiated is between immigrant and convert Buddhism. However, as Jan Nattier has suggested,
the actuality is more complex, and the ‘‘notion of ‘two Buddhisms’ . . . is clearly inadequate.’’
Jan Nattier, ‘‘Who Is a Buddhist? Charting the Landscape of Buddhist America,’’ in Faces
of Buddhism, ed. Prebish and Tanaka, 189.
3. Harvey Aronson, ‘‘Is Buddhism Psychology?’’ lecture presented at the Institute of Bud-
dhist Studies, Berkeley, California, October 18, 2000.
4. Although employing a different terminology—that of assimilation and ethnic reten-
tion—Lon Kurashige has called the opposition of the two a ‘‘false dichotomy.’’ Lon Kura-
shige, Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival in
Los Angeles, 1934–1990 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002),
xiii. Matthew Kapstein has noted a similar complexity in the case of the introduction of
Buddhism to Tibet: ‘‘the Tibetan Buddhist tradition was not, for all its conservatism, a static
replication of Indian antiquity, nor, in its dynamic aspects, was it the product of deliber-
ate contrivance on the part of Tibetans motivated to construct a uniquely Tibetan form of
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Buddhism.’’ Matthew T. Kapstein, The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism: Conversion, Con-
testation, and Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4.
5. Gay Watson, The Resonance of Emptiness: A Buddhist Inspiration for a Contemporary Psy-
chotherapy (London: Curzon, 1998), 1–6.
6. Heinz Bechert,Buddhismus, Staat, undGesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravada-Buddhis-
mus, 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Main and Berlin: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1996), 1:37–108; Don
A. Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu’s Reforms (Honolulu: University of
Hawai‘i Press, 2001); Gabriele Goldfuss, Vers un Bouddhisme du XXe Siècle: Yang Wenhui
(1837–1911), Réformateur Laïque et Imprimeur (Paris: Collège de France, Institut des Hautes
Études Chinoises, 2001); and Peter A. Jackson, Buddhadasa: Theravada Buddhism and Mod-
ernist Reform in Thailand, 2d ed. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2003).
7. Donald S. Lopez, Jr., Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 184–186. One of the earliest Tibetans to actively pursue
a modernization was Gendün Chöpel (1903–1951). See Thupten Jinpa, ‘‘Science as an Ally
or a Rival Philosophy? Tibetan Buddhist Thinkers’ Engagement with Modern Science,’’ in
Buddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground, ed. B. Alan Wallace (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003); and Elke Hessel, Die Welt hat mich trunken gemacht: Die Lebensge-
schichte des Amdo Gendün Chöpel (Berlin: Theseus Verlag, 2000).
8. See Ryuichi Abé, The Weaving of Mantra: Kukai and the Construction of Esoteric Buddhist
Discourse (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Stanley Weinstein, ‘‘Aristocratic
Buddhism,’’ in The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 2: Heian Japan, ed. Donald H. Shively
and William H. McCullough (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 449–516;
and A History of Japanese Religion, ed. Kazuo Kasahara (Tokyo: Kosei Publishing, 2001),
98–113.
9. Katsuichi Kazahaya, Koyasan Beikoku Betsuin Goju nen shi (Koyasan Buddhist Temple,
1912–1962) (Los Angeles: Koyasan Beikoku Betsuin, 1974), 115–118.
10. Masao Fujii, ‘‘Founder Worship in Kamakura Buddhism,’’ in Religion and the Family in
East Asia, ed. George A. DeVos and Takao Sofue, reprint (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1986 [1984]), 155–167.
11. See James Burnell Robinson, ‘‘The Lives of Indian Buddhist Saints: Biography, Hagiog-
raphy and Myth,’’ in Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre, ed. José Ignacio Cabezón and
Roger R. Jackson (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 1996), 57–69; and Eva M. Dargyay, The Rise of
Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977).
12. Louise H. Hunter, Buddhism in Hawai‘i: Its Impact on a Yankee Community (Honolulu:
University of Hawai‘i Press, 1971), 101.
13. In 1979 I visited this miniature reproduction of the Shikoku pilgrimage. By that time
it had fallen into disrepair and seemed to no longer attract any visitors. Only shells of the
shrines were left, with no statues or other iconographic representations. Located on private
property just off the main road, there was no sign to indicate its presence, and only if one
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had information as to its whereabouts, such as I received from the local Shingon priest,
would one be able to find it.
14. Hunter, Buddhism in Hawai‘i, 151. The statistical significance of such a relatively large
number of temples in Hawai‘i in the early part of the twentieth century is also reflected
in the religious demographics of mid-century Japan. In 1972, Japan’s Agency for Cultural
Affairs reported that Shingon claimed the third largest number of adherents of all Bud-
dhist sects in Japan, following only the Nichiren and Pure Land sects. Agency for Cultural
Affairs, Japanese Religion: A Survey (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1972), 239.
15. Katsuichi Kazahaya, Koyasan Beikoku Betsuin Goju nen shi (Koyasan Buddhist Temple,
1912–1962) (Los Angeles: Koyasan Beikoku Betsuin, 1974), 122.
16. Ibid., 163.
17. Richard M. Jaffe, Neither Monk Nor Layman: Clerical Marriage in Modern Japanese Bud-
dhism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 169. See also Richard Jaffe, ‘‘The
Buddhist Cleric as Japanese Subject: Buddhism and theHousehold Registration System,’’ in
New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan, ed. Helen Hardacre and Adam L. Kern (Leiden:
Brill, 1997), 506–530.
18. Jaffe, Neither Monk Nor Layman, 172.
19. Robert J. Smith, ‘‘Wedding and Funeral Ritual: Analysing a moving target,’’ in Cere-
mony and Ritual in Japan: Religious Practices in an Industrialized Society, ed. Jan van Bremen
and D. P. Martinez (London: Routledge, 1995), 28.
20. For wedding ceremonies in contemporary Japan, see Michael Jeremy and M. E. Robin-
son, Ceremony and Symbolism in the Japanese Home (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press,
1989).
21. Kazahaya, Koyasan Beikoku Betsuin, 123.
22. Ibid. While it is possible that Japanese Shingon had—like Shin and Zen—created a
Buddhist wedding ceremony, it seems unlikely. This becomes clear when we consider that
the ReverendAoyama, despite ‘‘having entered themonastic life’’ at age six, graduated with
honors from Koyasan University, having been an instructor at Sanboin Temple, Kyoto, and
head priest at his home temple before entering into missionary service (ibid., 115), did not
know of any Shingon wedding ceremony.
23. Ibid., 136.
24. Yoshito S.Hakeda, trans.,TheAwakening of Faith (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity Press,
1967), and Hakeda, ed. and trans., Kukai: Major Works (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1972).
25. The Buddhist Churches of America represent the Jodo Shin tradition of Honpa Hon-
ganji in the United States. See also Tanabe, Chapter 3, in this volume.
26. Prebish, Luminous Passage, 26.
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27. Koyasan Shingonshu Kyogakubu, Shingon Buddhist Service Book (Koyasan, Japan: Koya-
san Shingonshu, 1975); Seytsu Takahashi, ed., Raihai Seiten (Los Angeles: Koyasan Bud-
dhist Temple, 1972); YuseiArai, Shingon Esoteric Buddhism:AHandbook for Followers, trans.,
George Tanabe, Seicho Asahi, and Shoken Harada; and Eijun Eidson, ed., Koyasan: Koya-
san Shingon Mission/Kongobuji (Fresno, Calif.: Shingon Buddhist International Institute,
1997).
28. The term ‘‘priest’’ is the most appropriate English rendering of the Japanese ajari, which
derives from the Sanskrit acarya. As the tradition is primarily concerned with the perfor-
mance of ritual, it seems in some ways analogous to the sacramental Catholic tradition.
29. Tweed, American Encounter with Buddhism, 50–60.
30. KennethClark,The Romantic Rebellion: Romantic versus Classical Art (NewYork:Harper
and Row, 1973), 19. Clark, an art historian, identifies Edmund Burke’s ‘‘A Philosophical
Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful’’ (1757) as the first philosophic statement of the
movement.
31. On the political consequences of romanticism, see Isaiah Berlin, ‘‘The Romantic Revo-
lution: A Crisis in the History of Modern Thought,’’ in Isaiah Berlin, The Sense of Reality:
Studies in Ideas and Their History, ed. Henry Hardy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
1996).
32. Charles Hallisey has used the phrase ‘‘intercultural mimesis’’ to refer to the way in which
Buddhists effected the Victorian representation of Buddhism, e.g., in the work of Rhys-
Davids. Charles Hallisey, ‘‘Roads Taken and Not Taken in the Study of Theravada Bud-
dhism,’’ in Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism, ed. Donald S.
Lopez, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). See also Peter van der Veer, Im-
perial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2001). Richard King has also used the concept of mimesis in relation to
Asian religions, discussing counter-hegemonic strategies, drawing a distinction ‘‘between
re-presentative mimesis (that is, merely re-presenting or mirroring the hegemonic stereo-
type)—an act that involves conformity to the cultural stereotype—and parodic mimesis
(undoing by overdoing).’’ Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India
and ‘‘The Mystic East’’ (London: Routledge, 1999), 203.
33. Karl F. Morrison, The Mimetic Tradition of Reform in the West (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1982).
34. See Richard K. Payne, ‘‘Realizing Inherent Enlightenment: Ritual and Self-Transforma-
tion in Shingon Buddhism,’’ in Religious and Social Ritual: Interdisciplinary Explorations, ed.
Michael B. Aune and Valerie D. Marinis (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1996).
35. Two sets of beliefs and attitudes related to romanticism are primitivism and perennial-
ism. Primitivism is the idea that modern society is responsible for all of the ills that plague
humans, and that in the past, or among present-day primitives, these problems are absent.
Primitives are seen as spontaneous, motivated by their emotions, and inherently honor-
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able—an idealization that is extended to women and children. Perennialism is the con-
temporary expression of the Neoplatonic notion that there is a single truth, which is at
the same time the source of ethics and real existence. It is most commonly expressed in
the metaphor that different religions form different paths to the top of the same mountain.
Extended consideration of these two important topics would take us too far afield at this
time.
36. On the connection between mimesis, desire—and seduction, see Gunter Gebauer and
ChristophWulf,Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society, trans. DonReneau (Berkeley and LosAnge-
les: University of California Press, 1995), 211–216.
37. Lopez, Prisoners of Shangri-La, 202. While Tibet itself could be the object of romantic
mimetic desire, once Japan had taken the road to an aggressive policy of nationalism in the
Meiji era and modernization, it could no longer be the object of romantic fantasies.
38. Hallisey, ‘‘Roads Taken and Not Taken,’’ 32; see also Edward W. Said, ‘‘Introduction,’’ in
RaymondSchwab,TheOriental Renaissance: Europe’s Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680–
1880, trans. Gene Patterson-Black and Victor Reinking (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1984), xix.
39. Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2001), 248.
40. Arthur Versluis, American Transcendentalism and Asian Religions (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1993), 305.
41. For an example of the treatment of Buddhism inNewAge thought, seeWouter J. Hane-
graaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 191–193.
42. Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (London: Rout-
ledge, 1992), 36. It is this mimetic epistemology, further developed by Dilthey’s distinction
between explanation and understanding and by Husserl’s phenomenological methodology,
that has become so influential in the study of religion under the notion that through em-
pathy or intuition one can oneself constructively reexperience the religious experience of
the other.
43. Suzanne R. Kirschner, The Religious and Romantic Origins of Psychoanalysis: Individuation
and Integration in Post-Freudian Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
44. Arthur McCalla, ‘‘Romanticism,’’ in Guide to the Study of Religion, ed. Willi Braun and
Russell T. McCutcheon (London: Cassell, 2000), 378.
45. Robert Sharf, ‘‘The Zen of Japanese Nationalism,’’ in Curators of the Buddha: The Study
of Buddhism under Colonialism, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1995), ‘‘Whose Zen? Zen Nationalism Reconsidered,’’ in Rude Awakenings: Zen, the
Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism, ed. James W. Heisig and John C. Maraldo
(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1995); and ‘‘Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric
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of Meditative Experience,’’ Numen: International Review for the History of Religions 42, no. 3
(October 1995).
46. D. T. Suzuki, ‘‘Lectures on Zen Buddhism,’’ in D. T. Suzuki, Erich Fromm, and Richard
De Martino, Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis (New York: Grove, 1963).
47. Ibid., 5, 10.
48. My thanks to Robert Bellah for raising the question and toGeorge Tanabe for suggesting
the importance of the difference between the two forms of Zen.
49. It has been suggested that one of the important differences between Zen and Shingon is
the relatively greater freedom Zen priests had from control by central authorities in Japan,
particularly the freedom to conduct local ordinations that were recognized by Japan. (My
thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this issue to my attention.) This is
very suggestive but, as with other dynamics, cannot be entirely separated from the context
of romanticist religious culture as an independent variable. For example, not all Zen priests
exercised such freedom equally. While Suzuki Shunryu established the San Francisco Zen
Center on his own, this only happened after he broke with the Zen temple that brought
him to the United States, which, as a primarily immigrant temple, did not want him being
so involved with Anglo-Americans. The freedom to conduct initiations and ordinations
locally seems to have been instrumental in creating a convert community, but the interest
in conversion existed only against the background of an already romanticized version of
Buddhism.
50. This focus is evident even in the media coverage of Eck’s recent work, A New Religious
America. While itself noteworthy for providing a very balanced treatment, the media atten-
tion has continued to focus on converts to Eastern religions, rather than on the long-term
presence of immigrant communities.
51. Henry Yu, Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 65.
52. Ibid., 63.
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Globalization and the Pursuit of a
Shared Understanding of the Absolute:
The Case of Soka Gakkai in Brazil
Peter B. Clarke
This chapter considers the development within the Nichiren Buddhist movement
Soka Gakkai (Value Creation Society) of a new interpretation and application of
its criteria for distinguishing ‘‘real’’ from ‘‘provisional’’ Buddhism and for distin-
guishing religions of the ‘‘inner way’’ (naido) from those of the ‘‘outer way’’ (gedo).
In this presentation it is suggested that Soka Gakkai’s expansion outside Japan,
and more generally the East, in pursuit of its global mission, beginning with Brazil
in 1960, has acted as a catalyst in this development. It has precipitated a change to
a more inclusive, less oppositional understanding of and approach to other forms
of Buddhism and other religions, in particular Christianity in its Brazilian, Catho-
lic form and African-Brazilian religion. This change, which came with expansion
overseas, is sometimes seen essentially as the substitution of shoju or peaceful co-
existence with other religions and philosophies for shakabuku, a strategy of evan-
gelization that aimed at destroying the truth claims and undermining some of the
core values they espoused.1 It is suggested here that what has developed in the Bra-
zilian context is more than mere coexistence but something approaching a revolu-
tion in the way Brazilian members of Soka Gakkai, at least, think about and inter-
act with other religions. While they continue to be persuaded that Soka Gakkai
provides the effective spiritual means to transform the world,2 other means are not
rejected out of hand. A culture of experimentation has gradually taken over from
one of exclusive emphasis on the unique merits of the movement’s own spiritual
technologies to bring about the desired human revolution.
In the 1950s, during the presidency of Toda Josei (1900–1958), Soka Gakkai
became fixated with questions of religious orthodoxy and with the establishment
of criteria for the purpose of differentiating between ‘‘inner’’ and ‘‘outer’’ forms of
religion and ‘‘real’’ and ‘‘provisional’’ forms of Buddhism. All forms of Buddhism,
with the exception of Nichiren Buddhism, were classified as provisional or low-
grade Buddhism, including the Jōdo or Pure Land sects. Even within the Nichiren
tradition a distinction was made between Soka Gakkai, which claimed to be the
purest form ofNichiren Buddhism, and the other Lotus Scripture (Hoke-kyo) based
sects.3 Among other religions classified as outer and low-grade were Shinto and
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Christianity, the latter being placed on a par with the Jodo-shu and Jodo Shinshu
schools of Pure Land Buddhism.
As will be seen, several of the same principles that the movement used in
the 1950s, and for much of its history in Brazil, to distinguish between real and
provisional Buddhism and inner and outer forms of religion are now increasingly
interpreted and applied in an inclusive as opposed to an exclusive sense.Moreover,
fundamental beliefs held by other religions, such as belief in God, once considered
to be fundamentally contrary to Soka Gakkai’s teachings, are no longer character-
ized as ‘‘unscientific’’ doctrines that relegate those faiths that espouse them to the
category of low-grade, outer forms of religion. On the contrary, a strategy of re-
flexive syncretism is now encouraged, at least in Brazil, which seeks to find parallels
between these beliefs and those of Soka Gakkai.
There are, it should be mentioned, limits to the amount of doctrinal accom-
modation this more inclusive brand of Soka Gakkai found in Brazil is prepared to
accept, and these limits are not always determined by the leadership. One such
is the notion of a personal God who intervenes in human affairs and is respon-
sible for all that happens. Brazilian members who are interviewed stress that this
concept has to be refuted, albeit with sensitivity and respect, as it undermines
a fundamental principle in Soka Gakkai that every individual is responsible for
her/his own actions. On the other hand, members are open to, and even suggest to
potential recruits, the existence of parallels between fundamental Buddhist ideas
and the notion of God as Creator. In discussions with members in the state of
Bahia in northeasternBrazil—a state still deeply influenced by a tense intermixture
of Catholicism, popular religion, various forms of African-Brazilian religion, and
Spiritualism, and unaware of basic Buddhist beliefs—this notion was frequently
juxtaposed with the movement’s mantra ‘‘Nam-myoho-Rengekyo’’ (I put my faith
in the wonderful Lotus Scripture).
For the purpose of illustrating the above-mentioned developments in Soka
Gakkai teachings on and attitudes toward other religions, this chapter is divided
into three main sections. The first focuses on Soka Gakkai teachings on the truth
claims and status of Buddhism and other religions, and for this I am heavily in-
debted to research carried out by Professor Kamstra (1989),4 in which he examined
the content of the Canon of Shakabuku (Shakabuku kyoten), which the then presi-
dent of the movement Toda Josei had compiled in 1954, and the revised version
of this canon completed in 1969.5 The second section outlines the steps taken by
Soka Gakkai to move from an ethnic Japanese-based religion to a universal Bud-
dhist humanist movement in Brazil and shows how dependent, for a decade and
more, Soka Gakkai International Brazil’s (BSGI) views on ‘‘inner’’ and ‘‘outer’’—
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
1
3
4
o
f
2
5
6
Soka Gakkai in Brazil • 125
or true and false—forms of religions were on theCanon of Shakabuku, particularly
the 1954 version.
The third part of the chapter, in addressing the changing response of Soka
Gakkai to other religions, and in particular Roman Catholicism in Brazil, covers
some of the same ground as a previous publication.6 It is based on my fieldwork in
Brazil, carried out over almost twenty years, on the change in Japanese new reli-
gions (shinshukyo) in that country from ethnic to universal religions. As this third
section makes clear, Weber’s idea of elective affinity inevitably came into play as
BSGI underwent a process of universalization. This change in the ethnic composi-
tion of the membership, and the increasingly poor response from the wider society
where religious mixing is normative, put pressure on BSGI to alter, albeit not in
every respect radically, its perspectives on and attitudes toward other religions and
also its rules governing its own members’ participation in these religions.
Readers might want to note here for comparative purposes how different
movements in different cultural and religious contexts have developed similar ideas
and adopted similar strategies to those of Soka Gakkai in their attempts to adapt.
Particularly relevant and interesting is Rocha’s chapter on Zen in Brazil, which
like Soka Gakkai is increasingly unconcerned about denominational boundaries.
Other interesting comparisons can be drawn between Soka Gakkai and the Tai-
wanese Compassion Relief Foundation (see Huang, Chap. 8 in this volume), both
of which place great stress on grassroots support and lay witnessing. There are also
interesting differences between Soka Gakkai and several other movements dis-
cussed in this book, including the former’s commitment to the idea that Buddhism
is not only Japanese but is for all, a position that contrasts with that taken by other
Japanese Buddhists groups in, for example, Hawai‘i (see Tanabe, Chap. 3).
SOKA GAKKAI, BUDDHISM, AND OTHER RELIGIONS
Under the leadership (1944–1958) of Toda Josei (1900–1958), Soka Gakkai was
turned into a well-organized, efficiently administered, and highly separatist, if not
fundamentalist, Buddhist movement. The content of the Soka Gakkai canon
(Shakubuku kyoten), which is based on the Nichiren Buddhist kyohan (4),7 in its
1954 form approved by Toda, reflects its exclusive approach to other Buddhist
schools and to other religions.8The ultimate purpose of the canonwas the crushing
(shakabuku) of all forms of Buddhism and all other religions whose teachings and
practices failed to meet the criteria established for true Buddhism or true religion.
As Kamstra points out, the canon divides religions into two kinds: those of
the ‘‘outer way’’ (gedo) and those of the ‘‘inner way’’ (naido), placing in the latter
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category the superior religions and the superior form of Buddhism, the Maha-
yana tradition.9 While the canon affirms that Mahayana Buddhism is superior to
Hinayana Buddhism, it differentiates between real and provisional forms of the
former kind. It claims that certain schools, including the esoteric Shingon School,
have not understood the true meaning of Buddhism and, therefore, what they
teach is only provisional. Among the criteria used to distinguish real from provi-
sional Mahayana Buddhism, the most important one is the Lotus Scripture, which
Toda discovered in prison in 1944 and which from then on supplied him with
the meaning of life.10 According to the 1954 version of the Soka Gakkai canon,
real Mahayana Buddhism consists in adhering to the doctrines of the Lotus Scrip-
ture, which are made complete by the teachings of Nichiren and the recitation
of the previously mentioned mantra devised by him—‘‘I put my faith in the won-
derful Lotus Scripture’’ (Nam-myoho-Rengekyo). In practice this meant that only
Nichiren-derived sects were authentically Buddhist, and the most authentic of
these was Nichiren Shoshu.11
On the matter of ‘true’ and ‘false’ religion, the canon asserts that all religions
with the exception of Buddhism are false. Buddhism, it stresses, is scientific, and
this makes it true, a claim that we will see repeated in Brasil Seikyo, the move-
ment’s Brazilian newspaper. Furthermore, Buddhism is construed as relevant, in
ways that Christianity and other religions are not, to the modern world, where
scientific understanding prevails. Christianity is thus inferior to ‘‘real’’ Buddhism
and similar to the low-grade type of religion that is Amida Buddhism, which is dis-
missed as untrue on the ground that it is based on an empty fable of the Western
Pure Land (Kamstra 1989, 42).
Of coreChristian beliefs, beliefs that are almost universally accepted inBrazil
without being questioned, the canon is equally dismissive, describing the resurrec-
tion of Jesus, his virgin birth, and his ascension as fables. Moreover, it emphasizes
that Christianity has no logical, scientific explanation to offer for the healing and
other miracles attributed to Jesus. Buddhism, on the other hand, does possess an
explanation for certain kinds of healing in the law of cause and effect (Kamstra
1989, 42). CoreChristian teachings are said to fail the ultimate test of a truth claim
by contradicting what are called ‘‘the laws of the science of the universe’’ (Kam-
stra 1989, 41). Among the examples given are the resurrection of Jesus and the
immaculate conception of Mary, Brazil’s most popular saint. On the latter miracle
the canon states: ‘‘No matter from what angle one looks at it . . . the conception
of a virgin is contrary to the laws of the science of the universe. It is absolutely
impossible that a virgin can become pregnant without a human father . . .’’ (Kam-
stra 1989, 41). As to the empirical basis for an even more fundamental Christian
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belief, the resurrection of Jesus, this was not a miraculous event but the result of
the imaginings of the people in an abnormal state (Kamstra 1989, 41).
Also rejected is belief in the notion of a creatorGod.On this point the canon
affirms that ‘‘All living and dead beings of the universe without any distinction
were not made by some other being. We received our lives from our parents and
we were not made by God or by the Buddha . . .’’ (Kamstra 1989, 41). The notion
of God as spirit is also regarded as ill conceived, for all beings possess both body
and soul. A spirit separated from matter cannot exist (Kamstra 1989, 42). All the
qualities attributed to God by theists are in reality human qualities, for there is no
other law than that of cause and effect, and no such being as an absolute God.
Aswas previously suggested, the intention here is tomake SokaGakkai stand
apart as the most genuine and authentic form of Buddhism, and of religion. The
canon seeks, therefore, to exclude all other forms of Buddhism and of religion by
relegating them to the category of outer or provisional or low-grade paths. It is over
and against this doctrinal and philosophical perspective and in response to other
forms of Buddhism and other religions that the developments discussed in the third
part of this chapter need to be assessed. But first I shall draw a brief outline of how
Soka Gakkai opened up ethnically in Brazil—an opening up that had a consider-
able bearing on the more recent process of opening up doctrinally and in terms of
its rules relating to membership.
FROM ETHNIC TO UNIVERSAL RELIGION
Officially founded as a lay Buddhist organization in 1937 and named Soka Kyoiku
Gakkei (System of Value Creating Education), later changed to Soka Gakkai (In-
stitute of Creative Values), SGI began its global mission in earnest with its estab-
lishment of a branch in Brazil in 1960 by the newly appointed president of the
movement, Ikeda Daisaku (1928–). At the time, its membership was composed
entirely of Japanese nationals or Japanese Brazilians. This was also the case with
every other Japanese religion in Brazil.12
Brazil contains the largest population of Japanese descent in the world out-
side Japan, and this clearly provided a source of converts for the Japanese new
religions in Brazil seeking to expand beyond the shores of Japan. This ready-made
pool of converts was also in some respects counterproductive for some of these
movements and for the older schools of Buddhism, including the Pure Land and
Zen schools, by giving these religions the appearance of being exclusively for Japa-
nese people or people of Japanese descent. The following brief account of how
this large immigrant presence came to be will highlight the changing attitudes of
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the Japanese immigrants toward religion and will focus on the dynamics of the
development among them of Japanese new religions, including Soka Gakkai.
In modern times large-scale Japanese emigration started with the Meiji Res-
toration in 1868. No more than a trickle until 1885, it gathered momentum from
then onward, and by 1963 a total of around one million had emigrated.13 The
largest number of emigrants was eventually to settle inManchuria, followed byBra-
zil, Hawai‘i, mainland United States, Southeast Asia, Australasia, Canada, Peru,
Mexico, and Colombia. The search for a livelihood was the principal motivation
for emigration to the Americas, but not the only one. In other instances, such as
Manchuria, demographic, political, and strategic factors became important.
Beginning in 1908, with the demand for labor principally for the São Paulo
coffee plantations, Japanese outward emigration to Brazil continued with several
interruptions until the early years of World War II. By 1941 an estimated 234,000
Japanese emigrants had arrived in Brazil.14 At the time of writing there are ap-
proximately onemillion three hundred thousand citizens of Japanese origin and/or
descent in Brazil, the majority of whom are settled in São Paulo and elsewhere in
the south of Brazil, including Rio de Janeiro and Paraná, with only a few isolated
communities in the north of the country, such as ToméD’ Açu in the state of Pará.
If the concerns, preoccupations, and lifestyles of the immigrants as described
by the historians of Japanese immigration to Brazil—including Saito and Handa,
both Japanese immigrants themselves—can be used as a rough guide to the norm,
then the first generation of Japanese in Brazil expressed little interest in religious
matters, leaving them in the hands of the family back home.15 Almost all were
committed to returning home and believed that if they were unlucky enough to
die abroad before this could be arranged then their souls would find their own way
back to Japan. Pre–World War II Japanese immigrants in Brazil spoke of death
there as ‘‘death in a foreign land’’ (morte aldeia) or as the ‘‘death of a visitor’’ (morte
do visitante).16 The fact that the departing soul was leaving kin behind in Brazil did
not pose a problem, for it was believed to be simply going on ahead to the common
ancestral homeland.
Immigrants, then, made no provisions for the teaching of religion of any
kind. Their schools provided no religious education as such, the emphasis being
placed on the Imperial Rescript on Education proclaimed in 1890 and on filial piety
to the emperor, which it was designed to cultivate. A picture of the emperor occu-
pied the center wall of the school entrance, and all communal meeting places and
school assemblies focused attention on him and on the imperial ancestors only. As
to religious ceremonies and rituals, so little was known about them that it often
proved difficult to find anyone well versed enough in the relevant Buddhist scrip-
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
1
3
8
o
f
2
5
6
Soka Gakkai in Brazil • 129
tures to recite those appropriate to burial ceremonies. For these and other rites of
passage, immigrants were served by ‘‘monks made on the spot’’ (bonzos feitos na
hora, or substitute monks). Moreover, the ancestral tablets were rarely if ever cared
for and were usually consigned to the corner of the bedroom of the head of the
household, where they simply gathered dust.
Little attended to, Japanese religions abroad, both old and new, were thus,
until the late 1960s, essentially ethnic religions. Isolated as they were in their colo-
nies in Brazil, the Japanese experienced little contact with the rest of society except
by means of the Catholic Church, which made baptism a condition of entering
its much sought-after schools. Some of the Japanese who ‘‘converted,’’ were later
to reconvert after a fashion by joining a Japanese new religion. One interviewee,
a second-generation immigrant from that still very Japanese town of Suzano east
of the city of São Paulo, informed me that he always felt himself to be a Buddhist
and knew he would remain a Buddhist despite the pressure from Catholicism at
school.17 Such people have found in Soka Gakkai and other new Buddhist move-
ments present in Brazil a way of returning to Buddhism in a modern, practical, and
relevant form, in contrast to the Buddhism of their parents, the older Buddhist
traditions, which were perceived to focus on death and funeral rites.
A major shift in outlook among the Japanese immigrants in Brazil was al-
ready evident by the end of World War II. By then, some had begun to consider
Brazil their home, and by the late 1950s the idea of returning home to Japan had
lost much of its force. It was greatly weakened by the numbers of Japanese who had
gone back to Japan either immediately before or immediately after World War II,
only to find that life there was too rigid and restrictive compared with their Brazil-
ian experience, leading many of them to retrace their steps. Their children’s poor
knowledge of Japanese and the inevitable educational problems this would en-
tail also greatly influenced the older generation of immigrants to accept Brazil as
their permanent home, the place where they would die and become, in their turn,
ancestors (senzo).
This opting for Brazil and the kinds of domestic and lifestyle changes that
accompanied it gave religion greater importance and significance in the life of the
Japanese immigrant, and this in turn impacted on the understanding and interpre-
tation of belief and practice, widening both their application and their scope. For
example, protector deities of the land and the people (ujigami), once confined in
terms of their influence and power to the Japanese immigrant community, began
to be promoted by their ‘natural’ devotees as the deities, not just of the Japanese in
Brazil, but of all the country’s inhabitants. The most typical of Shinto shrines in
Brazil today, the Great Shinto Shrine of Brazil, the Dwelling of the Myriad Deities
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(Kaminoya Yaoyorozu Kyo), established in 1966 by the now nonagenarian Suzuko
Morishita, daughter of a Shinto ascetic (gyoja), stresses the universal character of
the Japanese sun goddess Amaterasu, commenting that in the afterlife there will
be ‘‘no nationalities, only people.’’18 This Shinto shrine, like other Shinto shrines
in Brazil, tends to be inclusive at the margins, so to speak, incorporating elements
of Catholic, African-Brazilian, and Amerindian iconography in the outer shrines
beyond the main sanctuary. The inner sanctum, on the other hand, remains a per-
fect replica of the Grand Shrine of Ise Jingu in Mie Prefecture southwest of Nara,
where the inner sanctuary (naiku) is dedicated to Amaterasu.
SokaGakkai broke out of its ethnicmold in Brazil at different speeds, making
headway faster in São Paulo and in the south generally than elsewhere in the coun-
try. In the state of Bahia, in the northeast, it was started in 1958 by a Japanese immi-
grant family, the Kominatus, who farmed on the Japanese Colônia da Mata de São
João, 100 kilometers south of the capital city, Salvador. Mrs. Kominatu in particu-
lar devoted herself to aggressive evangelism (shakabuku) among the Japanese im-
migrants in São João da Mata, and it was only in the late 1960s that non-Japanese
Brazilians joined the movement. Even with this change in ethnic composition,
the ceremonies remained entirely in Japanese. In Bahia there was general hostility
toward Japanese ways and an almost complete lack of information for those who
wanted to improve their understanding of Japanese culture. One of the first non-
Japanese Brazilians to join BSGI recalled that all that she could find as sources of
information were a few of President Ikeda’s discourses that had been translated
into Portuguese, and it was through reading these she came to admire him ‘‘as a
complete philosopher.’’19 Ikeda’s stature as a philosopher and teacher in Bahia is
high. Though few revere him as a prophet or savior with supernatural powers, he is
widely regarded as a great and wise man. One senior member of BSGI in Salvador
placed him alongside President Mandela and former President Gorbachev as one
of the three most important personalities of the twentieth century.20
By the beginning of 1999 there were 823 BSGI families in Salvador itself and
8,000 in the northeast of Brazil as a whole. This growth has been achieved with-
out salaried staff and without any full-time administrators. All events, including
ceremonies, study group (zadankai) sessions, seminars on Buddhism, and youth ac-
tivities are organized by volunteers. The entirely voluntary character of the enter-
prise generates an atmosphere of authenticity in themain center (kankai),which is
situated in the district of Tororo, close to the center of Salvador. Participants seem
not only to hold genuinely to their beliefs but to be tightly held by them. Those
who attend the ceremonies are not comfortably off. Few have cars and many will
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have taken up to half an hour or more to walk to the center. The director, who
displays a clear grasp of Nichiren Buddhist principles and is obviously widely read
in general philosophy and psychology, came from a poor family background in the
interior (sertão) of Bahia, where there was no opportunity to attend school. This he
did after marrying and moving to the city of Salvador in 1966. Makiguchi’s stress
on education was of great importance in attracting him to the movement.
Although not affluent, members are generally not from the most materially
deprived sections of society. Like Brazil’s evangelical Protestants, BSGI members
dress modestly and neatly. In other respects, however, they are unlike Protestants.
They are less judgmental about matters relating to private morality, going to the
beach, smoking, drinking alcohol, dancing, and participating in profane festivals
such as Carnival. In this respect they resemble Catholics rather than evangelical
Protestants. Nevertheless, BSGI in Bahia is not seen as an easy option; members
confess to being challenged by the movement to realize their own potential. Dur-
ing a certificate-awarding ceremony on December 2, 1998, mothers with children
who had completed courses on Buddhism expressed great satisfaction and pride
in their achievement—in which the 120 others present shared—when presented
with their diplomas, the first public affirmation of their abilities they had ever re-
ceived.
What is most noticeable in Bahia and further distinguishes this branch from
BSGI in São Paulo is the repeated emphasis in interviews, seminars, and sermons
on the social dimension of Nichiren Buddhism. In this it echoes liberation the-
ology discourse, though the philosophical paradigms of analysis in the two cases
differ greatly. Rather than emphasizing the inner transformations or the material
rewards that have been achieved through chanting, BSGI members in Salvador
are much more likely to point to the social improvements that have been made
in a particular community where chanting has been introduced. Tenement blocks
and even whole neighborhoods, once known as socially unfriendly and dangerous,
are said to have seen a marked improvement in interpersonal relationships since
the practice of chanting began.
To return to the theme of the movement’s transformation from ethnic to
‘‘universal’’ religion in Brazil, the success of this process had much to do with the
translation of Soka Gakkai’s philosophy and teachings into Portuguese. Also cru-
cial was the role of leadership both at the center and on the spot.Where the center
has been flexible and has allowed for local initiatives there has usually been rapid
progress in Brazil. This has been the experience of bothHouse ofGrowth (Seicho no
Ie) and Church ofWorldMessianity (Sekai Kyusei Kyo) in Brazil and is increasingly
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a feature of the BSGI leadership (Clarke 2000b).21 BSGI membership in Brazil is
estimated at 150,000, more than 80 percent of whom are of non-Japanese origin.
Most are residents of the city and/or state of São Paulo.
From a global perspective, BSGI is not only the largest branch of SGI in Latin
America, but anywhere in the world outside Japan. Greater success might have
been expected in the more secular and pluralist contexts of western Europe and
North America than in Brazil, which, despite what has already been referred to as
the explosion of Protestantism there since the 1960s,22 remains a predominantly
Catholic country. There are no obvious reasons, therefore, why BSGI should con-
tinue to make steady progress in contemporary Brazil, where a highly charged,
dynamic, renewed Catholicism is reaching out to millions in many different reli-
gious traditions and particularly to those in the neo-Pentecostalist churches, with
which it is in strong competition.23
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
Among the reasons for entertaining substantial doubts concerning Soka Gakkai’s
prospects, particularly in the less cosmopolitan centers of the north and north-
east of Brazil, is the apparent discontinuity between its own teachings and prac-
tices and the religious culture of Brazil. This, following Stark,24 should constitute a
major obstacle to the success of religion in a foreign environment, although ever-
increasing cultural globalization is likely to render this proposition lessmeaningful.
If the 1954 canon and even the revised 1969 version are taken as guides, the ideo-
logical and liturgical divide between BSGI and Catholicism is great. As we have
seen, the canon is explicit in stating that there is no place for belief in a personal
God and in the resurrection of Jesus, or for the veneration of Mary, the mother
of Jesus, pilgrimages to whose many shrines and belief in whose countless miracles
have become integral elements of Brazilian religious culture.
Ikeda was clearly aware when he launched the Brazilian district of SokaGak-
kai that the theological and cultural distance between Nichiren Buddhism and
Latin-based Catholic Christianity was a potential obstacle to his movement’s de-
velopment in their country. He likened his pioneering journey to Brazil inOctober
1960 to that of the first Catholic missionaries to Japan in the sixteenth century:
it was a voyage into unknown territory, without any knowledge of the culture,
customs, and language of the people he was seeking to convert.25 Brazil, Ikeda in-
sisted, was to play the lead role in the movement’s global strategy. It had been
entrusted, he announced, with themission of proclaimingNichiren Buddhism not
only throughout Latin America but throughout the world.26
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Ikeda’s concerns and his global ambitions notwithstanding, there is abun-
dant evidence that the Canon of Shakabuku greatly influenced BSGI thinking
on and attitudes toward other Buddhist groups and toward Catholicism in Brazil
until well into the 1970s. From then until the early 1990s, BSGI seems to have
simultaneously pursued a mixed strategy of shakabuku, or aggressive evangelism,
which sought the ‘‘crushing’’ of other religions, and shoju, or coexistence, which
was the approach counseled by President Ikeda in 1964 for all countries outside
Japan. With regard to African-Brazilian religions and Spiritualism, the strategy
was outright shakabuku until the mid- to late 1990s. This aggressive missionizing
notwithstanding, BSGI adopted from the outset what might be termed a ‘‘politi-
cally correct’’ attitude to Catholicism in public, acknowledging that it constituted
an integral part of Brazilian religious and cultural life.
This politically correct approach is evident in BSGI’s weekly journal Bra-
sil Seikyo, which carried articles on how Soka Gakkai’s members should relate to
Catholicism, one of which, written by Mr. Saito, the then executive director of
the movement in Brazil, is worth commenting on at some length. With the title
‘‘Let Us Be Useful to Brazil’’ (Sejamos úteis ao Brasil), the article emphasized that
Nichiren Buddhism was the only legitimate and authentic form of Buddhism and
the religion that would save humanity, for it was the ‘‘most correct and marvelous
of all religions’’ (a mais correta e maravilhosa religião entre as demais).27 This truth,
the article continued, was to be believed and spread with conviction and energy,
but without belittling other religions. Moreover, followers were informed that ho-
bobarai (essentially, the duty of converts to destroy all other objects of worship in
their homes) was not to be practiced in Brazil for the time being. This meant that
those who possessed them were dispensed from the duty to remove non-Nichiren
images and icons from their person or homes; nor was this to be demanded of new
converts. Such objects could be kept, members were advised, until such time as
through the practice of Nichiren Buddhism they acquired their own copy of the
object of worship, the sacred scroll orGohonzon inscribed by themonk and founder
of Nichiren Buddhism, Nichiren Daishonin (1222–1282).28
BSGI placed other limits on exclusivity, granting members the freedom to
associate with Catholics and even to participate in certain of their ceremonies.
Thus, if asked by a parent or a friend to attend a baptism or one of the other rites
of passage in a Catholic church, members should do so without any fear, for ‘‘it
would be worse for us to belittle them by not going.’’29 This sensitivity to Catho-
lic feeling and culture was motivated by more than pragmatism. It was also based
on the firm belief and confidence in the unique power and efficacy of BSGI’s own
practice to protect its members from any dangerous influences that contact with
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Catholicism, or any other religion, might bring with it and, at the same time, on
the notion of a clear separation between the religious and other spheres of life.
Such an outlook allowed for considerable interaction in various spheres of
life with Catholics, including the important sphere of education. Members were
advised not to worry about their children’s attendance of Catholic schools, ‘‘be-
cause this has nothing to do with religion,’’ and, even if difficulties over faith were
to arise, the pupils would be protected by the invincible power of the gohonzon, or
object of worship.30
These concessions to religious, social, and educational mixing notwithstand-
ing, at no time were theological boundaries blurred. In the following year another
article in Brasil Seikyo spelled out the criteria according to which the authen-
ticity of other religions should be assessed.31 There were three tests of authenticity,
readers were informed: one was the proof from literature, a second was the theo-
retical proof, and the third proof was derived from experience. The first—the proof
from literature—was to be found in the writings (gosho) of Nichiren Daishonin,
which were described as impeccably logical, rational, scientific, and relevant to the
modern world. The second was a logical consequence of the first, in that Nichi-
ren Daishonin’s teachings provided both a totally comprehensive and appropriate
philosophy for the modern world compared with Christianity, which, because it
was based on miracles, was irrelevant to contemporary life. The proof from experi-
ence (prova real) derived, it was explained, from the principle that belief can either
benefit or harm the believer. Nichiren Buddhism’s greatest benefit, it was claimed,
was the attainment of complete happiness through practice in this life. Readers
were not to concern themselves with a detailed investigation and analysis of the
scriptures to confirm all of this, for the most intricate details of true Buddhism,
they were informed, were incorporated in the gohonzon, just as the ‘‘principles of
electricity were incorporated in the various appliances.’’32
In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, BSGI put a great deal of effort into dem-
onstrating the compatibility between modern scientific thought and Buddhism.
Brasil Seikyo carried article after article on Buddhism and contemporary science,
including features illustrating the complete harmony between the former and the
theory of relativity.33 Another article elaborated on the theory of evolution to
demonstrate the agreement between the Buddhist understanding of the origins of
human life and that of modern science in this area as well, and how Christian the-
ology was incapable of grappling with this ‘‘supremely important issue raised by
biology.’’34
BSGI’s approach not only to Catholicism but also to other religions, includ-
ing the increasingly popular African-Brazilian religion and Spiritism, had begun to
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undergo a profound change by the early 1990s, so much so that by the middle years
of that decade its views on and attitude toward other religions were almost unrec-
ognizable when compared with those that prevailed in the 1960s. By the middle of
the 1990s the movement had effected a significant shift in strategy during a period
of some thirty-five years from shakabuku, the ‘‘crushing’’ or tearing apart of other
religions, to shakabuku-shoju, ‘‘crushing’’ tempered by coexistence, to qualified en-
gagement with the beliefs and philosophy of other religions and the acceptance of
the principle of multiple membership. Thus, this once doctrinally exclusive move-
ment had become inclusive to the extent that it had not only begun to tolerate
but also to accept in principle religious diversity within its own ranks and mul-
tiple memberships. New recruits were no longer required to reject their previous
religion. As Rocha has shown in her study of Zen in Brazil (Chap. 6), a similar at-
titude to denominational boundaries is also present in that movement. ‘‘Formerly,’’
it was explained by the present BSGI leadership, ‘‘there was a lot of this but now
it is over. Attending Church or Umbanda or a Spiritualist session is a decision for
the individual.’’35 The leadership had come to accept that those interested in join-
ing Soka Gakkai would decide for themselves what to believe, for ‘‘everyone has
enough intelligence to know what is best for them.’’36 This outlook allows BSGI
to compete on more favorable terms with other Japanese new religions in Brazil,
and in particular with House of Growth (Seicho no Ie) and the Church of World
Messianity (Sekai Kyusei Kyo), both of which have much larger memberships.37
The more inclusive approach of BSGI is not simply pragmatism on the part
of a minority movement in a dominant religious culture characterized by tolerance
and openness or in a world of keen competition with other alternative religions,
spiritualities, and philosophies, including Japanese new religions. It is also an ex-
pression of BSGI’s desire to proclaim its newfound identity as a universal humanist
philosophy, an identity that obliges it to demonstrate to its ethnically varied mem-
bership and to potential members from a variety of other faiths that it not only
has the capacity to engage in dialogue with them but also to offer them something
new, an approach once regarded as distinctive of other Japanese new religions in
Brazil, and in particular of Seicho no Ie (House of Growth).
Many of the young who are joining BSGI while at university are attracted by
its ecological and human rights programs, which have moved to center stage, cre-
ating an image of themovement in Brazil as a radical, humanist philosophy derived
from Buddhism rather than a religion per se. Members themselves stress that BSGI
is more than a religion or, as one adept fromRio de Janeiro commented: ‘‘It is not a
religion for the sake of being a religion’’ (‘‘Não é religião por ser religião’’). For mem-
bers, the ultimate test of whether BSGI is a religion or not is the impact it makes
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on individuals and society; if it fails to change people and their environment, then
it is not, informants stress, a religion.
CONCLUSIONS
Although its goal is world transformation, BSGI is no longer preoccupied with
converting everyone. To shape the thinking and attitude of a substantial minority
of the inhabitants of Brazil is its goal, not the conversion of all. The outlook and
behavior of such a minority, it is believed, will have a profound and lasting impact
on the rest of the population. Meanwhile, given its new, more inclusive attitude to
other religions, all those for whom belief in God, Jesus, Mary, and the miraculous
is important can continue on in that vein, even inside BSGI. Themovement’s ten-
dency to be tolerant of diversity inmatters of belief and belongingwill not diminish
the crucial importance it attaches to the power of its faith in the Lotus Scripture
and its mantra, described by former president Toda Josei as a never-failingmachine
that produces happiness.38
SGI’s global ambitions and the success achieved by BSGI in becoming a
multiethnic movement made up of members from diverse religious backgrounds
have resulted in the adoption of a strategy of reflexive syncretism, a strategy also
used by Zen in Brazil (see Rocha, Chap. 6) and in certain Theravadin Buddhist
contexts in Sri Lanka (see Kemper, Chap. 1). The most striking outcome in the
case of BSGI has been the abandonment of a previously widely espoused ideology
of exclusion based on the evaluation and assessment of beliefs according to the
movement’s own criteria regarding what constitutes the inner or outer way of reli-
gion, or the real and provisional path of Buddhism. This chapter has attempted to
chart the course that led to the abandonment of this culture of exclusion in favor
of one of inclusion, in which the beliefs held by others are no longer evaluated
and assessed using the criteria found in the Canon of Shakabuku and accordingly
relegated to the category of outer paths, or lower-grade religions. A more likely
outcome is the suggestion that, providing the belief in self-responsibility is not en-
dangered, a mutually beneficial discussion can be had on the similarities between,
for example, the belief in God as Creator, a notion rejected in the canon, and the
power of ‘‘Nam-myoho-Rengekyo.’’
The developments discussed here may appear to be pragmatic responses de-
signed to facilitate expansion on the part of Soka Gakkai. Indeed, all ecumeni-
cal dialog may be construed in this way and labeled euphemistically in academic
circles as reflexive syncretism. It is my view, however, that this local micropursuit
of a shared understanding of the Absolute reflects—fundamentalist reactions not-
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withstanding—what is also occurring much more widely and even at the macro or
global level. It mirrors what many new forms of religion or spirituality, whatever
their leadership may intend, are searching for, perhaps unconsciously, and that is
to be independent of the confines of traditionally imposed definitions and ways of
approaching the sacred—insisted upon by missionaries in the past who often had
the protection, if not the support, of a particular colonial power—in a manner not
dissimilar to the search for a consciousness beyond the nation-state, beyond land
or territory.
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Being a Zen Buddhist Brazilian:
Juggling Multiple Religious Identities
in the Land of Catholicism
Cristina Rocha
BUSSHINJI TEMPLE, MARCH 2000
The room is teeming with excitement. Folding chairs are arranged in rows. Japa-
nese men wearing suits and ties are sitting in the front rows and Japanese women
are at the back, as is appropriate in Japanese culture, where men take precedence.
In the middle rows, there are many T-shirted non-Japanese Brazilians, men and
women mixed, as befits their culture. This is the forty-seventh General Assembly
of the Sōtō Zen Buddhist Community of South America (Comunidade Budista
Sōtō Zenshū da América do Sul), and, as usual, it is taking place in the basement
of Busshinji (Buddha Heart-Mind Temple) in São Paulo city. There are about 115
people present, most of them non-Japanese Brazilians and Japanese descendents;
very few are part of the old, first-generation Japanese community.
Tension is in the air because this morning elections are taking place. Two
congregations are vying to run Busshinji’s administration—one composed of the
old, traditional, Japanese board, the other composed of their descendents who
align with the non-Japanese Brazilians. To aggravate matters, after a five-year hia-
tus, a new sōkan has just arrived from Japan.1 In the interim, this position was filled
by the missionary in charge of Busshinji, a non-Japanese Brazilian woman, Coen
Souza, who trained under the Zen master (rōshi) Maezumi at the Zen Center of
Los Angeles (ZCLA) for three years and then in Japan for a further twelve years.2
AlthoughCoen is a non-Japanese Brazilian nun, she had slowly gained acceptance
among the Japanese community because she worked hard to preserve the rituals
the Japanese community expects to be performed. Speaking both Japanese and
Portuguese fluently, she was a successful intermediary between the Japanese and
Brazilian communities. Paradoxically, her success was also the source of tension.
From 1995 (the year she was appointed) until 2000 (the year she lost her position
in the temple), Coen increasingly attracted Brazilians of non-Japanese ancestry
and began to conduct most of the temple’s activities in Portuguese. On that very
morning, she had reluctantly consented to run for the presidency of the Japanese
descendents’ faction. Because of the growth in the number of non-Japanese Bra-
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zilian adherents under Coen’s missionary work, this congregation had succeeded
in gaining control of the temple in 1998, when both groups disputed elections for
the first time. Now, with the presence of an ‘‘authentic’’ Japanese missionary (the
sōkan) to oversee the elections, would the coalition of non-Japanese Brazilian and
young Japanese descendents still prevail?
The new sōkan starts his speech, and his tone is conciliatory: ‘‘In the past
five years, when there was no sōkan in Latin America, the number of adherents
of the Sōtō Zenshū increased, thanks to teacher (sensei) Coen’s work. There are
many Zen groups in theU.S.A., France, and Spain, and they speakmany languages
other than Japanese. Therefore, it is only natural that conflicts arise. But these
conflicts are not necessarily negative. Let’s think of conflicts as an opportunity for
growth. . . .’’
Yet the general mood is not one of appeasement and the old disputes for
power are pervasive. Halfway through the assembly, following a series of speeches
by former members of the 1998–2000 administration, a Japanese man suddenly
stands up and bursts into Japanese. He is obviously upset. Many non-Japanese Bra-
zilians call out angrily that he should be speaking Portuguese, but he resists. One
Japanese descendent aligned with the non-Japanese Brazilian side shouts that they
are in Brazil and should therefore speak Portuguese. Commotion takes over the
room, only to be settled after some time, when a translator offers his services. It
turns out that the Japanese was a member of the administration prior to 1998. He
wanted to speak directly to the sōkan and to the fellow Japanese present so that
his words would not be misinterpreted. His speech is cut short, and he goes back
to his seat. The assembly proceeds with only minor incidents, and in the end a
new board comprised of the Japanese descendents (aligned with the non-Japanese
Brazilians) is elected. The morning is coming to a close, and everyone stands up
to prepare the room for the big lunch that is ahead. Feijoada (a typical Brazilian
dish purportedly originating from the food of slaves and consisting of black beans,
meat, rice, oranges, and vegetables) is served alongside sushi and Japanese green
tea. Forks, knives, and chopsticks rest on the table—an appropriate set of uten-
sils for the ever-present contentions that Japanese, Japanese-Brazilians, and non-
Japanese Brazilians undergo at Busshinji.
In this chapter, I will shed light on how these two distinct congregations have
laid claim to Busshinji temple in São Paulo city. I shall argue that the conflicts
over the ‘‘authenticity’’ of Zen stem from the different modes of religious practice.
On the one hand, for the first-generation Japanese, religious identity is expressive
of their ethnic identity; on the other hand, non-Japanese Brazilians use Zen Bud-
dhism as amarker of social distinction.3 After presenting an overview of the arrival
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of Zen in Brazil, identifying its demographics and adherents, I will proceed to map
the Brazilian religious landscape in order to show how established religions in Bra-
zil have creolized Zen Buddhism. I contend that converts use a Brazilian religious
‘‘grammar’’ as a matrix for new Buddhist ‘‘vocabulary,’’ and that the process has
facilitated the spread of Buddhism in the country.
AUTHENTICITY OR INNOVATION?
An occasion such as an election is a very telling situation. It is a time when sides
are clearly taken and decisions are made about who will hold power and for what
purpose. Moreover, such an event works as a metaphor for what is really at stake—
in this case, ethnic resistance against the surrounding society and the religious
identity of both groups. For many Japanese (issei) and some second-generation
Japanese-Brazilians (nisei), it is evident that theirs is the ‘‘authentic’’ Zen, since
they were the ones who brought Zen Buddhism to Brazil. For them, ‘‘true’’ Zen is
comprised of ‘‘masses’’ (as the members call the rituals, appropriating the Catholic
word), namely, funerals and rites for the worship of ancestors. Ethnic boundaries
are more clearly marked in situations where an individual or group is faced with
the ‘‘other.’’ For diasporic communities surrounded by a diverse population, these
boundaries have to be constructed, policed, and reinforced, so that the ethnic
identity of the community may be preserved.4 Religion can provide a strong bond
with the past and the homeland. The competition for authenticity described in
the above narrative shows that, by preserving some Japanese cultural traits (among
them language and religion), the Japanese-Brazilian immigrant community sought
to maintain its ethnic identity as distinct from other Brazilians.5
On the other side of this dispute for authenticity are the non-Japanese Bra-
zilians and some Japanese-Brazilians. For them, Zen Buddhism relies mainly on
meditation (zazen) as a way of experiencing enlightenment. Invoking the Bud-
dha Shakyamuni’s meditation practice and subsequent enlightenment, as well as
Dōgen’s assertion that Zen is basically about meditation, they regard devotional
practices and worship of ancestors as not authentic Zen Buddhism.6 This kind of
conflict between motivations, practice, and aspirations has occurred in other Bud-
dhist centers in the West.7
THE ARRIVAL OF BUDDHISM IN BRAZIL
Buddhism was introduced into Brazil by Japanese immigrants who first arrived in
1908 at the port of Santos, in the state of São Paulo.8 These immigrants worked
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mainly in coffee plantations and had hoped to return to Japan as soon as they
accumulated enough savings. Themaintenance of their culture, language, religion,
and beliefs was considered crucial. However, with the Japanese defeat in World
War II, the immigrants had to give up their dream of returning to their home coun-
try, prompting them to request missionaries from Japan to preach in their new
homeland. Until then, apart from a few independent missionaries, there were no
Japanese religious organizations in Brazil that would officiate at the death of an
immigrant.9
Zengenji, the first Sōtō Zen Buddhist temple in Brazil, was built in the early
1950s in Moji das Cruzes, a town in the outskirts of São Paulo City. In 1955, Bus-
shinji was established in São PauloCity as the headquarters of the Sōtō Zen School
in South America. These two temples, along with a temple in Rolāndia, in the
state of Paraná, have catered for three hundred Japanese-Brazilian families over
the past four decades.
Buddhismwas also introduced to Brazil by non-Japanese Brazilian intellectu-
als who imported European literature on Buddhism at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. The Buddhist Society of Brazil (Sociedade Budista do Brasil) was
founded in 1923 by Theosophists in Rio de Janeiro but was soon dissolved. In 1955,
Murillo Nunes de Azevedo reestablished it. Azevedo was deeply influenced by the
ideas of the Theosophical Society, where he had acted as president of the Brazilian
chapter for nine years.10 As professor at the Pontifical Catholic University in Rio
de Janeiro, Azevedo taught philosophy of the Far East and organized a collection
of translations called Luz da Ásia (Light of Asia) for Civilização Brasileira, a well-
known publishing house in Brazil. In this collection, he published twenty books
dedicated to Eastern philosophies. Among them was D. T. Suzuki’s Introduction to
Zen Buddhism, which Azevedo had translated into Portuguese in 1961.This book
was fundamental to the spread of Zen Buddhist ideas in Brazil and was frequently
cited in the interviews that I conducted among Zen practitioners in the late 1990s
in Brazil.
Azevedo and other intellectuals followed a similar path. Their initial en-
counter with Buddhism and Zen was through imported literature (European and
North American), which then led them to seek a place to practice; they found it
in Busshinji in São Paulo. In order to cater to the demands of Brazilians of non-
Japanese origin, in 1961 Ryōhan Shingū, the sōkan in charge at the time, cre-
ated a Zen meditation group (zazenkai) that met every Saturday. His interpreter
was Ricardo Gonçalves, a history professor from the prestigious University of São
Paulo. In making Zen accessible to Brazilians, Gonçalves helped to break down
the language barrier that had been themain obstacle to the proselytization of Bud-
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dhism in Brazil.11 Until very recently, when Brazilians of non-Japanese descent
sought association with other Japanese Buddhist schools, they were redirected to
Busshinji, because ‘‘they speak Portuguese there, and it is the place for non-Japa-
nese Brazilians,’’ as some non-Japanese adherents told me. The diminishing num-
bers of Japanese-Brazilianmembers (a similar phenomenon pointed out byTanabe,
Chap. 3), along with the growth in Buddhism in the past decade, have prompted
many Japanese Buddhist schools to make room for non-Japanese Brazilians. In-
deed, a Jōdo Shinshū temple in Brasília has introducedmeditation sessions in order
to attract this new clientele.12
BUDDHISM IN NUMBERS
Since 1976, as many as twenty-six Zen centers have been established for and by
non-Japanese Brazilians in Brazil. Unlike Busshinji, they do not have Japanese im-
migrant adherents and so their practice is based on meditation. Statistics available
on religion from the 2000 census show that, at that time, the Brazilian popula-
tion of 170 million people was comprised of 74 percent Roman Catholics (125
million), 15.5 percent Evangelicals (26 million, including traditional Evangelicals
and Pentecostals), 7.3 percent of no religion (12.3 million), 1.4 percent Spiritists
(2.3million), 0.14 percent Buddhists (245,000), 0.06 percent Jews (101,000), 0.04
percent esoteric religions (67,200), 0.03 percentAfro-Brazilian religions (51,000),
0.01 percent Muslims (18,500), and, finally, 0.06 percent indigenous religions
(10,700).13 It is worth comparing these figures with those of the 1991 census.While
those who identified as Catholics decreased by 10 percent since 1991 (83.8 percent
in 1991), there was an increase in other categories: evangelicalism (9.1 percent in
1991), no religion (4.8 percent in 1991), and Spiritists (1.2 percent in 1991).
As the statistics show, the great majority of Brazilians still come from Catho-
lic families. What these figures do not show is the movement from one religion
to another, multiple religious affiliations, as well as the combination of elements
of different traditions, which is commonplace in Brazil. Many Brazilians either
practice more than one religion at the same time or convert from one religion
to another. Indeed, according to the Brazilian sociologist Reginaldo Prandi, one-
quarter of the Brazilian adult population has converted to a religion different from
the one they were born into.14
A survey I conducted among Zen practitioners in the cities of São Paulo, Rio
de Janeiro, Ouro Preto, and Porto Alegre in 1998 and 1999 corroborates this fact.
Out of a total of eighty respondents, the majority (sixty-six) came from Catho-
lic families. The remaining fourteen respondents were equally distributed among
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Jewish, Spiritist, Evangelical, Protestant, the Church of World Messianity (Sek-
kai Kyūsei Kyō, a Japanese New Religious Movement [NRM]), and nonreligious
backgrounds.
Of the eighty respondents practicing Zen Buddhism, twenty hadmoved from
the religion of their upbringing to other religions before adopting Zen Buddhism.
Many (nine) had been affiliated with Spiritism, but the majority also combined
the religion of their upbringing with other religions, such as Protestantism, The-
osophy, Rosicrucianism, the Church of World Messianity, Daoism, Nichiren Bud-
dhism, Tibetan Buddhism, and nonreligious backgrounds. Eleven of these twenty
‘‘migrants’’ still practiced other religions while regularly practicing Zen meditation
at their Zen center or temple.
Finally, when asked if they considered themselves to be Buddhists, thirty-
eight respondents said ‘‘yes,’’ while eleven answered ‘‘not yet,’’ ‘‘sort of,’’ or ‘‘al-
most.’’ This is a hard question for Brazilians, as they consider Zen Buddhism and
Buddhism in general mostly as a philosophy rather than a religion (see Clarke,
Chap. 5). One respondent gave a very revealing response: ‘‘If one who practices
zazen is considered Buddhist, then I am a Buddhist.’’ The ‘‘not yet’’ Buddhists could
be classified as ‘‘sympathizers,’’ a term Thomas Tweed has used for ‘‘those who have
some sympathy for a religion but do not embrace it exclusively or fully. When
asked, they would not identify themselves as Buddhists. They would say they are
Methodists, or Jewish, or unaffiliated.’’ 15
WHO ARE THESE COSMOPOLITAN ZEN BUDDHIST BRAZILIANS?
The interviews I conducted with non-Japanese Brazilian practitioners showed that
their interest in Zen Buddhism was mediated by the United States, through the
media, books on Zen,16 movies,17 and travel. The word ‘‘Zen’’ is fashionable in the
West: one sees Zen perfume, shops, beauty parlors, restaurants, magazine articles,
and architecture. In Brazil it is a common occurrence to call someone ‘‘Zen,’’ mean-
ing very peaceful, collected, and tranquil. The word ‘‘Zen’’ usually appears in the
title of newspaper and magazine articles that report on a range of alternative reli-
gions and practices, such as other Buddhist schools, yoga, Tai Chi Tchuan, and
meditation. Furthermore, Zen has a positive image in the country; it is associated
with refinement, minimalism, nontension, nonanxiety, exquisite beauty, and ex-
oticism. Indeed, the word ‘‘Zen’’ appears almost daily in the trendy social column
of Folha de São Paulo, one of the leading newspapers in Brazil.
Moreover, all of the people interviewed described their first contact with Zen
as being through books. The United States is an ample source of ideas on Zen for
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various reasons. First, English is more accessible to Brazilians than Japanese. In-
deed, most of the books on Zen available in Portuguese had first been translated
into English. Moreover, because these practitioners come from the intellectual
upper-middle class and are educated liberal professionals, many of them are able to
read the books in English before they are translated. Some buy books on Zen via
the Internet and/or subscribe to American Buddhist magazines, such as Tricycle.
This is a very different constituency from that of Sōka Gakkai, which appeals to
lower-middle classes (Chap. 5).
In the late 1990s, web sites of Buddhist texts translated from English into
Portuguese by Brazilian Buddhists began to appear. The two visits by His Holiness
the Dalai Lama to Brazil (1992 and 1999) were highly publicized in the media, and
translations into Portuguese of his talks are on web sites as well. His books have
been translated into Portuguese, and The Art of Happiness: A Handbook of Living
(1999)was number one on a best-sellers’ list formanymonths after it was published
in June 2000. This book alone had sold 185,000 copies by July 2001 and became
the publishing company’s best seller since its establishment in 1975.18 In August
2000, a long article in the leading newspaper Journal do Brasil titled ‘‘The Soft and
Sweet Eastern Invasion: The Interest in Eastern Philosophy Increases and Opens
a Series of New Book Releases Heralded by new Dalai Lama’s Book,’’ commented
on the boom of books on Eastern philosophy, particularly Buddhism, due to the
demand of readers. In addition, it reported on the growing interest in Buddhist
psychology among Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo’s psychoanalysts, which was also
boosted by this year’s release of Mark Epstein’s book Going to Pieces without Falling
Apart: A Buddhist Perspective on Wholeness (New York: Broadway Books, 1998).
The increasing number of web pages and e-mail discussion lists about Bud-
dhism on the Internet is noteworthy.19 It is impossible to report the current number
of web pages, for new ones appear very quickly. However, e-mail discussion lists are
more stable. There are five lists in Brazil, three of them dedicated to three different
Buddhist schools (Theravada, Zen, and Tibetan), a general one on Buddhism, and
one for discussion of scriptures and translations. An average of ten to twenty mes-
sages are posted daily on each list, and the topics discussed include vegetarianism,
Catholicism and Buddhism, new books on Buddhism, interfaith dialog, reincar-
nation or rebirth, neophytes’ doubts on behavior and doctrine, koans, announce-
ments of retreats in Brazil and abroad, translations of scriptures and poems, and
biographies of important Buddhist masters.
It is a significant fact thatwhereas Evangelical, Pentecostal, neo-Pentecostal,
and Catholic (particularly the Charismatic) churches proselytize to Brazilian dis-
enfranchised classes through radio and television,20 the urban upper-middle-class
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and intellectual elite who are interested in Buddhism interact through a highly lit-
erate medium,21 the Internet, forming a ‘‘cybersangha.’’22 In contrast to radio and
television, where there is the authority figure of the priest and no direct contact
among the viewers, the cybersangha is more participatory, allowing recipients to
interact and communicate with each other by posting messages. Doubts on the
teachings, appropriate behavior, the differences among Buddhist schools, the his-
tory of Buddhism, and so on are answered, not by authorities on Buddhism certified
by a Buddhist institution, but by the sangha itself. Moreover, anyone can construct
a web site and furnish it by translating anything—from scriptures, Buddhist poems,
and koans, to stories of great masters—all according to one’s own personal inter-
pretation and understanding. This is increasingly common in Brazilian cyberspace.
These cybersangha features are consonant with trends of religious modernity such
as an emphasis on individual quest, privatization of religion, shunning authority,
and relying on experience rather than faith.23 These are precisely the values prized
by my informants when asked about the reasons for their choice of Zen Buddhism.
Thus while Japanese and non-Japanese Brazilian Buddhist monks and nuns have
been fundamental to the institutionalization of Buddhism in Brazil, much of the
propagation of Buddhist ideas is also the result of these self-appointed speakers on
its behalf.
The study of urban elite Brazilian Zen also requires an understanding of the
transnational linkages that enable the white urban upper class to forge a sense of
connection with their peers overseas. Such a fact creates a feeling of belonging
to a subculture group that extends beyond national borders.24 By going to retreats
abroad, translating scriptures, and publishing them independently on the web,
Brazilian Buddhists feel that they are part of a much larger world. Moreover, the
prestige Buddhism is enjoying in the developed world also confers cultural capi-
tal upon the Brazilian urban intellectual elite, who play the role of introducing
new ideas and ways of behaving into Brazil. Accordingly, I argue that being Bud-
dhist is a way of belonging to the developed world and detaching oneself from the
rest of the ‘‘backward’’ Brazilian population. This is something Brazilians aspire
to intensely, especially because they have in the past two decades suffered con-
siderably from the country’s economic crisis, endemic corruption, inflation, and
rampant crime and violence. According to the Brazilian anthropologist José Jorge
Carvalho:
Some sects have originated more due to a modernizing movement in our
society than due to religious matters. The identity issue is crucial: to adhere
to a certain group is to adhere to what is up-to-date, it is to be able to do
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certain things which are currently prestigious. [It] is a way of connecting
oneself to the meaning producing centers.25
In light of the transnational links between the Brazilian urban intellectual
elite and their counterparts overseas through books, media, travel, movies, and the
Internet, the diffusion of Zen Buddhism in Brazil could be seen as part of a ‘‘faculty
club culture,’’ a term coined by Peter Berger as one of four processes of cultural
globalization. According to Berger: ‘‘[The ‘faculty club culture’] is the internation-
alization of the Western intelligentsia, its values, and ideologies carried by founda-
tions, academic networks, and non-governmental organizations.’ Similar to ‘non-
Japanese Zen’, the ‘faculty culture club’ is primarily an elite culture, which spreads
its beliefs and values through some of themedia of mass communication. Some ex-
amples of these values are feminism and environmentalism.’’26 Indeed,many of the
adherents I interviewed toldme that the close relationship between Buddhism and
the ecological movement, as opposed to the Catholic way of approaching nature,
made them adhere to Buddhism.
Moreover, Peter Berger argues that English is the lingua franca of globaliza-
tion.27 As I mentioned before, most of the information on Zen in Brazil is con-
veyed through Portuguese translations of English material. For instance, when
Coen sensei was the head nun of Busshinji, in her weekly lectures she used to trans-
late passages from books in English, written either by Japanese monks while they
lived in America or by American scholars. At that time, there was also a scrip-
ture study group, where one lay ordained follower translated, printed, and handed
out parts of books originally written in English to be studied. In the Zen Center
of Porto Alegre, many adherents are learning English to be able to speak to Mori-
yama rōshi without the need of a translator. Following this trend of globalization
of North American Zen, some practitioners even choose to travel to Zen centers
in the United States and feel that it is more in tune with their own practice than
is Japanese Zen. As a result of such transnational links, developments in North
American Zen are very influential in Brazilian Zen. However, the ways in which
Brazilians localize Zen differ, as their own religiousmatrix differs from that ofNorth
Americans.
As noted earlier, the vast majority of the people interviewed were Catholics
before starting to ‘‘shop around’’ in the religiousmarketplace and eventually finding
Zen Buddhism. Adherents who left Catholicism and are studying Zen Buddhism
explain their disenchantment with the former as based on its dogmatism, its sepa-
ration from daily life, its hierarchical organization, its attitude toward nature, and
its almighty God. Looking for an alternative, Catholic adherents seek their sym-
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bolic universe via something that they can construct by themselves in daily life.
They are attracted to the freedom of the individual to interpret the scriptures and
the possibility of practicing mindfulness in daily life, outside the temple. Notably,
these are the same themes invoked by Buddhist and New Age practitioners in the
United States and United Kingdom.28
Likewise, Zen Buddhism for Brazilians accepts pluralism and diversity. This
approach to religious practice is justified through the Zen Buddhist idea of non-
attachment. The famous Zen saying: ‘‘If you meet the Buddha on the road, kill the
Buddha’’ is interpreted by practitioners as the impossibility of one religion being
the permanent answer to their spiritual needs. From this perspective, a practitioner
may participate in meditation both in a Tibetan Buddhist center and at a Japanese
Zen center. An adherent may even become lay ordained (ordenado leigo; jukai)29
and receive different Buddhist names from different lineages.30
Another characteristic of those who seek Zen Buddhism is that they are in
search of relief from personal problems. They wish to learn about their ‘‘inner-
self.’’ Very frequently, people I interviewed said they sought Zen meditation as a
way to learn about themselves. Zen meditation worked in place of psychotherapy
or in conjunction with it.31 One can appreciate how meaningful Zen Buddhism is
for its adherents when one realizes that many practitioners use their leisure mo-
ments, such as weekends and holidays, to go to meditation sessions and retreats
(sesshin). The consumption of goods is clearly evident in the sales of books, maga-
zines, courses, retreats, seminars, clothes, and utensils for meditation, as if enlight-
enment (satori) itself could be reached through consumption. Carvalho has noted
that
Samadhi, enlightenment, satori appear now also as a fetish, almost as a
commercial exhibition, as image of power, as merchandise. The possibility
of a trance, of a touch of energy, of a hug of divine love is as desired in
the present social context as the acquisition of a car, of an appliance, of a
trip to a famous place. The religious advertisement [. . .] has already incor-
porated, as any other advertisement of consumption society, the mimetic
desire of ownership.32
CREOLIZING ZEN IN THE BRAZILIAN RELIGIOUS FIELD
The term ‘‘creolization’’ originates from the Spanish criollo and Portuguese crioulo,
both derived from the Latin verb creare (to breed or to create). Until recently, the
concept of a ‘‘creole culture’’ was deeply connected to the encounter of African
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and European culture in the Caribbean. As a result, the term was extended to en-
compass the language spoken by these so-called Creole people. Such languages
were the result of the superimposition of the dominant language’s lexicon upon
the dominated language’s own syntax, grammar, and morphology. The resulting
new language revealed a twofold predicament: at the same time it demonstrated
that colonial peoples had yielded and adopted the dominant language by using its
lexicon, it also showed that they had clung to inner forms of their own language
as a matrix for this lexicon, a sign of resistance.33
Furthermore, contemporary scholars have detached the trope ‘‘creolization’’
from its Caribbean and linguistic roots and applied the term more broadly to pro-
cesses of cultural encounter and exchange. Many cultural and postcolonial theo-
rists have used ‘‘creolization’’ as a synonym for hybridity.34 ‘‘Hybridity,’’ however, as
ametaphor for cultural contact, carries with it the predicament of its origins in bio-
logical science, where it was juxtaposed to notions of racial purity.35 Hybridity also
derives from horticulture and animal-breeding practices, which in turn juxtapose
it with ideas of sterility and passivity, since hybrid plants and animals do not repro-
duce.36 Notwithstanding contemporary recuperation of hybridity as a subversive
practice/agency within postcolonial and cultural theory, it still has to grapple with
the dilemma of the discourse of race. Creolization as an analytical trope, on the
other hand, although having originated during colonial contact, carries notions
of creativity, agency, and innovation on the part of the colonized.37 Furthermore,
the concept of creolization, when inflected by its linguistic facet, highlights how
the process of continuous contact and negotiation takes place.
Nevertheless, I should mention a caveat before employing the term ‘‘creoli-
zation’’ to analyze Brazilian Zen. As previously mentioned, the word ‘‘creole’’ de-
rives from the Portuguese crioulo, which even today is a derogatory term for Afro-
Brazilians in Brazil. Furthermore, the use of this concept may lead some readers
to think that the history of Brazilian society is deeply connected with that of the
Caribbean. Nothing could be further from the truth. In spite of these drawbacks,
I believe that, in the context of an analysis of Zen Buddhism in Brazil, the trope
of creolization is meaningful because it sheds light on how Japanese Zen has been
superimposed on a Brazilian religious syntax upon arrival in the country. Unlike
the Jōdo Shinshu temple in Hawai‘i, where the membership is dropping due to
lack of ‘‘hybridization’’ (see Tanabe, Chap. 3), Busshinji temple thrived in the
1990s due to Zen’s popular appeal and Moriyama rōshi’s and Coen sensei’s flexi-
bility in negotiating with Brazilian culture. During this time, even ‘‘immigrant’’
Zen practices such as funeral and ancestor rites became more visible, and some
non-Japanese Brazilians have taken part in them. While for Payne Shingon Bud-
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dhism’s invisibility in the United States derives from Americanization and lack of
exoticism (Chap. 4), Busshinji is visible because it has undergone renewal, intro-
ducing Japanese architectural features that invoke exoticism while making room
for non-Japanese Brazilian practices. The Brazilian media, however, is just as ob-
sessed with ‘‘convert’’ Buddhism as its U.S. counterpart (as pointed out by Payne).
Although it is still too early to see the results of such creolization, I would like to
explore how this process is taking place.
AlthoughBrazil is well knownby the epithet ‘‘theworld’s largestCatholic na-
tion,’’ such a description ignores the presence of many other religions and religious
practices that have been introduced and creolized in Brazil since the Portuguese ar-
rived in 1500. During the colonial period (1500–1822), Catholicism went through
a process of creolization when it encounteredAfro-Brazilian traditions and indige-
nous religions. Popular Catholicism was created from such a convergence, adding
indigenous beliefs, rituals, and devotion to saints to the formal Catholicism of the
clergy and upper classes.38
In the nineteenth century, immigration brought German Lutherans and
other traditional Protestants to Brazil. By the beginning of the twentieth century,
North American Protestant missionaries were sent to Brazil and started to preach
outside of the ethnic enclave. Furthermore, still in the nineteenth century, French
Spiritism—which would become one of the main religions in Brazil39—was intro-
duced by the Brazilian elite who were quick to adopt the then new French fashion.
Spiritism orKardecism, as it is known inBrazil due to its founderHyppolyteRivail’s
pen name, Allan Kardec (1804–1869), was itself a synthesis of many religious prac-
tices such asCatholicism, Protestantism, and occult philosophies that flourished in
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, such as Swedenborgianism,Mesmer-
ism, Rosicrucianism, Freemasonry, and Theosophy.40 Along with Spiritism, other
esoteric traditions arrived at the turn of the century to pave the way for the dif-
fusion of Eastern philosophies in Brazil. Círculo Esotérico da Comunhão do Pensa-
mento (Esoteric Association for the Communion of Thought), an association that
studied and disseminated Hindu philosophy, was founded in São Paulo in 1908.
Later it established a leading publishing company for esoteric and Eastern philo-
sophical books (Editora Pensamento). In addition, the Theosophical Society was
established in São Paulo City in 1919, and in Rio de Janeiro in 1923.41
In the early twentieth century, Umbanda emerged—a quintessential Brazil-
ian religious creation that deployed elements of the main religious traditions of
the country (Catholicism, Kardecism, Afro-Brazilian, and indigenous religions).
Umbanda was created by white middle-class Spiritists attracted by the possession
rituals of the Afro-Brazilian religions.42 Since it relies on Kardecist literature, Um-
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banda also draws ideas from Hinduism and Buddhism (derived from the Theo-
sophical Society), which are reinterpreted to fit the demands of Umbanda’s ad-
herents.43
The main contributors to the wide acceptance of the concepts of karma and
reincarnation in Brazil were Kardecist Spiritism and Umbanda. At the core of
Spiritist doctrine is the idea of spiritual evolution through reincarnation. Karma,
and its corollary, the law of cause and effect, determine reincarnation: if one’s ac-
tions in a past life were negative, one reincarnates into a life of suffering (through
poverty, disease, unhappiness). By contrast, if one practiced charity in a past life (a
concept Kardec drew from Christianity), one reincarnates into a life of happiness.
In this context, free will plays a key role, as human beings may choose what path
to take in their lives. This means that the evolution of the spirit depends solely on
its own efforts.44
Through interviews with practitioners, reading newspaper and magazine
stories onZen, and discussions on e-mail lists, I realized that the Zen ideas of karma,
rebirth, and the individual’s responsibility for his own enlightenment were cre-
olized with Spiritist concepts to bridge the gap between Brazilian culture and Zen
Buddhism.However, the apparent similarity of concepts disguises deep differences,
particularly in relation to key terms such as ‘‘karma’’ and ‘‘reincarnation’’ or rebirth.
However, because the adherents of Spiritism are mainly white upper-middle class,
which is also the main segment of society that follows Zen Buddhism, the Spiritist
connotation of these concepts is very much part of how Buddhism is understood
in Brazil. Here I quote two dialogs of the ubiquitous discussions that take place
on the Buddhist e-mail lists on these concepts.45 The questions exemplify how
Brazilians creolize their Christian and Spiritist ideas with the novelty that Bud-
dhism presents. The answers are given by Brazilian Buddhist students who have
been studying Buddhism much longer and can therefore clarify such confusion of
concepts.
Q: Can somebody explain this to me? There is no individual soul that sur-
vives death, ok, I can believe that, but then what to do with the theory
of reincarnation? (Buddhismo-L, July 15, 2000)
A: The Buddhist doctrine is very different from the Kardecist one. It is
impossible to reconcile the belief in spirits and Buddhist teachings. Ac-
cording to the dharma, body and mind are a unity which is undone at
the time of death; hence there isn’t an individual being that survives.
Life continues in other beings; life is regarded as a process, not as a
chain of individuals. These are seen as mere illusions. As such, there
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is no reincarnation in Buddhism, but there is rebirth. (Buddhismo-L,
July 17, 2000)
Q: In Judaism and Christianity there is guilt. Isn’t it the same as negative
karma? I keep hearing people telling me not to do this or that because
of bad karma; this conditioning of bad and good, isn’t it the same as in
Judaism and Christianity? (Zen Chung Tao, November 9, 2000)
A: No, because in Judaism and Christianity one believes there is free will;
in Buddhism we think that people act impelled by conditions (cultural,
your parents, family, country) as well. Hence, there isn’t an individual
guilt. Karma is a much larger concept. No karma is completely indi-
vidual; all actions influence the whole world. Changing karma is like
steering a large ship: we need to hold the rudder for a long time until
the ship’s direction changes. That’s why the training is long and hard.
(Zen Chung Tao, November 10, 2000)
Another meaningful creolization takes place with Umbanda. Since Um-
banda is itself an appropriation by Kardecist white Brazilians of Afro-Brazilian reli-
gions of possession, the theory of karma and reincarnation as a way of returning
to earth to evolve spiritually is an essential part of it. Spirits are seen as needing to
assist human beings to develop their own karma so that they too will have a better
incarnation in the next life. In order to do that, they descend through mediums
to help human beings, who usually seek their services to solve problems of love,
work, illness, and legal difficulties.46 There are seven lines of spirits with which
to communicate. One of them is significantly called ‘‘Line of the East’’ or ‘‘Eso-
teric Umbanda.’’47 Whereas in other lines mediums are possessed by indigenous,
Afro-Brazilian, and African entities, in this line, Eastern entities such as ‘‘The
Hindu/The Indian,’’ ‘‘The Turk,’’ ‘‘The Jew,’’ ‘‘The Gypsy,’’ ‘‘The Chinese,’’ ‘‘The
Goddess of Fortune’’ (sometimes interpreted as Lakshmi), and ‘‘Brahma’’ descend
on mediums. Also associated with these figures is ‘‘The Buddha’’ who, in contrast
to the other entities, is not incorporated by mediums but is exclusively associated
with bringing in good fortune, happiness, andwealth. However, the images of Bud-
dha that I found in Umbanda centers and in shops that cater for Afro-Brazilian
traditions are, in fact, those of Hotei. Although originally regarded inChina as the
future Buddha (Maitreya), Hotei is known in Japan as one of the Seven Gods of
Fortune. In Brazil, Hotei is thought of as the historical Buddha, and one can easily
find small images of this fat-bellied, happy-faced Buddha in commercial outlets,
coffee shops, and some homes. An informant told me that every Umbanda altar
has a Buddha/Hotei, and if these altars aremore elaborate, they also bear the Seven
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Gods of Fortune. India and the mythic ‘‘Orient’’ have always fascinated Umbanda
practitioners. The same informant mentioned that books by Blavatsky and Lob-
sang Rampa were mandatory reads for Umbanda practitioners in the 1950s and
1960s: ‘‘all these authors were a huge success. Everyone wanted to open chakras,
talked about vibrations and so forth’’ (personal communication).
These examples illustrate the fact that when the first Zen texts were intro-
duced into the country in the 1960s, Buddhist concepts had long been in the
Brazilian imaginaire, carried by Spiritists, Umbandists, and a host of Eastern and
Occultist traditions that arrived in the country from the nineteenth century on-
ward.
ZEN AND THE NEW AGE BOOM
In the past two decades, so many New Age practices have become conspicuously
present in Brazil that David Hess described the Californian New Age reality as
bland compared to the Brazilian one.48 Brazil is experiencing an expansion of alter-
native spiritualities among urban middle classes and elites.49 The trend became
evident in the late 1980s, when there was a remarkable increase in sales of esoteric
books. By the 1990s, there was an extensive network of shops, seminars, thera-
pies, and bookstores that catered to the demands of people who were interested
in a vast range of practices and religions, such as New Age spirituality, yoga, and
world religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Japanese NRMs. Indeed, Robert
Carpenter describes the Brazilian religious marketplace in such terms:
[Brazil] is the home of the world’s largest Catholic population, as well as
to more Pentecostals, Spiritists, and adherents of traditions derived from
African religions than can be found in any other country in the world.
Moreover, there are more followers of the cluster of traditions known as
Japanese New Religions in Brazil than in any other country outside Japan.
Brazil’s religious economy is unquestionably the most diversified in all of
Latin America.50
NewAge religions, such as the Rajneeshmovement, are a common source of
Zen adherents. The Rajneesh movement, a NRM that began in India in the early
1970s, drew on both Western and Eastern sources to form a synthesis of New Age
spirituality. Bhagwan Rajneesh wrote a series of books where he analyzes and in-
terprets Zen teachings. Most of them have been translated into Portuguese. Many
adherents interviewed had been or still are his followers. Particularly in Porto Ale-
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gre, some adherents had a Buddhist name, which had been given at their lay ordi-
nation, and a Rajneesh name. The New Age boom is also responsible for a New
Age University (Unipaz), which was established in Brasília, the nation’s capital.
Zen is taught at Unipaz, and the monastery of Morro da Vargem (in Espírito Santo
state) is one of the recommended sites for students to conduct their last semester
research.
Paulo Coelho, the Brazilian best-selling author who writes New Age, self-
empowering and pilgrimage books, has a weekly column in Folha de São Paulo,
where he usually writes about popular occultism, mysticism, and Buddhism. He
particularly writes on Zen masters and their koans, spreading these tales to main-
stream society. Likewise, the Folha de São Paulo web site has a link called ‘‘Tudo
Bem, Tudo Zen’’ (Everything’s alright, Everything’s Zen, http://www.uol.com.br/
bemzen), adopting the common usage of the word ‘‘Zen’’ as a synonym of peace
and tranquility. In this site, many alternative practices and world religions are dis-
cussed.
The people I interviewed identified several New Age practices that they fre-
quently associated with Zen Buddhism—practices of healing (yoga, shiatsu, do in,
tai chi chuan, and acupuncture), eating habits (vegetarianism and macrobiotics),
practices of self-understanding (many kinds of psychotherapy and astrology), mar-
tial arts (aikido, karate, and kendo), and other religions (Spiritism, African reli-
gions, Mahikari, and Rajneesh).
Let us start with healing practices. Many Brazilian adherents are first inter-
ested in shiatsu, amassage based on acupressure before getting in contact with Zen.
Furthermore, meditation is closely associated with healing by the Brazilian media,
particularly as a way of eschewing urban stress. For instance, the cover report of
the national weekly magazine Isto É featured an article entitled ‘‘Meditation: How
to Use This Ancient Technique to Overcome the Economic Crisis, Escape Daily
Stress, Improve Your Concentration, and Make Difficult Decisions.’’ The story re-
ported that meditation as a technique has entered mainstream society, where in-
structors go to corporations, usually at lunchtime, to improve productivity.51
As for eating habits, there has always been a dilemma in Brazil: should Japa-
nese food or organic, vegetarian, macrobiotic food be used in retreats (sesshin)?
Urban Brazilians asked such a question in the 1960s and 1970s, when they started
practicing Zen at Busshinji, the only temple that was open to Brazilians at the time.
Because it catered mainly to the Japanese community, some Brazilian adherents
got to the point of bringing their own food when going to retreats. Nowadays, after
the establishment of Zen centers by non-Japanese Brazilians, fruit, brown rice, and
vegetarian food are served most of the time. Vegetarianism is closely connected
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with Buddhism in the West. For instance, Jan Nattier describes how her Asian-
AmericanBuddhist friends felt ill at ease at a lecture by a famousVietnamesemonk
because of the ‘‘not altogether friendly stares of the mostly Caucasian (and over-
whelmingly vegetarian) crowd as they tried to enjoy their hot dogs and potato
chips.’’52 Similarly, one of the most popular topics discussed on Brazilian Buddhist
e-mail lists is whether one should be vegetarian if converted to Buddhism. The
same is true for the United States, as reports Richard Hayes, the moderator of
Buddha-L, an international e-mail list.53
Martial arts are also very much a part of the Zen milieu. At Porto Alegre
Zen Center, many adherents came from aikido classes, because their teacher has a
close connection with Zen and Moriyama rōshi. Conversely, some Zen adherents
started to study this martial art after meeting these aikido practitioners. Further-
more, many martial art halls (dojo) conduct Zen meditation before classes. Con-
versely, Busshinji temple also holds karate and kendo classes attended mainly by
non-Japanese Brazilians.
Adding to such pluralization of faiths in the Brazilian religious field, Japanese
NRMs such as Seichō-no-ie, Sekai Kyūsei Kyō, Brazil Sōka Gakkai International,
Ōmoto, Tenrikyō, Risshō-kōseikai, Perfect Liberty Kyōdan (PL), and SeikaiMahi-
kari Bumei Kyōdan arrived in Brazil in the 1960s and became highly successful
among non-Japanese Brazilians in the following decades. For instance, in 1990,
90 percent of the followers of Seichō-no–ie, PL, and Sekai Kyūseikyō were non-
Japanese Brazilians.54
As for the Buddhist traditions, Japanese, Tibetan, Korean, Chinese, Thai,
and Singhalese Buddhist monks were increasingly present in Brazil in the 1990s.
Dharma Centers (Buddhist centers managed by non-Japanese Brazilians) bring
their spiritual mentors from abroad to give workshops, promote spiritual retreats,
and disseminate their teachings. Many followers undertake trips to the centers
where their mentors live.
I have already mentioned the conspicuous ‘‘religious migration’’ of Brazil-
ians among these diverse religious traditions, and the consequent blurring of their
boundaries. According to Brazilian anthropologist Roberto da Matta, Brazilians
see these religious traditions as complementary, not mutually exclusive.55 For in-
stance, a survey conducted in 1988 showed that when Catholics who attended
church once a week were asked if they believed in reincarnation, 45.9 percent said
they did.56 Since reincarnation is not part of the Catholic doctrine, one can see
how permeable the borders of the Catholic world are in Brazil. Conversely, the
survey also showed that 89.7 percent of the people classified as of ‘‘no religion’’ de-
clared they believed in God, 55.9 percent declared they believed in heaven, and
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44.1 percent believed in hell. It is clear that, the Catholic worldview has spread
beyond its borders, carrying its influence even to groups that are distant from that
worldview. A survey conducted by the agency Vox Populi in 1996 revealed that
59 percent of the Brazilian population believes in the existence of spirits, a con-
cept accepted only by Spiritism andAfro-Brazilian religions such as Umbanda and
Candomblé.57 Undoubtedly, while the Catholic worldview has spread beyond its
borders, the same is true for other religions in relation to Catholicism.
CONCLUSION
While the Japanese community in Brazil had to leave Buddhism behind, adopt-
ing Catholicism as a means of being accepted in the new country (much like the
Japanese immigrants to the United States who converted to Christianity; Chaps.
3 and 4), many non-Japanese descent Brazilians have been adhering to Buddhism
in the past years. These Zen adherents are part of the intellectual, cosmopolitan,
urban elite who importWestern discourse onZenBuddhism through books,media,
movies, travel, and, more recently, through the Internet. These cultural flows pro-
mote a subcultural group of Brazilian Zen adherents, who relate more easily with
their peers in North America or Europe than to their fellow citizens of disenfran-
chised classes. Class differentiation is influential in choosing Zen—a highly liter-
ate choice indeed, as Zen literature is fundamental to their initial and sustained
interest in Zen Buddhism.
While importing Buddhist concepts from metropolitan cultures overseas,
Brazilians creolize it with an already pluralistic religious matrix and then propagate
their interpretation of Buddhist teachings. Catholicism, Kardecist Spiritism,Afro-
Brazilian religions, Japanese NRMs, and the New Age movement offer a profusion
of faiths and beliefs onto which overseas Buddhist ideas can be superimposed and
creolized. On the whole, already existing native religious matrices facilitated the
acceptance of Buddhist concepts. Although such concepts do not necessarily have
the same meaning in Brazilian culture, the slippages bridged the gap and helped to
establish an understanding between themeaning-producing centers and interested
Brazilians.
As a result of the diverse sources of knowledge on Zen, conflicts like the one
I depicted in the opening of this chapter are ever-present. As a later development
of that story, Coen sensei was dismissed from Busshinji in January 2001 and went
on to establish a new temple in São Paulo City. The Japanese sōkan is presently the
only authority at Busshinji, the Sōtō School’s headquarters for South America.
As a last point, I would like to note that creolization occurs also between Japa-
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nese and non-Japanese Brazilian practices. In my fieldwork I found that, whereas
the Japanese superimpose Catholic terms and festivities on their Zen matrix, non-
Japanese Brazilians and younger Japanese-Brazilians may ask Zen monks/nuns to
conduct funerals, memorials, baby namings, and weddings. Religious boundaries
are indeed very porous in Brazil.
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7 Spreading Buddha’s Light:The Internationalization of Foguang Shan
Stuart Chandler
Foguang Shan (literally ‘‘Buddha’s Light Mountain’’), one of the most prominent
Buddhist organizations in Taiwan, has over the past two decades also developed a
significant network of temples around the globe. With more than 150 centers dis-
persed on five continents and serving hundreds of thousands of lay devotees, the
Foguang ‘‘empire,’’ as a variety of journalists and scholars have dubbed the phe-
nomenon, is now arguably one of the most extensive and best-organized Buddhist
groups in theworld. There are certainly fewmonkswho can claim to have gathered
as large a sangha as has Foguang Shan’s founder, Master Xingyun, who currently
supervises more than thirteen hundred monastic disciples. This chapter describes
the various factors that have contributed to Foguang Shan’s remarkable success in
transforming itself from a local institution to one of truly international magnitude.
After indicating Foguang devotees’ self-understanding of the historical setting of
their missionary efforts, I analyze the organization’s demographics and the four pri-
mary methods upon which the master and his disciples have relied to carry out
their ambitious objectives: providing a cultural link to China; creating links of af-
finity; sparking people’s curiosity; and localizing Buddhist teachings and practice.
Through this discussion, the challenges inherent in the group’s mission come to
light, most notably the tension that arises from serving as a cultural bridge back
to the homeland for the Chinese diaspora while simultaneously localizing prac-
tice to attract non-Chinese. I conclude by disclosing Master Xingyun’s positive
appraisal of the religious implications of globalization. For him, humankind’s in-
creasing sense of homelessness is not a negative, but rather spiritually beneficial, as
it allows false divisions based upon nationality and ethnicity to attenuate, allow-
ing people to recognize that they all share Buddha Nature. Hence, Foguang Shan
provides one piece of evidence that in the postmodern world, people’s primary ref-
erent for communal identity may very well increasingly revert from national to
religious symbols and myths.
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FROM MASTER HUISHEN TO MASTER XINGYUN
Master Xingyun first went abroad in 1963, when he joined a contingent of monks
sent to India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Japan, and Hong
Kong on a government-sponsored initiative to bolster support for the Republic of
China (ROC). The beginnings of Foguang Shan’s globalization are to be traced
to a more recent trip: the master’s visit to the United States in 1976, at which
point he recognized the great potential for serving the rapidly expanding Chinese-
American population. Twelve years later, Master Xingyun opened the doors of the
largest Buddhist temple in the Western hemisphere. He chose to call it ‘‘Hsi Lai,’’
which means ‘‘Coming to the West.’’ This is a play on words, for Chinese Bud-
dhists have long referred to Buddhism as having come from the west, namely from
India.
One year after the founding of Hsi Lai, the theme of bringing the Dharma
to the West gained even greater salience when Tang Degang, a historian then at
New York University, gave a lecture at the Foguang Shan Buddhist Youth Aca-
demic Conference, which he billed ‘‘From Master Huishen to Master Xingyun.’’ 1
Tang stated in his paper that during the North-South Dynasties (420–489 C.E.)
the Venerable Huishen, a monk of Indian origin but living in China, sailed to
America to spread the Dharma. The cleric returned to the Middle Kingdom some
forty years later, presenting to the Liang emperor many gifts from the distant land,
which he called Fusang. Tang cited three pieces of evidence to support his thesis.
First, he quoted passages from the ‘‘Twenty-five Histories’’ that relate the Vener-
able Huishen’s descriptions of his voyage and of the peoples, flora, and fauna he
observed in the land he had made his home for so long. Second, the scholar noted
that there are many ancient ‘‘stone anchors’’ (shi mao) in America with craftsman-
ship so Chinese in style that they must have derived from China and been brought
over by the monk. Finally, Tang asserted that there are still people in Acapulco,
Mexico, who are Buddhists, having received the tradition from their ancestors
who had learned of the Dharma from the Indian-Chinese missionary. The Ven-
erable Huishen’s early ‘‘discovery’’ (faxian) of America, a full millennium before
Columbus arrived, was of such historical importance to Buddhists, Chinese, and
all Americans, stated Tang, that he recommended that Hsi Lai Temple build a
‘‘Master Huishen Memorial Hall.’’
Tang Degang was not, in fact, the first scholar to hypothesize about an early
Buddhist arrival in America. This theory had been raised and debated within the
European academic community during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.2
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More recently, Wei Zhuxian of Taiwan National University devoted virtually his
entire career to cataloging archeological, anthropological, and historical evidence
for pre-Columbian contacts between Chinese and American peoples. In his opin-
ion, Huishen represents a relatively late interaction, since a thousand years earlier
Confucius had already made references to the North American hummingbird!
Whether or not Fusang was a Chinese name for the continent of America
will probably never be known definitively. Most of the evidence that Tang and his
predecessors cited to substantiate their claims is tentative at best. To scrutinize the
soundness of the data offered, however, is to miss the point. For the Foguang com-
munity, the theory’s importance lies not somuch in historical validity but rather in
its potential for creating a newmythology, namely, an expressive history that helps
to establish the group’s sense of purpose. The power of the Huishen legend arises
from three elements: the portrayal of him as carrier of Chinese culture; the con-
viction that he successfully planted the seed of the Dharma on American shores;
and the transnational profile he is given. We shall return to each of these com-
ponents as we discuss Foguang Shan’s missionary work not only in America, but
around the world.
THE PERIMETERS OF FOGUANG SHAN’S GLOBALIZATION
Master Xingyun has been remarkably successful in planting Foguang centers
around the world. In less than a decade Foguang Shan went from having virtually
no overseas branches to embracing nearly one hundred. As of the year 1998, the
headquarters oversaw 95 temples, Pure Land meditation centers, and lecture halls
from Tokyo to Paris, Sydney to São Paulo: 27 in Asia, excluding the ROC (8 in
Japan; 7 in the Philippines and Malaysia; 2 in Hong Kong; and 1 each in Thailand,
Singapore, and Korea); 13 in the South Pacific (10 in Australia, 2 in New Zealand,
and 1 in New Guinea); 19 in Europe (3 in the United Kingdom and Germany; 2
each in France, Spain, and Italy; and 1 each in Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium,
Switzerland, Hungary, Portugal, and theCzechRepublic); 7 inAfrica (all in South
Africa); 5 in South and Central America (2 in Brazil; 1 each in Costa Rica, Para-
guay, and Argentina); and 24 in North America (19 in the United States, the rest
in Canada). Master Xingyun decided to hold off on constructing new centers, so
the number of Foguang temples has remained steady since 1998 and probably will
continue to be so for the foreseeable future.
This network is supplemented by the Buddha’s Light International Associa-
tion (BLIA), the lay society founded by the master in 1992.Within five years BLIA
had grown to include 110 regional chapters (zonghui) and local chapters (xiehui)
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worldwide: 33 in Asia (10 in India; 2 each in the ROC, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and South Korea; and 1 each in Hong Kong, Macau, Brunei, Singapore, Thailand,
the Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and
Sri Lanka); 8 in the Pacific (6 in Australia, the other 2 in New Zealand); 25 in
North America (18 in the United States, 6 in Canada, and 1 in the Bahamas);
5 in Central America (1 each in Costa Rico, Mexico, El Salvador, Dominique,
and Panama); 7 in South America (1 each in Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Chile,
Uruguay, Guatemala, and Belize); 21 in Europe (3 in the United Kingdom; 2 each
in Germany, Russia, and Sweden; 1 each in Belgium, Denmark, France, Switzer-
land, Norway, Netherlands, Spain, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy, Portugal, and Aus-
tria); 11 in Africa (9 in South Africa, 1 each in the Congo and Tanzania).
Foguang temples may be found virtually anywhere a relatively large expatri-
ate population from the ROC has coalesced. The reach of BLIA is still farther,
extending to areas with even small communities of Taiwan emigrants.3 It is very dif-
ficult to determine exactly how many devotees frequent the temples or join BLIA
chapters. Foguang clerics have unofficially claimed BLIA’s worldwide membership
to be anywhere from one million to three million. I doubt that the roster of active
members (i.e., those paying membership dues) has ever reached anything close to
even the more modest of the two estimates, although the total number of people
who participate in BLIA events in a given year probably exceeds the three million
mark.
The question is, how many people are members of BLIA, how many of these
live in Taiwan, and how many live abroad? Given that approximately five million
people in the ROC frequent a Buddhist temple, that Foguang Shan is only one of
several large Buddhist organizations, and that many of Taiwan’s Buddhists do not
join any of these groups, I would estimate that perhaps four to six hundred thou-
sand people, or 8 to 12 percent of the island’s Buddhists, currently align themselves
with Foguang Shan as active members of BLIA.4 The lower estimate corresponds
to the number of Awakening the World (Jue Shi) magazines that were distributed
each month from 1997 to 1999.
Since Foguang Shan has only fifty-seven temples in Taiwan but ninety-five
overseas centers, it would appear at first that the majority of devotees live outside
of the ROC, so that the total number could exceed one million. On closer inspec-
tion, it becomes clear that this is not the case. The extent to which Foguang Shan
has thus far carried its banner of Humanistic Buddhism beyond the shores of Tai-
wan can be roughly determined by analyzing personnel distribution and temple
fund-raising strategies.5 Some Foguang overseas branch temples, such as Hsi Lai
Temple (Los Angeles), Nan Tien Temple (Wollongong, Australia), and Nan Hua
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Temple (Bronkhorstspruit, South Africa), are multimillion dollar structures that
have become prominent landmarks and tourist attractions. Most other outposts
are of muchmoremodest scale, occupying former homes, warehouses, schools, and
churches. Typically relying on a small and dispersed Chinese population, there is
neither the need nor the financial resources to support ornate halls or large staffs.
Hence, although international temples greatly outnumber domestic ones, they ac-
count for less than one-quarter of full-timeworker assignments. Of Foguang Shan’s
1,096 monastic, lay-monastic, and lay devotees who, as of August 1997, worked
full-time for the organization, 434 worked at Foguang headquarters, 423 were sta-
tioned in a temple in Taiwan, and 239 were assigned abroad.6 Overseas centers had
an average of 2.5 workers, compared to an average of 7.4 for the temples in Tai-
wan, a finding that supports the conclusion that the devotee base is much lower
elsewhere in the world than it is in the ROC.
The smaller number of devotees per monastery creates a significant financial
strain. Several lay followers active in the fund-raising efforts of overseas Foguang
temples confided to me that their branch would not be able to meet its bills if
it were not for the generous contributions made by key donors who periodically
visited from Taiwan. One nun revealed that as much as 80 percent of the funds
raised at Hsi Lai derive from people who either visit from Taiwan or who, while
having a second home in the Los Angeles area, still spend most of their time in
the ROC (although other monastics claimed a much lower percentage). Based
on these statistics and comments, I doubt that any overseas BLIA chapter, even
the one in Los Angeles affiliated with Hsi Lai Temple, has a roster of over a few
thousand, and those with no temple nearby generally maintain a membership of
only several dozen people. BLIA therefore probably has approximately fifty to sixty
thousand members whose primary residence is outside of Taiwan. The number of
people who participate in BLIA-sponsored events, however, is much greater.
Although the picture I provide of the extent of Foguang Shan’s global opera-
tions is not nearly so grand as that painted by Foguang devotees, one still has to
be impressed by what the order has done in so brief a time, particularly when one
keeps in mind that such global outreach is unprecedented in the history of Sino-
Buddhism. The only Chinese Buddhist organization with a comparable global
network is the Compassion Relief Foundation, which, as Julia Huang indicates
(Chap. 8), has established branches in twenty-eight countries. There is one signifi-
cant difference between the Foguang andCiji strategies for international outreach:
the latter opens overseas offices, not temples. In other words, no clerics have been
stationed abroad. The ‘‘offices’’ are typically homes or rented rooms where small
groups of members meet to discuss Buddhism and raise money for the headquar-
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ters’ worldwide humanitarian efforts. This is not to imply that Ciji offices are any
less active than are Foguang temples. As Huang observes, overseas Ciji members
undertake a wide range of programs and raise considerable sums of money not only
for the initiatives of the headquarters but for local philanthropic endeavors as well.
Nonetheless, the lack of overseas temples andmonastics has resulted in Ciji offices
having a generally lower profile outside of the immediateChinese community than
do the Foguang outposts.
Foguang Shan’s international network of temples not only exceeds that of
other Chinese Buddhist institutions but is one of the most extensive of any
Buddhist organization. Thich Nhat Hanh’s Order of Interbeing has a semiformal
arrangement of affiliates that by 1998 included a handful of temples and approxi-
mately three hundred ‘‘lay sanghas.’’ The vast majority of Thich Nhat Hanh’s dis-
ciples, however, remain in Plum Village, the order’s headquarters in France.7 The
only other international Buddhist organization in which clerics play an important
leadership role is Sangharakshita’sWestern Buddhist Order (WBO) and Friends of
the Western Buddhist Order (FWBO), which in 1998 incorporated fifty-five city
centers and fifteen retreat centers, mostly in Great Britain (where the order was
founded), but also in Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, India, Nepal,
and North and South America.8 Sangharakshita has been particularly active in
India, where his efforts to carry on Ambedkar’s work among Dalits is estimated
to have brought several tens of thousands into the Trailoka Bauddha Mahasangha
Sahayaka Gana, the Indian wing of the FWBO.9
Foguang Shan therefore probably has more temples and clerics around the
world than any other Buddhist organization. The global profile of its lay devotee
base is also among the most impressive. Having given an indication of the extent
of Foguang Shan’s internationalization campaign, I will now turn to consider more
closely its nature. To do so, I will focus on its two main objectives: the creation for
the Chinese diaspora of a bridge back to the cultural motherland; and outreach to
those who are neither Chinese nor Buddhists.
CULTURE, HOME, AND LAND
It is safe to say that over 99 percent of BLIA members are ethnically Chinese. Fo-
guang Shan’s forays around the world therefore represent the globalization of a
national tradition. In other words, the Foguang network is geographically inter-
national but remains almost completely associated with one cultural group and
is highly focused on that group’s concerns with the notion of homeland. Chi-
nese tradition has historically been grounded in one particular setting: the Middle
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Kingdom. As the number of Chinese living elsewhere in the world, even outside
of Asia, has multiplied dramatically over the last half-century, organizations such
as Foguang Shan have served a very important function in maintaining for their
members a sense of Chinese identity. The perception that Foguang Shan is a vital
carrier of traditional Chinese culture has therefore played an especially important
role in attracting new devotees. To understand the dynamics of this, we must look
more generally at the Foguang perspective on tradition and modernization.
The fact that Foguang Shan perpetuates certain customs and values is not
in itself remarkable, since every social organ does so. Of greater note is the group’s
conscious promotion of itself as both fulfilling this function and simultaneously
shedding those aspects of tradition regarded as encumbrances to modern life. At
the same time that specific traditions identified as relatively recent deviations of
Chinese Buddhism are rejected, ‘‘authentic’’ values of the Buddhist heritage are
retained and, in fact, explicitly espoused, as are certain key virtues of the Con-
fucian tradition.10 Modernism and traditionalism are regarded as mutually inter-
penetrating and complementary. The danger, in the Foguang view, occurs when
either one of these polarities eclipses the other. Within Chinese Buddhism, over-
reliance on (a misunderstanding of) tradition is believed to have left the religion
enervated, necessitating an aggressive modernization campaign. The problem of
general Chinese society, on the other hand, is seen to be just the opposite: in the
rush to modernize, people have drifted away from inherited values. This trend is
traced back to the May Fourth Movement of the 1920s, when Hu Shi, Chen Du-
xiu, and others called for their countrymen to ‘‘overthrow’’ (dadao) the stultify-
ing ritualism of ‘‘Confucius and Sons’’ (Kongjiadian) and to rid themselves of the
otherworldly escapism of Buddhism. The Communist Party stepped up this direct
assault, especially in the 1950s and 1960s.
For those under the Nationalist regime of Taiwan, the steady corrosion of
tradition is attributed, not to political campaigns, but to the ubiquity of Western,
especially American, influence. This foreign presence has been welcome for the
most part, if for no other reason thanwithout it the ROC could not have withstood
its Communist adversaries. Hence, the ‘‘fundamentalist’’ vituperations against the
West that have erupted in many other places around the world have found little
expression among Taiwan’s religious groups. Despite the lack of a strong reaction
against westernization, there nonetheless has been a response to it utilizing indige-
nous resources. As the New Confucian Tu Wei-ming has observed, this search for
roots bears a family resemblance to fundamentalism and proceeds from a critique
of modernity.11 Taiwan’s ‘‘mainland complex’’ (dalu qingjie), to employ the term the
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island’s media has made current to describe this pervasive heightened concern for
asserting Chinese cultural continuity, derives from four factors: an underlying am-
bivalence about the tremendousAmerican presence; discomfort with Taiwan’s un-
certain political status and future; recognition of the island’s peripheral historical
ties to China proper; and a sense of ever-increasing dissonance with contemporary
mainland culture. Let us consider the latter two of these in more detail.
Taiwan is not the homeland for Chinese. It became a formal part of the
Chinese empire and began to be settled by appreciable numbers of Fujianese and
Hakka farmers in the latter half of the seventeenth century, only after the Dutch
and Spanish had already briefly established outposts along its coasts.12 From 1895
to 1945, the island was claimed by the Japanese. Taiwan is therefore geographically
and historically marginal. This is compounded by a sense of exile from the heart-
land. The post-1949 political situation prevented most of those living outside the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) from even visiting until the 1980s. Since that
time, sojourns for family reunions, tourism, or to conduct business have increas-
ingly taken place. Such contact has proven bittersweet for many, however, as they
often have been unprepared for the lack of resonance they have felt with their
Communist countrymen. One Foguang nun who had traveled through mainland
China for a year and a half in the mid-1990s while still a layperson remarked to me
that she had found the experience deeply troubling for, while she loved ‘‘China the
place,’’ she could not relate to ‘‘the mentality of the people.’’ By China the place,
the young nun meant the physical sites, both of natural beauty and of historical
significance, about which she had heard somuchwhile growing up. The symbols of
home are over there; and yet present realities undercut these symbols, so that this
woman, like many Chinese who have visited the PRC, felt a stranger in her own
land. Communist China is not home, for state socialism is believed to have de-
prived the populace of any appreciation for their heritage, leadingmany onTaiwan
to see themselves as more legitimate bearers of Chinese culture. Upon returning
to Taiwan, this woman had come home—yet a home in a marginal space whose
oldest cultural landmarks are aboriginal, Dutch, and Portuguese. Hence, the sense
of homeland has been bifurcated, home and land separated into two entities.
Foguang Shan’s self-proclaimed role in protecting and perpetuating China’s
Buddhist (and key elements of its Confucian) heritage is one manifestation of Tai-
wan’s search for roots. In the case of the nun just mentioned, dynamics associated
with the mainland complex played not a little role in her decision to renounce
under Master Xingyun. After returning to Taiwan from her journey, the young
woman came upon a book by the master that so affected her that a steady stream
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of tears gushed down her face as she read it. ‘‘Not only the thoughts of the Mas-
ter moved me,’’ related the nun, ‘‘but the fact that here was a man from mainland
China who now had struck such a deep chord with people in Taiwan. Here was
my bridge.’’ The fact that Master Xingyun originally hails from the mainland has
played a vital role in his popularity, for he embodies the transferal of Chinese cul-
ture from China proper to Taiwan and the outlying diaspora.
The identity crisis felt by many in Taiwan is experienced in an even more
acute form by those who have emigrated abroad, thereby leaving even the margins
to enter lands with virtually no cultural connection with China. It then becomes
imperative to find ameans to return to one’s heritage, at least to selective aspects of
that heritage. Many who frequent the overseas branch temples do so, not so much
as devout Buddhists, but as expatriates seeking the familiar tastes, sounds, and
sights of their mother country. Weekly services, monthly retreats, and large-scale
Dharma functions are religious and social events. The Chinese language schools
run at many of the temples are a major drawing card. Parents regard these schools,
as well as the Boy Scout troops and other Foguang children’s programs, as effec-
tive means to steep their children in the ethical values and cultural legacy of what
otherwise would be a far-removed birthright.
Clerics serve as important symbols for this reconstructed sense of home.Mas-
ter Xingyun likes to quote the phrase ‘‘By leaving home, one gains amyriad homes.’’
In the past, this saying pointed to the fact that all monks had the right to take up
temporary lodging in any public monastery. So long as the monk had a certificate
of ordination and pledged to abide by themonastery’s rules, he could not be turned
away. He was both homeless and yet benefited from countless abodes throughout
the country.13 For Foguang venerables, their own organization provides the myriad
homes. These clerics, in turn, act as the channels to transmit traditional Chinese
culture to the laity. Just as monks and nuns by leaving their biological relatives join
a largermonastic family, so Foguang devotees are told that, although theymay have
strayed far from the Chinese homeland, through joining BLIA they have actually
become part of a family that extends around the world. Each Foguang temple, as
a center of Chinese culture, is home. It is not only a miniature ‘‘Pure Land’’ (in
the sense of the Pure Lands described in Buddhist scriptures), but also a microcos-
mic, archetypal homeland. Mainland China may physically be situated where the
Middle Kingdom once was, but the periphery is now where that kingdom’s cul-
tural legacy thrives. The geographic center has become marginal, the margins and
outlying regions transformed into cultural centers. In fact, there are more than a
few within the Chinese diaspora who believe that it is from these multiple centers
that China’s heritage can one day be reintroduced to the physical core.
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ATTRACTING LOCALS AND LOCALIZING THE DHARMA
Master Xingyun very much recognizes that his overseas temples and BLIA chap-
ters serve as cultural bridges back to China. For this very reason, he often reminds
his followers that these outposts are not meant merely to be overseas Chinese as-
sociations with a Buddhist veneer. Foguang temples are to be centers of Chinese
Buddhism, with the emphasis on the noun. Just as the bringing of Chinese cul-
ture was an incidental feature of the Venerable Huishen’s venture to Fusang, so is
it said to be a secondary aspect of Master Xingyun’s vow to globalize Buddhism.
For the tradition to fulfill its universal intent, the seed of the Dharma must be
planted in every nation, and not just among emigrants from Buddhist countries,
but among the general populace. Diaspora missions are not enough, to adopt the
typology employed by Linda Learman in this book’s Introduction. Foguang Shan
feels called upon to energetically undertake foreign missionary work as well. The
master and his disciples are still struggling with how to best accomplish this goal.
Three primary methods thus far have been employed: creating links of affinity (jie-
yuan), sparking people’s curiosity, and localizing Buddhist teachings and practice.
The Foguang Encyclopedia (Foguang Da Cidian) states that jieyuan originally
referred to situations in which, ‘‘although cultivation in this life can in no way re-
sult in liberation, there is an initial point of contact for fruition some time in the
future.’’14 In other words, planting the seed of the Dharma in a person’s conscious-
ness usually will not lead to that person’s attaining enlightenment in the present
life, but such a seed of wisdom can bear fruit in a subsequent rebirth. Historically,
jieyuan has been applied to describe those undertakings that serve to attract new
devotees to Buddhism: building a temple or pagoda; donating funds; or printing
scriptures, books, or tracts. In its contemporary usage, the term especially portrays
any activity that establishes or strengthens a personal relationship in such a way
as to spread the Dharma. Jieyuan relies upon and augments the spontaneous cre-
ative energy that arises through direct interaction among people. It is, one could
say, a Buddhist manifestation of the Chinese proclivity to conduct affairs through
personal contacts (guanxi), although without any of the negative connotations.
Jieyuan is regarded as an important means of attaining merit (gongde). The
degree of merit that thereby accrues depends upon the nature of the interaction
among the three components: the giver, the gift, and the recipient. The most pre-
cious gift of all is the Dharma itself, but if such a gift would not yet be appreciated
by the recipient, more mundane presents will serve the purpose better. The level of
merit is not determined so much by the monetary value of the gift as by its appro-
priateness, that is, its effectiveness in drawing the recipient to Buddhism. Jieyuan
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is often accomplished by attracting people, especially children, to Buddhist prac-
tice through distributing candies, treats, or money. This understanding emphasizes
that, to plant the seed of theDharma effectively so that itmay flourish in the future,
one must first create appropriate conditions (yuan). The goal of creating links of
affinity is to instill a positive predisposition toward Buddhism so that, later, when
the time is ripe, people will be that much more likely to find resonance with its
teachings.
The motivation of the giver in providing the gift also affects the amount of
merit gained. The purity of his or her intention is of utmost importance; he or she
must have no selfish aim in establishing a relationship with the recipient. Chinese
Buddhists therefore distinguish jieyuan from panyuan,which generally signifies the
clinging of the wayward mind to external phenomena and, as the opposite of jie-
yuan, refers specifically to providing favors or establishing ties with some ulterior
design in mind.15 In the unsullied giving of jieyuan, whether or not the recipient
of the gift can assist the giver in some fashion in the future is of no concern. In
fact, those who practice jieyuan in its highest form are said to do so with no con-
cept of giver, recipient, or gift; all are regarded as radically interrelated aspects of
ever-changing reality. According to his devotees,Master Xingyun has attained this
level of compassionate wisdom.
The third element determining the amount of merit gained through jieyuan
is the relative virtue of the recipient as this becomes manifest through his or her
subsequent acts and level of cultivation. Merit is quite great, for instance, if the
person eventually renounces. Significant merit may still result even if the recipient
does not become a cleric, for it also compounds to the extent that the person there-
after benefits Buddhism. This is the reasoning behind Master Xingyun’s emphasis
on establishing ties of affinity with the elite of society, whether in the business or
political worlds.When a leader becomes a Buddhist, especially an active Buddhist,
others follow. If the act of jieyuan with a member of the elite does not lead to the
person taking Triple Refuge, it may nonetheless trigger merit, for the recipient is
in the position to benefit the tradition even as a non-Buddhist. A wealthy person,
for instance, may donate considerable funds for a charitable drive, or a politician
may help to pass legislation advantageous to the religion.
Master Xingyun has therefore long sought to create ties of affinity with po-
litical figures. He has also been remarkably successful in doing so: since the 1970s,
a vast array of Taiwan’s presidents, vice presidents, secretary-generals, governors,
ministers, legislators, county magistrates, and city mayors have made regular pil-
grimages to Foguang headquarters, especially when election season comes around.
As Foguang Shan has established branch temples overseas, the master has ex-
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
1
8
2
o
f
2
5
6
Spreading Buddha’s Light • 173
tended this strategy, instructing disciples and BLIA leaders to seek out favorably
disposed politicians and to make them well aware of the group’s wealth and clout
amongChinese. Such efforts of outreach have borne fruit. His Excellency Sir Clar-
ence Seignoret, president of the Commonwealth of Dominica, joined BLIA as a
non-Buddhist ‘‘friend’’ during the association’s 1992 inaugural ceremony. One year
later, Santiago Ruperez, director of the Spanish Chamber of Commerce (Spain’s
unofficial governmental representative to Taiwan), made the pilgrimage to Fo-
guang Shan to take the Triple Refuge. Vice President Guadalupe Jerezano of Hon-
duras visited the mountain in May 1995. France’s President Jacques Chirac sent a
letter congratulating BLIA upon the convening of its 1996 worldwide conference,
which took place in Paris, and Chancellor Kohl of Germany invited two mem-
bers of the Berlin chapter of BLIA to introduce the organization to him and other
government officials during the Berlin International Cultural Fair in September of
that year. Several Australian politicians, including Her Excellency Leneen Forde,
the governor-general of Queensland, visited Chong Tien Temple of Brisbane in
the spring of 1997 to allay fears in the wake of anti-Chinese sentiment sparked
during the previous year’s elections. Around that same time, Elizabeth Aguirre de
Calderón, the first lady of the Republic of El Salvador, visited Foguang Shan.
The country in which Master Xingyun has most energetically pursued cre-
ating links of affinity with politicians is the United States. California Secretary
of State March Fong Eu was invited to view the Hacienda Heights property just
as construction of Hsi Lai Temple got under way. Apparently, it was she who ar-
ranged for Master Xingyun to perform purifying services to start the December
1988 session of the California legislature. Foguang literature proudly states that
this was the first time a Buddhist monastic had performed this rite on government
premises in the United States. (Master Xingyun later conducted such services in
New York City and Chicago as well.) That same year, the mayors of Austin and
Houston honoredMaster Xingyun as a friendship ambassador. Letters of congratu-
lations have been sent to the temple by numerous California politicians, includ-
ing Governor Pete Wilson, U.S. senator Alan Cranston, and Los Angeles mayor
Tom Bradley. Over the years, politicians to visit Hsi Lai Temple have included
California state senator Simon, California senate president David Roberti, U.S.
congressman Mel Levine, and U.S. congressman Matthew Martinez.
The master long maintained at least nominal links with the White House.
President Reagan both wired a telegram and dispatched a representative toHsi Lai
Temple in honor of its opening in 1988. The first President Bush invited Master
Xingyun to his inauguration and, when the Buddha’s Light International Asso-
ciation was founded in 1992 in Los Angeles, he sent a letter praising the group
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for its compassionate tenets and devotion to relieving the suffering of all beings.16
Such contacts with the Oval Office increased and became more direct during the
Clinton administration, culminating with Master Xingyun making a ten-minute
‘‘courtesy call’’ on Vice President Gore at the White House in March of 1996,
and the vice president reciprocating by attending a banquet at Hsi Lai Temple six
weeks later.
Politicians outside of Taiwan associate themselves with Master Xingyun
mainly for two reasons. First, where Foguang Shan has built one of its larger branch
temples, themillions of dollars spent in construction and the subsequent tourist in-
flux are seen as a boost to the local economy. It was precisely for this reason that the
business and political leaders of Wollongong, Australia, in the early 1990s sought
out themaster and provided land so that Foguang Shanwould erect amonastery in
their town. The resulting structure, Nan Tien Temple, cost US$30million to build
and has developed into one of the area’s most prominent landmarks. The property
forNanHuaTemple in Bronkhorstspruit, SouthAfrica, was acquired under similar
circumstances, although the hope was not somuch to attract tourism as to gain the
master’s assistance in encouraging devotees to establish businesses there. Second,
as the master is influential in the overseas Chinese community, association with
him is seen as one way to garner political support from that ethnic group. In the
United States, at least, that support has been expressed directly through financial
contributions. From 1993 to 1996, Foguang clerics and lay-monastics made dona-
tions of thousands of dollars to the Democratic National Committee and to the
campaign war chests of such politicians as Los Angeles County Supervisor Don
Knabe, California Secretary of State March Fong Eu, Congressman Patrick Ken-
nedy, Senator Edward Kennedy, Vice President Al Gore, and President Clinton.17
Master Xingyun is well aware that politicians come to him mainly for money
and votes. He welcomes them to do so with the idea that, even if they do not be-
come Buddhists themselves (at least not in this lifetime), a favorable portrayal of
the tradition by such leaders will encourage others to learn more about it. That
Master Xingyun has hoped to rely on such a trickle-down method to promote the
Dharma in countries without a Buddhist heritage is quite evident from a statement
he made to a group of American scholars two months before Hsi Lai Temple’s offi-
cial opening. In line with the conference’s topic of ‘‘Religion and Society in the
Tang and Song Dynasties,’’ the master remarked to the gathering:
I am very interested in the theme ‘‘The Relation between Religion and So-
ciety.’’ When religion and society have a close relationship, then religion
can spread smoothly. Otherwise, it is not easy to develop. When Buddhism
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spread into China, it spread from officials (guanfang) to the people. With
this strength to promote from above to below it is easy to develop within
society. When the Buddha was alive, he highly valued the thinking of the
Benevolent King Who Protected the Dharma (Renwang Hufa). The reason
why Buddhism enjoyed a golden era during the Tang and Song dynasties is
that, in addition to royal patronage, there were many scholars who studied
and practiced it.
Mahayana Buddhism and American society are very compatible.
Buddhism is different from other religions in its lack of exclusivity, its
magnanimity, and its affinity with nature. Whether or not Americans can
recover the golden era of the Tang and Song dynasty Buddhism will de-
pend upon people’s efforts. If those of high status and influence support it,
it will develop even faster.18
Master Xingyun therefore sees creating ties of affinity with politicians as an expe-
dient means (fangbian) for making people in that society more favorably disposed
to Buddhist teachings. In theUnited States, however, the strategy has backfired, at
least in the short term. After it became known that the Hsi Lai banquet attended
by Al Gore served as a fund-raiser for the Democratic National Committee, Mas-
ter Xingyun and his disciples found themselves not only unfavorably portrayed in
themedia as alleged agents for Taiwan political and business interests, but even the
objects of investigations by the United States Senate, House of Representatives,
and Justice Department.19 Since that time, the master and politicians (not just of
the United States, but around the world) have been more wary of establishing ties
with one another. Master Xingyun is now satisfied with relying on less glamorous,
but also less controversial, methods of attracting non-Buddhists to the Dharma.
When a news reporter from Wollongong, Australia, asked Foguang Shan’s
current abbot, the Venerable Xinding, how the organization planned to spread
Buddhism among non-Chinese Australians, he replied, ‘‘People will increasingly
come simply through human curiosity. Seeing the beautiful temple, they will be
drawn to see what goes on inside.’’20 As this statement indicates, clerics believe
that the very splendor of Buddhism, and the impressive way in which it is propa-
gated by Foguang Shan, will naturally excite people’s interest. Such reasoning ex-
plains why Foguang Shan has chosen to build such large, impressive structures as
Hsi Lai Temple, Nan Hua Temple, and Nan Tien Temple. This mode of operation
rests on the assumption that, as all people share Buddha Nature (Foxing), those
who have proper roots will spontaneously seek out theDharma once they have had
even the slightest exposure to it. Foguang Buddhists would therefore agree with
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Dharmapala’s assertion that there is no need to proselytize aggressively (see Kem-
per, Chap. 1). Instead, Buddhists can rely on simply sparking people’s curiosity so
that they will on their own initiative ask about the Dharma. Such a tactic not only
calls for creating impressive structures and organizing large-scale events to attract
attention but also for accentuating the uniqueness of both Buddhism and Chinese
culture.
In dialectical tensionwith themethod of celebrating difference to spark curi-
osity is the recognition that too strong a sense of foreignness can repel people
and incite prejudice. Foguang devotees from Malaysia and the Philippines say they
must keep a low profile to avoid harassment. There are also significant challenges
in promoting Buddhism in Africa. There, people look askance at the black robes
and tonsured heads of clerics because the color black is associated with evil magi-
cal power and a person will usually only shave his or her head after the death of
a parent or other close relative. Buddhist monastics are therefore vulnerable to
suspicions and often the target of countermagic.21 There have been hurdles in the
United States as well. It took nearly a decade punctuated by six volatile townmeet-
ings before permission was granted for the construction of Hsi Lai Temple. Shortly
after the temple was completed in 1989, the float entered by the Hsi Lai commu-
nity in a local Fourth of July parade was heckled along much of the way. Only after
several years of carefully cultivating good relations with neighbors and local politi-
cal and religious leaders did the accusations of being a ‘‘cult’’ die down, although
they arose once again in the aftermath of the Democratic National Committee
fund-raising debacle.
To lessen tensions with the mainstream society in each country in which Fo-
guang Shan plants one or more temples, and to smooth the transition for those at-
tracted to the Dharma,Master Xingyun has called for the ‘‘localization’’ (bentuhua)
of Buddhism. By this, he means that customs which have been generated by Bud-
dhists in China and other cultures over the centuries may be replaced by other cus-
toms more appropriate to each new region into which the Dharma is introduced.
The essential teachings remain the same, while culture-specific practices can vary.
To adapt George Tanabe’s horticultural metaphor, the Dharma continues as the
unchanged ‘‘rootstock,’’ although the cultural practices formerly grafted onto this
stock are pruned and replaced by a new grafting.22 The difficulty in applying this
method lies in determining just where core truth ends and custom begins. In fact,
the debate over the degree to which to localize touches every aspect of temple life:
should Dharma functions be altered in any way? what language should be used?
what kind of food should be served? what music is appropriate?
Master Xingyun believes that the people most competent to resolve these
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issues are natives of the respective non-Buddhist countries who have gone through
intensive training in a Foguang college, preferably on the campus at the head-
quarters. Most ideal of all is to find such individuals who aspire to renounce. The
Foguang Shan Monastic Academy has a special department to tend to the educa-
tion of such candidates. As with all monastic college students, tuition, room, and
board are provided free of charge. For those who come from an underprivileged
background, airfare to Foguang Shan is also paid.
To date, however, Foguang Shan has not been very successful in keeping such
clerics within the organization. Non-Chinese monastics typically voice two frus-
trations: either they find it too difficult to acclimate to Chinese customs and values
or they feel that their Chinese brethren do not take them seriously. The rate of
attrition is consequently very high, many leaving within a few months of matricu-
lating in the college, others making it through the period of training but disappear-
ing soon thereafter. Of the approximately one dozen Europeans and Americans
who tonsured under Master Xingyun, only two could still be found in the Foguang
Shan order as of the year 2002. Efforts in Africa and India have also had very lim-
ited success. Fewer than half of the ten young men who in 1994 became Foguang
Shan’s first shramanera from the Congo lasted through the year-long program at
NanHua Temple Seminary, and only one continued on afterward. Staff of theNan
Hua Seminary informed me that, of the sixty-three students brought there from
Tanzania and Malawi in 1998, not even a dozen remained by year’s end, of whom
three persevered for two years. The arrangement to bring young men and women
from Ladakh, India, to Foguang Shan to be groomed as monastics has also suffered
a high drop-out rate.
Although the initiative to develop a contingent of non-Chinese Foguang
clerics has met with numerous setbacks, it has by no means been a complete fail-
ure and, in fact, might even be considered something of a success. As mentioned
above, two Americans were still within Foguang ranks as of the year 2002, one
of whom was a nun who had been with the order for over ten years, the other a
monk who took full vows in Foguang Shan’s ordination ceremony in Bodhgaya in
1998. Also in the Bodhgaya ordination were five men from the Congo (including
a young man who in 1994 had been among the first ten to take the shramanera
vows) and six Ladakhi women who had spent at least a year studying at Foguang
Shan.23
The debate over the extent and ways in which to localize affects laity even
more than it does clerics, especially those devotees who are either non-Chinese or
ethnic Chinese who have grown up outside of China. Non-Chinese attracted to
Foguang temples generally fall into two groups: Sinophiles, many of whom wish to
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take on a full Chinese persona, and those primarily interested in Buddhist teach-
ings. The former have great interest in Chinese customs, ritual, and language, and
therefore typically prefer to interact with the Chinese devotees rather than with
any other non-Chinese who may also have become part of the community. To em-
ploy the terminology utilized by Richard Payne (Chap. 4), such neoromantics seek
to have a ‘‘mimetic merger with the exotic Other.’’ The latter have only passing
interest in things Chinese and may even wish to strip the Buddhist teachings of
what they see as Chinese cultural accretions. Hence, Sinophiles resist localization,
the others embrace it. To again use Tanabe’s metaphor, Sinophiles wish simply to
tend the bodhi tree exactly as it has been transplanted from China to their par-
ticular country; ‘‘purists’’ hope to prune that tree of the branches that over the
millennia were grafted onto the stock in the Middle Kingdom so as to return the
plant to the pristine condition of the original bodhi tree as it had initially grown
in India.
The localization debate is arguably most keenly felt by second- and third-
generation overseas Chinese youth. During a 1997 BLIA Youth Conference that
took place at Foguang headquarters, a student from Malaysia said that he and
others at his temple had held some activities not considered traditionally Bud-
dhist, and as a result they had been reprimanded by the resident monastics. He
felt that the criticism was unjustified and asserted that there had to be more open-
ness to adapting to the lifestyle of young overseas Chinese. A woman strongly dis-
agreed, responding: ‘‘As Buddhists, we must maintain a strong line between right
and wrong. Just because others do it doesn’t mean that we should do it. We have to
have a different standard.’’ This interchange raises two issues. First, although the
young man from Malaysia did not specify the types of activities he and his friends
had held, one can assume that they were much more influenced by global pop cul-
ture than they were by the country’s dominant Islamic lifestyle. This underscores
the complexity of today’s world, in which multiple cultural worldviews, both reli-
gious and secular, converge in nearly every society. Second, the young woman’s
response reminds us that, because custom is so tightly bound up with notions of
morality, any change in practice is often regarded as vitiating ethical standards.
The real issue, however, is not so much one of morality as of identity. I noted
earlier in this chapter that the first prong of the Foguang globalization program
is to act as a bridge back to the Chinese cultural homeland. The organization’s
capacity to serve as a vehicle to preserve Chinese identity is directly undermined
by any effort to localize practice or to harmonize it with global pop culture. These
three aspects of globalization are therefore in constant tension with one another.
For Foguang Shan to be able to claim to be an international operation transcend-
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ing all ethnic and cultural boundaries, it must extend itself beyond its core Chinese
base. To the degree that it does so, it risks ostracizing its most important source
of devotees and, hence, financial support. Foguang overseas temples thus far have
opted to continue to accentuate their Chinese heritage, making a few symbolic
gestures toward accommodating local and global custom. Temples may provide a
spoon and fork rather than chopsticks in the refectory, for instance, or clerics may
shake handswith lay visitors. For themost part, however, life in the temple is essen-
tially the same as it would be if it were located in Taiwan. In fact, non-Chinese
who come to visit are frequently referred to as laowai, ‘‘foreigners.’’
These difficulties experienced by Foguang devotees in negotiating cultural
boundaries point to the limitations of any language of global citizenry that implies
a negation or transcendence of local ties. Exposure to the globalization of mar-
ket and media forces and the setting adrift of imagined communities from their
territorial anchorage interact either to multiply cultural allegiances or, as often is
the case, to trigger retrenchment, that is, a reaffirmation of the primacy of one
particular imagined community. Chinese Foguang devotees have mostly opted for
this latter tactic as they have searched for stability in an increasingly fluid world
system. Despite the predominance of this strategy, they nonetheless recognize that
the global conditions of postmodernity call for an approach that better accords
with the inevitable hybridity of contemporary life. The last part of this chapter will
explore the Foguang Buddhist paradigm for world citizenry, one that empowers
devotees not only to come to terms with the global scope of humankind’s cul-
tural hybridity but also to harness the dynamism of these conditions to further
self-cultivation.
GLOBAL HOMELESSNESS
Since he retired as abbot of Foguang Shan in 1985, Master Xingyun has been said
to ‘‘wander the four seas like a cloud.’’ This is, in fact, the ideal lifestyle of all Bud-
dhist clerics, who upon leaving home are said in the Sutta Nipata to become ‘‘free
everywhere, at odds with none, and well content with this or that. . . .’’24 The con-
stant movement and simple life represented by forgoing any fixed abode embody
the Buddha’s teaching of impermanence and his ideals of detachment and equa-
nimity. Shakyamuni and his disciples traveled daily in search of alms, taking refuge
each evening in a convenient grove or on the outskirts of some town. Only during
themonsoon season did they halt their peregrinations towait out the rains. Even in
China, where monasticism has been the norm, clerics through the centuries have
hoped to ‘‘travel the four quarters’’ (canfang) as symbolized by the country’s four
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famous Buddhist pilgrimage mountains. To have an ordination certificate whose
borders were embossed with the seals of China’s most renowned monasteries was a
source of pride, especially if one had prostrated every three steps over the course of
the journey. Homelessness is not an undesirable state to be avoided or overcome.
It is a religious ideal.
Until recently, only clerics enjoyed the benefits to self-cultivation afforded
by long-term homelessness, and they largely enacted this lifestyle within the bor-
ders of their own country. With the development of international migration and
increased global mobility, all Chinese who have departed from the homeland sym-
bolically partake of the itinerant life. For laity, homelessness does not entail for-
going a family, but describes the physical departure from relatives and friends and
the cultural distancing fromChinese society that inevitably accompany expatriate
life. Foguang monastics, shifting posts of duty every three years, are the paragons
of global citizenry. For them (and, mutatis mutandis, for such Sri Lankan monks
as Piyadassi and Mapalagama Vipulasara who are engaged in videshagatavima, as
described by Kemper, Chap. 1), the badge of honor is not an ordination certifi-
cate filled with the seals of temples, but a passport covered with the entry visas of
various nations.
One reason the Huishen myth appeals to Foguang devotees is its transna-
tional flavor. The Venerable Huishen, after all, was not Chinese, but rather an
Indianmonk whomerely resided in China before moving on to spend themajority
of his life in America. The designations of ‘‘Indian,’’ ‘‘Chinese,’’ and ‘‘American’’
were fleeting and secondary. Huishen was first and foremost a Buddhist. Master
Xingyun similarly lacks a strong association with a particular place. He often notes
that people in Taiwan refer to him as ‘‘that monk from the mainland.’’ When he
has visited the PRC, however, and when he travels abroad, people have called him
‘‘that monk fromTaiwan.’’ Master Xingyun, like the Venerable Huishen, is a monk
without a home. This is not a negative, in the master’s view, but a positive, for it
allows him to symbolize personally the ability of Buddhism to transcend all such
nationalistic designations. As he once said in an interview with me:
I don’t feel that you are Americans. I also don’t feel that I am a Chinese.
We are all global. We are all the same. . . . If we could join together with
one another with no regard to nationality or race, it would be wonderful.
So [the] global character [of Foguang Shan] doesn’t simply mean building
temples in various places. We want to spread peace, equality, forbearance,
friendship, respect, and tolerance everywhere to everyone.
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Although Master Xingyun may say that ‘‘We are all global,’’ his call to de-
accentuate national identity serves to shift a person’s primary loyalty to the vehicle
that allows such deemphasis to occur, namely to Buddhism. We are all global in
that we all have Buddha Nature. Only to the degree that we recognize it will na-
tional and other local allegiances fade away. Such rhetoric points to what may
be a growing trend in postmodernity in which the primary referent for commu-
nal identity increasingly reverts from national to religious symbols and myths. It
is more than happenstance that secularization occurred during the same period as
the rise of nations. Religion and nationhood are in tension with one another as
contending sources of primary allegiance and identity. The attenuation of national
sovereignty brought about by global capitalism has left a vacuum, one easily filled
by religious traditions, since their worldviews incorporate language of both par-
ticularity and universality. Postmodernity may therefore spur people to once again
more fully align themselves with reconstructed elements of premodern traditions.
We see this not only in Foguang Shan devotees, but also in the interactions among
Sri Lankan, Japanese, Burmese, and European Buddhists, and in the experiences
of the Brazilian Zen and Soka Gakkai Buddhists (studied by Kemper, Rocha, and
Clarke, respectively).
From the Foguang perspective, modern globalization is by no means anti-
thetical to traditional Buddhist ideals or practices. Each realizes the other, as
through globalization people come to realize the truth of the Mahayana Buddhist
doctrines of impermanence and universal interdependence. Master Xingyun and
his devotees firmly believe that the Buddha, Dharma, and sangha are not relics
of the past but harbingers of postmodernity, actualizing the spiritual potential of
economic, political, and cultural globalization.
Notes
An earlier version of this essay was published as ‘‘Globalizing Chinese Culture, Localizing
Buddhist Teachings: The Internationalization of Foguangshan,’’ Journal of Global Buddhism
3 (2002): 46–78. Most of the information for the essay was compiled through fieldwork
carried out at the Foguang headquarters (Taiwan), Hsi Lai Temple (Los Angeles), Nan Tien
Temple (Wollongong, Australia), Nan Hua Temple (Bronkhorstspruit, South Africa), and
other Foguang branches. A total of two years of fieldwork took place over the years 1996
to 2002. Unless otherwise noted, quoted comments by Master Xingyun and his devotees
represent remarks made to me during interviews or conversations.
1. Shi Xingyun, Xingyun riji [Xingyun’s Diary], vol. 3 (Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Foguang Press,
1994), entry for January 2, 1990.
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2. For a more detailed discussion of the scholarly debate concerning an early arrival in
America by a Buddhist sailing from China, see Stuart Chandler, ‘‘Chinese Buddhism in
America: Identity and Practice,’’ inThe Faces of American Buddhism, ed.Charles Prebish and
Kenneth Tanaka (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 14–16.
3. Chinese emigrants frommainlandChina, HongKong, and Southeast Asia also frequent
overseas Foguang temples and join BLIA. Themoving force behind the organization’s inter-
nationalization nonetheless remains expatriated ROC citizens.
4. In 1992, 4.86million people inTaiwan indicated that they frequented Buddhist temples.
Eight years later, the numbers had increased to slightly more than five million. These statis-
tics were provided tome by the ROCDepartment of the Interior, Bureau of Religion, Taipei.
Awakening theWorldwas Foguang Shan’smonthly newsletter to its devotees through the year
1999, at which point it was discontinued and replaced by the daily newspaper Humanistic
Prosperity (Renjian fu bao).
5. The term ‘‘Humanistic Buddhism’’ is the English translation of Renjian Fojiao. Master
Xingyun did not coin the term ‘‘Renjian Fojiao,’’ nor is he the only contemporary Chinese
Buddhist cleric in whose lexicon it plays a central role. Master Taixu (1889–1947) was the
first to employ the concept, although he usually referred to it as Rensheng Fojiao. In Taixu’s
opinion, Chinese Buddhism had suffered a great decline due to an overemphasis on funer-
ary rites. He therefore devised the term ‘‘Rensheng Fojiao’’ to remind people that, as it is
the living (rensheng) who are in the best position to attain enlightenment, Buddhists should
devote their energies to maximizing this opportunity, both for themselves and for others.
The general preference for Renjian Fojiao has come about through the work of the Vener-
able Yinshun (b. 1906). He preferred ‘‘renjian’’ to ‘‘rensheng’’ to give even more emphasis to
the fact that Buddhist practice must occur through active participation in human society
(renjian, or ‘‘in the human domain’’). It should not be inordinately devoted to worshiping
buddhas as though they were deities, a tendency that in his opinion has long plagued the
Mahayana tradition. Both Master Xingyun and the Venerable Zhengyan (the founder of
Taiwan’s largest lay Buddhist association, Ciji) have followed Yinshun’s terminology. Tai-
wan’s most famous Chan master, the Venerable Shengyan, has preferred to maintain the
wording of Rensheng Fojiao. All five of these clerics qualify ‘‘Buddhism’’ with adjectives ap-
proximating the English ‘‘humanistic’’ so as to redirect people’s attention back from other
realms and lifetimes to present existence in this world.
6. These numbers are based on an analysis of the worker assignments listed in Foguang cun-
lin [Foguang newsletter], no. 424 (Foguang Shan Religious Affairs Committee), August 15,
1997. By full-time workers, I mean those clerics and lay-monastics (shigu) who have already
graduated from the monastic college and are not on some form of leave. An additional
110 monks and nuns were studying in one of Foguang Shan’s seminaries. One hundred and
thirty-six monastics were apparently on extended leave of absence. A ‘‘lay-monastic’’ has
not fully renounced but has vowed to remain celibate and to live on Foguang premises for
the rest of his or her life so as to devote all his or her energy to aiding the organization in
spreading the Dharma.
7. Patricia Hunt-Perry and Lyn Fine, ‘‘All Buddhism Is Engaged: Thich Nhat Hanh and
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the Order of Interbeing,’’ in Engaged Buddhism in the West, ed. Christopher Queen (Boston:
Wisdom, 2000), 45.
8. Martin Baumann, ‘‘Work as Dharma Practice: Right Livelihood Cooperatives of the
FWBO,’’ in Engaged Buddhism in the West, ed. Christopher Queen (Boston: Wisdom, 2000),
378.
9. Alan Sponberg, ‘‘TBMSG: A Dhamma Revolution in Contemporary India,’’ in Engaged
Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia, ed. Christopher Queen (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1996), 73–120.
10. Master Xingyun and his disciples regard themselves as vital carriers of filial piety (xiao)
and propriety (li), both traditionally closely associated with the Confucian tradition. For
more on this, see chapter 8 of my book Establishing a Pure Land on Earth: The Foguang Bud-
dhist Perspectives on Modernization and Globalization (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press,
2004).
11. Tu Wei-ming, ‘‘The Search for Roots in Industrial East Asia: The Case of the Con-
fucian Revival,’’ in Fundamentalisms Observed, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 742–745.
12. The Dutch planted trading posts along the southwest coast of Ilha Formosa (Beautiful
Island) from 1624 to 1662. Their population on the island peaked at twenty-eight hundred,
of whom twenty-two hundred were soldiers. The Spanish had settlements in the north from
1626 to 1642; I-shou Wang, ‘‘Cultural Contact and the Migration of Taiwan’s Aborigines:
A Historical Perspective,’’ in China’s Island Frontier: Studies in the Historical Geography of
Taiwan, ed. Ronald G. Knapp (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1980), 36. Before this
time, only a smattering of Chinese came to the island to fish or conduct trade, with virtually
none establishing permanent homes there with their families. Chinese began to settle and
farm Taiwan’s eastern coastal region under the protection of the Dutch and Spanish forts.
Significant numbers, however, began to arrive only when Zheng Chenggong established his
renegade anti-Qing regime there in 1661. The island became part of the Chinese imperial
state for the first time two decades later, when a Qing fleet forced the Zheng leadership to
abdicate their power. John E. Wills, Jr., ‘‘The Seventeenth-Century Transformation: Tai-
wan under the Dutch and the Cheng Regime,’’ in Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray A.
Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 84–103.
13. Holmes Welch, The Practice of Chinese Buddhism 1900–1950 (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 1967), 306–310.
14. Shi, Xingyun (general editor), Foguang Da Cidian [Foguang encyclopedia] (Kaohsiung,
Taiwan: Foguang Press, 1988), 5190.
15. Ibid., 6665.
16. According to Master Xingyun’s diary, when it turned out that he would not be able to
attend President Bush’s inauguration, there was talk of arranging for him to go to the White
House at another time to meet him. The master then goes on to say that the newly elected
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president had an interest in coming to Hsi Lai to visit. Shi Xingyun, Xingyun Riji, vol. 2,
entry for October 19, 1989.
17. These donations are listed in ‘‘The United States of America v. Maria Hsia A/K/A
Hsia Ling, Defendant,’’ United States Court for the District of Columbia, docket CR.98–
0057(PLF). This document is found under the district court opinions category of http://
www.westlaw.com.
18. Shi Xingyun, Xingyun Riji, vol. 2, entry for October 14, 1989. As the number of Ameri-
can political officials visiting Hsi Lai Temple mounted, Master Xingyun told his disciples,
‘‘For us Buddhists to come to America and be able to receive the positive acceptance by the
United States government is our greatest vow and hope!’’ Shi Xingyun, Xingyun Riji, vol. 3,
entry for January 23, 1990.
19. Stuart Chandler, ‘‘Placing Palms Together: Religious and Cultural Dimensions of the
Hsi Lai Temple Political Donations Controversy,’’ inAmerican Buddhism: Methods and Find-
ings in Recent Scholarship, ed. Duncan Ryuken Williams and Christopher Queen (Surrey,
Eng.: Curzon, 1999), 36–56.
20. The Venerable Xinding interview with Jodie Duffy of Prime Television (Wollongong,
Australia), Foguang Shan, May 2, 1997. Master Xingyun retired as the abbot of Foguang
Shan in 1985, passing on the day-to-day administration of temple affairs to one of his dis-
ciples.
21. The Venerable Huijin, one of the first Africans to tonsure under Master Xingyun, told
me of these difficulties for monastics in Africa. Because of the dangerous associations with
the color black, the African novices were early on granted permission to wear instead the
gray-colored work robes or, for special occasions, the mustard-colored robes (normally, only
fully ordained graduates of the Buddhist college are permitted to wear these latter).
22. It is important to note that in Tanabe’s metaphor the trunk of the tree represents Japa-
nese Shin ancestral religion, whereas I am using the trunk to represent an idealized, uni-
versal Buddha Dharma as opposed to a distinctive, local Buddhism.
23. Unfortunately, because of visa regulations, the five young men from the Congo soon
had to return to their country, where, due to escalating civil war, it was felt to be too dan-
gerous for them to continue a monastic lifestyle. Several had voiced the hope of returning
to Nan Hua Temple and resuming their career as clerics, but little was ever heard of them
after their repatriation. It was because of the degenerating political situation in the Congo
that Nan Hua shifted its base of recruitment to Tanzania and Malawi.
24. Edward Conze, ed. and trans., Buddhist Scriptures (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), 79.
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8 The Compassion Relief Diaspora
C. Julia Huang
This chapter presents a multiple-sited case study of the worldwide development
of a Taiwanese grassroots lay Buddhist movement. Thirty years after its establish-
ment in Taiwan, the Buddhist CompassionRelief Tzu-Chi Foundation (FojiaoCiji
Jijinghui, commonly known asCiji GongdeHui, CompassionReliefMerit Society,
in Taiwan, hereafter, CompassionRelief) is currently the largest formal association
in Taiwan, and over the past decade has formed branches in about thirty coun-
tries. Compassion Relief is the first modern Buddhist organization in any Chinese
society to carry out humanitarian missions on a large, international scale that in-
cludes delivery of relief on every continent. Such accomplishments have won its
leader, a Buddhist nun named the Venerable Zhengyan (or Cheng-Yen), the 1991
Philippine Magsaysay Award and the 1993 nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize.1
In the year 2000, a textbook for high-school students in Canada devoted one page
to Compassion Relief and its leader, both of whom they characterized as exem-
plary,2 and Business Week recognized Zhengyan as the only Taiwanese among the
fourteen—mostly entrepreneurs—‘‘stars of Asia.’’3
This essay examines the characteristics of this example of a global Buddhist
movement. More specifically, it seeks to describe the forms and content of the
movement’s globalism and to examine the ways in which the worldwide spread of
a Taiwanese Buddhist movement may represent both the importance of diaspora
communities in the globalization process and the desire to move beyond ethnic
confines, a two-edged strategy that may or may not succeed in the long run.4 First,
I shall describe the brief history of Compassion Relief by highlighting the external
and indigenous sources that have blended in the Venerable Zhengyan’s creation
of the movement. Second, I shall give an overview of the structure of Compas-
sion Relief ’s expansion worldwide, which consists of two overlapping parts: mis-
sion and missionaries and, more specifically, their global outreach programs and
their overseas branches of devotees. The closing section is an attempt to summa-
rize the characteristics of Compassion Relief ’s route of global development and
the possible implications this example has for the interplay between religion and
ethnicity in the global context.
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Compassion Relief is distinct from traditional religious practice among over-
seas Chinese. Despite the mistaken common label of ‘‘Buddhism,’’ the most widely
practiced religion among overseas Chinese has been Chinese popular religion—
that is, a combination of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism.5 ‘‘Canonical reli-
gions, in particular Christianity and Buddhism,’’ did not significantly rise until the
1990s, when a majority of overseas Chinese communities were comprised of well-
educated people instead of the earlier laborers and sojourners.6
From the outset Compassion Relief has retained its Buddhist identity—sym-
bolically and legally.7 However, unlike most Chinese (Mahayana) Buddhists who
focus on sutra chanting, Compassion Relief emphasizes building a ‘‘pure land’’
in this world through secular action—namely, making concrete contributions to
humanity. Perhaps more important, Compassion Relief is a formal association
compared to, although not completely separate from, informal social ties such as
personal connections (guanxi), and it operates under a new form of transnational
organization in contrast to, although again not completely separate from, familism.
To be a Compassion Relief person (Cijiren) is to identify oneself as a ‘‘deployable
agent’’ of Buddha’s universal compassion for all the living by contributing to the
Compassion Relief mission.8 By thus contributing, one becomes a member of the
group and involved in its ‘‘religious community.’’ Such engagement in Compassion
Relief, as the present case study will show, helps to ‘‘retain a sense of plausibility’’
of one’s new religious identity9 and, at the same time, offers a vision of Buddhist
global community among the Chinese and particularly Taiwanese diaspora.
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO COMPASSION RELIEF
Compassion Relief was founded in 1966 on the poor eastern coast of Taiwan.10
At that time, it consisted of a nun, five disciples, and thirty followers, all house-
wives. Their goal was to defray medical costs for the poor. The housewives each
donated NT$0.50 (buying power of about US$0.025 in current dollars) every day
from their grocery money and proselytized among their family and friends. The
nuns made handicrafts whose sale supported the monastic order and added to the
relief fund. Their monthly charity funds in the first year came to less than US$30.
Compassion Relief developed slowly in its first decade, and then rapidly
spread across the island in the late 1980s—the time when Taiwan was moving
toward a wealthier economy and a more democratic polity. By 2000, Compassion
Relief claimed five million members worldwide, with branches in twenty-eight
countries. Presently, it gives away over US$157 million (NT$5.4 billion in 1999)
in charity each year,11 runs a TV channel, a secular four-year university with a stan-
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dard medical school, and two state-of-the-Western-art 900-bed hospitals. It runs
free clinics in California and Hawai‘i, a medical institute in Vancouver, and a di-
alysis center in Penang, Malaysia. It has delivered relief to disaster victims in the
People’s Republic of China, Rwanda, Chechnya, and Papua New Guinea, among
many other places.
Compassion Relief is a lay Buddhist movement under monastic leadership.
Its founder and leader is the Venerable Zhengyan, a Buddhist nun with great cha-
risma. Most followers trace their conversion to her immediate personal appeals.
While she teaches classic Buddhist texts (e.g., the Lotus Scripture, [Miaofa lianhua
jing]; the Thirty-Seven Aids to Enlightenment [Sanshiqi daopin, Skt.: Siksananda];
the Scripture of the Medicine Master [Yaoshi jing]; and the Scripture of Parents’
Unrequited Kindness [Fumu enzhong nanbao jing]), Zhengyan’s Dharma (fa) is the
absolute authority for the whole movement.12 Under her charismatic leadership,
the Compassion Relief umbrella organization now has basically two overlapping
divisions: theCompassionRelief Foundation proper (Ciji JijinHui) and the volun-
teer association (Ciji GongdeHui). The nonprofit foundation alone has about five
hundred staff members and controls NT$12 billion (approximately US$342 mil-
lion) in funds.13 It gave away over NT$5.4 billion (approximately US$157 million)
in 1999 in charity,much of it international.14 Funds provided by the volunteer orga-
nization support all Compassion Relief missions and the foundation.15 The orga-
nization has over ten thousand ‘‘commissioners’’ (weiyuan) worldwide who have
no position in the foundation.16 They are committed to supporting all Compas-
sion Relief missions and generally refer to themselves as followers of the Venerable
Zhengyan. About 70 percent of the commissioners are women, althoughmale par-
ticipation has rapidly increased since total membership skyrocketed in the early
1990s.
The Venerable Zhengyan is the key to understanding Compassion Relief not
only because she is charismatic but also because all Compassion Relief missions
are very largely, if not solely, the result of her vision of Buddhism. She states how
and why Compassion Relief is a reform of traditional Chinese Buddhism:
In the past, Buddhism in this world had sounds but no forms, and was
hardly ‘‘practical’’ (shiji). The so-called Buddhism saw only temples and
masters speaking of texts. This was the image of Buddhism in the past
2,000 years, and the reason why most people misunderstood Buddhism
as only about chanting sutras and worshipping Buddha, a religion of old
ladies. . . . I founded Compassion Relief for Buddhism and for all the
living,17 with the hope that Buddhism shall not only exist on [people’s] lips,
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but also manifest itself—to demonstrate the spirit of Buddha through prac-
tical action; to pursue ‘‘involvement’’ (shi) (the spirit of Compassion Relief)
and ‘‘truth’’ (li) (the spirit of Buddha) in tandem.18
What Zhengyan meant by ‘‘practical action’’ and what she saw for Compas-
sion Relief engagement, by and large, consisted of contributions to social welfare
carried out by both the monastic order and the laity. On the one hand, in con-
trast with most Chinese Buddhist priests who rely for their livelihood on alms and
giving scripture (Skt: sutra) chanting services for donations, Zhengyan and her dis-
ciples not only completely support themselves independently from donations, but
also contribute to the relief funds. On the other hand, the main practice of the lay
followers is not chanting scriptures but contributing their time andmoney to prose-
lytizing, raising funds, and volunteering for the Venerable Zhengyan’s mission.
Zhengyan’s mission has expanded from uplifting the poor and caring for the
needy in the 1960s and 1970s, to building a Compassion Relief hospital on the
impoverished eastern side of Taiwan where most aborigines reside in the 1980s, to
the ‘‘Four Great Compassion Relief Missions’’ and the four ‘‘footprints’’ (jiaoyin).
The FourGreatMissions (si da zhiye) are charity (i.e., on-site investigation, evalua-
tion, and long-term care); medical care (e.g., building hospitals); education (e.g.,
building a university and organizing the Compassion Relief teachers’ association
and youth corps); and culture (e.g., Compassion Relief publications and TV). The
additional four ‘‘footprints’’ are international disaster relief; bone-marrow drives
(i.e., collecting bone-marrow samples for an international database and transplan-
tation); environmentalism (e.g., sorting garbage for recycling), and community
volunteers (e.g., cooperating with public social workers to provide local elders with
long-term care). In contrast with the often ad hoc nature or emphatically spiritual
practice of Buddhist charity in Chinese societies, Compassion Relief has estab-
lished a reputation for searching out causes and mobilizing for effective implemen-
tation.
The breakthroughCompassion Relief has made inChinese Buddhism is very
much the result of the reformism that Zhengyan developed through her own re-
flection upon various religious traditions in Taiwan. Compassion Relief literature
describes how Zhengyan came to conceive of the organization through a series of
events spanning her lay and monastic life. A closer look at these major events re-
veals clues to the pluralist influences on Compassion Relief of Japanese Buddhism,
Taiwanese indigenous Buddhism, reformist Chinese Buddhism, andCatholicism.19
At age sixteen (in 1953), Zhengyan prayed to the Bodhisattva Guanyin (the
Goddess of Mercy) to take twelve years from her life in exchange for her mother’s
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recovery from an illness. Her mother recovered. As also vowed, Zhengyan became
a vegetarian. The significance of this first encounter with Buddhist divinity lies less
in linking Zhengyan to Buddhism than in grounding her character in filial piety,
since she had yet to receive Buddhist teachings, let alone pursue her monastic
vocation, which did not occur until five years later when her father passed away.20
Bereaved, Zhengyan sought help in Buddhism and began to frequent Buddhist
temples in her hometown in central Taiwan, where one of the nuns told her that
she could no longer agree with the dependency of Chinese priesthood after she
had studied Buddhism in Japan. Zhengyan said to herself, ‘‘I shall change the cir-
cumstances and build the dignity of Buddhist priests if I become a nun one day.’’21
Ever since she embarked on the journey toward becoming a nun Zhengyan has
been abiding by the Chan Master Baizhang’s teaching ‘‘A day without working is
a day without eating.’’22 Zhengyan further established three ‘‘no’s’’ for her monas-
tic order: no scripture chanting for a fee, no Dharma ceremony for a fee, and no
begging.
Japanese Buddhism inspired Zhengyan to establish an economically inde-
pendent priesthood. In addition to Japanese Buddhist influence, Taiwanese indige-
nous Buddhism played a role in her early years as a priest. After she left home at
the age of twenty-four to become a nun, Zhengyan wandered to different temples.
Eventually she took refuge with a lay Buddhist in Hualian on the eastern coast.
Zhengyan shaved her head by herself and meditated on and studied the Lotus
Scripture alone in a humble house.23 Li argues that both her following a lay teacher
and her solitary meditation without formal ordination accord with the tradition of
Taiwanese indigenous vegetarian sect Buddhism (zhaijiao), themost prevalent form
of Buddhist practice in Taiwan until the Japanese colonization (1895–1945).24
A link to a reformist Chinese Buddhism came when a well-known seculariz-
ing and reformist monk, the Venerable Yinshun, agreed to be Zhengyan’s tonsure
master for her ordination in 1963. Yinshun hasmade his mark in the contemporary
religious-political arena. Inspired by the Venerable Taixu in mainland China dur-
ing his early years as a monk, Yinshun fled to Taiwan after the Communists took
over there in 1949 and has long advocated Buddhism of theHumanRealm (renjian
fojiao; also referred to as Humanistic Buddhism in Chandler’s essay).25 Because his
this-worldly approach challenged the then Buddhist authority’s otherworldly ap-
proach, Yinshun was silenced in the 1950s, when they suggested that his position
constituted Communist agitation.26 Yinshun was later vindicated and is currently
one of the most respected masters in Taiwan. Compassion Relief and other large
Buddhist groups (e.g., Foguang Shan [see Chandler, Chap. 7] and Fagu Shan) have
adopted his reformist notions since the late 1960s.27
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Catholicism, among other things, compelled Zhengyan to think of a lay orga-
nization as the way to save the lives of those too poor to receive medical treat-
ment. Two major events in 1966 led her to conceive of Compassion Relief in this
way. The first was the sight of blood on a hospital floor—the remnant of the mis-
carriage of an unconscious aboriginal woman who was refused admittance to the
hospital because her family lacked the deposit money. The second was a visit from
threemissionizingCatholic nuns, who criticized Buddhism for looking only to self-
fulfillment while ignoring the larger problems of society.28 Though she responded
to the criticism by arguing that Buddhists usually contribute anonymously, Zheng-
yan nevertheless began to contemplate the possibility of organizing the widespread
‘‘anonymous’’ Buddhists.29
Compassion Relief is therefore a creation that draws inspiration from the
religious pluralism in Taiwan. In his historical analysis, Li argued that Compassion
Relief is a religious transformation of postcolonialism. It resonates with Taiwan-
ese indigenous Buddhism, which barely survived the repression of Japanese colo-
nization and the coercion of the Chinese Nationalist regime, and incorporates
elements from foreign traditions—Japanese Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism, and
Catholicism, which experienced significant growth under the above two foreign
regimes. Li’s analysis grounds Compassion Relief in Taiwan’s history of Buddhism
and shows that it is not a mere reflection of Taiwan’s political history. Rather, it is
a new religion that organically combines elements of different religious traditions
and that is distinct from, and cannot be attributed to, any of its indigenous and
external sources alone.30
Yet Li does not explain why Compassion Relief ’s distinctive appeal received
such a tremendous response from women and why it did not achieve a massive fol-
lowing until the economic and political changes of late-1980s Taiwan. In spite of
its monastic leadership, Compassion Relief is essentially a lay movement. A com-
parison ofCompassionRelief women and the charitablewomen in the nineteenth-
century West shows the cross-cultural similarities between the two cases. It points
to the powerful, shared effects of modernity, the new opportunities women may
achieve from rapid structural change, and, in turn, the social ramifications brought
about by women’s activism. The equally important differences between Compas-
sion Relief and the Western case show that the significance of Compassion Relief
lies in its unique expression of Buddhism among people,31 in the emerging role of
women in the public sphere worldwide, and in the development of civic associa-
tions in post-martial law Taiwan.32
Compassion Relief is therefore significant in Taiwan’s historical context as
well as modernization. On the one hand, it cuts through the religious pluralism
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in Taiwan and reveals a dialogue between indigenous and external sources. On
the other hand, it opens a space in the public sphere for Buddhism among people,
for women’s activism, and for the formation of civil society in Taiwan. Moreover,
placing it in the larger context of the global arena, Weller points out that the par-
ticular timing of Compassion Relief ’s rapid growth also coincides with significant
change in the global context, especially in communications, including both the
media and transportation.33 The significance of Compassion Relief in the global
context lies in its breakthrough in manifesting the active role of religion—Bud-
dhism, in particular—in this era of movements. The following section will show
the two sides of Compassion Relief ’s global activism: one is to adopt a global vision
for its service-oriented mission resulting in international outreach programs; and
the other is to tap its overseas growth among the Chinese, especially Taiwanese,
diaspora leading to a mobilization of overseas Chinese that will center on Taiwan
as a new religious pilgrimage.
GLOBAL OUTREACH AND TRANSNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Concomitant to its rapid growth in Taiwan in the 1980s, by 1990 Compassion
Relief had broadened its vistas in the following three ways: dedication to inter-
national, as well as domestic, relief projects; the organization of worldwide bone-
marrow donation drives; and the development of overseas chapters. Both inter-
national relief and bone-marrow donation drives are usually initiated by the
headquarters in Taiwan, receiving support from overseas chapters through their
fund-raising publicity in host societies.
Four overarching motifs seem to emerge from Compassion Relief ’s global ef-
forts. One is the vision of a global community, in which peoples of different parts
of the world are seen to be possible prospects for becoming Compassion Relief
followers, who will then join together to build a better world through their collec-
tive good work. In Compassion Relief ’s words, ‘‘[We] invite all benevolent people
under heaven to the land of merit; with hearts pure, like ten-thousand lotus buds,
we will create a world of compassion relief (futian yifang yao tianxia shanshi, xinlian
wanrui zao ciji shijie).’’34
The second motif, especially for international relief projects and worldwide
bone-marrow donation drives, is based on the Buddhist notion of the universal
connection of, and empathy with, all the living, regardless of any mundane cate-
gory such as race, ethnicity, and nationality. In Compassion Relief ’s words, ‘‘Great
compassion for those who are known and unknown, boundless mercy for all beings
(wuyuan daci, tongti dabei).’’
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Overlapping with the first and second motif is the pursuit of ‘‘making be-
nevolent connections’’ with people around the world, especially the charity recipi-
ents of different races, ethnicities, and nationalities. This motif, akin to Master
Xingyun’s emphasis on links of affinity described by Chandler in this volume, is
highlighted by the priority of direct contacts in its practice of global outreach. It is
one of Compassion Relief ’s principles for international relief that it tries in every
possible way to deliver the relief directly, themselves, rather than through other
international or local organizations.
Finally, yet perhaps the most crucial motif, is the leader’s charismatic appeal.
The Venerable Zhengyan, like a lightning rod, finds herself at ‘‘ground zero’’ for
international projects, giving the personal push for the urgency of these missions.
‘‘When other people are hurt, I feel their pain; when other people suffer, I feel
their sorrow’’ (renshang wotong, renku wobei).35 Zhengyan embodies the suffering of
disaster victims, and in her spellbinding speech evokes the followers’ response. As
will also be shown in the third section, the Venerable Zhengyan’s personal appeal
has also played a crucial role in inspiring new converts to start proselytizing, which
later resulted in the founding of overseas branches.
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF
The first international relief that Compassion Relief delivered was to flood victims
in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the summer of 1991. In four months,
Compassion Relief raised more than NT$400 million (approximately US$13 mil-
lion).36 Zhengyan set up the principles for all their international relief efforts with
this first project: on-site investigation and delivery without delegating to or going
through mediating organizations or institutions, so as to ‘‘make benevolent con-
nections’’ (jie shan yuan) with the victims; giving priority to the most seriously af-
fected locations; and respect for local people and culture by not discriminating
among recipients.37 Zhengyan later added another three principles: no wastage of
contributions, timely delivery, and gratitude expressed to the victims for the op-
portunity to help.38
From the Taiwanese perspective, the issues involved in relief to the PRC and
other countries are different. The relief to the PRC is more frequent than to other
countries, and Compassion Relief literature presents their PRC project distinct
from other overseas outreach projects. For example, by 1998 Compassion Relief
had delivered relief to major disasters in the PRC at least once a year, building
houses, schools, and elders’ nursing homes. These are inscribed with the name of
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Compassion Relief. The result has impressed people in the PRC,39 although it does
not translate into influences on the government’s religious policy.40
In addition to the PRC, since 1992 Compassion Relief has provided aid to
the victims of natural disasters and warfare and other artificial disasters in over
thirty countries.41
Bone-marrow donations
In order to embody the bodhisattva’s ideal of ‘‘giving one’s head, eyes, marrow, and
brain for the benefit of others,’’ Compassion Relief has also channeled its organi-
zational, medical, and manpower resources into bone-marrow donation projects.
In response to a request by the Taiwan government’s Department of Health,
Compassion Relief founded its Marrow Donor Registry in October 1993. To com-
bat a common misunderstanding of alleged ill effects on marrow donors, Compas-
sion Relief followers held promotional events and gave blood tests across Taiwan.
The drive collected data on over 140,000 volunteer donors between 1993 and 1997
and increased the number to 242,039 in 2003. The registry is currently the largest
databank in Asia and the third largest in the world. Compassion Relief has helped
to carry out 559 cases of non-relative transplants. Among these cases, there were
over three hundred international donations to countries such as theUnited States,
Australia, Japan, and Germany.42 Likewise, almost every overseas branch has held
promotions and marrow donation drives in their local community.
Overseas branches
The first overseas branch, Compassion Relief Foundation–USA (Fojiao Ciji Jijin-
hui Meiguo Fenhui), obtained legal status in California in 1985 and was formally
founded at the turn of 1990 in conjunction with the opening of its chapter house,
the Still Thoughts Hall, named after Zhengyan’s monastery, the Still Thoughts
Abode. In the ensuing ten years, Compassion Relief devotees in other countries
opened their own branches. Among the over one hundred countries where there
are Compassion Relief members, twenty-eight had formed local chapters by Janu-
ary 2000 (see Table 8.1).
Most chapters have only one congregation in the country, but the scale of
local development varies considerably. Local membership ranges from less than
a hundred to several tens of thousands. Compassion Relief–USA is the largest
branch and had fifty offices in 2003. As of the year 2000, it had 50,000 of the total
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of 90,000 overseas members, and nearly 400 commissioners among the overseas
total of 552.
All Compassion Relief branches are located in the major cities of their host
countries. According to Huang Sixian, the head of the Department of Religion as
well as one of the highest lay representatives of Compassion Relief, participants
in all the branches consist primarily of overseas Taiwanese, secondarily of over-
seas Chinese. Compassion Relief does not, at any rate, prevent non-Chinese from
joining. Rather, as I try to make it clear throughout this chapter, especially later
in this section, Compassion Relief makes efforts to go beyond ethnic boundaries.
However, there are hardly any non-Chinese among Compassion Relief overseas
followers. During our interview in 2000,Huang Sixian listed three exceptions. The
coordinator of the Orlando chapter is a Caucasian; but his wife is Taiwanese, and
he himself also speaks Chinese. One of the volunteer doctors in the Phoenix chap-
ter is a Caucasian; but this does not necessarily mean that he is a Buddhist or a
Compassion Relief follower. And one Caucasian volunteer in the Hawai‘i chapter,
a hospital administrator by profession, has been a Compassion Relief devotee to
the extent that he proselytizes for the organization and received his Compassion
Relief commissioner title in 2000. Recently, Compassion Relief Monthly devoted
two pages to a profile of a Christian Zulu woman of Compassion Relief–Durban,
South Africa. She was a Compassion Relief charity recipient for seven years and
in 2002 became an active Compassion Relief volunteer, wearing the uniform and
delivering speeches about her experience of Compassion Relief as well as her pil-
grimage to the headquarters in Taiwan.43 The same literature also reports that four
hundred out of the fourteen thousand Zulu trainees at the Compassion Relief–
Durban career center have begun to participate as volunteers in the local branch’s
AIDS relief programs.44 The special attention given to these exemplars suggests
that they are still somewhat exceptional. Themajority of Compassion Relief devo-
tees worldwide are Chinese or, more specifically, Han Chinese according to my
fieldwork up to 2000 and my research so far.
Ideally, all overseas branches work toward the model of the headquarters,
that is, the ‘‘Four Great Missions’’ plus the four ‘‘footprints.’’ In practice, the scope
of the overseas branches varies and may be generally divided into three levels:
basic, intermediate, and the most active. The interplay between participants’ Chi-
nese ethnicity and their practice varies at each level. Practice in the least active
level consists of the initiates’ proselytizing efforts, volunteering at local social ser-
vice institutions and/or hospitals, and providing emergency help to Taiwanese and
Chinese immigrants and travelers. There is significant overlap in Compassion Re-
lief overseas branches at the basic level between ethnic boundaries and the scope
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of practice; they function pretty much as ad hoc ethnic associations based on a
shared belief in the Compassion Relief path of Buddhism.
At the intermediate level, services extend beyond ethnic boundaries, even
while there is increasing attention to shared cultural heritage. A chapter at this
level has a regular schedule of recruitment meetings, with teas and vegetarian buf-
fets, specific volunteer services, intragroup activities, and special events such as
bone-marrow drives, free on-site clinics, fund-raising for the headquarters’ interna-
tional relief projects and for local projects. Regular volunteer services reach out to
the local community and include visits to local institutions (e.g., seniors’ houses),
support for other charitable organizations (e.g., homeless shelters), street clean-
ing, and a system for the provision of care to individual charity recipients. Intra-
group activities include regular weekend (usually Sunday) scripture chanting and
meetings on the branch’s affairs; a study group on the Venerable Zhengyan’s teach-
ings; retreats; and community activities such as chorus, sign language (Chinese)
for the deaf, and Chinese (Mandarin) language classes for the locally born second
generation. Branches at the intermediate level also have chapters of the Compas-
sion Relief Youth Corps among Taiwanese students at local colleges. The corps
functions as an auxiliary to local chapters. In sum, intermediate-level branches
are ethnic Buddhist associations that reach out to the wider community across
ethnic boundaries while creating social ties and establishing secondary socializa-
tion among participants based on a shared cultural heritage.
Branches at the most active level tend to institutionalize their efforts both
in reaching out to a variety of ethnicities and in preserving the Chinese cultural
heritage. On the one hand, large branches take further steps toward transcend-
ing ethnic boundaries. They not only establish medical institutions and charitable
systems for serving the local poor of all ethnicities, but also initiate the delivery
of disaster relief to neighboring countries. For example, Compassion Relief–USA
runs a free clinic in Alhambra, California, which provides most of its services to
local Hispanic communities. At the same time, Compassion Relief–USA provides
substantial relief to Mexico and other countries in Latin America, whereas Com-
passion Relief–Australia and Malaysia play leading roles in relief to countries in
Southeast Asia.
On the other hand, large branches establish secondary socialization institu-
tions that preserve Chinese cultural heritage and spread Compassion Relief teach-
ings. These institutions consist of Chinese schools for second-generation immi-
grants and the Youth Corps for Taiwanese college students. Large branches in
Western societies—the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—have
founded seventeen ‘‘CompassionReliefHumanities Schools’’ (ciji renwen xuexiao)45
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and currently have a total of over two thousand pupils, whose parents do not
necessarily participate in Compassion Relief. Every weekend, youngsters up to
the twelfth grade learn Chinese characters through the official textbooks of the
Taiwan-based Committee for Overseas Chinese Affairs, as well as the Venerable
Zhengyan’s ‘‘Still Thoughts’’ teachings, using the pedagogical methods formulated
by the Compassion Relief Teachers’ Association in Taiwan.
The Compassion Relief Youth Corps is important to the education mission,
for it brings students outside of Compassion Relief institutions into contact with
the Venerable Zhengyan’s teachings. The Compassion Relief Youth Corps of some
chapters in the United States (e.g., Berkeley and Boston) have their own separate
pages on the Compassion Relief web site, and also organize activities and function
as a distinct group in cooperation with local Compassion Relief followers. In com-
parison, the Compassion Relief Youth Corps of Malacca, consisting of local-born
Chinese rather than Taiwanese college students, has become the branch’s focal
source of mobilization.
In addition to the obvious importance of socializing the younger generation
to Compassion Relief values and practices, the Chinese schools and youth corps
are felt to be important because of their potential for bringing Compassion Relief
to people who do not have a Chinese ethnic background. When asked if Compas-
sion Relief has a particular plan to draw in non-Chinese, Mr. Huang immediately
replied: ‘‘Compassion Relief youth are our future, because they study [abroad] and
have their cross-ethnic social connections. When they are out of school and start
working, they may draw in their classmates, colleagues, and friends.’’
Meanwhile, Compassion Relief is not waiting for the future to come with
the next generation. Recently it has significantly increased its use of a variety of
languages and the media. In addition to holding special meetings completely in
English for local non-Chinese,46 it has been distributing an English quarterly since
1993 and including English pages in its monthly newsletter, along with publishing
a series of English translations of the Zhengyan’s teachings and children’s books.
In addition, it has been publishing a monthly journal in Japanese since 1997. A
Compassion Relief web page, in both Chinese (traditional and simplified) and En-
glish, not only covers its daily news and each branch’s profile around the world,
but also airs the programs of its Taiwan-based TV channel. English subtitles have
been added to each of the Venerable Zhengyan’s televised sermons since 2000.
While extending communication beyond the Chinese language and excel-
ling in the use of global media, Compassion Relief has been knitting together
its dispersed congregations into a transnational system since 1995. Every Janu-
ary, core members from North and South America and Southeast Asia participate
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in a ‘‘Compassion Relief Spirit’’ retreat in Houston, Texas. In addition to hori-
zontal ties between branches, the headquarters maintains direct ties to overseas
branches. On the one hand, Huang Sixian, sometimes accompanied by one or two
of Zhengyan’s disciples, represents the headquarters and presides at every impor-
tant ceremony of each major branch, such as the end-of-the-year thanksgiving
party. On the other hand, overseas members (including mainland Chinese) visit
the headquarters as part of the ‘‘homecoming’’ ceremonies.Moreover, overseas fol-
lowers take individual trips to the headquarters in the name of ‘‘finding one’s roots’’
(xungen), often obtaining a special audience with the Venerable Zhengyan and
priority in the long waiting line for volunteer opportunities at the Compassion Re-
lief hospital in Hualian. In addition to these occasional individual links to their
religious ‘‘roots,’’ every year representatives of each branch join in a retreat in con-
junctionwith the anniversary ceremony at the headquarters; the headquarters also
has vacation camps exclusively for the overseas youth and followers’ school-age
children. A system of transnational itineraries centering on Taiwan has therefore
emerged in Compassion Relief worldwide.
In sum, Compassion Relief ’s overseas development is an ongoing process of
transforming an ethnic religious association into both localized community ser-
vice and an international nongovernmental organization not limited by ethnic
boundaries. At the same time, the linkage among Compassion Relief congrega-
tions has created not only itineraries bringing dispersed overseas Taiwanese, as well
as Chinese, under the ‘‘sacred canopy’’ of Compassion Relief Buddhism,47 but has
also strengthened ties to Taiwan as a pilgrimage center for overseas Chinese. To
some extent, like Foguang Shan (see Chap. 7), Compassion Relief has created a
new ‘‘homeland’’ of religious identity in Taiwan in lieu of the traditional cultural
homeland inmainlandChina. It is in this sense that Compassion Relief worldwide
development can be seen as a compassion relief diaspora.48
RELIGIOUS TRANSNATIONALISM
A good example of how Compassion Relief emphasizes global development was
the ceremony for its thirty-third anniversary, held in May 1999. One week prior
to the anniversary ceremony, seven hundred representatives of various overseas
branches arrived at the headquarters and joined an additional three hundred
local followers to begin the core members’ training retreat being held at the Still
Thoughts Memorial Hall. The retreat consisted of various programs, including
speeches delivered by, and questions and answers with, the Venerable Zhengyan
and lay leaders of each of the Compassion Relief missions, intensive small group
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discussions, and a celebration concert of performances presented by each branch.
The corridors to the auditorium in the Still Thoughts Hall were converted into a
photo gallery for a ‘‘global tour’’ of overseas branches. Several hundred additional
overseas core members arrived on the day of the anniversary ceremony, for the
event and a retreat over the following week.
The televised anniversary ceremony in the evening of Sunday, May 9, 1999,
began with overseas followers entering the auditorium via the central aisle. All
were dressed in the Compassion Relief volunteer uniform of blue polo shirts and
white pants, with the first one of each national branch holding the flag of their
host country. Each branch sat in a column, with the branch leader in the second
row, holding the flag. Meanwhile, the local followers entered the hall through the
rear corridors and sat in the balconies. When the second row formed an array of
flags and the hall was filledwith blue-and-white uniforms, about fortymonastic dis-
ciples of the Venerable Zhengyan entered by the central aisle in two columns and
sat down in the first row.49 The Venerable Zhengyan entered by the central aisle,
followed by two columns of male corps in uniform suits, each holding a lighted
candle. Zhengyan sat among her disciples. The emcee called for all to rise, face the
stage, and bow three times (san wenxun) to the Buddha. The stage backdrop was
a six-story-high portrait of Shakyamuni Buddha compassionately looking at, and
laying his hand above, the globe. A ten-foot-high panel of the world map stood
in front of the backdrop on the stage.
The program included the three essential parts of all Compassion Relief
rituals: sign-language song performance, a sermon by the Venerable Zhengyan,
and candle lighting. Sign-language song preceded the sermon. When the sermon
ended, with the lights out, representatives (mostly women) of each branch slowly
came to the stage, each holding a candle and her/his respective national flag. They
formed a row and fell on their knees at the Venerable Zhengyan’s feet. Zhengyan
lit each representative’s candle. One by one, each representative approached the
world map panel, placed the candle and the flag below the map in a row, turned
on one sparkling light on the map to indicate the location of her/his branch’s host
country, bowed to Zhengyan, and exited the stage. One after one followed, until
the world map shone with sparkling lights of all the Compassion Relief overseas
branches.
This anniversary ceremony symbolizes Compassion Relief ’s perception of its
future as a global Buddhist movement. The vision is portrayed in the grand back-
drop of Shakyamuni Buddha overlooking the globe. The ritual of candles and lights
on the world map embodies how this vision will be realized: the lay followers who
approach the Venerable Zhengyan for teaching shall carry those teachings to the
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world. Clearly, overseas followers are central to the Compassion Relief future. Yet,
these central carriers of Compassion Relief ’s future, as present at the anniversary
ceremony and the Compassion Relief official description, are primarily Taiwanese
and secondarily Chinese. Why are overseas Chinese so interested in Compassion
Relief Buddhism? How may such an ethnic constituency contribute to the glob-
alization of Buddhism?
Based on my ethnographic research of Compassion Relief overseas branches
in New York, Boston, Tokyo, and Malacca,50 and supplemented with Compassion
Relief literature, the four case studies share the following aspects. First, overseas
Compassion Relief is a rather recent phenomenon. Its first branch in the United
States began in 1989 and all the four mentioned above were not founded until the
1990s. Second, Compassion Relief overseas development, at least from the four
cases, stemmed from the support of overseas Taiwanese andChinese from societies
other than Taiwan (e.g., Compassion Relief–Malacca consisted mainly of locally
born Chinese; and Compassion Relief–Boston began with the support of Chinese
immigrants from Vietnam), and the participants in overseas Compassion Relief
have so far remained within this ethnic group. Third, they have always extended
charity beyond ethnic Chinese. Fourth, the founders were already pious Buddhists
prior to taking up Compassion Relief practice. Fifth, all the four cases began with
women’s efforts in response to the appeals of the Venerable Zhengyan’s charisma
and her emphasis on social service. Women continue to play an active role in
overseas Compassion Relief. No overseas branch is created, led, or staffed by Com-
passion Relief monastic disciples. Women’s pivotal role in the organization’s de-
velopment is similar to that in the Japan-originated, grassroots lay Buddhist orga-
nization Soka Gakkai (see Clarke and Learman, Chap. 5 and Introduction, for a
comparison between the two cases).
Compassion Relief overseas development not only reveals but also contrib-
utes to change in the associations of overseas Chinese. First, its significance for
Chinese transnationalism lies in its contribution to the role of Buddhist women in
overseas Chinese formal organizations, in which, until recently, women have been
underrepresented.51 Compared to charitable women’s groups such as the ‘‘redemp-
tive’’ societies and ‘‘salvationist’’ halls among overseas Chinese in the first half of
the twentieth century, overseas Compassion Relief has distinctive formal Buddhist
identity and enjoys international prestige, whereas the predecessors were primarily
charitable and spiritual, and were often deemed inferior to Buddhism by the intel-
lectuals because of their image as ‘‘women’s religions.’’52 The fact that all four cases
discussed here began with women’s efforts confirms the fact that Chinese women
are not socially inept but have the informal ties that enable mobilization for civic
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associations.53 Moreover, women’s initiatives in their host societies are a direct re-
sponse to Compassion Relief ’s appeal for Buddhists to contribute to this world
through secular action: in each of the four cases we see women taking action—
proselytizing and finding a local niche for Compassion Relief practice—immedi-
ately after being exposed to Zhengyan’s appeal.Although the formal establishment
often was brought about by a push from other than the pioneer women, the for-
mation of each branch would have been unlikely without the women’s enthusiasm
and early mobilization outside their homeland. Like their sisters in Taiwan, who
in the last three decades have developed a small local group into an island-wide
movement,54 overseas Chinese womenwere the carriers for the ongoing worldwide
growth of Compassion Relief Buddhism.
The second significance of Compassion Relief in the context of Chinese
transnationalism lies in its contribution to the emerging study of Taiwanese im-
migrants and Taiwan. Taiwanese immigrants in each host society have been in-
dispensable in the formation of local Compassion Relief branches. The four cases
either received their first Compassion Relief information from Taiwanese immi-
grants or were founded by Taiwanese. Indeed, the timing of Compassion Relief
overseas development is not only linked to its headquarters’ growth on a massive
scale in Taiwan but is also grounded in the phenomenon of Taiwanese emigration
during the period of the 1990s. According to the Ministry of the Interior, from
1990 to 1996, the number of emigrants from Taiwan increased more than four-
fold, from 25.5 thousand to 119.1 thousand. As Wang points out, the majority of
emigrants consisted of ‘‘middle-class businesspersons, investors, and professionals,’’
and ‘‘no matter where they settle, a majority of them continue to be integral mem-
bers of the society from which they originated.’’55
The spread of Compassion Relief during the Chinese and especially Taiwan-
ese diaspora demonstrates the interplay between Chinese transnationalism and
Buddhism. On the one hand, increasing Taiwanese transnationalism—in terms of
number of people and intensity of mobility—provides the resources for the over-
seas development of a Taiwan-based Buddhist organization. On the other hand,
the differential appeal of a Buddhist nun’s charisma and her mission of social ser-
vice to overseas Taiwanese reveals a changing aspect of the Chinese diaspora:
overseas Chinese from Taiwan, rather than the PRC or the host society, are dem-
onstrating their influence in their local communities, both in the associative life
among Chinese communities and in the contributions that reach beyond eth-
nicity.
Moreover, transnational as they can be, the emerging pilgrimage route be-
tweenCompassionRelief overseas followers and the headquarters more or less pro-
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motes Taiwan as a new ‘‘homeland’’ of religious identity for the Chinese diaspora.
In contrast to other Taiwanese transnational Buddhist organizations, Compassion
Relief overseas adherents focus on Taiwan as embodying an idea of ‘‘home’’ by first
identifying with its Buddhist charismatic center, rather than as a ‘‘bridge to cul-
tural heritage’’ as in the case of Foguang Shan (see Chandler, Chap. 7). Whether
overseas Chinese, defined as ‘‘Chinese not residing in China,’’ ever constituted
what Maurice Freedman calls ‘‘a residual China,’’ or, as Nonini and Ong rephrase
it, ‘‘an imperfect replication’’ of ‘‘real ‘Chinese culture’ in China,’’56 overseas Com-
passion Relief reveals not only the diversity of Chinese descendents living outside
any Chinese society, but also the Buddhist influence on the changing identities
among ‘‘the’’ overseas Chinese. In the context of Chinese transnationalism, the
Compassion Relief diaspora therefore shows an alternative face of diasporan com-
munity among Chinese descendents in the global context.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have tried to describe and analyze the respects in which the Com-
passion Relief movement may be termed ‘‘global’’: first, the creation of the move-
ment was a synthesis of external and indigenous sources, and the timing of its rapid
domestic growthwas both brought about by intensive social change and by a break-
through in the interplay of women, religion, and civil society; and second, the
global vision of its mission was an adaptation to, and a manifestation of, the role of
religion in intensified global communications. The result of Compassion Relief ’s
global mission has been to put Buddhism on the world map of border crossings in
the fields of international relief and bone-marrow donation drives. Another out-
come of its global mission has been to organize and highlight the resources of the
Chinese, especially the Taiwanese, diaspora in such a way as to channel it into an
active religious movement that is universal in terms of its causes but particularis-
tic in terms of its ethnic constituency, as it focuses on Taiwan as a new religious
pilgrimage center for Chinese transnationalism.
Compassion Relief is international yet ethnically specific. The Compassion
Relief case shows (1) the importance of culture, in terms of both the unique con-
text of the movement’s origins and the salience of ethnic identity; and (2) the
power of world-affirming religious charisma. First, the trajectory of Compassion
Relief ’s development—from a grassroots women’s group to an island-wide mass
movement to an international nongovernmental organization—is closely related
to Taiwan’s cultural context. Taiwan is a postcolonial society that is culturally hy-
brid. It is also a newly developed and democratized society that has ample space
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for social change. And finally, it is, as an ambiguous nation-state, endowed with
wealth and a pool of transnational people. Second, inasmuch as Compassion Re-
lief ’s trajectory can be attributed to the cultural context of Taiwan, the fact that its
overseas development has drawn upon the Chinese-speaking people from societies
other than Taiwan suggests strongly that ethnicity is a salient cultural boundary.
Yet it is not enough to point out that Compassion Relief appeals to the Chinese
diaspora. The question remains: just why are overseas Chinese so interested in
Compassion Relief ’s particular path of Buddhism?
The answer perhaps lies in the power of the Venerable Zhengyan’s world-
affirming charisma: her personal appeal serves as a catalyst for a practice that em-
phasizes concrete contributions to human welfare; that appeal is unique in the
context of Chinese Buddhism yet is still embedded in the Buddhist canon of uni-
versal compassion. Her charisma has led overseas followers to take the initiative
to start local missions; and it has also moved people in Taiwan to contribute to
relief projects on the mainland despite cross-Strait political tensions. Yet, at the
same time, the fact that Compassion Relief ’s overseas development has hereto-
fore remained within the Chinese diaspora seems to suggest a limit to Zhengyan’s
transcultural appeal.57
Is it, then, precisely Compassion Relief ’s appeal to the Chinese diaspora that
limits its appeal to the Chinese people? Is its characteristic diaspora a result of
the Compassion Relief approach or of Chinese ethnicity? Or, is it a common issue
of ethnicity and religion in globalization? In some way, Compassion Relief ’s dis-
tinctive charismatic model of a practical approach to Buddhism appeals to the
Chinese diaspora and, as it turns out, characterizes its global development within
that diaspora. In the Introduction to this volume, Learman suggests that Com-
passion Relief ’s social-service approach is perhaps too familiar or too secular to
appeal to Western people, and Chandler (Chap. 7) indicates that the lack of over-
seas temples and monastics has resulted in the overseas Compassion Relief ’s low
profile outside of Chinese communities. These are explanations from the ‘‘native
point of view.’’ Yet, in some way, the attribute of Chinese constituency shared by
CompassionRelief ’s and Foguang Shan’s global development seems to suggest that
religious diaspora may be in tension with religious ecumenism. The fact is, de-
spite their different emphases, Compassion Relief and Foguang Shan both show a
strong commitment to transcending ethnic, racial, national, and cultural bound-
aries; and, at the same time, both have heretofore succeeded in being global mainly
by means of developing within the Chinese diaspora. Such tension may not be
intrinsically Chinese, but an issue of negotiation between the mobilization of par-
ticularistic resources and the pursuit of universalistic spirit—a problem that has
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been broached in studies of religion and globalization.58 Further research should
explore the complex interplay between ethnicity and ideals of universality in the
shared circumstances of change in the global context.59
Notes
I am grateful to all the Compassion Relief followers and staff, especially Mr. Huang Sixian
and the coordinators and core members of the four branches where I conducted field re-
search, in New York, Boston, Japan, and Malaysia. I also thank Robert P. Weller, Charles
Lindholm,ChristopherQueen, PeterGregory, StuartChandler, and PalNyiri for their com-
ments. Linda Learman read different versions of this essay in detail. I am very grateful for
her insightful suggestions and helpful editing. I have also benefited from the suggestions of
the two anonymous readers at the University of Hawai‘i Press. All shortcomings are mine.
1. According to Compassion Relief literature, the Philippine Magsaysay Award is ‘‘the
Asian Nobel Peace Prize.’’
2. Barry Corbin, John Trites, and James Taylor, Global Connections: Geography for the 21st
Century (Don Mills, Ont., Canada: Oxford University Press, 1999), 408.
3. Business Week, July 24, 2000, 72.
4. I thank the first anonymous reader for his or her helpful suggestion for clarifying this
point.
5. VivienneWee andGloriaDavies, ‘‘Religion,’’ inTheEncyclopedia of theChineseOverseas,
ed. Lynn Pan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 80.
6. Ibid., 82.
7. This distinctive Buddhist identity distinguishes Compassion Relief from the Buddhism-
inspired charitable associations among overseas Chinese in the first half of the twenti-
eth century; see Prasenjit Duara, ‘‘Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty:
China, 1900–1945,’’ American Historical Review 102, no. 4 (1997): 1030–1051, and Maurice
Freedman and Marjorie Topley, ‘‘Religion and Social Realignment among the Chinese in
Singapore,’’ Journal of Asian Studies 21, no. 1 (1961): 3–23.
8. This term originally appeared in John Lofland and Rodney Stark, ‘‘Becoming a World-
Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective,’’ American Sociological Review,
no. 30 (1965): 862–875. I borrow it to refer to a committed member who not only con-
tributes significantly but also draws others in. However, I do not share Lofland and Stark’s
view on religious cults as ‘‘deviant.’’ Their original ‘‘deviant’’ connotation is later modified
in Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, A Theory of Religion (New York: Peter Lang,
1987).
9. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in
the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1967 [1966]), 158.
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10. For a detailed introduction to Compassion Relief, see Chien-yu Julia Huang and Robert
P.Weller, ‘‘Merit andMothering:Women and SocialWelfare in Taiwanese Buddhism,’’ Jour-
nal of Asian Studies 57, no. 2 (1998): 379–396.
11. Himalaya Foundation, Directory of 300 Major Foundations in Taiwan (Taipei: Himalaya
Foundation, 2002), 28.
12. Fa literally means ‘‘law.’’ In Buddhism, fa means ‘‘Dharma,’’ Buddha’s truth.
13. Himalaya Foundation, Directory, 28. The endowment decreased from NT$18.6 billion
(approximately US$0.6 billion) in 1997 (Himalaya Foundation, Jijinghui zai Taiwan [Foun-
dations in Taiwan]) (Taipei: Zhonghua Zhengxin She, 1997), 10.
14. Himalaya Foundation, Directory, 28.
15. Compassion Relief has a total of eight missions. It has long claimed its goal to be the
original ‘‘Four Great Missions.’’ More recently, particularly in the 1990s, Compassion Relief
developed four additional missions—international relief, bone-marrow drives, community
service, and garbage recycling—which, together with the original four, make the ‘‘Eight
Footprints.’’
16. A weiyuan is a devoted follower and volunteer who has recruited forty or more house-
holds and has vowed to abide by the Compassion Relief spirit and Buddhist disciplines,
and to devote her- or himself to all Compassion Relief missions. Compassion Relief English
literature uses ‘‘commissioner’’ as the translation of weiyuan.
17. ‘‘For Buddhism and for all the living’’ (wei fojiao wei zhongsheng). This was the maxim
Zhengyan received upon her ordination from the Venerable Yinshun.
18. Quoted in Li Dingzan, ‘‘Zongjiao yu zhimin: taiwan fojiao de bianqian yu zhuanxing, 1895–
1995’’ [Religion and colonial discourse: The historical transformation of Buddhism in Tai-
wan, 1895–1995], Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, no. 81 (1996): 43.
19. Li, ‘‘Zongjiao yu zhimin.’’
20. Huang and Weller, ‘‘Merit and Mothering,’’ 381. Compassion Relief literature empha-
sizes that her change of diet is an act of filial piety rather than a result of Buddhist teaching,
see Chen Huijian, Zhengyan fashi de Ciji shijie [The Venerable Zhengyan’s world of Com-
passion Relief ] (Taipei: Ciji Wenhua Zhiye Zhongxin, 1993 [1983]), 6.
21. Chen, Zhengyan, 10–11.
22. CompassionRelief Foundation, Let TenThousand Lotuses of Heart Blossom in ThisWorld:
Dharma Master Cheng Yen [Zhengyan] and the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi [Ciji] Foun-
dation (Taipei: Fojiao Ciji Jijin Hui, 1994), 5.
23. Chen, Zhengyan, 11–20.
24. Li, ‘‘Zongjiao yu zhimin,’’ 37.
25. The Venerable Yinshun developed his notion of Buddhism of the Human Realm from
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the Venerable Taixu’s notion of the ‘‘Buddhism of Human Life’’ (C: rensheng fojiao). For a
comparison between Yinshun’s and Taixu’s thoughts, see Yang Huinan, Dangdai fojiao si-
xiang zhanwang [A survey of modern Buddhist thought] (Taipei: Dongda Tushu Gongsi,
1991), 109–125. Most of Yang’s argument is elaborated in Charles Brewer Jones, Buddhism
in Taiwan: Religion and the State 1660–1990 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999),
133–135. I use Buddhism of the Human Realm instead of Humanistic Buddhism as the
translation of renjian de fojiao because it is more faithful to Yinshun’s original phrase. Yin-
shun explicates his notion in relation to Taixu’s that ‘‘the true Buddhism is of the human
realm. . . . we should inherit the true meaning of ‘Buddhism of Human Life’ to manifest
the Buddhism of the human realm’’ [C: zhenzheng de fojiao, shi renjian de. . . . women ying
jicheng ‘rensheng fojiao’ de zhenyi, lai fayang renjian de fojiao] (quoted in Yang, A Survey, 113,
my translation).
26. See Yang Huinan, ‘‘Taiwan fojiao de chushi xingge yu paixi douzheng’’ [The characteristics
of other worldly and the factional conflict in Buddhism in Taiwan], Dangdai, no. 31 (1988):
68–81; and Jones, Buddhism in Taiwan, 131–133.
27. For the linkage of Foguang Shan and Compassion Relief to Yinshun’s Buddhism of the
Human Realm, and hence to Taixu’s Buddhism of Human Life, see Jones, Buddhism in Tai-
wan, 205; and Lu Hwei-syin, ‘‘Fojiao ciji gongde hui ‘feisimiao zhongxin’ de xiandai fojiao texing’’
[The Buddhist Compassion Relief Society’s ‘non-temple-centered’ approach and its char-
acteristics of modern Buddhism], in Simiao yu minjian wenhua yantaohui lunwenji [Proceed-
ings of the Conference on Temples and Popular Culture] (Taipei: Committee of the De-
velopment of Culture, Executive Yuan, Taiwan Government, 1995), 745–746. I agree with
Lu’s point in her explication of the Venerable Zhengyan’s approach that it takes a step fur-
ther from her predecessors in emphasizing social actions or the practice of Dharma among
people.
28. Huang and Weller, ‘‘Merit and Mothering,’’ 382.
29. Interview with a Zhengyan’s monastic disciple in 1998.
30. Li, ‘‘Zongjiao yu zhimin.’’
31. I use ‘‘Buddhism among people’’ here to convey to English readers Zhengyan’s empha-
sis on social practice—a practice that distinguishes her approach from that of Yinshun and
Taixu; see Lu, ‘‘The Compassion Relief Society,’’ 745–746.
32. Huang and Weller, ‘‘Merit and Mothering,’’ 392–395.
33. Robert P. Weller, ‘‘Living at the Edge: Religion, Capitalism, and the End of the Nation-
State in Taiwan,’’ Public Culture 12, no. 2 (2000): 496.
34. Linda Learman helped me with this translation, and I thank her for it.
35. I am grateful to Linda Learman for pointing out to me the charismatic nature of this
appeal. Although the first-person pronoun wo can be singular for ‘‘I’’ and plural for ‘‘we,’’
ethnographic data show that Zhengyan’s personal appeal was crucial toCompassionRelief ’s
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successful mobilization for its mission. For a detailed analysis of Zhengyan’s charisma, see
chapter 2 in Chien-yu Julia Huang, ‘‘Recapturing Charisma: Emotion and Rationalization
in a Globalizing Buddhist Movement from Taiwan’’ (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 2001).
36. Duanzheng Wang, ed., Zainan, wuyian de dengdai: Ciji Jijinhui dalu jiuyuan jianjie [Dis-
asters, waiting in silence: Introduction to relief to China, the Compassion Relief Founda-
tion] (Taipei: Fojiao Ciji Jijin Hui, 1998), 6. Although the first relief outside Taiwan that
Compassion Relief supported was to the flood victims in Bangladesh a few months before
the need in the PRC, its role was limited to fund-raising for theRedCross to deliver the relief
to Bangladesh; see Gan Shanjun, in Ciji Nianjian 1966–1992 [Compassion Relief yearbook
1966–1992], ed. Shi Zhengyan (Taipei: Ciji Wenhua Chuban She, 1993), 397. The relief
to the PRC was the first ‘‘overseas’’ relief work that Compassion Relief initiated, funded,
and delivered. Compassion Relief publications often refer to the delivery to the PRC as the
‘‘beginning of [its] international relief work’’; see The Compassion Relief Foundation, Love
Transcends Borders (Hualian, Taiwan: Fojiao Ciji Jijin Hui, 2000 [1999]), 12.
37. Douglas Shaw, ed., Lotus Flower of the Heart: Thirty Years of Tzu Chi Photographs (Taipei:
Jinxsi Wenhua Zhiye, 1997), 25.
38. Duanzheng Wang, ed., Da’ai wuyuan fojie: Ciji jijinhui guoji jiuyuan jianjie [Boundless
great love: Introduction to international relief, the Compassion Relief Foundation] (Taipei:
Fojiao Ciji Jijin Hui, 1998), 2–4.
39. C. Julia Huang, ‘‘Sacred or Profane? The Compassion Relief Movement’s Transnation-
alism,’’ European Journal of East Asian Studies 2, no. 2 (2003): 217–241.
40. André Laliberté, ‘‘ ‘Love Transcends Border’ or ‘Blood Is Thicker than Water’? The
Charity Work of the Compassion Relief in the People’s Republic of China,’’ European Jour-
nal of East Asian Studies 2, no. 2 (2003): 243–261.
41. These include, in chronological order: Mongolia, Nepal, the refugee camps in northern
Thailand, Cambodia, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Ivory Coast, Afghanistan,
Lesotho, Swaziland, SouthAfrica,NorthKorea, Liberia,Gambia, the Philippines,Vietnam,
Peru, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, El Salva-
dor, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Colombia, the Kosovo refugees in Albania, earthquake victims
in Turkey, and Venezuela; see Wang, ‘‘Boundless Great Love,’’ and The Compassion Relief
Foundation, Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi [Ciji] Foundation (Taipei: Fojiao Ciji Jijin
Hui, 1999).
42. http://www2.tzuchi.org.tw/ focus/index.html, accessed on August 24, 2003; Duanzheng
Wang, ed., Ciji ninajian 1998 [Compassion Relief yearbook 1998] (Taipei: Ciji Wenhua,
1999), 510.
43. Ou Junping, ‘‘Diyiwei feizhouyi ciji zhigong: geleidisi’’ [The first African Compassion Relief
volunteer: Gladys], Ciji yuekan [Compassion Relief Monthly], no. 435 (2003): 22–23.
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44. Ou Junping, ‘‘Xuehui ziligengsheng, ye xuehui ai’’ [Learning to be independent and to love],
Ciji yuekan [Compassion Relief monthly], no. 435 (2003): 20.
45. This term highlights the fact that its curriculum goes beyond that of a language-learning
institute.
46. For example, in December 1998 the Canada branch held a meeting to introduce Com-
passion Relief to English speakers. Audiences were staff of the institutions where Compas-
sion Relief followers regularly volunteer (e.g., a children’s hospital, an AIDS association,
and a seniors’ house); see Duangzheng Wang, ed., Ciji Nianjian 1998.
47. Peter L. Berger’s term.
48. Cf. Steven Vertovec, The Hindu Diaspora: Comparative Pattern (London: Routledge,
2000), 3.
49. As of 1999, the Venerable Zhengyan had about eighty disciples, all women. The number
has increased to around two hundred in 2003.
50. I participated in the New York branch in the spring of 1992, conducted major fieldwork
in the Boston branch between 1996 and 1997, and did follow-up research in 1999. I visited
the Japan branch in December 1997 and the two Malaysia branches in April 1999.
51. Edgar Wickberg, ‘‘Overseas Chinese Organizations,’’ in The Encyclopedia of the Chinese
Overseas, ed. Lynn Pan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 83–91.
52. For the ‘‘redemptive’’ societies, see Duara, ‘‘Transnationalism and the Predicament of
Sovereignty.’’ For the ‘‘salvationist’’ sects, see Freedman and Topley, ‘‘Religion and Social
Realignment among theChinese in Singapore’’; and for the inferior status of the salvationist
groups, ibid., 22.
53. Robert P. Weller, Alternate Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan (Boul-
der, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999).
54. Huang and Weller, ‘‘Merit and Mothering.’’
55. Horng-luen Wang, ‘‘In Want of a Nation: State, Institutions and Globalization in Tai-
wan’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1999), 214.
56. Donald Nonini and Aihwa Ong, ‘‘Introduction: Chinese Transnationalism as an Alter-
native Modernity,’’ in Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Trans-
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Uniting Religion and Politics in
a Bid for Autonomy: Lamas in
Exile in China and America
Gray Tuttle
An examination of the activities of Tibetan lamas in China in the early decades
of this century reveals the repetition of centuries-old traditions as well as innova-
tions associated with modernity. Most interesting for those who are familiar only
with the current interest in Tibetan Buddhism in America is the fact that many
of the strategies for propagating Buddhism to a non-Tibetan audience and seeking
support for an autonomous Tibetan polity have earlier antecedents. The spread of
Tibetan Buddhism in China, and later in the West, has been intimately linked to
the political status of exiled Tibetan lamas. For this reason, this chapter discusses
the connection between certain prominent Tibetan lamas’ search for political pa-
tronage and the Tibetan Buddhist mission. The host of other Tibetan Buddhists
with little interest or involvement in politics who helped to disseminate their reli-
gion in China and in America must unfortunately be neglected here. However, I
should add that, both in China and America, ethnic Tibetan and Mongol lamas
who focused more exclusively on teaching religion were important forerunners,
preparing the ground, so to speak, for the later political activities of the lamas who
are the subject of this chapter.
Viewing the activities of Tibetans in China in the early twentieth century
allows us to discern patterns that provide significant parallels to the current place
of Tibetan Buddhism in contemporary America. The assertion that these lamas
were merely the pawns of Chinese politicians is a commonplace, while few Ameri-
cans have a historically informed perspective on the current Dalai Lama’s relations
with theAmerican government. I contend that all of these lamas, past and present,
have exercised an agency that elevates their roles above that of pawns in some-
one else’s game. At the same time, I recognize the very real context of events (or,
in Buddhist terms, the nexus of causes and conditions) that serves to limit these
actors’ choices. Among the issues I will discuss are the enduring role of nation-
alism in prompting Tibetan ‘‘missions’’ abroad, the initial religious nature of such
missions, their gradual politicization, and finally a combination of religious and
political activities that has been a characteristic feature of Tibetan Buddhism for
centuries.1
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In the study of the cross-cultural transfer of Buddhism and globalization, the
Tibetan Buddhist example holds a special place. Even before the Mongol succes-
sors of Genghis Khan became patrons of Tibetan Buddhism from the Middle East
to China, this religion had been linked with prominent political leaders. The ori-
gins of some Tibetan Buddhists’ orientation toward patrons from outside Tibetan
regions date back to the time of the Western Xia state (1038–1227). Lamas from
a branch of the Kagyu school became spiritual preceptors to the ethnically Tangut
rulers of the Western Xia state and were still serving in this role when Genghis
Khan eliminated the state and the dynastic family to whom the Tibetan Buddhists
had been ministering. Within a few short decades, branches of the Kagyu school
and the Sakya school had all come under the sway and received the patronage of
various descendents of Genghis Khan.2This relationship—theGenghissid patron-
age of various Tibetan Buddhist religious schools and the claim on their associated
properties—led to a vast dispersal of Tibetan Buddhism over much of East Asia,
and even parts of the Middle East.
This first wave of Tibetan Buddhism’s ‘‘global’’ dispersal was less the result of
a mission undertaken by Tibetans than a requirement of their relationship with
the rulers of the Mongol empire. Qubilai Khan (1260–1294) must be given the
greatest credit for ensuring the enduring relationship between the Chinese em-
pire and Tibetan Buddhism. Through the relationship between Phagpa lama Lo
drö gyal tshan (1235–1280) and Qubilai Khan, a close bond between China and
Tibet and between the religious and political functions of Tibetan lamas in the
service of the state was established. Certain elements of this ‘‘contract’’ remained
prominent in Sino-Tibetan relations into the twentieth century, though there was
rarely direct continuity; these instances represent an enduring, rather than an un-
broken, tradition. In his Tibetan Nationalism: The Role of Patronage in the Accom-
plishment of a National Identity, Christiaan Klieger described this Tibetan tradition
as follows: ‘‘Tibetan culture provides a mechanism whereby forces and personnel
from the ‘outside’ can be utilized . . . to economically and ideologically support the
perceived continuation of Tibetan cultural patterns.’’3 Instead of focusing on the
reception of Tibetan Buddhism in China and America, as discussed by Richard
Payne (Chap. 4), I explore how certain lamas engaged with ‘‘outside’’ resources,
spreading their religion while simultaneously pursuing political goals.
On the one hand, disciples of Tibetan Buddhism in China and America
shared an interest in potent ritual activity and the prestige associated with being
the patron (and student) of prominent religious figures. On the other hand, teach-
ers shared the desire to propagate their religion and receive patronage. Elsewhere
I have explored why Tibetan Buddhism was so popular in the early twentieth cen-
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
2
2
1
o
f
2
5
6
212 • Gray Tuttle
tury among Chinese Buddhists, and also the link between Angarika Dharmapala
and Master Taixu (Tai Hsü). A key figure in supporting Tibetan Buddhism in
China, Taixu embraced the Tibetan tradition of uniting religious and secular con-
cerns. His brief education in a Buddhist mission school inspired by Dharmapala
is a thread that links several of these chapters together, as Taixu’s ‘‘this-worldly’’
reforms of Chinese Buddhism influenced both Foguang Shan’s Master Xingyun
and, through Master Yinshun, Ciji’s Master Zhengyan.4 In this essay, therefore, I
will focus on a scarcely explored connection between Tibetan Buddhist mission
activity and the political goals of exiled lamas. As these varied interests make obvi-
ous, a union of religious and secular matters was involved in forging the modern
relations between Tibetans and their Chinese and American disciples.
The Tibetan understanding of the proper relation between religion and poli-
tics can be traced back to the end of the Tibetan empire in the eighth century,
but was set in place most firmly in the time of ‘Phagpa and Qubilai. Far from a
conception of the separation of church and state, the Tibetan idea of the inex-
tricable connection between religion and politics (chos srid zung ‘grel) implies that
these are not two opposing fields of activity which are meant to be kept separate.
Rather, the linking of these two arenas is seen as perfectly appropriate in Tibet.
As the current Dalai Lama stated in his autobiography, ‘‘religion and politics do
mix.’’5
Tibetan society, since at least the time of the fifth Dalai Lama in the seven-
teenth century, had been accustomed to the notion of a joint religious and secular
rule.6 When the global wave of nationalism closed in on Tibet from British India
and Han China, the thirteenth Dalai Lama tried to centralize these two aspects
of leadership under his personal control more effectively than had any Tibetan
leader in the past. With his success in this endeavor, other lamas found their posi-
tions—which shared similar features of joint religious and political rule, but on a
local level—challenged. Unable to resist the Dalai Lama’s military and political
power, someTibetan Buddhist hierarchs fled toChina. AlthoughmodernChinese
may have shared some of the Western beliefs in the separation of the ‘‘church’’ and
state, Tibetan Buddhists certainly did not.
As discussed in Julia Huang’s essay (Chap. 8), globalization was largely a
product of the spread of nationalism. The appearance of first a British, then a Chi-
nese army bent on redefining the relations of power in the very heartland of Tibet
forced the Tibetans to take a more active role in the world of nations. The thir-
teenth Dalai Lama, Thub ten gya tsho (1876–1933), was able to elevate his role to
what is commonly perceived today to be an ideal model for Tibetan leadership: a
truly unified secular and religious head of state. His innovation was actually taking
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into his hands all the secular power that had so often been associated in principle
with religious leadership. By tightening his control over Tibet and modernizing,
as much as possible, the Tibetan administration, the Dalai Lama hoped to assert
Tibet’s independence. Nevertheless, his efforts to create a compact national ter-
ritory caused tensions in the larger Tibetan cultural world, parts of which did not
necessarily recognize the supreme authority of a central Tibetan government. Just
as Tibet had broken with China when the Chinese attempted to administer Tibet
directly, so the leaders of heretofore self-governing Tibetan regions resisted the
authority of the centralizing policies of the Tibetan government in Lhasa. Some
of these leaders turned to their enemy’s enemy, China, in order to counter these
efforts at nation building.
At least partially, the Chinese aggression toward Tibet throughout the twen-
tieth century has involved a similar contestation of power.Whereas the thirteenth
Dalai Lama felt that he should exercise dominion over all culturally Tibetan re-
gions, the Chinese believe that they have rightful dominion over all of the former
Qing frontier dependencies, which included Tibet. The real source of the Tibet-
ans’ current claim to independence is that the central Tibetans succeeded in driv-
ing out the Chinese forces at the end of the Qing dynasty. On the other hand,
the monastic polities that resisted the centralization of Tibet under the rule of the
thirteenth Dalai Lama were not successful in resisting central Tibetan aggression.
Therefore, they—like the current (fourteenth) Dalai Lama—were forced to seek
support outside of Tibet proper. The impetus of nationalism that drove the Tibet-
ans to consolidate a Tibetan nation in the first half of this century is not entirely
different from the forces of nationalism that impelled the Chinese to exert control
over Tibet in the second half of the century. In both cases, smaller polities, which
wished to be separate and independent (but were not recognized as such by the
international community), were forcibly incorporated into a larger community on
the basis of nationalistic motivations.
Within a decade of his return from exile, the thirteenth Dalai Lama’s efforts
to centralize and militarily maintain a Tibetan nation-state resulted in the alien-
ation of one of the most important figures in the Tibetan Buddhist world, the
Panchen Lama. The Chinese were happy to receive the lama when he arrived in
Chinese territory and provided for his basic needs for many years.7 Similarly, India
and the United States would later support the fourteenth Dalai Lama against the
‘‘communistmenace’’ of the PRC.8Although the circumstances of these two lamas’
going into exile are not identical, the parallels are striking. Neither was forcibly
ejected from his home territory. Rather, in each case the stronger power tried to
coerce the weaker but legitimate authority to adjust to a reduction of autonomy.
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When both lamas felt that their lack of cooperation would soon lead to their im-
prisonment, they fled into exile. Another example of a lama driven into exile did
not share this common fate. The Nor lha Hutukhtu (1865–1936), the spiritual
and political leader of territory in Khams, was actually imprisoned by the Tibetan
government and only went into exile after he escaped his captors.9 He arrived in
Beijing late in 1924,10 just as the Panchen Lama himself was making his way to the
Chinese capital overland.
TEACHING RELIGION TO FOREIGNERS
Rather than playing prominent roles in the politics of a fragmented China, during
their early years in China, the Panchen Lama and the Nor lha Hutukhtu were in-
volved almost exclusively in spreading Tibetan Buddhist teachings. The Panchen
Lama was careful to maintain a low political profile at first. Part of the tension
between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama had been over the latter’s rela-
tions with the Qing state and the British in India. During his early years in China,
while the Panchen Lama was still hoping to quickly return to Tibet, he did not
want to add to the accusations that could be leveled against him. The fourteenth
Dalai Lama was to face a similar dilemma in both 1951 and 1957. At these times,
his acceptance of proffered American aid would only have confirmed the Chinese
condemnation of imperialist intrigue in Tibet, while he still held out hope for a
working relationship with the Chinese. The Dalai Lama was also careful not to
meet directly with these foreign agents.11 Likewise, in his early years in China, the
Panchen Lama only sent representatives to deal with political officials, while he
propagated religion.
The Panchen Lama’s first teachings were directed at Mongolian, Tibetan,
and Chinese adherents of Tibetan Buddhism at the sites of the old imperially sup-
ported Tibetan Buddhist temples in and around the capital, Beijing. However,
he quickly moved into contexts that were purely Chinese, both ethnically and
in terms of the form of Buddhism practiced. In these communities, the Panchen
Lama largely focused on teaching about Buddhist figures that were shared with
his Chinese Buddhist brethren. At the same time, he infused his teachings with
elements unique to Tibetan Buddhism, especially emphasizing the esoteric aspects
of the Buddhist figures. Once he had won a substantial following and the govern-
ment’s recognition of his religious status, the Panchen Lama sought to create a
bureaucratic administration to support his interests.
Meanwhile, the Nor lha Hutukhtu pursued Chinese government assistance
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in claiming his domains but failed to secure it. At best, he was given permission
to try, but without resources this was an impossible task. As there was no way to
return to the combined political and religious position that had formerly been his,
the Nor lha Hutukhtu was also limited temporarily to religious activities among
the Chinese. Unlike the Panchen Lama, however, he seems to have focused on
presiding over rituals whose precedents were of long standing in imperial China.
As the Qing elite were no longer a viable audience, he adapted these traditions by
making them available to the Chinese Buddhist laity. Although a prominent local
politician aided him, his actual support appears to have come from a very broad
base of the Chinese Buddhist community in Sichuan province. In these early years
in China, then, these two prominent Tibetan Buddhist hierarchs focused their
attention primarily on spreading Tibetan Buddhism among the Chinese, without
ever losing sight of their longer-term goals.
When the Dalai Lama first came to America, he was allowed entry only as
a religious leader and not as the leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Even
in this capacity, his entry into the United States was blocked until 1979. As early
as 1977 a student of Tibetan Buddhism in the Carter administration had secured
official permission for the Dalai Lama to come to America, but it was two years
before all obstacles were cleared.12 Like the two lamas in China, the Dalai Lama
initially spent his time abroad in religious contexts, offering Buddhist teachings to
relatively small crowds from 1979 to 1985. In 1981, he brought esoteric Tibetan
Buddhism toAmerica in the form of an elaborate ceremony and practice known as
the Kalachakra Tantra. The first group to attend this ritual numbered only twelve
hundred, but this number nearly doubled each time the event reoccurred over the
next decade.13 As will become clear, the Dalai Lama was not the first to share this
esoteric ritual with a foreign culture in modern times; in this, too, he followed a
precedent. Thus, the Dalai Lama—like the lamas in exile in China—was only able
to participate directly in American politics after he had built up a religious base of
support abroad.
The Panchen Lama’s first activities in China were perfectly consonant with
his being a prominent religious leader. Seeing the death and destruction caused by
the ravages of warlord battles, he offered prayers for those killed. Shortly thereafter
he sent an open telegram to all the warlords, requesting that they cease fighting
one another so that peace and prosperity might return to China.14 He favored no
side but made only vague statements about his support of the central government
based in Beijing. Moreover, when the government invited the Panchen Lama to
theNational ReconstructionMeeting in 1925—which brought together the rulers
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of northern China with the ‘‘father’’ of Republican China, Sun Yat-sen—he studi-
ously avoided becoming too involved in Chinese politics. He sent a representative
to the conference while he stopped at the sacred Buddhist pilgrimage site ofMount
Wutai and gave Buddhist teachings there until the conference ended.15
This instance of first contact with the central Chinese government set the
pattern that the Panchen Lama was to follow for several years: sending representa-
tives to deal with political matters while he frequented temples and expounded on
Buddhist topics, thus eschewing direct involvement in politics. Aside from con-
sidering how the Tibetan government would respond to his having dealings with
that of China, the Panchen Lama also might have been aware of the Chinese con-
demnation of monks who involved themselves in political affairs. Unlike Tibetan
society, Chinese culture had little tolerance for religious figures who were active
in politics.16 For instance, Taixu was pejoratively labeled a ‘‘political monk.’’
At least at first, the expectations governing the behavior of the fourteenth
Dalai Lama in America largely mirrored this Chinese attitude. The Dalai Lama
was limited to traveling abroad only as a religious figure with restrictions placed on
what he could say and do.17 For example, in 1987 he was reprimanded by the U.S.
State Department for addressing the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus.
Somehow this activity was deemed ‘‘inconsistent with his status as a respected reli-
gious leader’’ and a violation of the terms of his visa.18 This has certainly changed
in recent years, as it did for the Panchen Lama in his later years in China. Yet,
despite the fact that the fourteenth Dalai Lama has obviously embraced a very po-
litical role inAmerica, emphasizing this fact—as this essay consistently does—will
no doubt be perceived by some as insulting to Tibetan Buddhism in general and
the current Dalai Lama in particular. Yet he himself has said that ‘‘I find no contra-
diction at all between politics and religion.’’19 In any case, the pattern followed by
the Dalai Lama for many years was very similar to that of the Panchen Lama upon
his arrival in China: he acted as a religious figure, visiting local political leaders
wherever he went but taking no direct role in politics.
When the Panchen Lama first arrived in Beijing, he taught at Yonghe Gong,
which had served as the main imperial Tibetan Buddhist temple under the Qing
dynasty. Though some ethnic Chinese were pursuing the study of Tibetan Bud-
dhism at YongheGong at that time, the audiencewould have been primarily ethnic
Mongolian Tibetan Buddhists, as this group comprised the principal monastic
population of the temple. This instance demonstrates the subtle yet significant
role Mongols continued to play in ‘‘globalizing’’ Tibetan Buddhism. Just as the
earliest Chinese scholar of Tibetan Buddhism (Yu Daoquan) studied at the ethni-
cally Mongol Tibetan Buddhist monastery of Yonghe Gong, so the first American
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scholars of Tibetan Buddhism (Robert Thurman and Jeffrey Hopkins) studied in
an ethnically Mongol Tibetan Buddhist monastery in New Jersey. This monastery,
by far the earliest one in America, catered to and was supported by an immigrant
Kalmyck Mongolian community.20
The Panchen Lama’s first contact with a purely ethnic Chinese audience
seems to have taken place in the first few months of 1925. His two-and-a-half-
month-long southern tour into the heartland ofChinese culture in Jiangnan, south
of the Yangtze River, marked the first instance of a Tibetan Buddhist reaching large
ethnically Chinese audiences. This visit to Jiangsu and Zhejiang was especially sig-
nificant because the region was the heart of active Chinese Buddhist education
and training. Holmes Welch has described how these two provinces represented
the best and the brightest of Chinese Buddhism. In fact, according to his figures,
the number of Buddhistmonks and laity in these two provinces outnumbered those
in most of the other provinces combined.21
In April of 1925, the Panchen Lama transmitted the long-life (Amitayus)
Buddha’s mantra according to the esoteric tradition. The long-life Buddha cycle of
teachings was especially significant coming from him, as he was understood to be
an emanation of Amitabha, who is closely associated with Amitayus. This trans-
mission linked the recipients to the Panchen Lama through a powerful set of reli-
gious beliefs; he was the master and they the disciples. The Panchen Lama clearly
built a religious following oriented toward Tibetan Buddhist practice, though ini-
tially he did this through Buddhist teachings and deities shared by Tibetan and
Chinese Buddhism.
The Panchen Lama also traveled to a second of the four Buddhist sacred
mountains in China, the island Mount Putuo. The island was home to a very con-
centrated Chinese Buddhist monastic population that was well known for the in-
tensity of its study and practice.22 He blessed with the touch of his hand the four-
teen hundred monks who had gathered to see him; to each he also gave two silver
dollars. This was a significant financial contribution at the time, especially for a
refugee who had fled home due to lack of funds.23 On the next day, he lectured
to two thousand monks on the Buddhist theories of birth, old age, sickness, and
death, as well as on the three trainings in ethics, meditation, and wisdom. He also
transmitted the esoteric mantras of Tara and Avalokitesvara. This gathering was a
historic occasion, marking as it does the first time in the history of Sino-Tibetan
relations that a Tibetan Buddhist taught so many Chinese monks.
In late July 1925, the provisional chief executive of China and temporarily
the dominant warlord of north China, Duan Qirui, invited the Panchen Lama
to the capital to receive the government’s official recognition. Duan’s recognition
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of the Panchen Lamawas based on earlier models dating back as far as the Yuan dy-
nasty. The tradition since the Mongol rule of China had been that rulers of China
—whether Mongol, Han, or Manchu—would award respected Tibetan Buddhist
hierarchs eloquent religious titles and accompanying symbols of respect.24 The
most recent example, which Duan followed fairly closely, was the Qing court’s
treatment of the thirteenth Dalai Lama: ‘‘the Qing court, by imperial decree, con-
ferred on him an additional title, inscribed in a gold leaf album, of ‘The Loyally
SubmissiveViceregent,Great,Good, Self-Existent Buddha ofHeaven.’ ’’25OnAu-
gust 1, Duan bestowed the title ‘‘Propagator of Honesty, Savior of the World’’ on
the Panchen Lama and gave him a certificate printed on plates of gold and a golden
seal as symbols of his new honor.26 Thus, Duan demonstrated no new ability to
‘‘utilize’’ the Panchen Lama’s presence in China in the service of the struggling
Chinese nation-state. Though aware of the need to preserve the integrity of the
former Qing dynasty’s borders, he was unable to conceive of any modern methods
of employing Tibet’s second most famous hierarch to this end. In fact, the only
innovation that came about as a result of the Panchen Lama’s interaction with
this conservative leader of China was undertaken at the Panchen Lama’s request.
After receiving these honors, the Panchen Lama requested that he be permitted
to set up his own offices within China.
The Nor lha Hutukhtu, on the other hand, had little success either gaining
assistance from the government or teaching the Chinese in his early years in the
north. His lack of a common language seems to have hindered his ability to com-
municate, especially in north China. He was from the eastern Tibetan region of
Khams, which had its own dialects. In addition, the Nor lha Hutukhtu was trained
in the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism, whereas most of the Tibetans living
in China proper at that time were adherents of the Geluk school. These differ-
ences may well have made it difficult for the Nor lha Hutukhtu to find disciples or
venues in which to teach.
The Nor lha Hutukhtu’s one successful contact with a Chinese politician
while living in Beijing is described in two separate biographical accounts printed in
a single volume. One account tells how he reached the president of China, Duan
Qirui, through the practice of a great ‘‘dharma’’ which was ‘‘in response to a need
(ganying dafa).’’27 Duan was said to be very surprised by this, and the event appar-
ently increased his respect for the Nor lha Hutukhtu. The biography also implied
that Duan studied the Buddha Dharma with the lama, though it does not state
this directly and no other source confirms it.
In addition, Duan apparently ‘‘gave the Nor lha Hutukhtu permission to re-
turn to Khams to try to retake his lost territory’’ (fol. 4v). The language of the
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biography suggests that the Nor lha Hutukhtu was seeking support for his former
rule, rather than that theChinese were seeking to utilize his good services to retake
the area. The northernChinese had their own problems at the time, and Tibet was
far away and far from a priority. Another version of the Nor lha Hutukhtu’s biog-
raphy adds that Duan gave him one thousand Chinese yuan in cash (fol. 8v). Be
that as it may, by the autumn of 1925, Duan was already losing the support of the
warlords who had placed him in control of the Beijing government.28 When Duan
resigned his office in April 1926, the Nor lha Hutukhtu was left without even this
weak patronage.
This problem was solved when a warlord leader of Sichuan province, named
Liu Xiang, heard about the Nor lha Hutukhtu.29 His career as a teacher to Chi-
nese Buddhists blossomed in the next three years, during which time he built up a
huge following in Chongqing. We are told that after the Nor lha Hutukhtu trans-
mitted the esoteric teachings, his disciples numbered over ten thousand. In the
words of his biographer, ‘‘the Guru went from none to an abundance [of students].’’
The one English-language biography I have found of the Nor lha Hutukhtu simply
states that he ‘‘was invited to Szechuan by Gen. Liu Hsiang to preach Buddhism
[in] 1926 and won many converts to the faith.’’30 It is doubtful whether the Nor
lha Hutukhtu would have considered his disciples ‘‘converts,’’ as most were prob-
ably already Buddhists, but Tibetan Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism probably
appeared different enough to the Western observer to merit this term.
The Nor lha Hutukhtu’s ritual activities were marked by a combination of
tradition and modernity that is remarkably similar to Tibetan Buddhist practices
in the West today. For example, in the spring of 1927, he held a ‘‘Dharma assembly
for peace (heping fa hui)’’ that lasted forty-nine days. The event was held on the sec-
ond floor of a Chinese company’s office in Chongqing. Common laypeople were
permitted to attend the esoteric ceremony.31 Both of these conditions were new
in the realm of Sino-Tibetan relations. Under the auspices of the Qing dynasty,
such rituals were performed at court-supported temples dedicated to the practice
of Tibetan Buddhism. Only the Buddhist elite and the imperial family would have
taken part in such ceremonies, though they too had been for the benefit of both
the dynasty (and by extension, the country) and the people.
In other respects this situation also anticipated the modern, and soon to be
global, diffusion of Tibetan Buddhism. Instead of being initiated by the state, these
ceremonies were privately sponsored by common people with business connec-
tions. At the same time, they were public events, open to anyone, rather being re-
stricted to an imperial elite. Westerners accept as normal the events of 1991, when
the Dalai Lama taught in New York’s Madison Square Garden and a sand man-
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dala was displayed at the IBM office building, but the Nor lha Hutukhtu was the
pioneer in this move into nonreligious space. Even the Panchen Lama continued
to teach in temples or imperial palaces until the 1930s.
The next spring, in 1928, the Nor lha Hutukhtu held a one-hundred-day
‘‘great Dharma assembly for prayers (qidao da fa hui)’’ (fol. 4v). At this assembly, a
vajra-mandala was constructed. Though such mandalas had previously been con-
structed in imperially sponsored temples or within the imperial palace, this new
public construction of amandala again anticipated exiled Tibetan Buddhist activi-
ties on the global stage. In introducing this phenomenon’s appearance inAmerica,
JensineAndresen noted that the first public display of a sandmandala took place in
China, and this particular occurrence predates the one she noted by four years. As
in the United States, where some fifty mandalas were constructed between 1988
and 1997, this became somewhat of a regular practice in China.32 Moreover, this
activity did not merely draw an anonymous fringe of Chinese Buddhists; many
officials sent either telegrams or representatives to attend such ceremonies.
If the Nor lha Hutukhtu’s main goal in coming to China had been to re-
gain power in his native region of Khams, he had made little direct progress in
his first five years of exile. He gained permission to make the attempt and secured
limited financial support, but far from the contested region and from a warlord on
his way out of power. Nevertheless, his time was not entirely wasted, as he built
up a large following among the Chinese in Sichuan. In the end, the Nor lha Hu-
tukhtu’s efforts at cultivating Chinese Buddhists as his disciples had the positive
result of bringing him to the attention of the central government. As was the case
for the Panchen Lama, only after all of China united under theNationalist govern-
ment was the Nor lha Hutukhtu’s influence actually brought to bear on political
questions.
Sometime after the Panchen Lama had received his title and honors from
the government, he requested the right to set up offices to handle his affairs. The
first such office was apparently located in a temple in Beijing with government
approval. However, at that time, the government neither funded nor otherwise
oversaw the offices. Far from being part of a government ploy to enlist the services
of this prominent Tibetan Buddhist in Chinese schemes, the offices were the result
of Tibetan initiative. On the basis of linguistic evidence, the Panchen Lama ap-
pears to have adapted an old Qing institution to his own purposes.33 I suspect that
their principal reason for existence was to handle the business affairs that accom-
panied the massive donations made by the Panchen Lama’s Buddhist followers.
For most of 1926, the Panchen Lama was teaching in Chinese Buddhist temples
around the capital. In mid-September he gave an initiation into the tantric prac-
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tice of theAmitabha Buddha to lay andmonastic Buddhists. One feature of tantric
initiation is the often substantial donations made to the teacher of such liberating
techniques. It seems likely that these initiates’ donations provided both the reason
and the funding for creating offices that would handle the Panchen Lama’s affairs.
From late 1926 until early 1929, the Panchen Lama lived among the Mongol
adherents of Tibetan Buddhism in Inner Mongolia. During this period, he started
to perform initiations into the Kalachakra Tantra. The ceremonies that conferred
these initiations attracted enormous crowds (eighty thousand Mongols were said
to have attended each of the first three initiations into this tantra) and brought
the Panchen Lama much prestige and many rich donations. As Andresen noted
in researching the Kalachakra tantra in America, ‘‘economically, western patron-
age of Kalachakra provides an important source of financial support for exiled Ti-
betans.’’34 The growth of the number and the institutional development of the
Panchen Lama’s offices were no doubt given great impetus by similar donations.
THE POLITICIZATION OF THE TIBETAN
BUDDHIST MISSIONS ABROAD
The real politicization of theTibetan Buddhist leaders inChina did not occur until
1929, after the success of Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition had suppressed
the warlords of north China and opened the way for a truly centralized govern-
ment. The new Nationalist government was much more willing to involve these
Tibetan Buddhist lamas in the politics of China. The Panchen Lama had sent his
envoys to offer his congratulations to the new regime in Nanjing in the spring of
1928. By January 11 of the following year, the ‘‘Office of the Panchen’s resident in
[the capital] Nanjing to handle official affairs (Banchan zhu [Nan]jing bangong chu)’’
was officially established. For the first time in the history of modern China, the
government had created a special office for a Tibetan Buddhist hierarch. To mark
the establishment of this office, the government issued a proclamation of its open-
ing, a chart of the organization of the office, and detailed rules and regulations to
guide how affairs were to be managed there.35 In themeantime, the Panchen Lama
established additional offices, one in Taiyuan (located on the main road between
Inner Mongolia and Nanjing) and one in Khams.36 In this way, the previously reli-
gious nature of the Panchen Lama’s role in exile was transformed into an official
one, with a political administration.
After having established these offices, the Panchen Lama remained in Inner
Mongolia for two more years. During this period, he communicated with Chiang
Kai-shek, the leader of China. Judging from the content of the letters exchanged
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between the two men, it seems that the Panchen Lama was trying to see what
sort of political support he could gain from Chiang Kai-shek. Specifically, in April
1930, he requested military supplies—five thousand rifles, a quarter of a million
rounds of ammunition, five thousand uniforms, and funds to pay soldiers—to be
used against a bogus Nepalese ‘‘invasion’’ of Tibet.37 The Nationalists, who prob-
ably understood this request as the attempt to create a private army that it was,
shrewdly linked the supplying of these items to the Panchen Lama’s agreement
to provisions that would have eliminated Tibetan autonomy entirely, at least in
principle. So he refused these conditions and received no military aid. Despite the
official cooperation and ongoing communication between these two men, neither
the Nationalist government nor the Panchen Lama was to have their wishes ful-
filled at that time. The similarity between this situation and the negotiations that
arose between the Tibetan government and the CIA in 1951 is remarkable and
will be discussed later.
In 1929, just months after having established the Panchen Lama’s office in
the capital, the central government summoned the Nor lha Hutukhtu from Si-
chuan province to the capital in Nanjing. Once there, he was made a member of
the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. An office similar to the Panchen
Lama’s, called the ‘‘Office of the Hutukhtu’s resident in [the capital] Nanjing to
handle affairs (Hutuketu zhu [Nan]jing banshi chu),’’38 was then established, while
three branch offices were eventually set up in Chongqing, Chengdu, and Kang-
ding. The concentration of these three offices in the single province of Sichuan
demonstrates the more limited scope of the Nor lha Hutukhtu’s influence com-
pared to that of the Panchen Lama.39 Because his influence was most important
for securing the loyalty of the Tibetans in Khams, he was also made a member of
the commission to establish the province of Xikang.
The Nor lha Hutukhtu’s presence in the capital was also important for the
foreign community. The Nationalist government could counter Tibetan claims
that the contested Tibetan region of Khams belonged to Tibet if they had a spokes-
man from that region within their own government. In the 1933 supplement to
Who’s Who in China, the compilers gullibly reported that the Nor lha Hutukhtu
was the ‘‘former secular and religious ruler of Hsikang [Khams].’’40 This was an
obvious error in fact, as the Nor lha Hutukhtu had only ruled a small portion of
Khams. Nevertheless, the ignorance of westerners living in China and the prestige
conferred on this individual by the Chinese government were a powerful combi-
nation. Not only was the Nor lha Hutukhtu given positions within institutions
that dealt with Inner Asia, he was also made a member of the legislature (lifa wei-
yuan). Though this governmental body was actually powerless in the Nationalist
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party-state, few foreigners were fully aware of this at the time. Thus, after an ini-
tial period of avoidance of or exclusion from the political realm, both the Panchen
Lama and the Nor lha Hutukhtu had been welcomed into the Chinese govern-
ment bureaucracy. However, although their influence was brought to bear on the
ethnic and territorial problems China faced at that time, these men were pursuing
their own interests as well.
While the Panchen Lama and the Nor lha Hutukhtu were being officially
recognized in these various capacities byChiangKai-shek, theDalai Lamawas also
in communication with China’s new leader. In 1928 the Nationalist government
claimed that it would remain true to Sun Yat-sen’s policy of ‘‘equality for all nation-
alities of the country.’’ Encouraged by this stance, the Dalai Lama sent his resident
representative to Nanjing. This exchange, which was heralded as ‘‘the beginning
of contact between Tibet and the KMT [Nationalist] government,’’ followed the
initiative of the Panchen Lama by almost half a year, giving the impression that
the central Tibetans were trying to keep up with the Panchen Lama’s efforts.41
Given the presence of the Panchen Lama’s office in the capital since early
1929, the central Tibetan government must have begun to worry about the possi-
bility that he could undermine its de facto independence by cooperating too closely
with the Chinese. Later that year, the abbot of the Yonghe Gong monastery in
Beijing, who had been appointed to the post by the Dalai Lama, went to Nan-
jing and conveyed to Chiang Kai-shek that the Tibetan government was friendly
to China and welcomed the Panchen Lama’s return. The abbot, Kön chok jung
nay, continued on to Tibet, carrying Chiang’s message to the Dalai Lama. When
he returned to China in 1931, he was made the Dalai Lama’s chief resident rep-
resentative in Nanjing. Adapting a former Qing religiopolitical institution to the
modern context of overtly political offices, the Dalai Lama transferred an abbot
at what had been the primary imperial Tibetan Buddhist temple in the old capi-
tal in Beijing to serve as his representative to the Chinese government at the new
capital. Thus, in 1931 an ‘‘Office of Tibet’’ was set up in Nanjing.42 Originally, the
Chinese had wanted the office to be called merely the ‘‘Dalai Lama’s Represen-
tative Office’’ (Tib. Tâ la’i don gcod khang), which would have put it on par with
the Panchen Lama’s office. However, his representatives insisted that the office
represented Tibet and not merely the Dalai Lama.43
The creation of this office in China was a significant precedent for the later
globalization of such offices. At present, the Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile
has Offices of Tibet in New York, Geneva, London, New Delhi, Paris, Zürich,
Budapest, Moscow, Tokyo, Taipei, Washington, D.C., and Kathmandu, as well
as in South Africa and Australia.44 The first of these overseas offices were CIA-
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sponsored centers for the coordination of a National Security Agency (NSA) Spe-
cial Group program built ‘‘around the Dalai Lama to heighten a sense of nation
among his refugee constituency and to keep his cause before the international
community.’’ This 1.7-million-dollar program was funded by the NSA. An annual
budget of US$150,000 was given to the fourteenth Dalai Lama’s older brother,
Gya lo don drub, to run the first two offices set up in New York and Geneva.45 Ken
Knaus, the former CIA officer in charge of Tibetan operations, reported that in
1963 the U.S. State Department was willing to allow a New York office as an ‘‘un-
official embassy’’ for Tibet and informed India of this permission (Knaus 1999:283,
310). Unlike the Panchen Lama and the Nor lha Hutukhtu’s offices, these new
Offices of Tibet are similar to the Dalai Lama’s office in China, having served po-
litical purposes from the start.
Knaus credited anAmerican adviser to the Tibetans with the idea of creating
these offices, though he acknowledged that Gya lo don drub ‘‘readily recognized
that they would provide the Dalai Lama with unofficial representation’’ (ibid:282).
Given that Gya lo don drub had been intimately familiar with the offices in China,
I suspect that he played a significant role in the creation of these CIA-funded
offices.46 In any case, the Dalai Lama’s offices in China, and initially in the United
States and elsewhere, were very different from those of the Panchen Lama and the
Nor lha Hutukhtu in China in that they did not provide for a religious mission.
They were purely political offices, functioning principally as unofficial embassies.
Since 1974, when the United States eliminated such aid to the Tibetans as part
of its renewed relations with China (ibid.:310), the various Offices of Tibet have
come to coordinate both the religious and political roles of the Dalai Lama. In
this respect they now resemble those of his fellow Tibetans in China earlier in the
century.
UNITING RELIGION AND POLITICS
Although I have been able to periodize the Tibetan Buddhist mission to China
into neatly divided ‘‘religious’’ and ‘‘political’’ sections, the men examined here
would certainly not have compartmentalized their lives in the same way. I suspect
that they would have felt neither that they were using religion to achieve political
ends nor that their involvement in politics was merely some ‘‘expedient means’’
to be employed in the spread of religion. Rather, they likely felt that the politi-
cal and religious concerns were linked in a most natural way. They were Buddhist
leaders and had been ousted from their rightful place in the cultural context in
which they were raised. Given these circumstances, they did whatever was nec-
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essary and appropriate within the confines of the situation and their worldview
to restore themselves to power. In the meantime, spreading Tibetan Buddhism al-
lowed them both to practice the religion so central to their world and to build up
the political power that accompanies being a celebrity in the modern world.
From 1931 to 1935, the Nor lha Hutukhtu’s popularity grew immensely. His
biography states that he had disciples from all provinces of China.47 He trav-
eled and taught in Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guang-
zhou,Nanchang,Wuhan, andChangsha, while being based in the capital, Nanjing
(fol. 9r). He taught an impressive array of Tibetan tantric cycles over the six years
when he was based in the capital. These included cycles of teachings dedicated
to Amitabha Buddha, the Medicine Buddha, the bodhisattvas Avalokitesvara and
Green Tara, Padmasambhava, and a host of tantric deities previously unknown
to the Chinese. His disciples set up the the Nor lha Students’ Society to provide
funds to support his living and travel expenses, as well as for the publication of
his teachings.48 We are told that he initiated twenty thousand disciples into the
esoteric teachings of Tibetan Buddhism. Although no gender ratio can be deter-
mined, the Nor lha Hutukhtu’s biography, unlike those of other figures in China
at that time, does mention that he had women disciples.49 His experience antici-
pated that of dozens of teachers who have come to America: without the status of
the Panchen or Dalai Lamas, such men have relied on a devoted following of stu-
dents. Devotees’ supporting their lama was certainly nothing new to the Tibetan
Buddhist tradition; however, the formation of particular societies dedicated to this
purpose appears to be a modern phenomenon that has reached new heights in
America.50
Prior to 1929, the Nor lha Hutukhtu had had a decidedly local influence tied
closely to his home region, as it was nominally controlled from the very provin-
cial capital in which he lived. After 1929, the Nor lha Hutukhtu became a na-
tional figure for the Chinese. He represented the interests of the nation and not
just the local concerns of an exiled Tibetan Buddhist leader. By embracing this
role, he both gave the Chinese Nationalists his religious and political support and
earned for himself their trust. The differences between the current Dalai Lama’s
relationship to foreign governments and the Nor lha Hutukhtu’s relationship with
the Chinese government are most pronounced in this respect. Although the Dalai
Lama has become an international figure, he has never been offered or accepted
a position or title from any other government body.
For the Nor lha Hutukhtu, the culmination of this trust was the National-
ist government’s conferral of the title Pacification Commissioner of Xikang. This
abrupt assignment to an officially political role was occasioned by the Commu-
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nist LongMarch through the Nor lhaHutukhtu’s native Tibetan region of Khams.
In August 1935, the Nor lha Hutukhtu went to Kangding and assembled the im-
portant religious and political figures of the region to explain the position of the
Nationalist government and the threat of the Communists.51 Nevertheless, he
failed to prevent the Communist advance, or even to return to his homeland be-
fore his death in 1936. In the end, although the Nor lha Hutukhtu was able to use
the influence gained over all his years of missionizing in China to secure the sup-
port of the Chinese government in returning to his homeland, he failed to retake
his former domains.
Meanwhile, the differences between the Panchen Lama and Chiang Kai-
shek had been resolved by February 1931, when the Nationalists invited the Pan-
chen Lama to the National Conference to be held later that year. He accepted and
on May 4 was welcomed to Nanjing by a huge crowd of people—official represen-
tatives from all government ministries, councils, and commissions, as well as ‘‘sev-
eral tens of thousands of citizens and students.’’52 The next day the Panchen Lama
met with Chiang Kai-shek and throughout the period was housed in his headquar-
ters. From that time, the Panchen Lama took a stand in support of Chinese policy
toward Tibet while the Chinese government solidly backed the Panchen Lama.
No doubt this open and public acknowledgment of the position that China had
consistently maintained toward Tibet was the deciding factor in the close rela-
tions the Chinese government now adopted toward the Panchen Lama. A similar
situation governed the United States’ support for the Dalai Lama. In 1951, when
the fourteenth Dalai Lama was in India trying to decide whether to return to an
occupied Tibet, the State Department conditioned support for Tibetan autonomy
upon the Dalai Lama’s disavowal of the Seventeen Point Agreement made with
the Chinese, as well as a promise to resist the Communist regime. At that time,
the Dalai Lama refused to agree to such externally imposed conditions and was
refused overt aid by the Americans.
By late 1932, the Nationalist government rewarded the Panchen Lama for
his support of China’s titular sovereignty over Tibet. They publicly granted him a
title that suggested a more political orientation while preserving the religious ele-
ments of its precedents, Protector of the Nation, Propagator of Transformation,
Great Master of Infinite Wisdom. With such government recognition, he enjoyed
an enormous surge in popularity. The Chinese government also committed itself
to supplying an annual subsidy of 120,000 yuan to the Panchen Lama.53 Likewise,
when the Dalai Lama repudiated the Seventeen Point Agreement in 1959, the
U.S. government agreed to support him and his government-in-exile with a yearly
subsidy of US$175,000.54
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As with the Nor lha Hutukhtu, the conferral of official recognition brought
with it a whole new level of missionizing activity. The most important were Kala-
chakra rituals. Although the Panchen Lama had given the Kalachakra initiation
to enormous crowds inTibetan Buddhist InnerMongolia, the practice of this ritual
among the Chinese was unprecedented. The first ceremony, held in the Forbidden
City in Beijing, accommodated as many as one hundred thousand people by some
estimates. The second, held in 1934 in Hangzhou, was said to have been attended
by some seventy thousand.55 Admittedly, these numbers represent a tiny propor-
tion of the Chinese population at that time (roughly 500 million), nevertheless,
it represents over 150 times the proportion of Americans who have attended the
Dalai Lama’s Kalachakra ceremonies in the United States. Few Americans or Ti-
betans are aware that the performance of the Kalachakra for foreign audiences was
first popularized in China.
The growth of the Panchen Lama’s religious popularity was accompanied by
an increasing political importance. At the end of 1932, he was granted a purely po-
litical office for the first time. He was to serve as the Western Borderland Publicity
Commissioner, whose job it was ‘‘to publicize the desires of the central government
to the borderland . . . [and] to propagate, with the help of religious belief, the Three
People’s Principles, teachings of the late Director-General Sun Yat-sen.’’56 In this
way, the Tibetan Buddhists had brought the Chinese around to their perspective:
religion and politics had to go hand in handwhen trying to settle relations between
China and Tibet. Following a different tradition, in the United States propaganda
was handled by a public relations firm hired by the CIA to help the Tibetans make
their anti-Communist case in 1959.57
In return for his help, throughout 1933 the Chinese government assisted the
Panchen Lama in negotiating with the Tibetan government permission for the
Panchen Lama’s return to Tibet. His last major public appearance in China, just
days after the second Kalachakra ceremony, was to be his best attended event. Ac-
cording to Chinese sources, he lectured in Shanghai to a crowd of three hundred
thousand on the topic ‘‘Mongolia and Tibet are China’s important frontiers.’’ By
July 1934 he had set off for the western borderlands to carry out his duties and, it
was hoped, return to Tibet. Like the Nor lha Hutukhtu, the Panchen Lama had
finally secured the support of the Chinese government in his attempt to return to
his former domains. Also like the Nor lha Hutukhtu, he was ultimately to die (in
1937, in the borderlands between China and Tibet) unsuccessful in his effort to
return to his former position of authority.
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CONCLUSION
Despite their cooperation with Chinese politicians, these Tibetan Buddhists were
pursuing their own goals. In order to return to their previous positions, they sought
the financial and military backing that only the Chinese government could have
provided. In fact, as religious figures cooperating with the Chinese government,
they established an important pattern for the future of Sino-Tibetan relations. As
is still the case today, Chinese politicians were forced to work with the religious
leaders of Tibet to try to maintain control over the populace in the region.
At the same time, these men invented and adapted strategies for dealing
with the new challenges of a modernized world. They taught religion and gathered
disciples when there was no way to enter into the political life, but accepted and
often initiated political contacts and institutions when this was possible. Finally,
they succeeded in combining religion and politics in an almost seamless fashion,
linking their religious activities with their political causes.
For those who are privy to the world of Tibetan Buddhism in America today,
this may well sound a familiar note. With regard to nationalism, the current Dalai
Lama—whether or not he coordinated his plans with the American government
—has fulfilled the 1963 goal of the NSA’s Special Group: he continues to serve as
the key rallying point for the Tibetan nationalist movement. And, like the lamas
in China, he taught religion to foreigners as long as he felt that that was his only
option. In his The Making of Modern Tibet, Grunfeld cynically (though probably
accurately) described this early period as one in which ‘‘[Tibetan] Buddhist mon-
asteries, study groups, rural communes, and even an accredited college . . . have
converted hundreds, if not thousands, to their religious beliefs—thereby creating a
large, receptive audience for their political beliefs.’’58 He also prophetically noted,
as he completed the writing for the first edition in 1985, that the Dalai Lama’s
‘‘spiritual role . . . far outweighs his political functions—for the time being’’ (Grun-
feld 1996:210).
This balance of religion and politics did change after 1985. As Grunfeld re-
ported in his second edition, the Dalai Lama has always officially come to the
United States only as a religious leader of the Tibetan people. However, since the
‘‘Tibet lobby’’ has enlisted a powerful law firm to serve as its United States agents
for the Tibetan government-in-exile, theDalai Lama has had decidedlymore of an
international political force.59 At present, he, like the lamas before him in China,
has also succeeded in uniting religion and politics abroad, as anyone who has at-
tended one of his large public events will readily acknowledge. Whatever the dif-
ferent causes that resulted in these diversemissions toChina and now to theworld,
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the strategies have remained true to tradition while at the same time evolving in
new—but surprisingly parallel—directions.
Notes
1. In this analysis I am indebted to the work of the prominent late Tibetologist, Dung dkar
Blo bzang ‘phrin las, The Merging of Religious and Secular Rule in Tibet, trans. Chen Guan-
sheng (Beijing: Foreign Languages, 1991), and David Ruegg, Ordre spirituel et ordre temporel
dans la pensée Bouddhique de l’Inde et du Tibet, Publications de l’Institut de Civilisation Indienne
(Paris: Collège de France, 1995).
2. Ruegg, Ordre spirituel, 34–37.
3. P. Christiaan Klieger, Tibetan Nationalism: The Role of Patronage in the Accomplishment
of a National Identity (Berkeley, Calif.: Folklore Institute, 1992), 20.
4. Gray Tuttle, Faith and Nation: Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China (1902–
1958) (New York: Columbia University Press, in press).
5. Bstan ‘dzin rgya mtsho, Dalai Lama XIV, Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai
Lama (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 202.
6. Franz Michael, Rule by Incarnation: Tibetan Buddhism and Its Role in Society and State
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982), 40–50.
7. Ya Hanzhang, Biographies of the Tibetan Spiritual Leaders Panchen Erdenis, trans. Chen
Guansheng, Li Peizhu (Beijing: Foreign Languages, 1994), 258–260.
8. Ken Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival (New
York: Public Affairs, 1999), 275.
9. Han Dazai, Kang-Zang Fojiao yu Xikang Nona Hutuketu yinghua shilüe [Brief account
of Khams-Tibetan Buddhism and the manifestation of the Nor lha Hutukhtu of Khams]
(1937), fols. 4r, 8v. I want to thank Professor Lawrence Epstein and Peng Wenbin of the
University of Washington for alerting me to the presence of this text.
10. Two conflicting dates are given in Han (Kang-Zang Fojiao) for his arrival in Beijing:
Mar. 15, 1924 (fol. 4v) and Oct. 15, 1925 (fol. 8v). Other sources, including Holmes Welch,
The Buddhist Revival in China, Harvard East Asian Series, 33 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1968), 175, indicate that he was present in Beijing in 1924, so I have ac-
cepted this date.
11. Knaus,Orphans of theColdWar, 88–103, 140. Instead, a chain of intermediaries informed
him (at least partially) of the negotiations of his older brothers. However, it should be noted
that they were not officially the Dalai Lama’s representatives and at times followed their
own agenda.
12. Roger Hicks and Ngakpa Chogyam, Great Ocean: An Authorized Biography of the Bud-
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
2
3
9
o
f
2
5
6
230 • Gray Tuttle
dhist Monk Tenzin Gyatso His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama (New York: Penguin, 1990
[1984]), 164.
13. Rick Fields,How the Swans Came to the Lake: A Narrative History of Buddhism in America
(Boulder, Colo.: Shambala, 1981), 378; Jensine Andresen, ‘‘Kalacakra: Textual and Ritual
Perspectives’’ (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1997), 15–16.
14. Ya, Panchen Erdenis, 261.
15. Fabienne Jaguo, ‘‘A Pilgrim’s Progress: The Peregrinations of the 6th Panchen Lama,’’
Lungta 1, no. 10 (1996): 6, 14.
16. Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, 157.
17. Hicks and Ngakpa Chogyam, Great Ocean, 164.
18. Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947
(London: Pimlico, 1999), 416.
19. Bstan ‘dzin rgya mtsho, Freedom in Exile, 203.
20. Fields, Buddhism in America, 291–293.
21. Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, 251.
22. Ibid., 239.
23. These were probably Mexican silver dollars.
24. For photographs of Qing examples of a golden certificate, see entry 74, and of a golden
seal, entry 71, in A Collection of the Historical Archives of Tibet (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe,
1995).
25. Ya Hanzhang, The Biographies of the Dalai Lamas, trans. Wang Wenjiong (Beijing: For-
eign Languages, 1991), 263.
26. Ya, Panchen Erdenis, 264; Danzhu Angfen, Liwei Dalai lama yu Banchan erdeni nianpu
[Chronicle of the genealogy of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdeni] (Beijing: Zhongyang
minzu daxue chubanshe, 1998), 637–638.
27. Han,Kang-Zang Fojiao, fol. 4v.What exactly occurred is left to the reader’s imagination.
28. Joseph K. H. Cheng, Richard C. Howard, and Howard L. Boorman, eds., Biographical
Dictionary of Republican China, 3 vols. (1970), 3:335.
29. Han, Kang-Zang Fojiao, fols. 4v, 8v–9r.
30. Jerome Cavanaugh and ChineseMaterials Center, Who’s Who in China, 1918–1950, with
an index, 1933 supplement ed. (Hong Kong: Chinese Materials Center, 1982 [1933]), 82.
31. Han, Kang-Zang Fojiao, fol. 4v.
32. Andresen, ‘‘Kalacakra,’’ 238.
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
2
4
0
o
f
2
5
6
Uniting Religion and Politics • 231
33. For details, see Tuttle, ‘‘Faith and Nation,’’ 198.
34. Andresen, ‘‘Kalacakra,’’ 17.
35. Danzhu Angfen, Nianpu, 639.
36. In May 1929 and April 1930, respectively; see Danzhu Angfen, Nianpu, 640.
37. Li Pengnian and Fang Qingqiu, eds., Jiushi Banchan neidi huodong ji fanzang shuoxian
dang’an xuanbian [Selections from the archives concerning the ninth Panchen’s activities in
China and the restrictions on his return to Tibet] (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe,
1992), 15–17.
38. In Tibetan, this institution was simply called Norlha’s Representative Office (Nor lha
don gcod khang); see Thub bstan sangs rgyas, Rgya nag tu Bod kyi sku tshab, 44.
39. Han, Kang-Zang Fojiao, fols. 5r, 9r; Sichuan sheng difang zhi bianji weiyuanhui, Sheng
zhi renwu zhi bianji and Ren Yimin, eds., Sichuan jin xiandai renwu zhuan [Biographies of
Sichuan’s contemporary figures], vol. 1 (Chengdu: Sichuan sheng shehui kexue yuan chu-
banshe, 1985), 291.
40. Cavanaugh and Chinese Materials Center, Who’s Who in China, 81.
41. Ya, Dalai Lamas, 341; Thub bstan sangs rgyas, Rgya nag tu Bod kyi sku tshab, 25–26.
42. Ya, Dalai Lamas, 342, 345–346; Goldstein, 214, 219; Thub bstan sangs rgyas (Rgya nag
tu Bod kyi sku tshab, 55) provided an English translation of this office’s name in Tibetan
transcription, the ‘‘Bureau of Tibet’’ (Tib. Be ’u ru ’u/ Ob/ Kri bi kri).
43. For a full history of the office, see Thub bstan sangs rgyas, Rgya nag tu Bod kyi sku tshab.
44. The official web site of the Tibetan Government-in-exile: www.tibet.com
45. Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, 275, 282.
46. Gya lo don drub frequented the Tibet Office while studying in Nanjing from 1947 to
1949. However, his relations with this office and the conservative officials it represented
were tense. Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, 48–49; Mary Craig, Kundun: A Biography of the
Family of the Dalai Lama (Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 1997), 134.
47. Han, Kang-Zang Fojiao, fol. 5v.
48. Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China, 175.
49. Han, Kang-Zang Fojiao, fols. 3r, 6v. He also tried to improve the status of women in
Khams.
50. Alexander Berzin, Relating to a Spiritual Teacher (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion, 2000), 16.
51. Han, Kang-Zang Fojiao, fol. 9r.
52. Ya, Panchen Erdenis, 271–272; Danzhu Angfen, Nianpu, 641.
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
2
4
1
o
f
2
5
6
232 • Gray Tuttle
53. Danzhu Angfen, Nianpu, 642; Jaguo, ‘‘A Pilgrim’s Progress,’’ 16.
54. Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, 275, 310.
55. Ya, Panchen Erdenis, 274, 284.
56. Ibid.; italics added.
57. Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War, 204.
58. Thomas A. Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, rev. ed. (New York: M. E. Sharpe,
1996 [1985]), 209.
59. Grunfeld, 230–240; see also Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows, 412–416.
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
2
4
2
o
f
2
5
6
List of Contributors
Stuart Chandler is an assistant professor at Indiana University of Pennsylvania, where
he teaches about the religions of China and Japan. His dissertation at Harvard Univer-
sity analyzed the modernization and globalization of the Foguang Shan Buddhist order. He
has also been very involved with the Pluralism Project, a multiyear enterprise tracking the
emergence of Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Jain, Islamic, and other religious communities in the
United States.
Peter B. Clarke is a professor of the history and sociology of religion at the University of
London, King’s College. He is founding and present coeditor of the Journal of Contemporary
Religion and has researched contemporary religions in Africa, Brazil, Japan, and Western
Europe. His books include Japanese New Religions in the West (ed., 1994), An Annotated Bib-
liography of New Religions in the West (1997), New Trends and Developments in the World of
Islam (ed., 1998), An Annotated Bibliography of Japanese New Religions in the West (1999),
and Japanese New Religions in Global Perspective (1999).
C. Julia Huang is an assistant professor at the Institute of Anthropology, National Tsing
Hua University, Taiwan. She received her Ph.D. in anthropology from Boston University
and completed a postdoctoral fellowship at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna, and
a senior fellowship at the Center for the Study of World Religions, Harvard University. Her
research focuses on religion, charisma, and transnationalism. She is currently finishing a
book on the topic.
Steven Kemper is a professor of anthropology at Bates College. He is the author of The
Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics, and Culture in Sinhala Life (1991) and Buying and Be-
lieving: Sri Lankan Advertising and Consumers in a Transnational World (2001). His research
interests range from monasticism to transnational forces such as advertising and Western
models of education.
Linda Learman received her A.M. from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign,
in Asian studies and her Ph.D. in anthropology from Boston University. Her dissertation
focused on religion, marriage, and modernity in Taiwan. She organized the conference,
The Globalization of Buddhism: Case Studies of Buddhist Missions, on which this book is
based.
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
2
4
3
o
f
2
5
6
234 • List of Contributors
SarahLeVine is a research associate in human development and psychology,HarvardGrad-
uate School of Education. Her books include Mothers and Wives: Gusii Women of East Africa
(1979) and Dolor Y Alegria: Women and Social Change in Urban Mexico (1993).
Richard K. Payne is dean of the Institute of Buddhist Studies at the Graduate Theologi-
cal Union, Berkeley, where he is also a member of the doctoral faculty. He is the author
of Tantric Ritual of Japan and editor of Re-Visioning ‘‘Kamakura’’ Buddhism, as well as being
the chair of the editorial board of Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies.
His main area of research is Shingon ritual, and he is currently working on developing a
cognitive theory of ritual.
Cristina Rocha received her Ph.D. from the University of Western Sydney, Australia. Her
publications include: ‘‘Zen Buddhism in Brazil: Japanese or Brazilian?’’ Journal of Global Bud-
dhism 1 (2000); ‘‘Catholicism and Zen Buddhism: A Vision of the Religious Field in Brazil,’’
in The End of Religion? Religion in an Age of Globalisation, ed. Carole Cusack and Peter Old-
meadow (2001); ‘‘The Brazilian Imaginaire on Zen: Global Influences, Rhizomatic Forms,’’
in Japanese Religions in and beyond the Japanese Diaspora, ed. Ronan Pereira and Hideaki
Matsuoka (forthcoming); ‘‘Zen in Brazil: Cannibalizing Orientalist Flows,’’ in Orientalism
and Identity in Latin America, ed. Eric Camayd-Freixas (forthcoming); and Zen in Brazil: The
Quest for Cosmopolitan Modernity (forthcoming). She has been the recipient of a Urasenke
Foundation scholarship (1992–1993) and a Japan Foundation fellowship (2000).
George J. Tanabe, Jr., is a professor of Japanese religion in the Department of Religion at
the University of Hawai‘i. He has authored Myōe the Dreamkeeper: Fantasy and Knowledge in
Early Kamakura Buddhism (1992), coauthored Practically Religious: Worldly Benefits and the
Common Religion of Japan (1998), edited Religions of Japan in Practice (1999), and coedited
the second edition of Sources of Japanese Tradition (2001).
Gray Tuttle received his Ph.D. from Harvard University and now teaches Asian history
and religion at Trinity College. He specializes in the history of Tibetan Buddhist institu-
tions and relations with the Mongol, Chinese, and Manchu rulers of China. The chapter
in this volume is drawn from his dissertation, ‘‘Faith and Nation: Tibetan Buddhists in the
Making of Modern China 1902–1958’’ (2002).
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
2
4
4
o
f
2
5
6
Index
accommodation. See assimilation and
accommodation
Adams, Romanzo, 78, 96
African-Brazilian religions, 151–152, 153,
157. See also Soka Gakkai: and African-
Brazilian religions
Ambedkar and conversion of Dalits, 42,
50n. 68, 167
Amerindian religions, 130, 144, 151
Amida (or Amitabha) Buddha: as identical
to Christian God, 82–83; and Panchen
Lama, 217, 220; and rituals, 225; and
Shakyamuni Buddha, 96
Amritananda, Venerable, 37; and restora-
tion of Theravada Buddhism in Nepal,
37, 64
Anderson, Benedict, 98n. 3
Ando Tarō, 82
Andresen, Jensine, 220, 221
Appadurai, Arjun, 12, 23
Arnold, Sir Edwin, 32
Asia and cultural diffusion, 1, 15, 39
Asoka, 7, 22; Dharmapala on, 29; son and
daughter’s visit to Sri Lanka, 26
assimilation and accommodation, 12, 101–
103, 112–114, 117–118n. 4; ‘‘creolization’’
model, 142, 149–150, 152, 157; ‘‘horti-
cultural’’ model, 79–81, 81–94 passim,
94–98, 176, 178; and Japanese Bud-
dhism, 83; ‘‘melting pot’’ model, 78,
79, 81, 94, 97; and Newar Buddhism,
61–63, 70, 74n. 36; and Shingon Bud-
dhism, 101, 105–106, 109–111, 116; and
Soka Gakkai, 124; and Taiwanese Bud-
dhism, 202–204; and Zen, 142, 150,
152–153. See also Jōdo Shinshū [Nishi]
Honpa Honganji: Americanization;
Soka Gakkai: and ‘‘reflexive syncretism’’
Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva and rituals,
225
Awakening the World (Jue Shi) (magazine),
165
Azevedo, Murillo Nunes de: and the
Buddhist Society of Brazil, 143; and
Theosophy, 143
baby naming rituals, Zen Buddhism and,
158
Baizhang, Chan Master, 189
bana, 6–7; Dharmapala and, 31; versus
Dharma discussion, 41
Berger, Peter, 1; and ‘‘faculty club culture,’’
148
bhikkhuni ordination, 15, 46–47n. 27, 51,
60, 70–71; history of, 74n. 32
Bodh Gaya, 32, 33, 34, 41; and bhikkhuni
ordination, 46–47n. 27, 51
Bodhidharma, 8
bodhisattva ideal, 7; in Chinese Buddhism
in Taiwan, 12, 193
Brasil Seikyo, 126, 133, 134
Brickfields Vihara (Kuala Lumpur), 40
Buddha’s Light International Association
(BLIA): founding of, 164, 173; glob-
alization of, 164–167; and homeland,
170–171, 178; and localization, 178–179;
and politics, 173–174
Buddhayana Temple (Netherlands), 40
Buddhism: changes to, 16, 60–63, 96,
182n. 5, 184n. 21, 187–188, 190; con-
tinuities within, 96, 181; Mahayana
missionary agendas, 3, 5, 7. See also
under specific traditions
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
2
4
5
o
f
2
5
6
236 • Index
Buddhist-Christian dialog. See ecumenism
Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu-Chi
Foundation (also Compassion Relief
Merit Society and Ciji; referred to in
text as Ciji, Compassion Relief, and
Compassion Relief Foundation): and
benevolent connections (jie shan yuan),
192; Compassion Relief Humanities
Schools, 196; Compassion Relief Teach-
ers’ Association, 197; Compassion Relief
Youth Corps, 196, 197; and conver-
sion, 10, 11–12; and disaster and war
relief, 193, 202, 205n. 15, 207nn. 36,
41; and globalization, 166–167, 185,
202; global outreach, 191–202; history
of, 186–198; and ‘‘homecoming’’ cere-
monies/homeland, 198, 202; and hospi-
tals, 198, 208n. 46; and Japanese, 197;
as a lay movement, 4–5, 19n. 30, 125,
185, 186–187, 190–202; Marrow Donor
Registry and donation drives, 193, 202;
particularism and universalism, 191–192,
195–196, 202–204; and proselytism, 192,
195, 205n. 15; ritual innovations, 199;
and technology and communications,
12, 186–187, 191, 197, 202; television
channel, 197; Zulu members, 195. See
also Zhengyan, Venerable
Buddhist Missionary Society (Kuala Lum-
pur), 40
Buddhist regionalism in Asia, 1, 15, 22,
25–26, 27, 39, 41, 51; in India-Tibet–
Kathmandu Valley, 53, 55, 58; between
Japan-Korea-China-Taiwan, 97; be-
tween Nepal-Burma, 55, 57, 59, 64, 69,
70; between Nepal-China, 71; between
Nepal-China-Mongolia–Sri Lanka–
Vietnam, 64; between Nepal-India,
56, 58, 59; between Nepal-Malaysia,
71; between Nepal–Sri Lanka, 57, 64,
70; between Nepal-Taiwan, 64, 70–71;
between Nepal-Thailand, 64, 70, 71;
between Nepal-Tibetan communities,
72; between Sri Lanka–Burma, 74n. 32;
between Sri Lanka–China, 71; between
Sri Lanka–Thailand, 74n. 32; in the
Taiwanese and the P.R.C. diaspora, 176;
between Thailand and the People’s
Republic of China, 192–193; through
voluntary, transnational organization,
43, 58, 64
Buddhist Society of Brazil (Sociedade
Budista do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro), 143
Buddhist Society of Nepal (Dharmodaya
Sabha, Sarnath), 58; objectives of,
60–61, 64
Buddhologists, 1
Burma Buddhist Mission (Rangoon), 89
Bush, President George H. W., 173–174,
183n. 16
Busshinji (Buddha Heart-Mind Temple,
São Paulo), 140–141, 143, 148, 150–151,
157; as temple for non-Japanese, 144,
151, 155, 156. See also Zen Buddhism
Cao-Dai, 36, 48n. 47
Carpenter, Robert, 154
Carus, Paul, 33
Carvalho, José Jorge, 147, 149
caste, 14; in India, 41; in Nepal, 52, 62;
among Newar Buddhists, 14, 57, 62; in
Sri Lanka, 11
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 222,
223, 227
Chandramani, Mahasthavira: and help
to Newar monks, 57, 59, 74n. 27; as
president of Buddhist Society of Nepal,
58
Chappell, David, 3
charitable works: in China, 8; and
Dharmapala, 11; by Japanese Buddhists
in Hawai‘i, 92, 93; by Japanese Bud-
dhists in Sri Lanka, 43; by Newar Bud-
dhists, 65–66, 68; by Taiwanese-Chinese
Buddhists, 13, 15–16, 167, 171–172, 185,
186–188, 191–198
Chiang Kai-shek and Panchen Lama,
221–222, 223, 226
Chinese Buddhism: in Brazil, 156; ‘‘funeral
Buddhism,’’ 9; and modernization, 168;
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
2
4
6
o
f
2
5
6
Index • 237
spread in China, 7; from Taiwan, 1, 9.
See also Buddha’s Light International
Association; Buddhist Compassion Re-
lief Tzu-Chi Foundation; Foguang Shan;
Tibetan Buddhism: in China; Xingyun,
Venerable; Zhengyan, Venerable
Chinese popular religion, 186, 188–189,
200
Chong Tien Temple (Brisbane), 173
Ciji. See Buddhist Compassion Relief
Tzu-Chi Foundation
civil society, 191, 200–201, 202
class, economic and social, 14; and Bud-
dhism in Brazil, 103, 131, 141, 146–147,
152, 154, 157; and Buddhism in China,
7–8; and Buddhism in Hawai‘i, 84, 91;
and Buddhism in Nepal, 54, 55, 57, 59–
60, 62, 65, 67; and Buddhism in Sri
Lanka, 7, 23; and North American con-
vert Buddhists, 19n. 30; and Taiwanese
Buddhists, 19n. 30, 172–175, 201
Clinton, President Bill, 174
Coelho, Paulo, 155
Coen sensei (surnamed Souza), 140–141,
148, 150, 157
colonialism, 9, 16, 25, 114, 150; Dharma-
pala on, 27–28, 29; Japanese, 15, 97,
189; in Sri Lanka, 7, 23, 24, 26; and
support of missionaries, 137
Communist Party, Chinese, 168
Confucian values, 168, 169, 183n. 10,
205n. 20
consumerism: in Sinhala Sangha, 39; in
Thai Sangha, 65; of Zen Buddhists of
Brazil, 149
conversion: as ‘‘alchemic absorption,’’
79, 98n. 3; and Anglo-American mis-
sions, 3; and charisma, 187, 203; and
craving, 14; de-emphasized, 14, 25, 29,
37, 78, 82, 144, 156; defined, 10–12,
219; distinguished from discipleship,
219; and domestic, diaspora, and foreign
missions, 10, 14, 16–17, 33–44, 82, 101,
115, 122n. 49, 171, 185, 203; methods,
14; multiple affiliations and, 144, 149,
156, 159n. 17; and Olcott, 29; preva-
lence of in Brazil, 144–145; proscribed
in Nepal, 58, 61, 74n. 35; and Three
Refuges/Triple Refuge, 10, 29, 160n. 29,
172; of westerners to Buddhism, 29,
46n. 20, 101. See also charitable works
Cranston, Senator Alan, 173
creolization. See assimilation and accom-
modation
Dalai Lama, fifth, joint religious and secu-
lar rule of, 212
Dalai Lama, fourteenth: and bhikkhuni
ordination, 46–47n. 27, 51, 70–71; in
Brazil, 146; and China, 213, 214; and
ecumenism, 3; and Kalachakra Tantra,
227; and modernism, 103; and politics,
16, 210, 215, 223–224, 226, 228; as reli-
gious leader, 215, 227, 228; and ‘‘Tibet
lobby,’’ 228; and United States, 210, 214,
215, 216, 223–224, 226, 228
Dalai Lama, thirteenth (Thub ten gya
tsho) and centralization of political
power in Tibet, 212–213, 223
Da Matta, Roberto, 156
Deegalle, Mahinda, 6
Democratic National Committee (U.S.),
174, 175, 176
dhammadīpa (radiant with the light of
truth, or island of truth), 25–26
Dhammaloka, Venerable Hinatiyana,
34–35
Dhammananda, Venerable Kirinde, 40;
and bhikkhuni ordination, 46–47n. 27,
49n. 63
Dhammawati, Venerable, 69–72
Dhammawirantha, Anagarika, 40, 49n. 61
Dharmacari, Venerable (Laxminani Tula-
dhar), 59, 60, 68
Dharmadittya Dharmacarya, 55–56, 58
dharmaduta (messenger of dhamma):
Dharmapala and, 22–32; and Maha
Bodhi Society, 32–44; as neologism, 26;
and the West, 38, 41
Dharmakirti Vihara (Kathmandu), 69
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Dharmapala, Anagarika (Don David
Hevāvitārana): and Buddhist missionary
work, 22–28, 29–31, 33–34, 36, 42, 43,
73n. 22; and Chinese Buddhists, 9, 176,
212; and Christian missiology, 3, 6, 26,
30; on Christian reform, 45n. 7; and
conversion, 27, 29–30, 42, 47n. 32; and
economic and social development and
reform, 11, 28–29; impact on India, 33,
34, 42, 55; impact on Newar Buddhists,
55, 56, 57; impact on Sinhala Buddhism,
23, 24–25, 27; and liberation, 11, 29;
life, 23–35 passim; and London Buddhist
Vihara, 34, 35, 39; and Maha Bodhi So-
ciety, 3, 29, 32–34, 55; and meditation,
11, 29; and Parliament of Religions, 29,
33; and Shakyamuni Buddha, 31; and
Sinhala Baudhaya, 26; and theism, 31–
32; and veneration of relics, 24, 32, 43,
46n. 26, 47n. 31
Dōgen, Zen Master, 8, 9, 158n. 6
Duan Qirui, 217, 218–219
economic development: and American
foreign aid in Nepal, 12; and Anglo-
American missions, 3; and Buddhism in
Taiwan, 202–203; Dharmapala and, 11;
and Nepalese monks and nuns, 70, 71;
and Sri Lankan Buddhist monks, 34
ecumenism, 3–4, 46n. 26; and Chinese
Buddhism, 203; and Jōdo Shinshū, 81–
83; and Soka Gakkai, 136; and Zen
Buddhism, 146
education: and Anglo-American mis-
sions, 3; and Dharmapala, 11; Dharma
schools, 77; modern, 12, 16, 67; monas-
tic in Nepal, 68–71; monastic in Thera-
vada countries, 65–66, 69–70; of Shin-
gon priests, 109; and Soka Gakkai, 134
‘‘enforeignization’’ (videsagatavima), 39, 180
English language, use of, 14; in Brazil, 146,
148; for Compassion Relief propagation
work, 197; by/for second- and third-
generation Japanese immigrants, 77,
109, 110; for Jōdo Shinshū propagation
work, 84, 89–91; in Sri Lanka, 25; for
Theravada propagation work, 35–36, 38,
40, 60, 68, 70
enlightenment, 10–11, 16, 19n. 31, 142,
149, 171, 182n. 5
Enlightenment, the, 111
Epstein, Mark, 146
ethnicity, 14, 16, 19n. 30, 191–192; and
Dharmapala, 25, 27–28, 30; Han Chi-
nese, 167, 170, 174, 178–179, 180–181,
185, 195–198, 200–202, 217; Hindu, 64–
65; Japanese, 78–79, 81, 85–87, 96–98,
102, 105, 124–132, 140–142; Mongol,
216–217; Newar, 51; Sinhala, 22, 23,
27–28, 44n. 1; Tibetan, 214, 217
exiles, 23. See Nor lha Hutukhtu; Panchen
Lama
expedient means, 175, 224
Fagu Shan (Dharma Drum Mountain),
189
Foguang Shan (Buddha’s Light Mountain,
Taiwan): and bhikkhuni ordination, 71;
and Chinese diaspora, 162, 167, 170,
202; and conversion, 10, 162, 167; Fo-
guang Shan Monastic Academy, 177;
globalization/internationalization of,
164–167, 170, 171, 175–177, 184n. 23;
and Humanistic Buddhism, 189; and
laity, 162, 164, 166; and localization
(bentuhua), 176–179; and modernism
and traditionalism, 168–170; and non-
Chinese monastic disciples, 176–177,
184n. 23; particularism and universal-
ism, 176–177, 180–181, 203–204; and
romantic mimesis, 113. See also Xingyun,
Venerable
‘‘four fruits,’’ 10, 11; explained, 19n. 31
generation gap, 178, 197
Genghis Khan and patronage of Tibetan
Buddhism, 211
globalization: 9–10, 12, 15; and Buddhism
in Brazil, 148; defined, 1; Dharma-
pala on, 44n. 4; missionaries and, 23;
and Nepal, 67; and popular culture,
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178; and sectarianism, 14–15, 90; and
Tibetan Buddhism, 211. See also Bud-
dha’s Light International Association
(BLIA): globalization of; Buddhist
Compassion Relief Tzu-Chi Founda-
tion: and globalization; Foguang Shan:
globalization/internationalization of;
Sangharakshita, Venerable; Xingyun,
Venerable
Goenka, S. N., 66
Gore, Vice President Al, 174, 175
Green Tara Bodhisattva and rituals, 225
Gregory, Peter, 16
Grunfeld, Thomas A., 228
guanxi, 171, 186. See also Buddhist Com-
passion Relief Tzu-Chi Foundation:
and benevolent connections; links of
affinity
Guanyin Bodhisattva, 188–189
gurumaas (mother-teachers). See women,
Newar Buddhist
Gya lo don drub (brother of fourteenth
Dalai Lama), 224, 231n. 46
Hays, Richard, 156
Hess, David, 154
Hinduism: impact on Buddhism, 54, 62,
153–154; kings in Nepal, 51–52, 54, 61,
67; Nepalese Legal Code (Mulaki Ain),
52, 53, 58, 61, 62, 74n. 35; and Shai-
vite priests at Bodh Gaya, 32, 33; in Sri
Lanka, 25, 31
homelessness, 179–181
Hsi Lai Temple (Los Angeles), 71, 163,
175, 176, 183nn. 16, 17
Huang Sixian, 195, 198
Huishen, Venerable, and America, 163–
164, 171, 180. See also Tang Degang
Humanistic Buddhism, 165, 182n. 5; in-
fluence on Venerable Zhengyan, 188,
189
Humphries, Christmas, 49n. 59
Hunt, Ernest and Dorothy: contributions
to Jōdo Shinshū mission in Hawai‘i, 89–
91; fired, 91; hymnal, 95; ordained as
Jōdo Shinshū ministers, 89, 97–98; and
Theravada Buddhism, 89, 95
hybridization. See assimilation and accom-
modation
identity, religious, 13, 15, 27, 30, 145, 147–
148, 168, 178, 181, 186, 198, 202, 204.
See also ethnicity
Ikeda Daisaku, 13, 127, 130, 132, 133
Imamura Emyō, 84–90, 97; on democracy
and autocracy, 91–95; on nationalism,
91–95
immigrants, 19n. 30, 23, 49n. 58, 101,
109–110, 171; Chinese, 182n. 3, 186,
191; Japanese to Brazil, 13, 127–128,
142–143, 150; Japanese to Hawai‘i, 9,
91; Japanese to United States, 102, 103,
109, 115, 116; media neglect of, 115;
Mongolian, 216–217; scholarly mar-
ginalization of, 117n. 1; Sinhala, 23;
Taiwanese, 164–166, 170, 182n. 3, 186,
191, 201–202; Theravada, 49n. 58. See
also ethnicity
International Buddhist Institute (I.B.I.,
Hawai‘i), 90–91
International Business Machines (IBM),
219
International Conference on Buddhist
Women, first, 70
Islam, 72; in Brazil, 144; in Malaysia, 178
Jaffe, Richard, 106
Japanese Buddhism: as funeral religion,
106, 128, 143; influence on Venerable
Zhengyan, 188–189; and World War II,
102, 108, 129, 143. See also under specific
traditions
Jetavana Vihara (Vietnam), 36
jie shan yuan. See Buddhist Compas-
sion Relief Tzu-Chi Foundation: and
benevolent connections
jieyuan. See links of affinity
Jōdo Shinshū [Nishi] Honpa Honganji
(True School of the Pure Land), 1,
119n. 25; and Americanization, 77–78,
86, 91–96, 113; and competition with
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Jōdo Shinshū (continued)
Christian churches and other Japanese
sects, 84–85, 88, 95; decline in Hawai‘i,
77–78, 150; and egalitarianism, 88,
99n. 19; and enlightenment, 19n. 31;
as ‘‘family or ancestral religion,’’ 13,
84–87, 89, 94, 96–97, 98n. 5; found-
ing of in Hawai‘i, 81–85; and funeral
and memorial services, 84, 98n. 5; and
Japanization, 95–96; and modernism,
109; and nationalism, 86, 88, 91–96;
and sectarian universalism, 85–89; and
Sunday schools, 89, 90; as viewed by
Soka Gakkai, 124. See also ethnicity:
Japanese; Hunt, Ernest and Dorothy
Kagahi Sōryū, 81–83
Kalachakra Tantra. See Dalai Lama (four-
teenth): and ritual empowerments;
Panchen Lama: and Kalachakra Tantra
Kamstra, Jacob H., 124, 137n. 3
Kangtse Lama, 53, 54, 59
Kardec, Allan (Hyppolyte Rivail) and
Kardecism, 151
Kardecism, 151–153, 157
karma, 152
Kemarama Nunnery (Moulmein, Burma),
69
Kennedy, Senator Edward, 174
kensho. See satori
Kimdo Baha Monastery (Kathmandu), 53
Kimdol Vihara (Kathmandu), 69
Kimura Saiji, 82
King, Winston, 3
Klieger, P. Christiaan, 211
Knaus, Ken, 224
Kön chok jung nay, 223
Kongobuji temple, 105, 107, 108
Korean Buddhism, in Brazil, 156
Kuchiba Gikyō, 91
Kukai (Kobo Daishi), 103–104
Kunwar, Jang Bahadur (Maharaja of Gor-
kha Empire). See Rana kings of Nepal
Lankaramaya (Singapore), 40–41
Lankaramaya (Sydney), 41
lay-monastic (shigu), 182n. 6
Li Dingzan, 189, 190
Ling, Trevor, 42
links of affinity (jieyuan), 14, 171–175, 192
Liu Shufen, 8
Liu Xiang, General, 219
London Buddhist Vihara (England), 34,
35, 37, 39
Lopez, Donald, 112
Los Angeles Daishi Church/Koyasan
Beikoku Betsuin Temple, 104; and
Americanization, 151; and Boy Scouts,
105, 107; as branch of head Shingon
Temple in Japan, 107–108; and Fujin-kai
(women’s auxiliary), 105; and funerals
and memorials, 105; identification with
Japan, 105, 107; during World War II,
108
Lotus Scripture, 8, 9, 187, 189; sects based
on, 123, 126. See Soka Gakkai
Maezumi rōshi (Koun Taizan) 140
Maha Bodhi Society, 33, 34, 43, 47n. 35;
founding of, 3, 32–33; and India, 42; and
Maha Bodhi Journal, 33; and Nepal, 51,
54, 55, 56–57, 60, 68; and Paul Carus,
33; purpose of, 29, 33; and Sri Lanka, 34
Mahapragya, Venerable (Prem Bahadur
Shrestha), 58–59
Mahavairocana Tathagata (Dainichi
Nyorai), 104
Mahavamsa, 25–26
Makiguchi Tsunesaburo, 131
martyrdom: and Anglo-American mis-
sions, 3; and Nichiren, 9
May Fourth Movement, 168
Medicine Buddha and rituals, 225
meditation: Dharmapala and, 31; Jōdo
Shinshū and, 144; Newar Buddhism
and, 63–64, 65–66, 68; Piyadassi on, 38.
See also Zen Buddhism: and meditation
Mellor, Phillip A., 46n. 20
‘‘melting pot’’ model. See assimilation and
accommodation
merit, 29, 110, 112, 171–172, 185; land of,
191
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Mindon, King of Burma, 32
Ministry of Buddhist Religion (Sri
Lanka), 7
mission: history of Anglo-American think-
ing on, 2–5; Western religions in Sri
Lanka, 22–23. See also Buddhist Com-
passion Relief Tzu-Chi Foundation;
conversion: and domestic, diaspora, and
foreign missions; dhammadīpa; dharma-
duta; Dharmapala, Anagarika; Foguang
Shan; Kongobuji; Los Angeles Daishi
Church/Koyasan Beikoku Betsuin
Temple; Maha Bodhi Society; Shin-
gon Mission of Hawai‘i; Jōdo Shinshū
[Nishi] Honpa Honganji; Soka Gakkai;
Theravada Buddhism; Zen Buddhism
missionaries: as cross-cultural brokers,
12, 140–141, 150; and globalization,
23; kaikyōshi, 83–84; as preservers of
ethnic boundaries, 142. See also specific
traditions and individuals
missionary religion, definitions of, 1–10
modernism, Buddhist, rise of, 113, 115. See
also under specific traditions
modernization: influence of on missionary
movements, 10, 15–16, 24, 145, 147–
148, 190–191, 210; and religious identity,
52, 56–57, 147–148
Moriyama rōshi, 150
Morro da Vargen (Espírito Santo, Brazil),
155
Mueller, Max, 2; quoted by Dharmapala,
28
Mulagandakuti Vihara (Sarnath), 3
Nan Hua Seminary, 177
Nan Hua Temple (Bronkhorstspruit, South
Africa), 165–166, 174, 175
Nan Tien Temple (Wollongong, Aus-
tralia), 165, 174, 175
Narada (Narada Mahathera), 35–36,
48n. 50; and restoration of Thera-
vada Buddhism in Nepal, 37, 58; and
Vietnam, 36, 43, 50n. 74
nationalism, 9; decline of, 162, 181, 191,
203; Japanese, 15, 86, 91–96, 105; Sin-
hala, 25–26; Tibetan, 210, 212–213,
228
Nationalist government of China, 168,
221–222, 225, 226
National Security Agency (NSA) Special
Group, 223–224, 228
Nattier, Jan, 10; and typology of propaga-
tion of Buddhism, 18–19n. 30, 117n. 2
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 42
neoromanticism, 113, 116
Nevius, J. L., 4
Newar Buddhism, 51–54 passim; and Bud-
dhist Society of Nepal (Dharmodaya
Sabha) and caste, 51, 62; and commu-
nity service, 65–66, 68; and leadership,
64–72; and modernism, 55–57, 60–63;
and monks’ order, 63, 65–67; and Newar
goldsmiths, 55, 57; and nuns’ order,
51, 67–72; and reform, 62–72; Vajra-
yana, 51–52, 54, 56. See also Hinduism;
Theravada Buddhism
Nichiren Buddhism. See Soka Gakkai
Nichiren Daishonin, 8, 19n. 31, 133, 134,
137n. 3
Nor lha Hutukhtu: and Chinese govern-
ments, 214, 218–219, 222–223, 225;
Dharma assembly for peace, 219; exile
to China, 214; offering esoteric rituals to
laity, 219, 225; as religious teacher, 214,
215, 218, 225
Nor lha Students’ Society, 225
Obeyesekere, Gananath: on Dharma-
pala, 24, 30, 46n. 25; and ‘‘Protestant
Buddhism,’’ 24, 31
Olcott, Henry Steele: and Dharmapala,
23, 26–27, 29, 32, 45n. 11, 46n. 26; and
Sinhala Buddhism, 39; taking the five
lay precepts, 29
Overseas Mission Association, 83
Padmasambhava, 8, 225
Panchen Lama: and Amitabha Buddha ini-
tiation, 221; and Chiang Kai-shek, 221–
222, 226; and Chinese governments,
215–216, 217–218, 221–222, 226–227;
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Panchen Lama (continued)
as emanation of Amitabha Buddha, 217;
exile to China, 213–214, 218, 220; and
Kalachakra Tantra, 221, 227; as military
leader, 222; prayers for war dead, 215; as
religious leader, 214–215, 217, 220–221,
224, 227
Pannasekhera, Venerable Kalukondayave,
34
Pannasihe, Venerable Madihe, 35
Phagpa lama (Lo drö gyal tshan), 211, 212
Piaget, Jean, 12, 102
pilgrimage, 62; to Bodh Gaya, 33, 34, 53
pirit, 36, 41
Piyadassi, Venerable, 36, 37; on home-
lessness, 180; on reforming Sinhala
Buddhism, 38; on training missionary
monks, 38
Plum Village (France). See Thich Nhat
Hanh: and globalization of Order of
Interbeing
politics: and Pure Land congregations, 77;
and Tibetan Buddhist missionaries, 12,
16, 210, 221–229. See also Dalai Lama;
Jōdo Shinshū [Nishi] Honpa Honganji
(True School of the Pure Land): and
nationalism; Ministry of Buddhist Reli-
gion (Sri Lanka); Nor lha Hutukhtu:
and Chinese governments; Panchen
Lama; Rana kings of Nepal
Pragnananda, Venerable, 37
Pragnarama, Venerable Yakkaduwe, 35
Pragnyananda, Venerable (Kul Man Singh
Tuladhar), 59
Prandi, Reginaldo, 144
Prebish, Charles, 110
proselytism, Asian, 2, 15, 36. See also con-
version; missionary religion, definitions
of; and specific individuals and traditions
Protestantism: Anglo-American, 1–5, 6,
22, 27; challenge to Buddhism in Asia,
103; Dutch, 22; Evangelical, 1, 7, 15,
109, 131, 144, 145, 146, 151; impact on
Brazilian ethos, 160n. 39; impact on
Japanese Buddhism in United States,
109; impact on Maha Bodhi Society
mission strategies, 57; Pentecostal, 1,
4–5, 146
Qing state and relations with Tibet and
Tibetan Buddhist monks, 213, 214,
217–218, 219
Qubilai Khan, 211, 212
Rahula, Venerable Walpola, 35, 48n. 44
Rajneesh, Bhagwan, 154–155
Rana kings of Nepal, 52, 60, 63; and edu-
cation, 55, 73n. 21; efforts to isolate
the kingdom, 54–55; opposition to
Buddhism, 54, 57–58, 59
Reagan, President Ronald, 173
Red Cross, 207n. 36
relics, veneration of, 44, 46n. 26
Rhys-Davids, T. W., 5
Roman Catholicism: in Brazil, 123, 124–
125, 130, 131, 132–133, 142, 144, 145,
146, 148–149, 151, 156, 158, 160n. 39;
impact on Buddhism, 124, 158, 158n. 1;
and liberation theology, 131; in Sri
Lanka, 22; and Venerable Zhengyan,
188, 190
romanticism: American, 101–102, 115–
116, 121n. 37; and conversion, 115,
122nn. 49, 50; and mimetic impulse,
111–113, 116, 121n. 42, 178; and primi-
tivism and perennialism, 120–121n. 35;
and transcendentalism, 112
Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 107
Ryōhan Shingū, 143
Saddhatissa International Center (Surrey,
England), 37
Said, Edward, 112
Sakyadhita (daughters of the Buddha),
(International Conference on Buddhist
Women), 70
Sangharakshita, Venerable, and interna-
tional Buddhist organizations, 167
satori, 11, 19n. 31, 149
Sayadaw, Mahasi, 66
Seneviratne, H. L., 35, 39
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
4
.
9
.
2
4
 
0
7
:
2
2
 
 
7
1
4
6
 
L
e
a
r
m
a
n
/
B
U
D
D
H
I
S
T
M
I
S
S
I
O
N
A
R
I
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
E
R
A
O
F
G
L
O
B
A
L
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
2
5
2
o
f
2
5
6
Index • 243
Shah, Privithi Narayan, King of Nepal, 51
shakabuku. See Soka Gakkai
Shakyamuni Buddha: and Amida Buddha,
96; and Brahmins, 28; and a buddha’s
lineage (gotra), 10; enlightenment, 24;
and his enjoinder to wander and teach,
24–25, 179–180; and Hotei, 153; and
the Seven Gods of Fortune, 153–154;
and Sri Lanka, 25, 26; venerated by
Compassion Relief members, 199
Shengyan, Venerable, and Humanistic
Buddhism, 182n. 5
Shingon Buddhism, 1, 13; and English,
110; as Japanese Vajrayana Buddhism,
103–104; and modernism, 109; and
weddings, 106, 119n. 22. See also immi-
grants: Japanese to United States; Los
Angeles Daishi Church/Koyasan Bei-
koku Betsuin Temple; Shingon Mission
of Hawai‘i
Shingon Mission of Hawai‘i, 98n.2, 104–
105
Shingon Mission of Los Angeles. See
Los Angeles Daishi Church/Koyasan
Beikoku Betsuin Temple
Shinto, in Brazil, 129–130
shoju. See Soka Gakkai
Shutai Aoyama, 106; as first official Shin-
gon missionary to United States, 104
Silaratana, Venerable Hendiyagala, 34
Soka Gakkai (Institute of Creative Values,
or Value Creation Society), 1; and
African-Brazilian religions, 123, 130,
133, 134–135; and Christianity, 124,
126–127, 132–135; and conversion, 10,
97, 132, 136; and ecology, 135; from
ethnic to universal religion, 127–132,
135; and humanism, 135; and human
rights, 135; and inner and outer ways
(naido and gedo), 123–125, 126–127,
136; and Japanese new religions, 125,
131, 135; as lay movement, 4, 125, 127,
130–131; and Lotus Scripture, 123,
124, 126, 136, 137n. 3, 138n. 28; and
modernism, 126, 134; and Nichiren Dai-
shonin, 9, 137n. 3; and other Nichiren
sects, 137nn. 3, 5; and ‘‘real’’ and ‘‘pro-
visional’’ Buddhism, 123, 124, 126, 136;
and ‘‘reflexive syncretism,’’ 136; and sci-
ence, 126, 134; and shakabuku and shoju,
14, 123, 124–126, 133–136; and Shinto,
123; social dimension of, 131; and Spiri-
tualism, 124, 133, 134–135; and women,
130, 131, 200; and world transformation,
123, 131, 136, 137n. 2
Somalankara, Venerable P., and bhikkhuni
ordination, 47n. 27
Sōtō Zen Buddhist Community of South
America (Comunidade Budista Sōtō
Zenshū da América do Sul, Busshinji,
São Paulo), 140–142. See also Busshinji;
Zen Buddhism
Spiritualism and Spiritism, in Brazil,
144, 145, 151, 157, 160n. 39. See Soka
Gakkai: and Spiritualism; Zen Bud-
dhism: and Spiritualism
Stark, Rodney, 132
Strauss, Charles, 33
Sumangala, Venerable Hikkaduve, 35
Sun Yat-sen, 215, 227
Suzuki, D. T. (Daisetsu Teitaro), 114, 115,
143
syncretism, reflexive. See Soka Gakkai: and
‘‘reflexive syncretism’’
Taiwanese indigenous vegetarian sect
Buddhism (zhaijiao), 189
Taixu, Venerable (or Tai Hsü): and Chi-
nese Buddhism, 9, 182n. 5, 205n. 25,
206n. 31; and Christianity, 3; and Inter-
national Buddhist Institute in Hawai‘i,
90; and politics, 216; and support of
Tibetan Buddhism in China, 212
Takakusu Junjirō on Buddhism and egali-
tarianism in Hawai‘i, 88
Tang Degang, 163
Taylorism, 31, 35
Teraoka Tosuke, 84
Theravada Buddhism: in Brazil, 146, 156;
and Buddha Puja, 63, 68; in Japan,
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Theravada Buddhism (continued)
50n. 77; and life-cycle rites, 63; as mis-
sionary religion, 3, 5–7, 18nn. 24, 25, 26,
27, 30; ‘‘modernism,’’ 51, 52, 55, 60–63,
71, 73n. 13; in Nepal, 7, 54–72; as ‘‘Prot-
estant Buddhism,’’ 24; and ‘‘reflexive
syncretism,’’ 136; revivals, 6–7, 51; Sin-
hala, 1–2, 10, 22–44, 46n. 25; and social
reform, 28; ‘‘universalistic’’ and ethnic
temples in, 40–41; in Vietnam, 43,
50n. 74; worldwide spread, 27. See also
bhikkhuni ordination; Hunt, Ernest and
Dorothy: and Theravada Buddhism;
Mahavamsa; Walters, Jonathan
Thibaw, King of Burma, 32
Thich Nhat Hanh: and bhikkhuni ordina-
tion, 46–47n. 27; and globalization of
Order of Interbeing, 167
Tibetan Buddhism: in America, 12, 112,
114, 210, 222, 228; in Brazil, 146, 156,
159n. 17; in China, 9, 210–229 passim;
exiles in America, 101, 102–103; Geluk,
16, 58, 218; Kagyu/Kagyupa/Karma
Kagyupa, 53, 211; and media, 159n. 17;
and missionary strategies, 210, 215, 228;
and modernism, 102–103, 219–220,
225; and nationalism, 210, 213, 223,
228; in Nepal, 51–53, 56–57, 58, 61;
Nyingma/Nyngmapa, 53, 58, 218; and
patronage, 210–211, 218–219, 221; and
politics, 12, 210, 211, 212, 221, 224–
225, 228; and ritual empowerments,
9, 14, 211, 215, 220–221; Shakya, 211;
Vajrayana in Nepal, 1, 16, 51, 57, 62.
See also Dalai Lama, fourteenth; Nor lha
Hutukhtu; Panchen Lama
Toda Josei, 123, 124, 125–126, 136
Trailoka Bauddha Mahasangha Sahayaka
Gana. See Sangharakshita, Venerable
transcendentalism, 112
Tsering Norbu, 53, 54, 58, 59
Tsunoda Ryusaku on Shinran, 87–88
Tuladhar, Laxminani. See Dharmacari,
Venerable
Tu Wei-ming, 168
Tweed, Thomas, 145
Umbanda, 151–152, 153–154; and Karde-
cism, 151
Vaidya, Jagat Man. See Dharmadittya
Dharmacarya
Vajiragnana, Venerable Palane, 35
Vajirarama (Colombo), 34, 35, 65
Vidyalankara (Colombo), 40; and Marxist,
socialist, and nationalist agenda, 34–35
Vidyodaya (Colombo) and social and
economic development, 34
Vimalakirti Nirdesa Scripture and lay
ideal, 8
Vipulasara, Venerable Mapalagama and
bhikkhuni ordination, 47n. 27
voluntary organizations, Buddhist transna-
tional, 43. See also specific organizations
Walters, Jonathan: on Buddhism as a mis-
sionary religion, 1–2, 5, 6; on Sinhala
Buddhism, 7, 26–27, 45nn. 10, 14
Watts, Alan, 115
Weber, Max: elective affinities, 7, 125;
world-affirming religious charisma, 202,
203
wedding ceremony: Shingon Buddhist,
106–107, 119n. 22; Zen Buddhist, 158
Wei Zhuxian, 164
Welch, Holmes, 217
Weller, Robert P., 191
West, the: Buddhist regionalism in, 96,
145–149, 165, 167; Buddhist regionalism
with southeast Asia, 197; converts to
Buddhism, 1, 46n. 20, 143–149; and
cultural corruption, 27–28; cultural,
economic, medical, and technical dif-
fusion, 1, 3, 22, 25, 27; influences on
Dharmapala, 24, 25, 26–27; influences
on Shingon Buddhism, 105, 106–107;
influences on Taiwanese society, 168–
169; influences on Theravada Bud-
dhism, 44, 70; moral principles rather
than homeland, 96; western Buddhist
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missionaries, 1. See also Coen sensei;
colonialism; economic development:
and American foreign aid in Nepal and
Anglo-American missions; Hunt, Ernest
and Dorothy; romanticism
Wilson, Governor Pete, 173
women: and Anglo-American missions, 3;
early Chinese Buddhist, 8; Han Bud-
dhist, 186, 187, 190, 200–201, 202;
Newar Buddhist, 11, 51, 57–58, 59–60,
67–72; Pentecostal, 4; and Tibetan Bud-
dhism, 225, 231n. 49. See also bhikkhuni
ordination; Coen sensei; Dhammawati,
Venerable; Dharmacari, Venerable;
Soka Gakkai: and women; Zhengyan,
Venerable
World Fellowship of Buddhists (WFB), 34,
37, 43, 64
World Tathagata Movement (Korea), 37
Xa Loi Temple (Saigon), 36
Xia state, Western (China), 211
Xinding, Venerable, 175, 184n. 20
Xingyun, Venerable (or Hsing Yun):
and bhikkhuni ordination, 46n. 27;
and Boy Scouts, 107; on Buddhist
missions, 9, 162, 170, 171; and Chi-
nese diaspora, 163, 170; as founder of
Buddha’s Light International Associa-
tion, 164; as founder of Foguang Shan,
162; and globalization, 162; on home-
land, 170–171; and homelessness, 179–
181; and Humanistic Buddhism, 182n. 5;
and localization (bentuhua), 176–177;
and the media, 175; and monastic dis-
ciples, 162, 169–170, 177; and politics,
172–175, 184n. 18; on religion and so-
ciety, 174–175; retirement, 184n. 20; and
Taixu, 212; and universalism, 180–181;
and vow to globalize Buddhism, 171.
See also Buddha’s Light International
Association; Foguang Shan; links of
affinity
Yinshun, Venerable, 182n. 5, 189,
205n. 25, 206n. 31, 212
Yonghe Gong (Beijing), 216, 223
Young Buddhist Association (Y.B.A.,
Hawai‘i), 90
Zen Buddhism, 1, 101, 114; and African-
Brazilian religions, 153–154, 157; and
conversion, 10, 39, 115, 125, 135, 156;
creolization of, 149–158; and ecology,
148; and ethnic conflict, 140–142; as
‘‘funeral religion,’’ 142, 150, 158; and
healing, 155; and Japanese new religions,
156, 157; and the laity, 144–147, 148;
and macrobiotics, 155; and martial arts,
155, 156; and the media, 115, 145–147,
151, 155; and meditation, 142, 143–144,
149, 155, 156; and modernism, 103, 115,
147–149; and New Age religion, 149,
154–155, 157; and psychoanalysis and
psychotherapy, 146, 149, 155; and ‘‘re-
flexive syncretism,’’ 135, 152; Sōtō Zen
missionaries and congregations, 19n. 30,
96–97, 140–142, 157; and Spiritualism
(including Kardecism and Umbanda),
151–154, 155, 157; and vegetarianism,
146, 155–156
Zen Center of Los Angeles (ZCLA), 140
Zengenji (Moji das Cruzes, Brazil), 143
Zhengyan (or Cheng-Yen), Venerable,
12, 16; biography of, 188–190; on Bud-
dhist missions, 9; charismatic leadership
of, 187, 192, 201, 203, 206n. 35; and
filial piety, 188–189, 205n. 20; ‘‘Four
Great Compassion Relief Missions’’ and
‘‘four footprints,’’ 188, 195, 205n. 15;
and Humanistic Buddhism, 182n. 5,
189; monastic disciples of, 198, 199,
208n. 49; and 1991 Philippine Mag-
saysay Award, 185; and nomination for
Nobel Peace Prize, 185; and reform of
Buddhism, 187–188, 203; Still Thoughts
Abode (in Hualian, Taiwan), 193; and
Taixu, 212; and universalism, 203. See
also Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu-
Chi Foundation
Zurcher, Erik, 6
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